by Thomas Leahy
Despite the emergence of this divisive debate, there remains no extensive academic account that evaluates the effectiveness of the intelligence war against the IRA. Yet most academic and journalistic accounts available argue that the British won that war. These authors believe that that defeat was one of the factors that forced the IRA into peace in the 1990s. The standout example of this view is the work of Martyn Frampton. Frampton argues that senior spies in the IRA, including Donaldson and Stakeknife, prevented many IRA operations from being carried out successfully, from the 1980s onwards.25 Frampton concludes that ‘the republican capacity for ‘war’ was greatly curtailed’ and ‘[i]t was ultimately for this reason … that the IRA opted for peace … the security services had won the intelligence war’.26 Talking to Terrorists, co-written by Frampton and John Bew, reaches a similar conclusion, stating that ‘extensive’ high-level infiltration ensured: ‘the IRA’s operational capacity had been steadily undermined. The result of this was that it was the IRA who came to the British seeking negotiations, not vice versa.’27 This is not to argue that Frampton and Bew provide a monocausal account for the IRA’s decision to end its campaign. The authors dismiss the ‘primacy of military “solutions”’. They provide multiple reasons to explain the republican movement’s peace strategy in the 1990s. These include the declining political momentum of Sinn Féin and the increasing ability of loyalist paramilitaries to target republicans. They also admit that the evidence surrounding infiltration of the IRA remains ‘incomplete’. Basing their argument on the evidence currently available, however, Bew and Frampton maintain that informers and agents had pushed the IRA’s campaign into a trajectory of decline by the 1990s. They argue that the intelligence war ‘had a decisive impact’ on republicans’ decision to opt for peace.28
This argument is widely accepted in Troubles literature. Ed Moloney presents a similar argument, following the exposure of Stakeknife and Donaldson.29 Thomas Hennessey also suggests that the intelligence war contributed to the IRA’s ‘strategic defeat’ in the 1990s.30 Bew and Frampton agree that the IRA was ‘strategically defeated’. This term suggests that the IRA’s armed campaign was being ‘contained’ by the British forces. As a result, these authors believe that the IRA could not influence British policy towards Northern Ireland in the 1990s. In their view, the intelligence war is a crucial factor in explaining why the Provisional IRA ended its campaign and had made political concessions by 1998.31 The view that the IRA lost the intelligence war is also predominant within war and intelligence studies literature. Michael Kirk-Smith and James Dingley argue: ‘[o]verall the RUC, in cooperation with the [British] army, developed … highly effective intelligence systems that fundamentally defeated the PIRA’.32 Both Jon Moran and Bradley W. C. Bamford agree that a primary reason for the IRA ending its campaign was heavy infiltration and SAS operations against the IRA.33
This dominant interpretation differs from the consensus view that had existed before 2003. According to this previous theory, the IRA and other conflict participants all realised they could not defeat each other. Everyone compromised in 1998. There was a military and political stalemate.34 Nonetheless, these authors were writing before the recent revelations about IRA and Sinn Féin informers and agents took place. Frampton is right that we must review previous arguments in light of these new developments.35
However, some recent research has begun to question the dominant argument that the intelligence war helped force the IRA into peace.36 Niall Ó Dochartaigh suggests that high security costs caused by the IRA and a sizeable minority of political support for Sinn Féin led to the British government accepting peace talks involving republicans by the 1990s. In this account, both the British and IRA had agreed to peace talks by the 1990s. The peace process did not emerge because the British pushed the IRA to the negotiating table.37 Nonetheless, Ó Dochartaigh was writing about negotiations and not specifically the intelligence war. Richard English argues that a crucial explanation for the IRA’s political compromise was their inability to win a majority of Irish and Northern Irish electoral support. But English does not suggest that the IRA achieved nothing. He argues that republican violence and politics prevented a political settlement on unionist terms. It also ensured ‘that Sinn Fein would be involved in … implementing … a new Northern Ireland deal’. He believes that the IRA could have continued their armed campaign. However, he suggests that ‘they had been damagingly infiltrated’. For English, the intelligence war also encouraged the IRA to end its campaign. The trouble with accepting this latter point is that English (understandably given this topic was not the focus of his work) does not provide extensive analysis about the outcome of the intelligence war.38
