no doubt if we were to remain here much longer under the same conditions that there would be a kind of tacit understanding not to fire at outposts and that there would even develop neutral zones and surreptitious commerce between the sentinels, as I have heard from veterans was the case in the latter years of our civil war.17
Of course, this was the trend all along the front lines in the winter of 1914–15, and had led to the famous Christmas truce, a spontaneous fraternization that occurred on some parts of the front.18 Cendrars too demonstrates that these legionnaires were imposing their own rules of engagement in the trenches that might not always reflect their commanders’ wishes. His squad arranged an ambush to frighten their lieutenant, who planned to discipline them for looting, so that he would cease to visit them in the front lines.19 And when the fireman sergeants tried to have Cendrars punished for fraternization with the Germans, the legionnaire explained that there was a large pile of coal between the lines where both French and German patrols came to provision themselves. At first these meetings erupted into fire fights,
but later, under pressure of circumstances, the different regiments in the sector came in turns, and the Boches also. This happened quite naturally, without prearrangement, without talks or an understanding. The Boches come every other day. Tonight's our turn. Tomorrow's their's.... The men come with sacks. They aren't armed. But as you never know, they carry grenades in their pockets. The Boches do the same thing... . They are cold just like us, and it is really not worth getting killed for coal, don't you agree? Better to form a queue.
Cendrars also admitted that each side often left cigarettes and newspapers for the other to pick up, but denied that this was fraternization.20 On the contrary, the implication of Cendrars's testimony was that he was quite prepared to fight so long as it contributed to victory. However, the legionnaires had concluded that, at this stage of the war, at any rate, aggression for its own sake was actually counterproductive, especially as the Germans were so much better armed and equipped.
This appears to be supported by the first offensives into which the new Legion was hurled in the summer of 1915. Seeger was at least half correct when he divined as early as October 1914 that
The Germans, as far as I can see, occupy all the territory they have coveted and all that they would keep in the event of their ultimate victory. It is my idea that they will now wage a defensive war entirely, limiting themselves to holding what they have.21
Apart from their attacks at Verdun in 1916, that is precisely what the Germans did in the West between the opening Battle of the Marne in 1914 and the Michael offensives of 1918. A defensive stance on the Western Front freed troops to seek a decisive victory in the East. Therefore, if there was to be fighting on the Western Front, then it was the Allies—and in 1915 this meant essentially the French—who had to initiate it.
French commander-in-chief Joseph Joffre prepared to launch a series of assaults on the German western wall from May 1915 that were meant to crack open the front and allow the Allies to flow into the German heartland. Unfortunately for the French, this task would prove beyond reach, for several reasons. In the first place, the French were desperately short of materiel, especially of heavy artillery, needed to pound the German lines into submission. The 75-mm gun was a marvelous field piece, but it lacked the range to hit the German reserve trenches, especially the heavy batteries well to the rear that could continue to punish French attackers with little risk to themselves. It was essentially a direct fire weapon, which meant that it lacked a curved trajectory that made it able to hit enemy positions masked by hills, so that the Germans learned to site their defenses whenever possible out of direct view. The absence of trench mortars and a sufficient number of high-impact shells to smash the German defenders in their deep dugouts meant that French attacks, until the summer of 1917, would lack punch.
This defect, while important, might not have been fatal had the French been able to develop flexible tactics that minimized the importance of firepower—tactics that, for instance, relied upon short, violent hurricane barrages and surprise for success. Unfortunately, this was not easy for any army to achieve, least of all that of France. The uncoordinated attacks of the opening weeks of the war, attacks that had cost the French heavily during the Battles of Frontiers in August and on the Marne in early September, had made generals reluctant to concede too much initiative to subordinate commanders. Battle, it was believed, must be tightly controlled and closely managed. Assault waves leapfrogged through the lines of German trenches following a prearranged schedule of barrages. No adjustments could be made that took account of changed local circumstances or the unexpected. Artillery support stopped periodically so that the short-ranged 75s could move into more forward positions to support the attack on the next trench line, forfeiting valuable time, which allowed the Germans to organize counterattacks. And last, the preparations for these offensives, the stockpiling of material and gathering of men behind the lines for weeks in advance, telegraphed the intentions of the Allied planners, making surprise virtually impossible to achieve.
Therefore, when historians speak of the difficulties encountered by Legion attacks, it must be remembered that the entire French army was making war on a shoestring, pushed into premature offensives by commanders who were under pressure to attack from politicians and allies whose own instincts told them that to hesitate would leave the initiative to the Germans, and who argued that the technological balance favored the defensive more each day. Therefore, to postpone an attack was merely to make it more costly in the long run.
