by Thomas Leahy
British intermediaries tried to persuade republicans to think about a political deal with loyalism that could eventually lead to British departure from Northern Irish affairs. In May 1975, for example, British intermediaries told the republicans: ‘the Brits feel that both Republicans and Loyalists want a way out of the situation; the Loyalists are not rigid regarding the British connection and there is an opportunity here for [republicans]’.54 British civil servants and intelligence officials had information suggesting elements within loyalism wanted greater independence for Northern Ireland. This intelligence most likely inspired Rees’s idea of ‘Ulster Nationalism’. Rees saw loyalist resistance to power-sharing under Sunningdale and the IRA’s continuing campaign as a demonstration of ‘Ulster nationalism’. In this view, both loyalists and republicans agreed that they did not want British government interference.55 Rees’s idea was not groundless. Glenn Barr, a leading figure in the UDA and the loyalist Vanguard political party, said in October 1973: ‘Let me put it on record that I stand here as an Ulster nationalist … an Ulsterman’s first allegiance must be to the state of Ulster.’56 Whilst Barr was unclear here about the parameters of his Ulster Nationalism, such as whether he wanted an independent Northern Ireland, he stated that loyalists would not indiscriminately accept any settlement in Northern Ireland that the British government wanted. Their opposition to Sunningdale demonstrates this point. British intermediaries met the UDA’s Glenn Barr and Andy Tyrie in June 1974 after the collapse of the Sunningdale Agreement. The British discovered that the UDA representatives were willing to discuss a six-county solution with the Provisionals, and to politicise loyalism.57 British government documents reveal that Rees and Wilson kept an eye on these conversations. In a letter from Rees to Wilson on 26 September 1974, Rees concluded that whilst currently there were no meetings between loyalists and republicans, the Labour government should ‘sponsor some kind of joint meeting’ if the opportunity arose.58 In March 1975, leading UDA members also met in Holland. They discussed Ulster independence for the six-county area to try to remove the border from politics in Northern Ireland.59 With republicans wanting a new nine-county Ulster parliament, the idea of potential common ground existing between loyalists and republicans was not completely far-fetched.
British ministers and officials were not receiving false intelligence on the political aims of republicans and loyalists. The Irish state also found that many unionist and loyalist leaders were contemplating Ulster independence. This perspective formed following secret contacts between the Irish Department of Foreign Affairs and various loyalist and unionist political representatives.60 The unionist politicians and loyalist paramilitaries that the Irish diplomats engaged with were senior policymakers in their respective organisations. In late July 1974, for example, a representative from the Irish Department of Foreign Affairs met with leading UDA representatives in a Belfast hotel. The UDA attendees argued that they wanted to ‘de-sectarianise’ politics by finding common ground with the SDLP. The leading UDA representative present made an astounding admission:
[He] sees a united Ireland as inevitable. It will come in a gradual development over a period of years but in his view there is no way in which it cannot happen. He said that people like himself see quite clearly that they are only second-class British citizens and when the British finally dump them, as he has no doubt they will, the only place they can turn to is the Republic.
The UDA representative added that the organisation wanted to take part in the forthcoming Constitutional Convention elections and talks, but:
[i]f the Convention does not work then he sees some sort of negotiated independence for Northern Ireland coming out. He is for power-sharing if it is power-sharing with the right people. [With] negotiated independence, the North would be driven inescapably to close links with the Republic and this would lead eventually to a united Ireland.
This passage illustrates that the UDA leadership favoured independence if the Convention collapsed. The UDA leaders did state that they were not interested at that point (July 1974) in talking to the IRA, despite approaches from leading republicans. The UDA leaders still felt the IRA was inflexible in its demands.61 The UDA leadership’s stance altered during the ceasefire in 1975. In a meeting in January 1975 with the Irish Department of Foreign Affairs representative, Glenn Barr insisted: ‘there should be at least one voice at the Convention which represents the Provo (IRA) point of view’. He also was in contact with Ó Brádaigh at the time via a Quaker intermediary.62 A senior UDA intermediary also stated that the UDA were ‘all for talking both to the Provos’ if private contacts could be organised from January 1975.63 The IRA ceasefire in 1975 changed opinions within the UDA leadership about talking to republicans.
