by Thomas Leahy
In Derry City, the other major epicentre of IRA activity before June 1972, we now know that Observer B was passing intelligence to British forces. He was mentioned during the Bloody Sunday Inquiry in 2000. A former MI5 officer said that Observer B was recruited by a British Army Battalion Intelligence Officer in 1970. The testimony of Observer B at the Saville Inquiry suggests that he was a businessman travelling across Northern Ireland, and that he gathered intelligence from various loyalist and republican contacts. Information provided to the inquiry suggested that his intelligence had some impact on the Derry IRA. In May 1972, a Military Intelligence Liaison Officer (MILO), who coordinated Army intelligence work with MI5 and RUC Special Branch, told the MI5 handler of Observer B that this agent had helped discover ‘a major arms smuggling route … [and] the location of a weapons’. The Observer B case suggests a degree of infiltration of the Derry City IRA, even if limited.31
The author has not encountered any other specific examples of surveillance operations against the Derry City IRA before June 1972. According to Cursey, the MRF was created and positioned in Belfast.32 During a meeting between Harold Wilson and Sir Harry Tuzo on 16 November 1971, the British Army GOC in Northern Ireland, Tuzo said ‘the first priority is Belfast’. Operations in Derry City would be expanded ‘in due course’.33 The card-index system for vehicles would have operated in the same way in Derry City as in Belfast. But the degree of success of this system in Derry City is questionable. There are no available accounts detailing significant arrests there against the IRA resulting from vehicle checkpoints by July 1972. Initially, the accessibility of the border with Donegal made escaping across the border possible in Derry.34 Surveillance operations in Derry City appear undeveloped in this period, because British forces saw the greatest threat to Northern Ireland as located in Belfast, the capital city.
The Belfast and Derry City IRA units were initially based on the brigade, battalion and company structures. The Belfast Brigade was made up of three battalions; the first battalion covered the Andersontown and Upper Falls Road area; the second was based around Ballymurphy and the Lower Falls Road; and the third battalion consisted of the various nationalist enclaves such as the Unity Flats, the Ardoyne, the Bone, the Markets and the Short Strand.35 According to Danny Morrison, the former Sinn Féin director of publicity, this structure meant that ‘the IRA fought its armed struggle through local people in local brigades. Beechmont people would be fighting the British Army in Beechmont; Ballymurphy people would be fighting the British Army in Ballymurphy.’36 Morrison explained that this structure was eventually cumbersome since it ‘made it much easier for British intelligence services to work out who was in A, B, C Company’.37 If one volunteer ‘turned’ they could reveal the identities of those with whom they operated because they all lived in the same area.
In addition, following increasing activities by loyalists and British forces, IRA volunteers grew in number by 1972. According to British Army statistics:
by July 1971 there were … about 200 members of OIRA [Official IRA] and 500 in PIRA. Of those 700 about 130 were in Londonderry and 340 in Belfast … By May 1972 there were about 1700 active members of the two organizations, and a further 600 had been interned … Altogether about 10,000 people were involved in the IRA between 1969 and 1972.38
Tommy McKearney estimates that each unit (company) of the Derry and Belfast IRA in this period had ‘in the range of 10 or 20 volunteers’.39 But Gerry Bradley, a former Third Battalion G Company leader in Belfast, remembers thirty active volunteers in his unit by 1972.40 The IRA’s significant expansion in the cities created opportunities for infiltration. The sheer volume of people involved made it difficult for the IRA to work out who exactly was informing. Kitson recognised that the Belfast IRA’s increasing size had made it ‘much too big’ to regulate by 1972.41
The IRA was also susceptible to infiltration by civilian agents in Belfast and Derry City. In the early 1970s, the organisation’s acceptance as defenders against British Army and loyalist incursions into some working-class nationalist areas enabled the IRA to operate fairly openly. During an interview, Féilim Ó hAdhmaill, a former republican prisoner, recalled the IRA’s more overt presence in nationalist Belfast during the early 1970s:
[y]ou would see people running around with guns in the early 1970s … I remember one time during a riot situation coming home from school and there was no bus … down the Falls Road … I saw this guy … He just walked up to this street corner and started shooting at a British Army foot patrol and then walked away.42
Other republicans recall similar incidents in Belfast.43 Elsewhere in Derry City, Shane Paul O’Doherty remembers a public IRA training exercise in the Creggan.44 Initially, the IRA did not even wear masks when operating.45 Being so open potentially exposed the IRA to agents and informers.
