The crabs were called the “cavalry of the rice paddies,” and effectively helped to drive the Viet Minh from their bases near Saigon, deeper into the Plaine des Jones and the forests.
The increasing power of Viet Minh units caused the crab units to become more vulnerable in 1950, and sent the high command looking for ways to attach accompanying infantry. The “alligators,” amphibious vehicles capable of carrying twenty-five men, proved to be the ideal solution. In the autumn of 1951, two amphibious groups of battalion strength were created in the REC, combining crabs as light reconnaissance vehicles and alligators as support. This gave the French, and the Legion in particular, an off-road capability they had seldom before enjoyed, and an ability to penetrate with relative safety deep into Viet Minh areas. By December 1951, it was possible to advance the claim that “At present, the 1er REC is more an amphibious than a land force.”85
Unfortunately for the REC, these vehicles did not adapt as successfully to other areas—they were limited by the monsoon, which determined the water level, and the fact that the alligators could not travel on roads, and they did not work in the Tonkin delta because of the different consistency of the mud and different structure of the rice paddies.86 Mechanical problems also limited operations, as did commanders who used them merely as floating support armor, rather than assigning them cavalry-type missions of reconnaissance and envelopment. When they were properly used in the south, they could accomplish quite decisive results, as at Tho Lao on May 17, 1952, when a large Viet Minh unit surrounded by the REC surrendered. By the end of the war, however, the situation in the south had deteriorated badly.
The most serious challenge to Legion adaptability was undoubtedly the “jaunissement”—literally “yellowing”—the French term for Vietnamization of the war. The continued shortfall of French troops, the reluctance of the French government to provide more soldiers for Indochina, and the ever-increasing strength of the Viet Minh caused de Lattre to press Bao Dai to augment Vietnamese participation. In early 1951, thirty thousand Vietnamese regulars and thirty-five thousand supplétifs, or auxiliaries, were serving with French forces. In July 1951, Bao Dai declared a “general mobilization” of the Vietnamese population. Within a year, the number of Vietnamese serving had risen to fifty-four thousand regulars and fifty-eight thousand supplétifs, with a further fifteen thousand men in training, the basis of an independent Vietnamese army.
The problem for de Lattre was how to train this many men. Four hundred French officers and NCOs were seconded to the fledgling Vietnamese army from units that had already stretched their manpower to the limit. The solution arrived at for whipping this new Vietnamese army into shape was to attach these recruits to established units. In March 1950 “parasite” Vietnamese battalions had already been joined to some Legion units. Now, however, the Legion was ordered to form composite battalions with a base of 534 Legion officers, NCOs and legionnaires and 292 autochtones, indigenous recruits. Although in theory this should have given a majority of Europeans, in practice the Vietnamese appear to have been more numerous in some of these mixed units. Each Legion regiment mothered a composite battalion, sometimes two, and Legion battalions took a mixed company under its wing. Legion units were also ordered to provide cadres for “auxiliary” Vietnamese units—a sort of Home Guard whose men served on one-year contracts.
How well did this experiment work? Overall, it can be considered a success. It certainly increased the number of troops available to the French, and by early 1952 the Vietnamese army had begun to acquire its own autonomy and personality. Its problems were essentially three. First, although numbers of men were sufficient, it lacked quality cadres, in part because Bao Dai refused to call up middle-class students who continued to sit out the war in university classrooms.
Second, it lacked political motivation and direction. This came in part from the recruitment—the French high command in Central Vietnam believed in April 1951, even before general mobilization was declared, that the recruitment pool had already been picked over by the Viet Minh, who collected the most fit and most politically motivated, leaving the dregs for the French.87 For instance, the 1er BEP complained in 1953 that it received recruits who knew nothing of the war and who were often physically unfit but who had been designated by village headmen,88 presumably under pressure to provide bodies for military service. Also, the French refused to make the political concessions to the Bao Dai government that would have allowed it real status and independence in the eyes of its people. Therefore, the attitude of benevolent neutrality in the war that permeated the Vietnamese government was mirrored by the army. This was a problem that continued into the American phase of the conflict, and was often inelegantly, but accurately, summed up by GIs with the question, “How come their gooks are so much better than our gooks?”