This book provides the first detailed assessment of the intelligence war against the IRA. This intelligence war primarily used agents, informers, special forces, surveillance and electronic intelligence. I evaluate the regional nature of the intelligence war against IRA units across the island of Ireland and England between 1969 and 1998. This regional analysis enables us to explore the overall outcome of the intelligence war against the IRA. I suggest that British intelligence efforts had not contained IRA activity to any significant extent when the IRA called prolonged ceasefires in 1972, 1975 and the 1990s. In south Armagh, north Armagh, Belfast, Derry City and England, the IRA’s campaign was never in a position of terminal decline because of the intelligence campaign against it. It does appear that the IRA was facing greater containment by the 1990s in east Tyrone and Newry. But elsewhere the organisation was able to restart its activities following temporary containment. British intelligence did not ‘win’ the intelligence war. Neither does this book suggest that the IRA won the conflict. Instead, the conflict ended in a stalemate situation.
Three principal aspects of the IRA’s structure explain why it was not in a position of terminal decline in the 1990s. All three of these features meant that the IRA was difficult to infiltrate and restrain. First, many rural IRA units were elusive. Second, the IRA had adopted a small cell structure in Belfast and Derry City after 1975. Finally, the IRA leadership remained isolated from the rest of the movement. One reason for the change in British political policy towards republicans in 1975 and 1989 was the inability of the intelligence campaign to restrict IRA activity to an ‘acceptable level of violence’. Between July 1972 and May 1974, and 1976 and 1989, I suggest that the British government’s aim of reducing IRA activity to a level at which it caused minimal disruption to political, social and economic life in Northern Ireland did not succeed.39 Instead, the British government began to try to encourage the IRA and Sinn Féin towards a political compromise in both 1975 and in the 1990s.
I also examine growing evidence that the IRA leadership wanted to negotiate a political settlement from the early 1980s onwards. In the meantime, the IRA aimed to pressurise the British government to return to talks. Republican leaders envisaged doing this by persisting with IRA activity and by increasing Sinn Féin’s electoral mandate.40 The IRA’s capacity for further conflict by 1994 shows that its leadership fulfilled their aim of survival and persistence. Yet that leadership also accepted the need to negotiate a political settlement by 1994. They agreed to talks primarily because Sinn Féin was unable to win a majority of electoral support across the island of Ireland.41 But the republican leadership only agreed to a ceasefire in 1994 because of the political limitations and opportunities at that time showed that there was no more to be gained through IRA activity.42 Political factors played a greater role in producing peace than did the intelligence war. This argument matters, because various commentators and governments – rightly or wrongly – look to Northern Ireland for ideas on how to create peace in other conflict zones.43
The book’s three parts mirror the main periods of conflict that occurred between prolonged IRA ceasefires. The first period was between August 1969 and June 1972, the second between July 1972 and December 1975, and the third between 1976 and 1998. Each part considers whether or not the IRA’s prolonged ceasefires in that
period emerged because of the intelligence war. Each part has three chapters. The first chapter in each of the three parts details British political, military and intelligence strategy against the IRA in the different time periods. The second chapter in each of the three parts considers the effectiveness of the intelligence campaign against regional IRA units in each period. These regions include republican heartlands within Belfast, Derry City, south Armagh, north Armagh, east Tyrone and Fermanagh. The IRA’s operations in England are also discussed. The third chapters in both Parts I and II consider whether or not the IRA called prolonged ceasefires because of the intelligence war. The only slight variation in this structure is in Part III, where there are four chapters because of the greater volume of material to discuss between 1976 and 1998.
