“as important as the battle of Gettysburg”: PP, 613.
“Glory Has Its Price”
Time in the last week of December: “Man of the Year,” Time (Jan. 1, 1945): cover; TT, 600 (current German salient); Royce L. Thompson, “Ardennes Campaign Statistics,” Apr. 28, 1952, CMH, 2-3.7 AE P-15; “Ordnance,” n.d., “History of the Ardennes Campaign,” NARA RG 498, UD 584, box 2; “Tactical Air Operations in Europe,” XIX Tactical Air Command, May 1945, Frederick L. Anderson papers, HIA, box 83, folder 1, 56 (ordered to bomb any column).
Of greater concern was a German armored spearhead: Rickard, Advance and Destroy, 202–3; Ardennes, 430–35, 535 (four-night round-trip), 426–27; TT, 577–79 (five miles from Dinant); Collins, Lightning Joe, 292 (nearly 100,000 strong).
Savage fighting raged from the Salm: William E. Dressler et al., “Armor Under Adverse Conditions,” 1949, AS, Ft. K, 41–48; TT, 583; Ardennes, 570 (equipment from six battalions), 595–603 (Sixth Panzer Army’s last sally); Harmon, Combat Commander, 240 (British flame-throwing tank).
Eisenhower for the past week: Weigley, Eisenhower’s Lieutenants, 545.
An Ultra intercept decoded just after Christmas: Sent on December 21, the message took five days to decode (Bennett, Ultra in the West, 214); Royce L. Thompson, “Ardennes Campaign Statistics,” Apr. 28, 1952, CMH, 2-3.7 AE P-15 (almost four thousand tanks).
Patton favored driving from the south: Ardennes, 610-11; Rickard, Advance and Destroy, 191–96.
Collins, in a memorandum on Wednesday: memo, JLC to C. Hodges, “Plans for Offensive Operations,” Dec. 27, 1944, JLC papers, DDE Lib, box 3, 201 file.
Montgomery hesitated: war diary, Ninth Army, Dec. 28, 1944, William H. Simpson papers, MHI, box 11; corr, JLC to Bruce C. Clarke, Feb. 21, 1975, CARL, N-8467.297; OH, JLC, 1973, G. Patrick Murray, SOOHP, in “Courtney Hodges Story,” MHI (“Nobody is going to break through”); OH, JLC, 1972, Charles C. Sperow, SOOHP, MHI, 235–38 (“You’re going to push the Germans out”).
Falaise could hardly be blamed solely on Montgomery: Weigley, Eisenhower’s Lieutenants, 539; msg, BLM to DDE, Dec. 22, 1944, 2155 hrs, DDE Lib, PP-pres, box 83 (doubted Patton’s ability); memo, JLC to C. Hodges, Dec. 30, 1944, JLC papers, DDE Lib, box 3 (“definitely expended itself”).
“Praise God”: notes, James M. Robb, Dec. 27, 1944, DDE office, DDE Lib, PP-pres, box 98.
“Monty is a tired little fart”: PP, 608; notes, James M. Robb, Dec. 27, 1944, W. B. Smith office, DDE Lib, PP-pres, box 98 (“our masters in Washington”); Rickard, Advance and Destroy, 193, 198–99 (Bradley also favored pinching the enemy at Houffalize); Hogan, A Command Post at War, 225 (counted seventeen uncommitted German divisions); Ardennes, 614 (clear skies ended).
Montgomery later asserted: OH, BLM, Oct. 1, 1966, John S. D. Eisenhower, CBM, MHI, box 6, 7; Bolger, “Zero Defects: Command Climate in First U.S. Army, 1944–1945,” Military Review (May 1991): 61+ (preferred the more conservative route); Sylvan, 241 (“Hodges has had enough”).
Delayed by fog, snowbanks, and further reports: Hamilton, Monty: Final Years of the Field-Marshal, 1944–1976, 259–63; Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, 360; TT, 609 (Montgomery sketched the plan).
Yet the field marshal was vague: Hamilton, Monty: Final Years of the Field-Marshal, 1944–1976, 222 (“gallopers”), 259–63 (a “master plan”); Wilmot, The Struggle for Europe, 605 (“one more full-blooded attack”); TSC, 385n.
With this ancient theme again resurrected: TSC, 385. Eisenhower glosses over this episode in his memoir (Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, 360–61).
“definitely in a somewhat humble frame of mind”: Hamilton, Monty: Final Years of the Field-Marshal, 1944–1976, 265, 246–48 (“such a decent fellow” and “You are far better informed”); Hastings, Armageddon, 223 (“We have tidied up the mess”).
