by Harry Yeide
Panzers penetrated the line in several places—at one point coming within half a mile of the beach.19 A provisional 636th company consisting of six M10s from Company B and six from Company C—joined by Recon and the Ranger Platoon—rushed to reinforce men of the 158th and 189th Field Artillery battalions. The artillery crews had been just about all that stood in the path of an advancing German tank company and panzergrenadier battalion. One battery of 105mm howitzers had knocked out five panzers with six rounds at ranges of only two hundred to three hundred yards, according to a VI Corps observer.20 Clark’s Fifth Army headquarters was located just behind the thin line, and cooks, clerks, and drivers hastily established a firing line when it appeared the Germans might break through.21
The attack was narrowly stopped, but the official U.S. Army history concluded that Fifth Army at this point “found itself at the edge of defeat.”22 Clark mulled withdrawing VI Corps from the beachhead. He decided instead to add the 82d Airborne Division to the hard-pressed VI Corps sector, and the paratroopers made an administrative drop into the beachhead that evening.
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The German counteroffensive reached its crescendo on 14 September.
The 636th Tank Destroyer Battalion was defending a fifteen hundred-yard wide sector in the critical area barely off the beach. Battalion CO LtCol Van Pyland and his staff worked through the night to prepare for a renewed German attack at dawn. The twelve available M10s were dug into firing positions south of the junction of the Calore River and F. La Cosa Creek. Reconnaissance Company dug in on the left flank, while the Ranger Platoon strengthened positions on a rocky mass dominating the right flank. An artillery barrage struck about noon, and the first German infantry came into view shortly thereafter. About the same time, eight Sherman tanks from Company C, 751st Tank Battalion, arrived and deployed to support the Ranger Platoon.23
Walter’s Ranger Platoon and some infantry volunteers opened up first on the advancing enemy with machine guns, Browning Automatic Rifles (BARs), rifles, and bazookas while artillery rounds exploded about them. Germans fell, and the Shermans accounted for four advancing panzers. But several Mark IVs overran part of the Ranger Platoon’s position, killing one man and wounding several others. The Shermans reported that they were receiving fire from 88mm guns and pulled back.
Pyland ordered five M10s out of their positions and moved to the right to save his collapsing flank.24 The 2d Platoon of Company C maneuvered through the artillery fire to engage the panzers. Sergeant Edwin A. Yosts’s M10 “Jinx” reached the crest of a ridge and opened fire. The first round was short, but the second disabled a Mark IV, and the third exploded an ammunition truck. Jinx backed away to escape artillery fire, only to reemerge in a nearby hull defilade position. Yosts’s gunner, T/5 Alvin Johnson, knocked out four panzers with his next four shots. Other M10 crews in the company, meanwhile, accounted for two more Mark IVs.25 Company B’s tank killers were just as busy; they KO’d seven tanks by the end of the day. The battalion lost only two men killed in action.26
Further inland, elements of the 16th Panzer and 29th Panzergrenadier divisions at 0800 hours advanced again near the tobacco warehouse at Persano. The American forces had adjusted their lines during the night, and the Germans unknowingly advanced across the 179th Infantry Regiment front. M10s from the 645th Tank Destroyer Battalion joined in raking the Germans with flanking fire that knocked out all of the panzers and forced the infantry to retreat.27 The crews of B/645th got their revenge for their losses at Persano when a German tank attack struck their defenses late in the afternoon. These tank killers destroyed eight confirmed panzers for the temporary loss of only one M10.28
All Allied strategic and tactical air assets in the Mediterranean Theater were redirected against German troop concentrations and lines of communication. Allied aircraft flew more than nineteen hundred sorties during the day. Naval gunfire, meanwhile, pounded German positions close to the beach.29
By the evening of 14 September, Allied commanders concluded that the crisis was past. The beachhead would hold.