A number of key themes emerge from this book. The hitherto underappreciated regional nature of the conflict is explored. I compare the intelligence war’s impact on different IRA units by examining levels of republican armed activity in each region. In 1990, John Whyte called for more research on the regional element of the Troubles. With a few notable exceptions, this area remains underdeveloped, particularly for the post-1970s period.44 I explain how local variations in violence influenced overall British and IRA strategies at leadership level. Assessing the intelligence war’s regional impact can enhance our understanding of the conflict.45 Stathis N. Kalyvas argues that too much research on political violence focuses on armed groups in the cities, partly for logistical reasons. He argues that the ‘urban bias … distorts data’. Kalyvas suggests: ‘incorporating the local dimension … almost always uncovers the plurality and lack of uniformity of … experiences and outcomes … What is needed … is a way to connect the local and the national, the view from below with the perspective from above.’46 I explain why the IRA was not facing terminal decline by the 1990s by considering the intelligence war’s effect on the IRA in urban and rural areas.
Divisions within the state is another reoccurring theme. Cooperation between state agencies was crucial to achieving British political, military and intelligence objectives. Sir David Omand’s Securing the State emphasises that the coordination of government, intelligence and security structures is essential to the state’s effective response to terrorist or paramilitary attacks.47 I provide examples whereby multi-agency cooperation led to intelligence success. For example, there was some progress for British forces and intelligence against the East Tyrone IRA in 1987. But evidence also shows that rivalries between state institutions partly restricted intelligence achievements against the IRA. Furthermore, the intelligence war led to the rise or demise of certain intelligence agencies such as MI5, the Metropolitan Police Special Branch and the Royal Ulster Constabulary Special Branch. The book explains why MI5 became the dominant intelligence agency against the IRA in the UK.48 In addition, I suggest that divisions within the state influenced when talks with the IRA would emerge throughout the conflict.49
This book also considers how various British prime ministers used intelligence to achieve policy objectives against the IRA. The Black Door by Richard J. Aldrich and Rory Cormac evaluates how effectively British prime ministers used secret intelligence to achieve their aims in various situations. I will test the validity of their arguments by comparing how each government performed in the intelligence war against the IRA.50
A further theme explored is whether the intelligence war targeted the IRA without radicalising the republican community. Omand suggests that progress against an adversary requires reassuring ‘the communities in which terrorists seek support’. The state should not alienate these communities.51 Frank Foley has compared British and French security policies since 1998. Foley agrees that successful security and intelligence strategies must not antagonise the communities from which armed groups operate.52 I explore these arguments in relation to the intelligence conflict against the IRA. I will show that particular intelligence activities, including the use of the SAS in rural areas in the 1980s, often achieved only a short-term reduction in IRA activities. In the long term, controversial intelligence incidents could radicalise the local republican community. In the regions where these incidents occurred, the IRA’s campaign often continued or escalated. Of course, the British state may not have focused on winning support away from the IRA in some republican areas. But Operation Banner, the post-Troubles report published by the British Army in 2006, suggests that the British state wanted an ‘acceptable level’ of IRA activity before 1998. It describes this as ‘a level at which normal social, political and economic activities can take place without intimidation’.53 In other words, the British state wanted to reduce and contain the IRA’s campaign. Controversial intelligence incidents contradicted this objective in the long term. They created further toleration, if not support, for IRA activity in republican areas. At times, such incidents made the violence worse. As Foley argues, these actions were tolerated partly because Northern Ireland was viewed as a ‘place apart’, where traditional UK liberties did not always apply.54
The IRA was not the sole focus of British intelligence during the Troubles. British and RUC intelligence efforts were also directed against loyalist paramilitaries as well as smaller republican groups such as the Irish National Liberation Army (INLA).55 Nonetheless, the threat posed to the British state by the IRA was far greater. For this reason, my book investigates the intelligence war against the Provisional IRA.56
Definitions and Terminology
The British government sets their own security and intelligence policies. It is the intelligence services who work with them to gather, analyse and act on secret information. The intelligence services gather this information primarily by covert means. However, the government have the final say over how to act on intelligence.57 In Northern Ireland, there was an intelligence war waged against the IRA. Whilst British agencies tried to gather and use covert information, the IRA resisted. Omand explains how covert intelligence differs from overt security measures. Intelligence aims to ‘pre-empt’ terrorist and paramilitary activities. Omand summarises the primary sources of obtaining pre-emptive intelligence: ‘the recruitment of human sources (HUMINT) and the interception (and where necessary deciphering) of communications (COMINT) … that together with radar and electronic intelligence (ELINT) makes up the broader category called signals intelligence (SIGINT)’.58 In relation to Northern Ireland, Omand’s definitions, with his emphasis on secrecy, human intelligence and signals intelligence, are favoured over competing definitions, as these were the primary sources of intelligence used.59 Open-source intelligence (OSINT) will also be discussed. This refers to intelligence gathered from open sources of information. In Northern Ireland, OSINT included gathering reports on republican meetings and strategies from sources such as An Phoblacht and Sinn Féin speeches.60 In addition, the use of covert intelligence to set up special operations against the IRA such as SAS ambushes is one of the intelligence methods evaluated in this book.