Last, trained by the French and equipped in part by the Americans, the new Vietnamese Army was less well adapted to the conditions of warfare in Indochina than were its Viet Minh opponents. To this might be added what became a misuse of many of these units, especially of the auxiliaries, by the French, who stuck them in isolated posts with their families in the belief that they would fight ardently to defend them. However, these posts aroused no more enthusiasm, indeed they aroused even less, among Vietnamese than they did among the French, so that morale plummeted and desertions followed. Nevertheless, many Vietnamese units turned in an honorable military performance, and although infiltrated by the Viet Minh, betrayals and desertions were not as common as they might have been.89
How did the Legion adapt to this task of training Vietnamese troops? Generally speaking, with bad grace, although in this they were probably no less guilty than other French units, who were very skeptical about the possibilities of transforming Vietnamese into soldiers. It is true also that this mission placed special strains upon the Legion. The Viet Minh un-sportingly refused to suspend the war to allow the Legion to train their Vietnamese, so that in the battalions it was business as usual while the extra burden of digesting Vietnamese conscripts continued. For instance, the 3e étranger created mixed units using 1,500 legionnaires and 2,500 Vietnamese in 1951. These larger numbers might have been very welcome, but they had not been accompanied by an increase in the number of NCOs, of which as has been seen there was already a serious dearth. Therefore, in the short term, the influx of Vietnamese disorganized the companies further. Training was complicated by the language problem, because many of the foreign NCOs did not speak French, much less Vietnamese, while most of the French could not be promoted to NCOs.
The real objection to training Vietnamese was spelled out by Lieutenant Colonel Pelleterat de Borde, commander of the 2e étranger, in terms that would have been endorsed by Rollet. In a lengthy “rapport exceptionel” of March 28, 1951, he made the predictable argument that this was not part of the Legion's “traditions.” In the first place, the legionnaires despised the Vietnamese, “whom they consider good only to carry arms or work as coolies. This mentality is perhaps regrettable, but it is nonetheless very developed among NCOs and legionnaires of German, Slavic or Hungarian origins who make up the majority.” Second, the legionnaires were unstable characters who prospered only in a truly Legion milieu. To remove them from or dilute this structured environment was to invite a return “to the disorders inherent in the weakness of his nature.”
The third argument maintained that the inclusion of Vietnamese would shatter the “homogeneity of a Corps which guarantees by its traditions the worth of the subdivision of the arm.” The cohesion, discipline and worth in combat were ensured by the presence of a special breed of officers who understood them.
because it is a heavy troop in combat which needs to be animated to maneuver—the platoon commander must normally be an officer, for there are very few senior NCOs [and] these with a few exceptions are intellectually lazy and fall into routines. Courageous and confident in their re-flexes, they do not like to think out seriously an operation or a maneuver before undertaking it.
Fourth, the combat styles of legionnaires and Vietnamese were simply incompatible—one was heavy but reliable, the other light, mobile but irresolute, “capable of slipping away if the combat gets off to a bad start.” Last, he added a series of problems that would invariably follow from amalgamation, including conflicts over the Vietnamese soldiers’ women, homosexual incidents between legionnaires and Vietnamese, and the possibility that Viet Minh propaganda would be more effective upon legionnaires after amalgamation. In short, the inclusion, even as a temporary training measure, of Vietnamese in the Legion would be “to the detriment of their cohesion, their leadership, their homogeneity and their traditions.”90
There was nothing extraordinary about these attitudes, which were common in the Legion. Any combat unit will tend to resist tasks that it perceives will interfere with its elite image. The incontestable fact, as de Lattre realized, was that if the French were to hold their own in Indochina, they needed more soldiers. In the absence of French conscripts, the recruitment of Vietnamese was to be their only source, even if these men did not always inspire confidence. Also, if the Viet Minh were clearly having success in turning out solid units capable of maneuvering well, why could not the Legion do the same thing? Time for the old arguments that the Legion was fit only for certain missions because of its “traditions” had clearly passed, although it is hardly surprising that jeremiads similar to those heard in the Legion in 1914, in 1919 and 1939 were again echoed in reports.
