The Secretariat Official – not to see, not to speak and not to hear . . .
The role of the secretariat is to advise the political executive. The officers manning the secretariat are to analyse each policy issue or individual proposal dispassionately and freely, and render opinion to the political executive without fear or favour. Integrity, impartiality, fearlessness, precedents, and experience in administration are the basis on which notings on files are made by the echelons in the secretariat. Whereas private decision-making is done by the owner or the CEO based on his judgement, decision-making in government requires consultation within the department, with related departments and ultimately leading up to a final view by the minister concerned. Where the matter is of relatively larger importance, after inter-departmental consultations, the issue is taken up before the cabinet for a final decision. In all of these, the opinions of various officials are recorded in a file which is seen by others concerned, leading up to a decision. It is of utmost importance that the system should nurture and maintain the ability of the official to express his views freely and independently without any pressure. It does not matter if he is overruled, but the official has the right to make his point without being under duress.
In the first decades after Independence, much or most of the policy making was proposed, sponsored and developed by officials, especially the higher civil service, finally to obtain the formal approval of the political executive. Indeed this was a continuation of the practice followed during the British days, when the governor of the state would affix his signature, merely as a rubber stamp in nearly all the files. In fact, one governor when asked how he handled so many files coming up to him, he said, 'The trick is simple, I approve the files without reading the notes, except every fortieth put up before me.' When asked to explain why he did so, he replied that, 'I have to show who the boss is!' By the '70s, the ministers asserted to have their own say on decision-making, especially on individual cases. Policy-making was by and large still left to the bureaucracy; however, the need of the ministers to clear individual cases had become stronger by then. So during the '70s and '80s, it was quite usual for the ministers to overrule their subordinates, and enforce their writ. By the '90s it had become more and more difficult to overrule logical, correct and proper notes in a whimsical way, largely due to adverse attention shown by the courts, as well as the difficulties inherent in attacking a logical well-built case. The need came at that time to transfer out inconvenient secretaries or joint secretaries, and have them replaced with more pliant ones, at least those who would not write so strongly as to make it difficult for the minister to overrule the notings of the secretariat. Generally, the minister would be satisfied to get a wishy-washy note suggesting alternatives including the one that the minister would prefer to approve; clearly he encouraged his officials to firmly indicate the desired course of action, as has been verbally communicated by the minister to the secretary.
The above required that the secretariat supporting the minister should be pliant and be willing to co-operate with the minister concerned. They need not really be co-conspirators; it was sufficient if they were intellectually dishonest to write the kind of notes which were really required, and to guide the final decision in the desired manner. Of course there are many variants to this theme, depending on local circumstances and the situation. By and large, the minister wanted a secretary who will 'play ball' with him, even if he was not always required to 'tango' with him. It was the unspoken responsibility of the secretary to the department to handle the lower formations suitably, so that the system functions smoothly. This he did by suitably allocating the work within the department to ensure that he had least difficulty.
Despite all the above, many intrepid secretariat officials, at all levels, would write strong notes supporting or opposing one's course of action or the other, irrespective of how the seniors wanted it. Fortunately, even today, there are strong independent officials, having the courage of their convictions and willing to commit their views on paper. However, sadly, a large number of senior officials would not consider continuing with the fight, and would prefer to get sidelined to insignificant areas in the secretariat, where they would not block the mainline traffic, nor be disturbed by the exigencies of the situation.