“We have had one very definite failure”: Chandler, 2387.
“I put this matter up to you again”: corr, BLM to DDE, Dec. 29, 1944, DDE Lib, PP-pres, box 83.
“Under no circumstances make any concessions”: corr, GCM to DDE, Dec. 30, 1944, Eyes Only Message, Walter B. Smith collection, DDE Lib, WWII documents, box 27; TSC, 385–86.
“They are all mad at Monty”: diary, Kay Summersby, Dec. 29 and 31, 1944, DDE Lib, PP-pres, box 140.
“knowing Monty, the last thing he would do”: notes, James Robb, SHAEF, Dec. 31, 1944, NARA RG 319, SC background files, 2-3.7 CB 8.
“All right, Beetle”: OH, DDE, n.d., CJR, box 43, file 7, 33.
Now fully alive to Montgomery’s peril: Chandler, 2387n.
“All right, Freddie”: OH, DDE, n.d., CJR, box 43, file 7, 34.
“I do not agree that one army group commander”: corr, DDE to BLM, Dec. 31, 1944, DDE Lib, PP-pres, box 83.
Already in fragile health: OH, Alan Moorehead, Jan. 21, 1947, FCP, MHI (“one of you will have to go”); AAAD, 425 (Mareth); Ambrose, Eisenhower: Soldier, General of the Army, President-Elect, 1890–1952, vol. 1, 376 (“What shall I do”).
“Dear Ike … Whatever your decision”: corr, BLM to DDE, Dec. 31, 1944, DDE Lib, PP-pres, box 83.
“The general tendency at SHAEF”: Hamilton, Monty: Final Years of the Field-Marshal, 1944–1976, 288–89; Chandler, 2389 (“very fine telegram”), xxiii (“He’s just a little man”); OH, John Whiteley, May 15, 1963, CR, box 44, folder 3 (kept him awake).
Although he commanded ten French and eight American divisions: RR, 462–63, 482–83, 492; Garland, Unknown Soldiers, 346 (“Shit on Hitler’s Home”).
The Colmar Pocket, as wide as the Bulge: OH, Paul D. Adams, 1975, Irving Monclova and Marlin Lang, SOOHP, MHI; diary, Dec. 12, 1944, John E. Dahlquist papers, MHI, box 3 (“enemy attacked on three fronts”); corr, J. E. Dahlquist to Homer Case, June 5, 1945, John E. Dahlquist papers, MHI, box 1 (“holding the bag”); corr, JLD to DDE, Dec. 18, 1944, NARA RG 319, RR background files, FRC 5; diary, JLD, Dec. 15, 1944, MHI; Franklin L. Gurley, “The Relationship Between Jean de Lattre de Tassigny and Jacob L. Devers,” March 26, 1994, Sorbonne, NARA RG 319, RR background files, FRC 4 (“two problem children”).
At Verdun on December 19: RR, 486–89, 495–97, 511, 533; notes, Dec. 26, 1944, SHAEF main, James M. Robb corr, DDE Lib, PP-pres, box 98 (brought Devers a map); Gurley, “Policy Versus Strategy: The Defense of Strasbourg in Dec. 1944,” NARA RG 319, RR background files, FRC 5 (abandoning Strasbourg and the Alsatian plain); memo, DDE to JLD, Dec. 28, 1944, 1024 hrs, NARA RG 498, ETOUSA HD, UD 584 (SHAEF reserve west of the Vosges).
“The Germans undoubtedly will attack me”: diary, JLD, Dec. 26, 28, 29, 1944, MHI.
De Gaulle thought so too: DOB, 401 (left-handed salute); Gurley, “Policy Versus Strategy,” NARA RG 319, RR background files, FRC 5 (“They are up to something”).
While Smith prevaricated: John W. Price, “The Strasbourg Incident,” 1967, OCMH, NARA RG 319, RR background files, FRC 5, 3–5 (fallback positions); OH, Russell L. Vittrup, 1989, Henry E. Fitzgerald, SOOHP, MHI, 125–26 (“Ain’t going to do it”); De Lattre de Tassigny, The History of the French First Army, 303–4 (“psychosis of retreat”); Gurley, “Policy Versus Strategy,” NARA RG 319, RR background files, FRC 5 (“integrity of the present front”).
“Call up Devers and tell him”: notes, Jan. 1, 1945, SHAEF main, James M. Robb corr, DDE Lib, PP-pres, box 98.