Nevertheless, the intelligence war had little success against these units before June 1972. Between January 1970 and June 1972, the Belfast and Derry City IRA persistently killed security-force members and other IRA ‘targets’ that they linked to the British state. It is possible to discern IRA ‘targets’ by checking whether that organisation justified or apologised for a particular killing in Lost Lives, which is currently the key source for details on conflict-related deaths. In this book, the IRA’s ‘targets’ for each of its main heartlands are not considered to include suspected agents and informers, civilians or loyalists. For the IRA, killing agents, civilians, informers or loyalists did not directly damage the British state and its representatives in the north of Ireland, which was the primary focus.46 As one seasoned republican commented, loyalists ‘were never our main focus … They took up a lot of our time and … our attention. But they were never the main focus.’47 The IRA’s responsibility for civilian deaths is considered in later chapters. Only when Lost Lives lists the IRA as responsible are any ‘intended targets’ included in the statistics below. Intended targets for the IRA included British soldiers, British and unionist politicians, contractors working for the British security forces, leading figures within the business community in Northern Ireland, members of the British judiciary, prison officers, RUC officers and UDR members.
In Belfast in 1971, the IRA killed 31 ‘intended targets’ altogether, including British soldiers, police officers and members of the UDR. The Belfast Brigade in total killed 53 ‘intended targets’ in 1972. These attacks were in addition to the financial damage inflicted on Belfast city centre, and civilians that the IRA killed.48 Ian Phoenix, an RUC officer at the time and later a member of RUC Special Branch, recalls various bombings against Springfield Road RUC barracks in west Belfast. One attack led to the death of an RUC member in May 1971. Phoenix also notes in his diaries that the ‘rest of 1971 became a blur of riots, shootings and bombings’ in Belfast. At no point does Phoenix suggest that the IRA in Belfast was suffering because of the intelligence war by June 1972.49
By 1971, the Derry City IRA was still in its infancy. In that year, it killed five security forces members. In contrast, in the first six months of 1972, the IRA killed nine security forces members there.50 Between August 1971 and February 1972, it is also estimated that there were 2,656 shots fired at British soldiers and 225 bomb attacks on businesses within Derry City, which cost an estimated £6 million in damages.51 An MoD assessment in March 1972 stated:
the commercial life of [Derry] City is being rapidly and visibly reduce [sic] … businessmen are cutting their losses and leaving … Londonderry remains an intractable problem. Both factions of the IRA are now in positions of strength, having recruited a large number of volunteers, amassed … arms and ammunition, and made themselves secure within the Bogside and Creggan areas.52
No wonder Operation Banner recalls that between March and July 1972, ‘control was being lost’ to the IRA.53
There are various explanations as to why the intelligence war had not inflicted significant damage on the Belfast and Derry City IRA by June 1972. First, the increasing sense of alienation felt by the nati
onalist population towards the British state restricted the amount of intelligence available. This alienation was primarily caused by the British Army’s indiscriminate actions at times. These actions included the Falls Road Curfew in Belfast and Bloody Sunday in Derry City. In Derry City, O’Doherty (a later opponent of the IRA and Sinn Féin) describes that many nationalists were ‘delighted’ when the British Army arrived in August 1969. They believed that the Army would stop loyalist attacks. But, O’Doherty went on, the change in atmosphere:
was noticeable within days. At the edge of the Bogside the Army set up tents through which everyone … had to pass … each person had to write his or her name, address or destination … Far from defending the Bogside from police and mob attack, the British Army was sealing it off … I lost any sense of welcome for the British Army.