However, few of these broad considerations could have been of much consolation to the legionnaires brought in to attack Hill 140, which was in fact a shoulder of the Vimy Ridge in the Artois sector, on May 9, 1915. After a preliminary artillery barrage lasting four hours, four battalions of the 2e régiment de marche of the 1er étranger were launched at Hill 140. The first German line was quickly reached, but the climb to the summit was undertaken in a murderous fire that killed most of the cadres, including three of the battalion commanders and many of the company commanders. The regimental commander was also wounded. On the right, the attack of the 156th Infantry Regiment stalled, exposing the attackers to a costly flanking fire. Nevertheless, the legionnaires charged on, companies and battalions mixed and often leaderless, to the top of the hill. However, reinforcements failed to arrive despite urgent appeals from legionnaires. The brigade commander, a much-respected veteran of North Africa, Colonel Theodore Pein, went forward to organize the defensive positions and was brought down by a German sniper. A counterattack supported by heavy artillery fire drove the legionnaires from the hill some time after three o'clock in the afternoon, although they did not surrender all of their gains.
The attack on Hill 140, the second serious offensive in which the Legion participated in World War I, has rightly been hailed by Legion historians as a great demonstration of courage. Despite a murderous fire, a fire that took out most of the cadres, the legionnaires pressed on to the objective on their own initiative,22 a great demonstration of commitment from the volunteers for which the regiment was awarded a croix de guerre. Even those battalions that had not received a large leavening of veteran legionnaires, the Czechs, Poles and Greeks who formed autonomous units with their national flags, appear to have fought as well as the others, a demonstration, perhaps, that the offensive is an option of choice with less experienced troops.
For their part, the Germans attributed the Legion success to the fact that their attack fell upon a weakly held sector which, without natural defense obstacles, had been badly churned by the French artillery. The Berliner Tageblatt exulted that the counterattack, which drove the Legion from Hill 140, had been spearheaded by a unit of Alsatians who had “in this way inflicted the recompense due to these men without a fatherland.”23
Yet the inexperience of these Legion units proved costly: 1,889 legionnaires, or almost 50 percent of strength, had fallen on May 9 alone.24 A first criticism was
that the Legion attack was carried out almost as if it were a private battle, with little concern with what went on on its flanks. “The history of the 2e régiment de marche does not mention during these combats, any liaison, any exchange of information with the neighboring regiments,” read an after-action critique. This was especially important as the 156th Infantry Regiment on its right flank had been assigned “the formidable center of resistance of Neuville-St. Vaast,” against which it failed to advance. However, had the 156th maneuvered to cover the Legion's flank, “it is probable that these would have had far fewer casualties; B battalion [of the Legion] could have operated to its front; Neuville would have fallen through encirclement,” wishful thinking perhaps, as Neuville only fell in June 1915 to the crack 5th Infantry Division after fierce house-to-house fighting. In other words, the organization was not supple enough to react to opportunities and changes that occurred in the course of the battle. Lack of liaison also accounted for the failure of reinforcements to arrive once the Legion reached the top of Hill 140, so that they were eventually driven from the crest by a German counterattack.25 Other mistakes made by the attackers included the fact that they rolled over successive German positions in the short space of two hours without stopping to clear them out, so that the Germans emerged from their dugouts and often shot the legionnaires from behind. The death of most of the cadres made it difficult to organize the defense of Hill 140 properly once the legionnaires had seized it. The presence of more machine guns would also have helped the defenders thwart the German counterattack.26
Some of these defects were rectified on June 16 when the Legion was again in action before Souchez in the same sector. The attacked jumped off just after noon, the Legion in the second wave behind the Algerians, and crossed the Souchez ravine at the foot of Hill 119, which was traversed by a murderous machine-gun fire. The hill was seized. But a German counterattack that smashed into the zouaves to the Legion's left at eight o'clock in the evening forced a slight readjustment of the lines. The next morning, a German bombardment of such intensity rained down upon the Legion lines that the hill was abandoned. Unfortunately, the retreat through the Souchez ravine proved to be as costly as the attack, costing the Legion more troops including a battalion commander.
The Souchez action showed that the Legion had profited from their mistakes on May 9. For instance, each squad detailed trench cleaners with knives and ample supplies of grenades. However, the inability to regulate artillery fire meant that French soldiers again ran under their own shells during their advance. Lack of liaison again meant that reinforcements were slow to arrive, so that the Legion and other units of the Moroccan Division had to hold the terrain for most of the night against German barrages and counterattacks. They also appear to have been slow to reorganize the German trenches, which were “facing” the wrong way.27 Reybaz confessed of this attack that “the utilization of terrain was with us ... a science which was still largely ignored.”28
Rockwell reported that the June 16 action was more costly for the Legion than that of May 9.29 However, although the American contingent suffered considerable losses for the first time, the regimental diary of the 2e regiment de marche of the 1er étranger does not support Rockwell's contention—45 legionnaires were killed, 320 wounded, and 263 listed as missing, including Russell Kelly, out of an attacking force of 67 officers and 2,509 men. This makes for a casualty rate of 24 percent, substantial certainly, but less than half that of the May 9 attack. Furthermore, the casualty rate among officers was 34 percent, which was less devastating than on May 9.