Prejudice against Vietnamese troops and a disinclination to participate in Vietnamization died hard. The Legion being the Legion, however, the officers did not complain of the difficulties, according to the commander of the 3e étranger, “concerned not to be suspected of being afraid,” and worked honestly to make Vietnamization succeed, but “they don't believe in it.”91 The legionnaires, however, seemed to take the whole experiment in better spirits than many of their superiors obviously did, and regarded the spectacle of diminutive Vietnamese kitted out in uniforms designed for Europeans and their arrival in camp accompanied by their family entourage as highly entertaining: “They amuse the legionnaires by their look, and their slightly Courtelinesque [a reference to the French comic playwright Courteline] family harkas,” the 3e étranger reported. “The legionnaires have a tendency to treat them like a new nationality of legionnaire.”92
Despite the warnings and obvious problems, the experiment of attaching Vietnamese to Legion battalions appears, on balance, to have achieved overall success. In the 5e étranger, the Vietnamese were told, “You are legionnaires, and you must fight and conduct yourselves as legionnaires.” It found that they performed credibly in combat, but disliked intensely the manual labor of building posts.93 The 5e étranger declared in 1952 that its Vietnamese battalions had far fewer problems with desertion than did those with other units.94 In May 1953, General Leblanc, the commander of central Vietnam, had to turn the 4th battalion of the 2e étranger into a mixed battalion “because of the difficulties of recruiting legionnaires.”95 The REC integrated its crab units up to 50 percent after it discovered that its vehicles could carry more Vietnamese than Europeans, thus increasing its combat strength on operations, while the indigenous soldiers also proved more effective in searching villages. In other words, the recruitment of Vietnamese helped the Legion to attenuate their manpower shortage and probably improved efficiency.
Nevertheless, all regiments did not join into this paean of praise for the experiment. The 3e étranger declared in December 1952 that the commanders of its two “yellowed” battalions had lost confidence in their men and wanted the percentage of white troops raised.96 Lieutenant Basset observed that in combat, “a quarter fight, half go over to the other side, the last quarter waits to see who is the winner.”97 These problems were solved in part when these Vietnamese units were turned over to the Vietnamese army. This was not a happy occasion for everyone. Major Rambaud, who commanded 4th battalion of the 2e étranger, reported that his Vietnamese “considered themselves to be ‘regular’ soldiers of the French army” and had no desire to go into the Vietnamese army.98
The most prolonged opposition to jaunissement came out of the BEPs, perhaps because they especially regarded themselves as an elite, and deeply resented having to accept recruits who never lost their “conscript mentality. They await the end of their contract like conscripts await ‘la classe’ [the end of their service period].” The presence of these men “breaks the unity of this unit which must suspend belief when it sees the accumulation of wives and children with which his Vietnamese comrade burdens himself.”99 They were also upset that, whereas the infantry had gradually shed its “yellow” battalions, it had actually seen its numbers of Vietnamese increase. This caused problems in 1954 during the battle of Dien Bien Phu, when the idea of being parachuted into a battle which was already lost apparently did not strike the BEP's Vietnamese troops as the ideal spring holiday. The 2e BEP insisted that its Vietnamese paratroopers, “the majority of whom are young in service, [were] motivated by a single desire not to fight and to go home. They hampered the battalion to the point that the commander no longer wanted them as reinforcements.”100
If the 2e BEP's experience with its Vietnamese recruits was disappointing, other Vietnamese paratroop units performed very credibly at Dien Bien Phu. Overall, considering the extra burden of work that this program of Vietnamization placed upon the Legion, its history of color prejudice, the obvious antipathy of many Legion officers and NCOs for this training mission, and the fact that most of the Vietnamese sent to the Legion were reluctant conscripts, the Legion's participation in jaunissement may be termed a qualified success.
Chapter 26
THE FINAL ACT— DIEN BIEN PHU
WITHOUT A DOUBT, the Legion's tour de force in Indochina occurred at what effectively amounted to the French finale there—the battle of Dien Bien Phu. That remote valley in the highlands of Tonkin became a showcase of courage, both French and Vietnamese. Unfortunately, the courage of many of the French-led troops was not matched by the competence of their commanders. The origins of the disaster lay in the decision by the French commander-in-chief in Indochina, General Henri Navarre, to create a base aéroterrestre at a point that would block Viet Minh penetration of Laos. In his view, Dien Bien Phu offered the best strategic location, across an important road junction linking upper Tonkin with Laos. It was far from Viet Minh main-force units, while the existence of an airstrip dating from the Japanese occupation would give the French access by air. The successful French defense of Na San, another base aéroterrestre in the higlands east of Dien Bien Phu, in November-December 1952 helped to convince the French command that the Viet Minh lacked the means to overwhelm these entrenched camps.