“I won’t go to him with that story”: Gurley, “Policy Versus Strategy,” NARA RG 319, RR background files, FRC 5.
“The political pressure to retain French soil”: corr, DDE to JLD, Jan. 1, 1945, JLD papers, MHI.
Devers capitulated: diary, JLD, Jan. 1, 1945, MHI (“no alternative”); Franklin L. Gurley, “The Relationship Between Jean de Lattre de Tassigny and Jacob L. Devers,” March 26, 1994, Sorbonne, NARA RG 319, RR background files, FRC 4; Gurley, “Policy Versus Strategy,” JMH (July 1994): 481+.
“You can kill a willing horse”: diary, JLD, Dec. 30, 1944, MHI.
“make it a Stalingrad”: diary, JLD, Jan. 1, 1945, MHI.
The final day of the year tic
ked by: war diary, Seventh Army, Dec. 31, 1944, MHI; Cochran, “Protecting the Ultimate Advantage,” Military History (June 1985): 45+; Bradley, A Soldier’s Story, 483 (“Never was the world plagued”); diary, JLD, Dec. 31, 1944, MHI (“Patch called me”).
The attack indeed fell that night: RR, 493–97, 499–500 (Seventh Army was overextended); Bonn, When the Odds Were Even, 181–83; Rickard, Advance and Destroy, 173, 241 (force Patton to withdraw).
The Americans were also alert and entrenched: Cochran, “Protecting the Ultimate Advantage,” Military History (June 1985): 45+; Donald S. Bussey, “Ultra and the U.S. Seventh Army,” May 12, 1945, SRH-022, and “Reports by U.S. Army Ultra Representatives,” 6th Army Group, n.d., SRH-023, NARA RG 457, E 022 (Patch had little doubt).
“German offensive began”: Wyant, Sandy Patch, 9–11 (“Murdered them”); Bonn, When the Odds Were Even, 197, 200, 203–4 (“Gained only insignificant ground”); RR, 504–5; Yeide and Stout, First to the Rhine, 275 (“Morgue Valley”).
The most flamboyant German sally: TT, 608 (Hangover Raid); Miller, Masters of the Air, 374 (white gloves); VW, vol. 2 190. Richard G. Davis puts the tally of destroyed Allied planes at nearly two hundred, including three dozen American aircraft (Carl A. Spaatz and the Air War in Europe, 535).
But German losses approached 300 planes: Germany VII, 693–94; Miller, Masters of the Air, 374 (“our last substance”). Miller puts Allied losses at more than 450 planes and German losses at over 400.
Even as NORDWIND collapsed: RR, 505–9; “The Psychological Warfare Division,” 1945, CMH, 8-3.6 BA, 78–79 (Radio Stuttgart): Gurley, “Policy Versus Strategy,” NARA RG 319, RR background files, FRC 5 (“caused a general panic”).
Lowered tricolors and the sight of official sedans: Gurley, “Policy Versus Strategy,” NARA RG 319, RR background files, FRC 5; memo, “Misleading Briefing Data,” Frank A. Allen, Jr., to JLD, Jan. 16, 1945, and memo, 6th Army Group, Jan. 21, 1945, NARA RG 331, E 240P, SHAEF public relations section, box 38 (“women pushing baby carriages”); Fussell, Doing Battle, 129 (inverted dinner plates).
Charles de Gaulle, once again referring to himself: De Gaulle, The Complete War Memoirs of Charles de Gaulle, 834. De Gaulle’s message, written on January 1, took twenty-seven hours to reach De Lattre (OH, Philippe de Camas, asst G-3, French First Army, Oct.–Dec. 1948, Miguel Vigneras, Paris, NARA RG 319, RR background files, FRC 5).
“a bomb-like effect”: OH, Philippe de Camas, asst G-3, French First Army, Oct.–Dec. 1948, Miguel Vigneras, Paris, NARA RG 319, RR background files, FRC 5; Salisbury-Jones, So Full a Glory, 171 (“Ça, non!”); Gurley, “Policy Versus Strategy,” NARA RG 319, RR background files, FRC 5 (“problem of conscience”).
De Gaulle saw no dilemma: De Gaulle, The Complete War Memoirs of Charles de Gaulle, 834–37; Gurley, “Policy Versus Strategy,” NARA RG 319, RR background files, FRC 5 (snubbed Madame De Lattre); De Lattre de Tassigny, The History of the French First Army, 311 (“our last hope”).