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Within days of landing, the tank destroyer battalions in Fifth Army found themselves scattered across the map despite the brass’s professed intentions not to repeat their mistakes in handling TDs in North Africa. Reconnaissance Company of the 601st, for example, had been sent to the 180th RCT, and both the 45th Infantry Division artillery CP and 141st RCT tried to issue orders to the battalion. The 601st operations report noted, “At this stage, no one seemed to know to whom the battalion was attached…. Officers and men of the 601st Tank Destroyer Battalion were rather perturbed by the attachments and detachments of companies and platoons to various organizations for support, not even in one division, but in several divisions, including British…. During most of the operations, the battalion commander and battalion staff were used as messenger boys between higher headquarters and the various gun companies and platoons detached from the battalion. In some cases, the battalion commander was left completely out of the picture. At various times, even company commanders were overlooked.”
Extreme fragmentation and rapid reattachments of elements down to the platoon or even gun-section level became the norm in Italy to a degree seen in no other theater of combat. On 16 September, for example, a mere two guns from the 813th Tank Destroyer Battalion (two platoons of which had been sent to Italy to join an aborted 82d Airborne Division operation to grab Rome’s airport upon Italy’s surrender) were attached to Company B of the 601st. Company B was in turn attached to the 133d Field Artillery Battalion.30 Moreover, assignments to Allied units occurred frequently.
In addition to the confusion that resulted, there were practical problems. As one TD officer later noted, “While attached to the 1st Armored Division, despite some differences about where and when TDs could be most effective, we were truly attached. I.e., Division took care of all our logistical needs. When attached to infantry divisions, as soon as they found out we needed diesel fuel and 3-inch ammo, they wanted no part of that supply problem, and we were usually sent to corps supply dumps for all our needs.”31
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The 776th Tank Destroyer Battalion arrived in the Salerno Gulf on 16 September 1943 amidst the crash of naval gunfire in support of the troops ashore. The convoy endured three days of German air attacks while the tank killers waited their turn to land.32 After working with the 1st Armored Division in North Africa, the battalion had equipped its TDs with 500-series radios in place of their old 600s so that they could talk directly to armor on the battlefield.33 Unfortunately, this practice had not been adopted force-wide, and the battalion was destined instead to work closely with the infantry, who used yet a different communications setup.
Beyond the Beachhead
Kesselring by late in the day on 16 September concluded that he would not be able to destroy the Allied beachhead. Not only had four days of German counterattacks failed to cause fatal harm, but Monty’s Eighth Army was only hours away from linking up with Fifth Army. Kesselring authorized a fighting withdrawal to the Volturno River twenty miles north of Naples, where he ordered the line be held until mid-October.34
For the Allies, climbing the Italian peninsula would be like climbing a ladder of nettles. Ultra intercepts indicated that Hitler had decided to defend Italy south of Rome. Kesselring began to build a series of defensive lines north of the Volturno River, where the Barbara Line ran along a ridge to the Garigliano River and thence across the southern Apennines to the Trigno River. Next came the Reinhard (also referred to as Bernhard) Line, which stretched from coast to coast. Kesselring planned to hold this line until 1 November. German engineers received orders to put all command posts along this intermediate line underground, construct the main battle line on the reverse slopes of hills to escape Allied artillery fire, construct OPs on the crests and forward slopes, and clear all fields of fire. Twelve miles further north and anchored on the Garigliano and Rapido rivers, the Todt organization was constructing fortifications for the Gustav
Line, where Kesselring planned to hold the Allies until spring of 1944.35
On 18 September, VI Corps troops found nothing to their immediate front. The Germans had begun their fighting retreat. As the 157th Infantry Regiment recorded, the Germans’ withdrawal “was as lethal as their attack, and there was no hurtling forward.”36
Over the next two weeks, VI Corps averaged a daily advance of only three miles in the face of delaying actions and demolished roads and bridges as it fought to move abreast of British 10 Corps, which on 1 October took Naples.37 Indeed, one VI Corps observer would describe the campaign over the coming months as an “engineer war:” “The Germans are expert at demolition, and in the mountainous country through which the Fifth Army is operating all advance must cease until bridges are built and roads repaired.”38 From Naples, the U.S. Fifth Army would advance up the western side of the Apennines, while the British Eighth Army advanced in a loosely coordinated fashion on the eastern side.