His account goes on to argue that internment ‘was a license to rape a community’. Despite drifting away from the IRA before Bloody Sunday, he rejoined shortly afterwards because ‘the forces of so-called law and order were murdering us’. Admittedly, O’Doherty supported militant republicanism after the Easter Rising celebrations in 1966.54 Yet in his study of the start of the Troubles in Derry City, Niall Ó Dochartaigh (no relation) agrees that many Derry nationalists turned against the British state following various indiscriminate actions by the British Army. Colonial techniques of population control and ‘screening’ – whereby the British Army questioned nationalists about their activities, either on the streets or in custody for a few hours – embittered many nationalists in Derry City. The situation was similar in Belfast.55 This sense of hatred initially made it difficult for British intelligence to recruit high-level informers.
Without sufficient intelligence, the British Army had to conduct indiscriminate searches in nationalist areas. But these searches made many nationalists less likely to provide information on the IRA. Operation Banner explains how:
house searches were a major aspect of … operations [in the early 1970s]. They were normally conducted on the basis of information received, which was often … poor … Occupied house searches were hugely unpopular due to the invasion of privacy and inadvertent or sometimes deliberate damage that accompanied them … They probably contributed significantly to the alienation of the Catholic population.56
The need to conduct house searches was symptomatic of poor intelligence. But with British forces lacking sufficient intelligence, the Army felt that it had to conduct them to try to disrupt IRA activity. It was a vicious circle.
Alleged MRF actions at times exasperated tensions and influenced some nationalists to tolerate IRA control of their areas. McKittrick et al. and Taylor claim that MRF undercover operatives shot Patrick McVeigh, an unarmed ex-British serviceman, whilst driving past a vigilante checkpoint in west Belfast in May 1972.57 Another MRF unit allegedly wounded three taxi drivers in Andersontown in June 1972 following a drive-by shooting. Arrests followed. Sergeant Williams was subsequently charged with attempted murder, but was acquitted in 1973.58 The allegations surrounding these MRF activities so far remain unproven in court. If allegations of MRF involvement in these attacks are true, their purpose is difficult to decipher. Those targeted were not IRA members. These incidents would only have increased support for maintaining barricades for republican paramilitaries to protect the nationalist community. The examples explored here question Operation Banner’s argument that Whitelaw’s low-profile policy after March 1972 led to enhanced IRA control behind barricades.59 British Army actions prior to March 1972 also created support for the ‘no-go’ areas in Free Derry and parts of west Belfast. These barricaded areas were a disaster for the intelligence effort, as they became ‘denied areas’.60 Whilst the MRF were able to photograph individuals undercover, translating identification into arrests before June 1972 proved difficult. The IRA was able to operate behind barricaded areas.