At nine P.M. on Tuesday, General Juin: Gurley, “Policy Versus Strategy,” NARA RG 319, RR background files, FRC 5 (“extremely grave consequences” and “they are dependent on us”); corr, David G. Barr to JLD, Aug. 15, 1967, NARA RG 319, RR background files, FRC 5 (pulled from his pocket).
“Juin said things to me last night”: notes, Jan. 3, 1945, DDE office and W. B. Smith office, James M. Robb corr, DDE Lib, PP-pres, box 98; “Summary of Directions in Chronological Order Concerning Holding Strasbourg or Not Holding Strasbourg,” Jan. 3, 1945, JLD papers, MHI (“forget Strasbourg”); John W. Price, “The Strasbourg Incident,” 1967, OCMH, NARA RG 319, RR background files, FRC 5, 26 (“ineradicable shame”); Seventh Army war diary, Jan. 3, 1945, MHI (“terrible reprisals”); Gurley, “Policy Versus Strategy,” NARA RG 319, RR background files, FRC 5 (Evacuation plans); memo, “Misleading Briefing Data,” Frank A. Allen, Jr., to JLD, Jan. 16, 1945, and memo, 6th Army Group, Jan. 21, 1945, NARA RG 331, E 240P, SHAEF public relations section, box 38 (only two hundred rail cars).
“Next to the weather”: Chandler, 2491.
Smith phoned Devers to ask: “Summary of Directions in Chronological Order Concerning Holding Strasbourg or Not Holding Strasbourg,” Jan. 3, 1945, JLD papers, MHI.
The crowded stage in this melodrama: John W. Price, “The Strasbourg Incident,” 1967, OCMH, NARA RG 319, RR background files, FRC 5, 21–22; Danchev, 642 (Eisenhower whisked them); Chandler, 2396n (a copy of his letter).
Eisenhower gestured to the map: De Gaulle, The Complete War Memoirs of Charles de Gaulle, 834–37 (“In Alsace, where the enemy”).
“a state bordering on anarchy”: memo, DDE to GCM, Jan. 6, 1945, NARA RG 319, RR background files, FRC 5.
“All my life,” Churchill said: De Gaulle, The Complete War Memoirs of Charles de Gaulle, 837–39; Porch, The Path to Victory, 603 (asked for a total of fifty).
By now the supreme commander’s face: Gurley, “Policy Versus Strategy,” NARA RG 319, RR background files, FRC 5 (“If you carry out the withdrawal”); De Gaulle, The Complete War Memoirs of Charles de Gaulle, 837–39 (“I am having a lot of trouble”).
“I think you’ve done the wise and proper”: Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, 384.
“not always aware of the political consequences”: Kersaudy, Churchill and De Gaulle, 300; De Gaulle, The Complete War Memoirs of Charles de Gaulle, 838–39 (“Glory has its price”); Gurley, “Policy Versus Strategy,” NARA RG 319, RR background files, FRC 5 (“Imagine, asking us to withdraw”); Porch, The Path to Victory, 610 (“equate politics with sentiment”).
As the happy news of salvation: Gurley, “Policy Versus Strategy,” NARA RG 319, RR background files, FRC 5; msg, DDE to JLD, Jan. 7, 1945, and “Summary of Directions in Chronological Order Concerning Holding Strasbourg or Not Holding Strasbourg,” Jan. 3, 1945, JLD papers, MHI (“as strongly as possible”).
NORDWIND would drag on: RR, 505–9, 513, 527, 564; VW, vol. 2, 249 (enemy troops ferried across the river); MEB, “Army Group G,” Dec. 1956, OCMH, NARA RG 319, R-91, box 14, 18; Giziowski, The Enigma of General Blaskowitz, 373 (Hitler denounced as “pessimistic”), 371 (“Whipped Cream Division”); Bonn, When the Odds Were Even, 219 (recruits from eastern Europe).
“We must believe in the ultimate purposes”: Eisenhower, Letters to Mamie, 229.
He had new worries, too: office diary, Jan. 5, 1945, Kay Summersby, DDE Lib, PP-pres, box 140 (developing a ray); Gardner, “The Death of Admiral Ramsay,” AB, no. 87 (1995): 44+; Woodward, Ramsay at War, 194; Chalmers, Full Cycle, 267.
“E. leaves office early”: desk calendar, Jan. 7, 1945, Barbara Wyden papers, DDE Lib, box 1.
The Agony Grapevine
SHAEF on January 5 confirmed: office diary, Jan. 5, 1945, Kay Summersby, DDE Lib, PP-pres, box 140; Weigley, Eisenhower’s Lieutenants, 565 (“by instant agreement”); Eisenhower, The Bitter Woods, 465.