The key component of the British intelligence war against the IRA was the recruitment of informers and agents. George Clarke, a former RUC Special Branch officer, writes: ‘even mechanical gathering has to have a starting point, and that brings me to the informant. Surveillance teams needed to know where to go. What houses to target. What vehicles to follow.’61 William Matchett, a former RUC Special Branch member, argues:
approximately 60 per cent of all intelligence gathered in the Troubles was from people giving information or what [RUC] SB called agents. Of the rest, approximately 20 per cent was technical (telephone intercepts, and eavesdropping on buildings/vehicles of known terrorists), 15 per cent surveillance and the last 5 per cent almost evenly split between framework operations (routine police and Army patrols that interacted with the public) and open sources (local newspapers, community/parish bulletins).62
Despite the emergence of sophisticated electronic intelligence-gathering methods, agents and informers remained crucial to British intelligence operations against the IRA.63
Englis
h defines terrorism as political violence used against various targets. It has a ‘psychological dimension, producing terror or fear among a directly threatened group … in the hope of maximizing political communication and achievement’. He admits that it can play a part in wider political campaigns as well. The ‘terror’ element can be used by state and non-state groups alike. English argues that we cannot define terrorism according to its targets. If terrorism occurs when an armed group targets civilians, he admits that conventional warfare and criminal activity could also be called ‘terrorism’. Whilst admitting that the word terrorism has been used for political purposes, he suggests: ‘my definition … allows us to use the word without assuming that those who practise such violence are necessarily … immoral or illegitimate’.64
Nonetheless, this book does not describe the IRA as a terrorist organisation, for multiple reasons.65 Dominic Bryan et al. suggest that the political aims of terrorist violence do not distinguish it from other acts of political violence. Even formal acts of war by states or assassinations by insurgents are political. In addition, the strong psychological reaction encouraged by terrorist violence does not make terrorism a unique form of political violence.66 The Blitz unleashed on the UK by Nazi Germany during the Second World War is one example. This example also shows why English is right to suggest that terrorism is not defined by the targeting of civilians. States and non-state groups have both killed civilians in conflicts to varying degrees, either intentionally or unintentionally.67
The term terrorism also overlooks the nuances in the use of political violence by different regional IRA units. In rural south Armagh, the IRA focused predominately on targeting British security forces. Alongside this strategy, the Belfast, Fermanagh and Tyrone IRA also attacked loyalist paramilitaries regularly. On occasion, these attacks led to Protestant civilian casualties. In contrast, the IRA in England killed civilians (whether intentionally or not), security-force members and British politicians. Similar to those by the Belfast and Derry City IRA, republican attacks in England also targeted the economy via commercial bombings. The distinct nature of the IRA’s campaign in each locality is blurred by applying the generalised term of ‘terrorism’, rather than describing it as ‘political violence’ or ‘armed activities’.