Then there are the relatively smaller formations, like state corporations, directorates and the like, where except at the senior-most levels, the rest of the officials are permanent employees of that particular institution. Usually the chief executive would be a senior officer, probably from the IAS or the state civil service, and the organisation would be chaired by the minister. As we have seen elsewhere, the minister expects to receive a 'tribute' before each file is finalised. In this process, it is imperative that the lower formations who are processing the files should all 'play ball'; the potential for sending them out on transfer is limited, since they are permanent employees of the agency concern. However, most of the employees would already be 'on the take' and would push the process through, for an appropriate consideration, offered discreetly or even overtly where required. There would be the odd stubborn employee who refuses to toe the line and insist on writing his own opinion. Sometimes this would be based on his own conviction; sometimes this may be due to the absurdity or enormity of the proposal he is expected to champion. These create problems for the upper echelons in the agency. Sadly, I have come across many instances personally, where such officials have been asked to take their notes out of the file, or have their notes physically taken out and destroyed by the chief in the officer's presence, and asked to go back and write a fresh note again. One senior engineer in one such agency told me, with tears in his eyes, that he was called by the managing director, who in his presence took out the offending note from the file, calmly placed it in his own drawer, threw the file back at the engineer asking him to go back and put up a 'proper' new note. Failure to do so of course, in all possibility, would result in harassment of different sorts – adverse performance entries, blocking of increment or promotion avenues or even registration of false cases leading to suspension from duty and inquiry. Even the right to write freely on files is now not guaranteed. In many situations, the government servant now is treated as an assistant in a small private firm, who is given verbal instructions to do this or the other, legal or not. Naturally what I have said is not true everywhere. However, there is enough of one variant or the other of the above, applicable in most secretariat or directorate or public sector situations. The political control of bureaucracy has extended its tentacles to all aspects of all levels of secretariat work.
Place of the Civil Servant in the Totem-Pole – slipping, slipping … flat on the ground
As has been described, the higher civil servant was a full partner with the political executive in processing policy matters and accomplishing decisions. Even today the bulk of the work in conceiving policy issues, and processing them up to the stage of a final decision is undertaken by the higher bureaucracy. It is only in processing of individual cases or in approving departures from existing policy, or to create specific windows for individuals or interest groups to gain, that the political executive takes the lead. In such situations, the minister through his special assistant suggests or hints that a particular type of proposal should be processed for final approval – the final beneficiary will be the minister, who will obtain a 'rent' in the bargain. In general, however, the higher civil service, at least in internal circles, has high visibility in the process of decision-making. Thus the chief secretary in the state works very closely with the chief minister, in handling the most difficult issues of the day; at least in internal circles is highly visible mainly because he plays an effective role in the process. In de facto terms, the chief secretary is the most 'powerful' person in the state after the chief minister, except for one or two senior 'powerful' ministers. At the Centre, the cabinet secretary plays a significant role in processing major policy matters. He consults the concerned secretaries appropriately, discreetl
y checks out the views of individual ministers, and taking all factors into account, comes up with a policy prescription to cover the situation, which goes through the cabinet. In all of this he was highly visible.
Indeed in major announcements to the press or public by each department in the Centre, the minister invariably has his secretary beside him. It is possible that the secretary may play a silent role in the meeting, and only intervene when asked to clarify this aspect or the other. In the state, in general, the chief minister would always have the chief secretary by his side in major official conferences and meetings – the impression is to create that the two function as a team; even though there is no doubt about their hierarchical relationship. This generally has been the pattern till the end of the past century. I recall that in two or three conferences of chief ministers held by the prime minister when I was the cabinet secretary, I would sit next to the prime minister, and help conduct the proceedings, even though the prime minister clearly was the chairman. I also recall a conference of director(s) general of police (DGP) convened by the prime minister of the day, when apart from the cabinet secretary, the home secretary to the GOI was also sitting in the front row of the dais, helping in the conduct of the proceedings. However, in the first years of this century I have increasingly seen chief ministers holding official conferences flanked by other ministers and even party functionaries, with the chief secretary sitting in the back row. In December 2008, when the prime minister and the new home minister met the chief ministers on the 'terror' issue at Vigyan Bhawan, I was astounded to see the cabinet secretary and the home secretary relegated to the second or third row in the dais. The subjugation of the civil services is now formally complete.
The Civil Servant as a Spectator – the non-participant player . . .