This was not the country envisioned in tank destroyer doctrine. Indeed, some ideas stressed in training—such as the danger of canalizing tank destroyers in narrow valleys—were completely at odds with the reality of warfare in Italy.39
The problem, however, cut both ways. German Generalmajor Martin Schmidt explained the sitution from the perspective of the panzer crews, “The German panzer units, in regard to organization, equipment, and training, were intended primarily for action on terrain like that of western, central, and eastern Europe…. It was of decisive significance that the panzer organizations were fighting on the defensive during the whole campaign [in Italy], whereas they were intended for offensive action. Almost all the panzer and panzergrenadier divisions that came to Italy in 1943 had gained their combat experience during campaigns in France and Russia…. In Italy, these divisions had to change their tactics considerably and sometimes paid dearly for their lessons.”40
The battle became one of infantry maneuver as soon as the GIs left the coastal plain. Advancing infantry regiments encountered countless small German strongpoints, usually defending a demolished bridge or some other roadblock. One battalion would try to pin the Germans down, while the other two scrambled across the mountainous terrain to flank the position. In a typical experience for the TD outfits during this period, the 601st Tank Destroyer Battalion (attached to the 3d Infantry Division after 19 September) found that, because of the terrible terrain and deep mud caused by continuous rain, it could do little but follow the doughs up main roads.41 The official U.S. Army history concluded that the heavy and road-bound tank destroyers were often a liability in this kind of fighting rather than an asset.42 The doughs, tank killers, armor, and artillery would have to figure out ways to profitably employ the tremendous firepower the TDs represented.
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The reconnaissance companies from the tank destroyer battalions, however, were a perfect fit for the new style of warfare and were among the busiest elements during the first weeks of the push northward. Infantry division commanders seized on their presence to reconnoiter for advancing units and to maintain contact with neighboring Allied forces.
Reconnaissance companies operated, as they had in Algeria and Tunisia, with three platoons of six machine-gun and FM radio-equipped jeeps and a command halftrack (the company headquarters had additional trucks and halftracks, and four motorcycles).43 Some battalions, however, had received M5 light tanks to replace the company headquarters’ 37mm-armed halftracks, as the 899th had during the last weeks of fighting in North Africa.44 Despite frequent orders to conduct reconnaissance on behalf of units to which they were attached, the tank destroyer recon platoons still lacked radio gear compatible with that used by infantry recon troops.45
About 21 September, Reconnaissance Company of the 776th was attached to the famous Japanese-American 100th Infantry Battalion, 34th Infantry Division. The company formed the spearhead of the 100th’s operation to outflank German defenses around Naples by capturing Benevento. The mission proved to be a pain-staking assignment of sweeping mines (by the pioneer platoon) and scouting out hostile gun positions and enemy troop concentrations. Company commander Lt Shelden Thompson, one other officer, and four enlisted men were wounded on 29 September when their halftracks hit Teller mines while on a scouting mission. The 776th battalion CO, LtCol James Barney Jr., and two enlisted men became the first Americans to enter Benevento when they were conducting a reconnaissance around the city.46
Even maintaining contact with other Allied units was less easy than it sounds as various columns pushed up roads through mountainous terrain that blocked a clear picture of what “neighboring” units were doing. On 6 October, Lieutenant Rogers of the 601st Tank Destroyer Battalion led his 3d Reconnaissance Platoon to Linatola to contact a friendly unit, but they encountered German infantry supported by machine guns and mortars instead. Rogers returned minus his jeep—and his brand new bedroll. Other members of Reconnaissance Company/601st had better luck and were among the first few to reach the Volturno River that same day.47
