Chronology of major political events
xxiii
May. Extremists conduct a systematic campaign of attacks
and intimidation, but fail to deter the largest turnout of voters
since 1970. Secular parties are routed.
2013
July – Mamnoon Hussain elected president by parliament.
2013
September – More than 80 people are killed in a double
suicide bombing at a church in Peshawar. It is the deadliest
attack so far against Christians in Pakistan, while extremists
claim responsibility.
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Acknowledgements
I am eternally grateful to God, the Most Merciful and Most Compassionate,
for His continuous guidance, support and blessings throughout my life. The
completion of this book is simply another manifestation of His blessings that
I could never deny. In all things, I am mindful of my Creator, and, through
that, my responsibilities to Creation.
I would like to express my deepest gratitude and appreciation to my PhD
supervisor Mehmet Asutay, who I endearingly refer to as ‘Agabey’. He is fine
gentleman, a sophisticated scholar and a great friend. This achievement
would not be possible without his genuineness, sincerity and encouragement.
Thereafter, I wish to sincerely thank my dearest teachers, confidantes and
guides who have assisted in the course of writing this book. Among them,
I would like to thank Prof. Saleem M. M. Qureshi, Dr Ghulam Nabi Fai,
Dr Sayyid Saeed, Shaikh Ahmad Totonji, Professor Azzam Tamimi, Professor
Tariq Ramadan, Professor Stephen Welch, Professor Paul Rogers and Professor
John Esposito.
Last, I owe an unending debt of gratitude to the wonderful, dynamic
people of Qatar. In particular, I wish to graciously thank the love, support
and encouragement of the eminent Shaikh Muhammad – a gem of a man, his
entire family, especially sister ‘Umm Hamad’, and numerous other Qatari
households who have welcomed me into their home as one of their own.
Knock, and He’ll open the door.
Vanish, and He’ll make you shine like the sun.
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Fall, and He’ll raise you to the heavens.
Become nothing, and He’ll turn you into everything.
Rumi
1
Introduction
The symbol of Islam is not the Wheel of Dharma, the Shield of David or the
Crucifix. It is, undoubtedly, the cube of the Kaa’ba. That immovable, stable
and enduring symbol of permanence represents the absolute character of
Islam. If there ever was a symbol that so completely represents the spirit of Islam
it is the Kaa’ba: perpetual certainty, or ‘permanence,’ constantly surrounded by
the ‘impermanence’ of orbiting believers who represent both dynamism and
flux. This, after all, sends a powerful message: life is full of change, yet we often live for those things that don’t change. Clearly, ‘meaning’ in our lives exists as a consequence of permanence – and this is precisely what comes under question
in the modern world. 1 Contrarily, this ‘permanence’ remains the mainspring of an Islamic ethos.
‘Once the spirit of Islamic revelation had brought into being, out of the
heritage of previous civilizations and through its own genius, the civilization
that may be called distinctly “Islamic”, the main interest turned away from
change and adaptation’. 2 Henceforth, its corresponding epistemology came to embody a ‘permanence’ premised on the ‘certainty’ of the principles from
which they issued forth. This ‘permanence’, in fact, is far too often mistaken
as inertia in Muslim societies. Yet, more succinctly, it reflects the unique bal-
ance that Islamic civilization instils between enduring principles and changing
circumstances.
Today, many Muslim polities attempt to intelligently reconcile the twin
forces of ‘permanence’ – thabit – and ‘change’ – mutaghayir. Relatedly, this
reconciliation includes managing modernity and tradition. Though nowhere is
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the problematic nature of reconciliation better exhibited than when decon-
structing political culture in Muslim polities. It is here that the antecedents of
political instability may be understood. Therefore, in recognition of that
chronic, internal civilizational tussle between permanence and change, this
book analyzes political culture to understand the roots of its ideological and
consequential political instability. However, conclusions drawn and insights
gained are relevant across Muslim majority countries.
To begin with, this book thoroughly reviews the literature on political culture
and locates, therein, constant references to the ‘core’, ‘existing meaning’,
‘enduring cultural component’ or ‘stock of knowledge’ in a given polity. Then
2
Islam and Pakistan’s Political Culture
those unexplained terms are used to describe the essence of political culture,
alluding to its intrinsic values. Yet that allusion is vague, since what the ‘core’
exactly consists of, amounts to or how it may alter, is left largely undefined.