Paratroops floated into the level valley, about thirteen miles long and seven miles wide, through which ran the Nam Yum River, on November 20, 1953, chased out the Viet Minh troops occupying it and began to establish a camp. Although the site was overlooked by mountains, the French high command calculated that they were beyond artillery range even if the mountains were occupied by the Viet Minh. Therefore, according to French thinking, the Viet Minh, inexperienced artillerymen, must bring their artillery into the valley, what little they could shift to this remote area, to make it effective, where it could be easily handled by French aviation and counterbattery fire. The French high command also chose to ignore the fact that Dien Bien Phu was at a maximum operating distance from air bases near Hanoi and that the monsoon weather sharply reduced the air support upon which the garrison depended. Viet Minh artillery and antiaircraft guns, whose appearance surprised the French command, firing from well-concealed positions did the rest.
The tactical deficiencies of the French position are well known. The network of defenses built on a series of small hills was poorly conceived. The key to the battle would be the airstrip—the French had to keep it open while Giap had to try to close it down, which he managed to do on virtually the first day of the battle. Most of the garrison was packed
into central defensive positions around the airstrip—Huguette, Dominique, Claudine and Eliane. A mile and a half to the north and the northwest, Béatrice and Gabrielle, each held by a battalion, were established on two small hills overlooking the airstrip. A loosely connected series of strong points held by T'ai auxiliaries and christened Anne-Marie stretched northwest beyond Huguette. About four miles to the south, Isabelle, with two battalions and two 105 batteries under the command of Colonel Andre Lalande, who had fought at Narvik and throughout World War II with the 13e DBLE, was given the mission of supporting the central position with artillery fire. Béatrice and Gabrielle, obviously the weak points of the defense, were at the extreme range of Isabelle's guns. Although the defensive positions were linked by trenches, blockhouses and dugouts, protected by minefields and barbed wire, no attempt had been made to camouflage the French camp. For Viet Minh artillery observers, Dien Bien Phu held no secrets—a scrap of yellow dust, which turned to mud with the March monsoon, whose every activity was observed, recorded and fired upon. For the French, on the other hand, the activities of their foes were masked by the verdant jungle whose fringe reached to the periphery of their camp.
WHEN GIAP OPENED the battle on March 13, 1954, with an attack on the distant and fairly isolated Béatrice, the negligence of the French command as well as the poor organization of the defense was instantly revealed. Although the attack was rapidly executed, it was no surprise, for the 450 legionnaires of the 3rd battalion of the 13e DBLE who held Beatrice even knew the hour of the attack. Sergeant Kubiak, who survived Beatrice, reported that the officers were nervous, but the legionnaires considered the Viet Minh “crazy” to attempt to dislodge the Legion from their position, an indication that almost no one on the French side, from commander to private, really understood what they were now up against. In the early afternoon, a violent artillery barrage “rained down on us without stopping like a hailstorm on a fall evening,” remembered Kubiak. “Bunker after bunker, trench after trench, collapsed, burying men and weapons.”1 Some of the shells struck the airfield, exploding planes, munitions and fuel. At five o'clock in the afternoon, two Viet Minh regiments leapt from their approach trenches barely two hundred yards from Béatrice. At six-thirty a Viet Minh shell took out the battalion command post, followed a few minutes later by a second round that killed the commander of the northern sector. With no one to coordinate the defense on Beatrice, the companies fought on independently. At ten-thirty that evening, the radio of the 10th company fell silent. A half-hour later the last word arrived from the 11th company that fighting had reached the command bunker. A few minutes after midnight on March 14, Sergeant Kubiak's company called down artillery on their own positions: With a handful of survivors, he slipped into the jungle and at daylight was able to regain the French lines.
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