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The weather deteriorated rapidly in early October, adding immeasurably to the misery of the fighting men and often immobilizing even the tracked tank destroyers. Nonetheless, on 4 October, Eisenhower and General Sir Harold Alexander—now commanding general of 15th Army Group, incorporating the U.S. Fifth and British Eighth armies—concurred that Allied forces would march into Rome within the month.48
The first large units of Fifth Army closed on the rain-swollen Volturno River on 7 October. The high water and mud forced two postponements of a planned assault crossing. On the far bank, three German divisions waited.49
Finally, the night of 12–13 October, the Allies launched their first major river assault crossing of the war. VI Corps planned to send the 3d Infantry Division on the left and the 34th Infantry Division on the right across the river during the night. The 45th Infantry Division was pushing the Germans out of the upper Volturno River Valley to anchor the corps’ right flank. The Americans engaged in deception operations, such as limiting the volume of artillery fire before the day of the assault, to assure surprise.50
Beginning at midnight, GIs waded across or paddled assault boats to the far shore. Recon Company men from the 601st Tank Destroyer Battalion, carrying radios with which to call in supporting fire, forded the river with the doughs of the 3d Infantry Division. An hour later, artillery opened up all along the front. As the sky brightened, M10s from A/601st commenced direct-fire support from the south bank and destroyed two tanks, an SP gun, and other German targets. Beginning about 1100 hours, waterproofed Shermans from the 751st Tank Battalion splashed across the Volturno, followed an hour later by the first M10s—also waterproofed—from C/601st.51
The 776th Tank Destroyer Battalion provided indirect-fire support to the doughs of the 34th Infantry Division, who crossed the Volturno in a section deemed impassable to armor. The infantry came to a stop in front of unbending German resistance in the brush-covered hills beyond the river. Early on 14 October, four M10s forded the stream and drove the defenders from their key strongpoint with direct fire.52 The M10, as it turned out, could go places heavier Sherman tanks could not.
Sixth Corps gained a foothold above Capua, but German troops could rain observed fire onto all suitable bridging sites and thus greatly slowed the American buildup north of the river. A British crossing below Capua, meanwhile, was checked. A smaller crossing by two British divisions closer to the coast north of Naples provoked vigorous German counterattacks. Indeed, the Germans were able to hold largely in place until 16 October, when they withdrew to the next line of defenses fifteen miles to the north—exactly in accordance with Kesselring’s schedule.53
As visions of a rapid advance on Rome faded for good, Eisenhower proposed to the Combined Chiefs of Staff that his forces mount a small amphibious and airborne operation to turn the German line. The chiefs turned down the idea because requirements for Operation Overlord, the invasion of France, precluded devoting additional resources to the Mediterran
ean Theater. Eisenhower realized that his men were condemned to a grueling series of costly frontal assaults.54
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The Allies called the ground north of the Volturno and south of the Rapido River and Gustav Line the “Winter Position.” The West Point history of the Second World War offers a superb description of what the tank destroyer crews found there: “On Kesselring’s map there were two delay lines in the area, the Barbara and Reinhard. His subordinate corps commanders had added intermediate delay lines of their own. Naturally, German commanders at lower echelons had added outposts and reserve blocking positions, so that to the GI and Tommy, attacking through the area seemed like attacking one big defensive zone. All hill masses were occupied. Positions had been sighted to provide each other covering small arms fire. Engineers had constructed some of the major bunkers of concrete. They had cut others from solid rock with pneumatic drills. Infantrymen had improved less critical positions by rolling large rocks around their foxholes. Because of the treeless mountains, artillery forward observers had overlapping, unobstructed views of the approaches to other mountains in the area. The towns that dotted the valley floors, such as San Pietro, San Vittore, and Cassino, were converted into strongpoints…. The ultimate difficulty was, of course, the German infantryman, whose morale was high and who was glad to be ending his Army’s 2,000-mile retreat from El Alamein, through Tunis and Sicily, to the Gustav Line.”55