Here we are provided a concept that is meant to do the explaining, which itself
requires an explanation. Therefore, this book proceeds to define that ‘core’, with
regard to Muslim polities, and labels it as the ‘foundational’ aspect of Islamic
political culture. This, effectively, represents its deeply cherished political
ideals, yet is only the first sphere of inquiry essential to understand the totality of political culture in Muslim polities. Specifically, understanding that totality
involves grasping the complex interplay between the ‘core’ political ideals that
are symbolic of permanence, the changing context in which they are evident,
as in Pakistan, and the approach political leadership chooses to interact with
both. In other words, understanding Islamic political culture involves three
spheres of inquiry: ‘foundational’ (what endures or should be), ‘contextual’
(what is) and ‘individual’ (the agent for movement), illustrated in Figure 1.1 below: Strictly speaking, the solid outer circle is the ‘foundational’ sphere of
inquiry, which includes those patterns of behaviour, norms, and cultural
assumptions collectively representing the core ideological and political platform
of Islam – the ‘ideals’. In this study, it includes the Qur’anic theory of
knowledge, the political ideals extracted from both the Qur’an and Prophetic
sayings with, lastly, the Rashidun era. Essentially, these four variables enable
us to extract deep-rooted political principles and set them forth as an ‘ideal
type’. These ‘ideals’, then, are manifest not only in Muslim society in Pakistan,
but throughout the entire Muslim world, albeit to varying degrees. Straight-
forward to this analytical approach is the assumption that the ideals incorporated
at the ‘foundational’ sphere of inquiry are of significant consequence, having
a pivotal impact on the organization and direction of political life. Second,
the criss-crossing and porous lines inside the circle, symbolic of imperm
anence,
represent the ‘contextual’ sphere of inquiry. This pertains to the way the
‘foundational’ finds expression, depth and meaning, for instance in Pakistan.
And is representative of the spread of ‘foundational’ ideals of Islam to regions
beyond Hejaz and its consequent interfacing with divergent sociocultural
realities. However, to limit the scope of our analysis, the time frame for our
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Figure 1.1 Graphic representation of the requisites for political stability in Muslim
polities, which requires a balance between the three spheres of inquiry.
Introduction
3
study begins during the early twentieth century Pakistan movement, moves on
to include its fractious constitutional development and ends with civil-military
analysis. Third, the star in the centre, another aspect of impermanence,
represents the individual that responds to both forces and, similarly, influences
them in application or form.
Collectively, these three spheres of inquiry comprise the composite Islamic
political culture and coexist simultaneously. The ‘core’ values, the manner in
which they find expression in space-time and the agent for movement directly
impact its manifestation. Therefore, any analysis focusing singularly on one
sphere of inquiry would be deficient in revealing its totality. Consequently, this
trilateral approach is intended to shun simplistic analyses, and is calculated to
offer a careful framework – without dissociating the inquiry from its sociological
context. 3 Furthermore, this approach disqualifies both the portrayal of a monolithic Islamic political culture across spatial and temporal bounds, to a
degree defying empirical realities, and those who insist of there being no
commonality across Islamdom.
This triangular relationship lies at the heart of understanding Islamic political
culture and produces three variant political cultures – namely, ‘traditionalist’,
‘secularist’ and ‘revivalist’. More clearly, the differing manner in which ‘indivi-
dual’ political leaders in their ‘context’, such as Pakistan, choose to interact
with the ‘foundational’ produces them. This interaction, however, is, largely,
antagonistic, not solely as a result of their diverse understandings, but also by
competing for control of the centres of power. As a result, the conflict
between these variant political cultures contributes towards ideological and
political instability. Yet the ‘revivalist’ political-culture type manages this rivalry by both a restraining influence and cohesiveness that resolves issues of
instability insomuch as it hinders development, progress and direction.
Here, this study proceeds to take into consideration two pioneering figures
of the Pakistan movement, Muhammad Ali Jinnah and Muhammad Iqbal. It
closely examines and characterizes them as ‘revivalists’ who expressed a vision
that resonated or connected with their people. Resultantly, they succeeded in
fostering unity, amidst diversity, towards a common directive. Not only did
they balance the ‘core’ values of their society with their present-day realities,
but understood power as meaningless without popular support. Accordingly,
their narrative was rooted in the sensibilities of their context, based on
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established tradition, ongoing through the process of enculturation.