Many working-class nationalists also tolerated the IRA as a necessary defensive force. This acceptance decreased intelligence-gathering opportunities for the British Army or RUC. Brendan Hughes claims that ‘[n]inety-nine per cent of the doors were left open’ to his IRA unit in Belfast in the early 1970s.61 Gerry Bradley agrees that ‘popular support was enormous’ for the IRA in north Belfast since: ‘[t]he areas of the third batt[alion] were constantly under attack from loyalists, from British Army raids. The IRA were the defenders … Every door was open.’62 British Army personnel recall the hostility they encountered in nationalist areas in Belfast and Derry City too.63 The IRA initially had popular support within working-class nationalist city estates.64
David Omand and Frank Foley both suggest that successful security policies require the state to only target paramilitaries. The state must not target the entire community from which the paramilitaries emanate. Omand, the first UK intelligence and security coordinator between 2002 and 2005, believes that successful security strategies can partly be judged according to:
whether the minority communities from whom the terrorists … seek support can be persuaded of the real nature of the threat … and of proportionality of the security response. Reassurance is needed that their community is not being stigmatized or discriminated against … at the same time as … effective intelligence-led action is taken to uncover the existing terrorists hiding within the community.65
In addition, Omand suggests that the use of intelligence and security measures can gain ‘time for longer-term measures addressing the roots of the current problems to take effect’.66 Foley agrees that ‘[a]n effective counterterrorist strategy needs … to prevent attacks, imprison those who posed a threat, and reduce levels of terrorist activity … without raising the political temperature in a way that could contribute to radicalisation’.67 Both authors emphasise that effective security and intelligence strategies must not radicalise the population whilst attempting to reduce paramilitary activity. The increase in IRA activity in Belfast and Derry City largely resulted from indiscriminate security and intelligence activities. Internment, Bloody Sunday and the killing of civilians allegedly by the MRF had all contributed to instability rather than a decrease in IRA violence by June 1972. These specific actions radicalised a significant minority of nationalists in the long term, who then sustained the IRA for years to come. Furthermore, this radicalisation did not contain and reduce IRA activities to ‘an acceptable level’. It had the opposite effect. These intelligence activities further suggest that the Heath government was focusing on gaining short-term advantages over the IRA. These measures were not designed to address the political factors driving the IRA’s campaign.
It is often overlooked that the IRA’s brigade, battalion and company structure at first helped create communal solidarity. Danny Morrison feels that this was one of the problems with ending this structure later:
local people … really took pride in their local IRA unit … Once the cell structure came in, it would no longer be people from the Falls Road exclusively making up D Company [based in the Lower Falls]; it would be more likely Volunteers from other areas of Belfast. The local element of pride … would have diminished.68
Recruiting large numbers into the IRA during this period was not a major security risk. The IRA was well supported within its communities and could remain elusive in the no-go areas. IRA support made intelligence hard to obtain.
The British Army came into Northern Ireland blind in intelligence terms, and so they relied on RUC Special Branch. But the RUC initially lacked adequate intelligence. Operation Banner admits that internment failed initially because: ‘suspect lists were badly out of date’.69 The RUC’s problem was that it was no longer welcome in working-class nationalist communities in Derry City or Belfast by 1969. The no-go areas starved it of intelligence-gathering opportunities.70 This problem further highlights the fact that indiscriminate security activities made it harder for the state to end the IRA’s campaign. The Army felt that RUC Special Branch was too small and ‘overworked’ in this period.71 George Clarke, a former RUC Special Branch officer in the b
order area in the early 1970s, agrees that many senior members initially ‘were just not up to the job’. Clarke believes that his superiors lacked practical experience on the ground.72 The situation whereby the British Army arrived in a country to find the local Special Branch in disarray was not new. It had had a similar experience in previous conflicts, including Kenya.73 It would take time for the Army to build its intelligence. But RUC Special Branch’s lack of intelligence made the Army’s job harder.
The British Army felt that RUC Special Branch ‘was almost completely ineffective’ in the early 1970s. They also ‘found the RUC to be secretive, and mistrustful of outsiders’.74 Clarke concurs that certain Special Branch officers had created ‘an elite force within a force’ and were reluctant to share information.75 In June 1969, the British government created a Joint Intelligence Committee. The British government also sent an MI5 officer and MILO to RUC headquarters at Knock. The MILO and MI5 officers found that RUC Special Branch had no centralised system of collating intelligence reports.76 However, RUC Special Branch was not ready to accept criticism. By July 1969, the two liaison officers had to move to a separate headquarters in Belfast after disputes with RUC Special Branch. William Whitelaw created the Director and Coordinator of Intelligence (DCI) role in October 1972. The DCI’s job ‘was to serve as [Whitelaw’s] personal security adviser and his link to the GOC and head of the RUC’. The DCI had to improve cooperation between the intelligence agencies. Nonetheless, the ‘problematic’ relationship between RUC Special Branch and military intelligence meant that the DCI never effectively coordinated intelligence between the two agencies in the early 1970s.77