“We have nothing to apologize for”: diary, Jan. 1, 5 and 6, 1945, CBH, MHI, box 5. Even Stars and Stripes referred to GIs as “Monty’s troops” (Hamilton, Monty: Final Years of the Field-Marshal, 1944–1976, 302).
“I shall show how the whole Allied team”: msg, BLM to WSC, Jan. 6, 1945, UK NA, CAB 120/867.
“The real trouble with the Yanks”: Hamilton, Monty: Final Years of the Field-Marshal, 1944–1976, 411.
When Brigadier Williams, the intelligence chief, asked why: OH, E. T. Williams, May 30–31, 1947, FCP, MHI; Hamilton, Monty: Final Years of the Field-Marshal, 1944–1976, 304 (“Please don’t”); OH, David Belchem, Feb. 20, 1947, FCP, MHI (smelling condescension); OH, Alan Moorehead, Jan. 21, 1947, FCP, MHI (“some bloody awful mistake”).
In a double-badged maroon beret: OH, Alan Moorehead, Jan. 21, 1947, FCP, MHI (“dressed like a clown”); VW, vol. 2, 425–27 (“a brave fighting man”); Wilmot, The Struggle for Europe, 610–11 (No mention was made of Bradley); TT, 611 (British troops were “fighting hard”).
“The first thing I did”: Davis, Soldier of Democracy, 530.
“Let us have done with the
destructive criticism”: VW, vol. 2, 425–27.
“Oh, God, why didn’t you stop him?”: Hamilton, Monty: Final Years of the Field-Marshal, 1944–1976, 303; Colville, The Fringes of Power, 551 (“indecently exultant” and “exceedingly self-satisfied”); Weigley, Eisenhower’s Lieutenants, 565 (“what a good boy am I”); Richardson, Send for Freddie, 172 (“cock on a dunghill”); Bradley and Blair, A General’s Life, 382 (“Montgomery Foresaw Attack”); VW, vol. 2, 428 (“‘somewhat bewildered’”).
“He sees fit to assume”: war diary, Ninth Army, Jan. 19, 1945, William H. Simpson papers, “Personal Calendar,” MHI, box 11; OH, Frederick E. Morgan, n.d., FCP, MHI (“active hatred”); “Excerpt from Diary, D/SAC,” Jan. 31, 1945, NARA RG 319, SC background papers, 2-3.7 CB 8 (“out of the question”).
Bradley twice called Versailles: office diary, Jan. 9, 1945, Kay Summersby, DDE Lib, PP-pres, box 140. The “calculated risk” explanation first emerged from 12th Army Group on Dec. 21 and was widely cited long after the war (Royce L. Thompson, “American Intelligence on the German Counteroffensive,” vol. 1, Nov. 1949, CMH, 2-3.7 AE P-1).
“attempt to discredit me”: Bradley Commentaries, CBH collection, MHI, box 41.
“I cannot serve under Montgomery”: Bradley, A Soldier’s Story, 487–88; diary, Jan. 8, 1945, CBH, MHI, box 5.
“No single incident that I have encountered”: Chandler, 2481.
Heading off, seeing off, and writing off: Rickard, Advance and Destroy, 200–203 (“must take care of itself”); Ardennes, 650–51 (twice as many tanks); Weigley, Eisenhower’s Lieutenants, 572 (“Desertions few”).
Yet many enemy commanders had been killed: Ardennes, 615; MEB, “The German Withdrawal from the Ardennes,” May 1955, NARA RG 319, OCMH, R-series #59, 20 (combed the countryside for gasoline); Rickard, Advance and Destroy, 319 (traveled by bicycle); Roger S. Durham, “The Past Is Present: The World War II Service of George E. Durham,” 1996, a.p., 124 (“pants-crapper”).
“Ten shells for their one”: White, Conquerors’ Road, 7, 14 (“Get along there”); PP, 615 (“unfortunate incidents”); TT, 226 (Skorzeny’s saboteurs); FUSA G-2, Operation GREIF, n.d., NARA RG 407, E 429, ML #994 (“musketry”); Heinz, “The Morning They Shot the Spies,” True (Dec. 1949): 28+ (“We had to stop them”); “W.C. Heinz, 93, Writing Craftsman, Dies,” NYT, Feb. 28, 2008.
The Guns at Last Light: The War in Western Europe, 1944-1945 Page 115