It will also be interesting to trace the attitude and approach of the members of the higher civil services in the period since Independence. For the first two or three decades, both at the district and secretariat levels, the members of the higher civil services functioned as if they were the 'government'. The district magistrate was free and independent, could take up causes and programmes on his own shoulders like his predecessors of yore, and generally was responsible for his own actions. He functioned of course under the benevolent eye of the commissioner. However, he had freedom of action to take up any cause and pursue it. We have seen the onslaught of politics from the mid-'70s onwards, how the entire civil service was infiltrated, suborned, subjucated and finally demolished (at least in spirit) by the political executive – this process took a couple of decades. The new breed of higher civil servants at senior levels in this century will not take up any issue (however convinced of its correctness), will not take any significant initiative and generally will wait for instructions from the political executive before he moves one inch. Thus it is now standard for our senior managers, at the state or the Centre, to be very polite, proper and friendly with you when you meet them. But under no circumstances would he take the next step on his own; (the above is a generalised comment, though probably with not too many exceptions). It is sad that such vibrant, dynamic, wonderful experienced individuals as a class have lost their initiative, and have become mere spectators in the main. This is a far cry from even the '80s or '90s when a secretary at the Centre or a chief secretary in the state, after he was convinced of the correctness of a proposal will boldly pursue it, take it up with vigour and have it finally approved in a formal manner. Today any senior official would be scared to do this. Apart from his inherent loss of initiative, he would also be scared of being accused of taking 'too much interest'. My wide contacts in the bureaucratic and business fields give me daily instances of such apathy and inaction. In fact, while pursuing projects of the charitable causes with which I am associated, I have had numerous occasions to meet many chief secretaries and other officials at the state and at the Centre – everyone is very nice, polite and even respectful to me. But their unspoken message to me, often even articulated openly is that, 'I know your cause is good, but I am unable to help you; please get through to the minister or the chief minister as the case may be, and get instructions sent to me.' This 'paralysis' at the highest levels of governments is now an accepted feature. Just to give one instance, one cabinet secretary was fully convinced and was passionately interested in dealing with the issue of 'micronutrient deficiencies'. I happened to chair a charity organisation dealing with this subject; he held six meetings over a period of a year-and-half, to discuss the issue with the concerned departments and agencies in the Government of India. At the end of it all nothing happened except the meetings; and anon a new incumbent came in his place, and the matter was dropped. Of course one could not expect the prime minister to take detailed interest in pursuing such a 'trivial' matter! In the couple of state governments where the chief ministers or the minister concerned took interest, the programmes moved rapidly. In short, the civil servant now, sadly, is merely a file-pusher, a scholarly, educated witness to goings-on in the government!
The Public Servant as a Private Servant – ready to crawl . . .
Till about the mid-'70s, there was a clear distinction maintained between the politicians and the bureaucrats as groups. The interface between these, in the secretariat, was by formal interaction between the secretary and the minister. The secretary was fully in-charge of managing the secretariat, and in implementing the ministers' instructions; the minister rarely intervened in the affairs of the secretariat. Likewise, the secretary rarely entered into issues relating to the political arena, while advising the minister; even though he had to make a judgement as to what will go through and what won't, taking into account the various factors including political issues.
The concept of 'committed bureaucracy' ushered in by Indira Gandhi was a significant factor which ultimately changed the situation significantly. To be charitable to the then PM, perhaps she intended the commitment to be to the work assigned or the tasks to be completed. Rapidly the interpretation changed as commitment to the politician concerned, then on to any politician; this became the norm within a few years. Thus, 'enterprising' bureaucrats interpreted this call for commitment to come closer to politicians (not necessarily policies) and to ensure that the minister's will was converted into law. Rapidly 'commitment' got translated into reckless, unprincipled alliances to individual politicians or to parties. Even by late '80s, it was only the odd bureaucrat, well-identified by his community, who joined hands with the politicians, in unprincipled alliance – by the mid-'90s, such was the 'success' of such 'pioneers' that bureaucrats in much larger numbers made the transition.