Nevertheless, although the Legion had covered itself with glory in Artois, the attack of June 16 brought the problems of the Legion to a head. Already in April, friction between veterans and Russian “Republicans” had led to forty-two of the Russians being sent to the rear, apparently in disgrace. After protests, the forty-two Russians were allowed to transfer to line regiments.30 However, this was merely a minor incident compared to what even the quasi-official history of the RMLE refers to as “I'affaire du 16 juin 2915.”31 Poor relations combined with the enormous casualties of the May 9 battle obviously had sapped morale. Probably the critical factor, one that helps to explain the great bravery of legionnaires on May 9, and the reluctance some of them subsequently showed for battle, was the fact that they no longer believed a breakthrough possible. Quite naturally, the first manifestations of this occurred in the more nationally homogeneous units, among men who shared a common language and could therefore more easily make a common cause against their French commanders. Ordered into the attack on June 16, the Greeks in C battalion refused to charge, an even more forceful demonstration of how these new legionnaires no longer shared the command's view of what was achievable in the battlefield conditions of the early summer of 1915. The regimental commander, Lieutenant Colonel Cot, rushed over to them, only to be told that they had enlisted to fight Turks, not Germans. Cot apparently promised to send them to the Dardanelles, which, combined with the arrival of a wave of Algerian tirailleurs, bayonets fixed, behind them, induced them to attack.32
The regimental diary of the 2e regiment de marche confessed that the attitude of the Greeks during the June 16 attack was “hardly edifying.” “Following the explosion of a shell in the trench,” read the regimental diary,
a certain number of Greeks flee to the rear, and the energetic intervention of several officers is required to return them to their place. The effervescence caused by this incident is however sufficient to cause the brigade colonel to demand the relief of the battalion to the rear where it is in the process of being reorganized.
This conduct apparently earned for them “the reprobation of the other legionnaires.” On June 19, the colonel was again forced to intervene to quell a demonstration of Greek legionnaires, who two days later were sent away “to be reorganized and given the training which they are totally lacking.”33
Lieutenant Gustave Marolf, a Swiss, saw his Greek legionnaires scramble for the rear when ordered into the attack: “A wave of terror ran through my Greeks,” he wrote to his brother of the events of June 16.
Part of them had run away, probably terrified by the barrage of which they were the target. As for the NCOs, all gone! I shout in Greek: “Forward! Forward!” with all my force. But, of four sections, I only see a few men. The rest had evaporated! My beautiful company, in which I thought I could have complete confidence, had broken, the victim of fear!
Marolf was at once “humiliated” by the defection of his men—“And my promotion, what will become of it after this brilliant success?”—and relieved that the Germans did not transform their flight into a “catastrophe.” Returning to the rear, he discovered them hiding in trenches and shell holes. “I am furious, but I don't have the energy to horsewhip them.” The NCOs were broken, and Marolf acquitted of responsibility by a court-martial.34 The Greek battalion was disbanded and its legionnaires subsequently dispatched to the eastern Mediterranean, some to operate unsuccessfully in irregular formations that were broken up because of indiscipline, while others were sent to reinforce the Legion battalion in the Dardanelles. In fact, as a group the Greeks did not do well in Legion service in the First World War—a bataillon de marche d'Orient attached to the 1er étranger and made up of Greeks from Turkish territories was disbanded after six months because of indiscipline.35
But these problems could not have been confined only to the Greeks, for at the same time those from Alsace-Lorraine who had not signed the declaration of a desire to serve against Germany were also sent away from the front.36 These departures, combined with the losses of May 1915, reduced the 2e régiment de marche from four battalions on May 9 to two battalions by August. On July 1, the regimental diary complained that morale, which had been high before May 9, “and brought to a state of exhilaration worthy of the handsome results achieved during the recent combats, has fallen rather low following the departure of the Italians and the incorporation of Greek elements always ready to carry out acts of collective indiscip
line.”
This scramble to exit the Legion proved to be contagious. “The removal of [the Greeks] did nothing to calm the malaise, the trouble which reigned in the spirits of those who remained,” the diary continues. “For this reason, the Russians also made the necessary requests to obtain the cancellation of their contracts and passage into a metropolitan regiment.”37 “Made the necessary requests” is putting it mildly. Many of the “Russians” appear to have been Parisian Jews of Russian extraction who simply refused to return to the front from the rear cantonments. However, apparently unlike the other groups, between seven and eleven of these rebels were court-martialed and shot.38
According to legionnaire Sholem Schwartzbard, this did not end the trouble. The existence of a circular allowing “Russians” to transfer to the Russian army or to French regiments was made known between the attacks of May 9 and June 16, 1915. When, however, the requests to transfer were ignored and the legionnaires were told to prepare for a new attack, a number of Jewish legionnaires assembled in a wood and demanded to know why they were not allowed to transfer. When the colonel explained that Russia and France were fighting the same enemy, he was told, “But not in the Foreign Legion.” They were locked up in a large barn guarded by Senegalese troops, and eventually decided to rejoin their unit.39
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