Furthermore, both Jinnah and Iqbal may be portrayed as ‘revivalists’, or
harbingers of a new ‘asabiyya’, by the manner in which they responded to the
challenges of their time. 4 That included a clear vision for the future rooted in an appreciation of their cultural and religious past, though not necessarily
bound by it. Granted, these leaders were competing and contesting dissimilar
meanings held by ‘traditionalists’ – who were unable or unwilling to synthesise
Islamic ideals with the idea of the nation-state, or ‘secularists’ who did not
recognize the importance of Islam in their political narrative. Admittedly, the
depiction of both Jinnah and Iqbal as ‘revivalists’ may be disputed. Indeed,
4
Islam and Pakistan’s Political Culture
today in Pakistan it is a hotly contested issue. Yet what is undeniable is that
they both chose to not ‘disconnect’ in idea, word or deed, from either the
historiography – which ‘secularists’ often ignore – or the contemporariness –
which ‘traditionalists’ often ignore – of their society. Fittingly, they prevented
delegitimizing themselves in the eyes of their people and succeeded in galva-
nizing an ethnically diverse mass into a cohesive unit. This, too, irrespective
of opposition from the traditionalists and secularists, both of whom opposed
an independent homeland for Muslims. Taking that into account, what has
popularly been referred to as the ‘Arab Spring’ is simply, another manifestation
of ‘revivalists’ securing the support of the majority of people in Muslim polities
and seizing their rightful place at the helm of socio-economic, cultural and
political affairs. This, too, in spite of resentment and resistance by secularists and traditionalists, who, disregarding lip service, tend to be wary of democratization.
In total, this book critiques the concept of political culture and offers an
alternative methodology to explain Islamic political culture. As such, it begins
by analysing the early foundational mores of an Islamic polity based on four
variables: its epistemic tradition, the Qur’an, Prophetic sayings and Rashidun
era. Together, this leads to the analytical formation of the ‘foundational’ sphere
of inquiry, the first explanatory variable. Then it places that in the context of
Pakistan and assesses how individuals interact with it. By doing so, this study
reveals the development of competing political cultures, with their own
understandings and trajectories, whose interaction broadens ideological and
political instability.
Concerning the archetype of the early foundational mores, this book does
not merely propose to reiterate the early Islamic era as the ideal and the eras
following as mere efforts to reach or catch up. Instead, there is a reinvention
of that ‘ideal’ relevant to the context in which it arises, which disqualifies any
contradiction towards the foundational insomuch as it seeks to garner legitimacy.
Certainly, for one to ‘catch up’ to an ideal it must, from the onset, be accepted
as the benchmark to achieve. For that reason, this study insists ‘ideals’ exist as a consequence of principles espoused by its epistemic tradition and enculturation. 5
The challenge, then, is to create it anew, acknowledging that renewal is not
linear, in that there needs to be a return to a specific ideal thought to exist in
the past. Utopia is not, necessarily, mimicking of bygone days, or to put it
plainly ‘going back in time to an idealized past’. Nor does it require viewing
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the world as the source of ills and conflicts, and not humans, and by doing so
making human life expendable. 6 Yet the ‘ideal’ does exist in any society with regard to its ethical, socio-ec
onomic and political direction. Thus, ‘foundational’
mores cannot be ignored, nor can present conditions. In essence, it is this
creative articulation of enduring principles and its present-day application
that the ‘revivalist’ in Muslim polities wishes to realize, the ‘traditionalists’
wish to resist and the ‘secularists’ wish to deny.
Subsequent efforts, throughout Muslim history, to create such ‘utopias’
were the responsibility of ‘revivalists’ in which they, per se, aim to actualize its substance, or maqasid, rather than merely its form. 7 In our analysis, the
Introduction
5
‘revivalists’ in Muslim polities do so by responding to challenges with a solution
that steers away from both the ‘traditionalist’ and ‘secularist.’ Both largely
understand Islam as a monolithic and unchanging dispensation, albeit for
their own reasons. 8 It is undeniable that early schisms existed in Islam, as they persist today. Nevertheless, the ‘revivalist’ aims at recognizing the strength
and wisdom of diversity – a diversity that includes different ideas and colours,
unusual beliefs and devotion, dissimilar languages and race. Truly, appreciating
diversity is recognizing all those differences, still maintaining convergence of
purpose, even while insisting on differing methods and then, lastly, trusting
that ‘God knows best’.
It may be noted that this high classicalism is similar to other religio-political
ideals, as well, if one looks at Jewish history or the classical Hindu age in
India, now being idealised amongst the Hindutva proponents. Often such
‘utopianism’ may be, as John Gray says, based on millenarianism, which is
not unique to Abrahamic traditions but equally shared by communists and
other such trajectories. 9 The ‘nostalgia’ exhibited by some contemporary American scholars, bemoaning their crisis, follows a similar design. Though
the idea of ‘utopianism’ in Muslim society is distinct – at least from Gray’s
description, which labels society, not humans, as responsible for societal ills.
Humans, in Islamic tenets, are described as God’s vicegerents on earth, with a
responsibility to work together to achieve a synthesis between the foundational,
Islam and Pakistan’s Political Culture Page 3