I recall that N.K. Singh, a very bright and able IAS officer was the first special assistant to the then Commerce Minister L.N. Mishra. The former's role was path-breaking and made a major contribution to the de facto changes in the secretariat systems, in the ultimate emaciation of the regular secretariat, and in changing the way decisions got taken. In a sense, the special assistant was like a dubash used by the British India Company, when they entered India and captured power from the Mughals. The dubash represented the British to the Indians, and represented the Indians to the British, while closely pursuing the British interests, for significant mutual considerations. Thus, the special assistant was a politician among the bureaucrats and a bureaucrat to the politician, representing the minister's views and ensuring that his wishes got implemented. While all of this was not immediately visible, one could trace the current heavy politicisation of the bureaucracy to this device, introduced in mid-'70s.
I had read that in 1998 the national security adviser (NSA) and other senior officials went to the party headquarters of a political party, to brief them on the 'nuclear deal'. There has been an unwritten rule in the Central secretariat that officials would never go to the party headquarters or meet politicians in their houses or offices to discuss official business. At the most the visit could be to the officer's-own minister's residence, to brief him on official matters. While this was a nearly inviola
te rule in Delhi, already in many state governments, breaches had taken place in one form or the other. In a coalition, there may be ten or more parties – is the cabinet secretary or various secretaries expected to participate and brief politicians in party meetings? What happens to the sanctity of the Official Secrets Act? – a host of such issues arise. Increasingly, one now sees in every state, senior bureaucrats in public view, participating in private functions of various politicians; one even saw the disgraceful sight of some senior officers literally touching the feet of the chief minister or other senior functionaries – what does this say of the standards of impartiality or neutrality they are supposed to uphold? Sadly, such aberrations slowly are becoming the norm – all pointing to serious decline in governance standards. Government servants' bending like this to political expediency is not a pretty sight – more importantly it leads to deleterious administration. Boot-licking is not unknown in India through the ages; sadly, it has re-emerged in higher positions.
Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel, in April 1947, while laying down a Code of Conduct for public servants had said inter-alia, 'Above all, I would advise you to maintain the utmost impartiality and incorruptibility of administration. A civil servant cannot afford to and must not, take part in politics. To depart … is to debase public service and to lower its dignity… no service can exists if it does not have the highest standard of integrity.' Alas! Patel, like Gandhi, is not only dead and buried, but totally forgotten.
Fall in Probity Standards – for a handful of silver . . .
A reference has been made in many places about the steep fall in standards of probity and integrity among the higher civil services. It may not be possible to dispute this with any conviction. When the ICS was constituted in the mid-nineteenth century, the members received a significantly high pay package; in many districts, the district magistrate would have the same income as the richest zamindar or the highest paid lawyer – indeed the senior government official, belonging to the steel frame enjoyed high pay and perks, much like the current CEOs of the finance sector, whose annual income is in millions. This presumably was done to ensure the highest levels of integrity in the service, and also to keep the senior officials, with enormous unrestrained local powers, away from temptation. It must also be noted that the mortality rate of members of the service 'dying in saddle' was quite high, for a variety of reasons – high pay package was also for compensation for the higher level of risks. At any rate this policy worked – members of the ICS, with odd dishonourable exceptions, were generally men of probity, exhibiting high independence and integrity. By and large, this situation continued through the period of Independence and the first decade thereafter. As has been seen elsewhere, while the intellectual integrity of higher officials got progressively compromised, and politicisation of the service crept in slowly, and gradually increased in pace, the financial probity of most members of the service continued unquestioned. Indeed in the '60s and '70s, it was the rare civil service officer who would be known among his colleagues as 'not so straight'. As has been seen, the situation has worsened progressively. However, one thing needs to be mentioned with emphasis. Even today, the number of IAS officers who are financially corrupt would still be a relatively small proportion. If one compares the levels of corruption in the political class, or as prevalent in the business class, the higher administrative services stand in a totally different footing.
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