During a meeting with a senior unionist MP in October 1974, the Irish Department of Foreign Affairs representative noted: ‘[the unionist MP] sees the creation of an independent Ulster as the only possible solution which might in the long-term lead to peace and stability’ if the Convention failed. ‘He would’, the report added, ‘see this independence as being negotiated and commanding financial support from London and political support from Dublin’. The report explains why this senior unionist MP believed that independence could work: ‘He thinks that if the Loyalists were to give up their aspirations to be British and the minority were to give up their aspirations to be Irish, a genuine Ulster allegiance could be won from both sides.’64 The Irish Department of Foreign Affairs continued to report that this unionist MP supported independence in June 1975.65 Elsewhere, in January 1975, a leading Vanguard and UDA representative told the Irish Department of Foreign Affairs representative that he remained ‘committed to … negotiated independence … [t]he historical aspirations of both communities will have to be abandoned as they contain the recurring seeds of civil war’.66 In May 1975, two leading UDA members explained to the Irish Department of Foreign Affairs representative that they accept: ‘that the British no longer want anything to do with Northern Ireland … This leads inevitably to an independent Northern Ireland.’ They said it was ‘preferable’ if independence was negotiated, but ‘[Person b] intervened to say if it could not be negotiated it would have to be seized and [Person a] did not dissent from this point of view’.67
Even Ian Paisley, the Democratic Unionist Party leader, considered independence. In an Irish Department of Foreign Affairs report from June 1975, Reverend William Arlow, a Protestant clergyman in contact with the IRA, said ‘that the British are planning a withdrawal and that the Provos [IRA] may well have been given private assurances on this’.68 Arlow’s statement led Paisley to consider negotiated independence. Paisley apparently feared a unilateral declaration of intent to withdraw by the British.69 On 21 May 1975, Brendan Duddy’s diaries also record the IRA Army Council receiving a message from Paisley. Paisley asked: ‘What does the PAC [Provisional Army Council] think of a … negotiated Ind[ependent] N.I. [Northern Ireland] …?’70
With various unionist and loyalist leaders shifting towards independence for Northern Ireland, the Irish government began to assess different options in mid-1975. One option discussed was the viability of independence. One Irish government report suggested: ‘every major loyalist politician in Northern Ireland has over the past year indicated either publicly or privately that independence was an option’. The group researching this political solution for the Irish Department of Foreign Affairs concluded in June 1975 that ‘the least undesirable of the undesirable developments in the event of a British withdrawal would appear to be negotiated independence with maximum guarantees [for nationalists], including a possible United Nations presence in Northern Ireland’. The report noted that independence could lower tensions in Northern Ireland. There was a fear that loyalists might use independence as an excuse to return to majority and discriminatory rule. But even some SDLP leaders told the Irish officials that they would consider independence. The SDLP’s support was conditional on the British state announcing their withdrawal and unionists agreeing to a
Bill of Rights beforehand.71 The Irish state believed that trying to find an agreement between loyalists and republicans was a reasonable policy to explore at the time. In an undated (most likely 1975) discussion paper, the Irish state representatives stated ‘ideologically motivated Republicans would accept that the solution [of an independent Northern Ireland] meant “breaking the connection with England”’. For this reason, the Irish government thought some republicans would accept independence.72The British government was therefore not deluded about seeking an agreement between loyalists and republicans on independence.
British intermediaries kept encouraging the two ‘extremes’ to talk throughout 1975. On 25 August 1975, the republican minute-taker records: ‘Meeting with Loyalists suggested [by British] … it appears to [British] that common aims could be identified.’73 On 22 October, the British allegedly made the following enquiry of republicans: ‘[i]n the event of [Her Majesty’s Government] giving the [declaration of intent to withdraw] – what accommodation could be reached with the Loyalists by the Republican Movement?’74 When Duddy replied that Sinn Féin would consider a six-county, independent Northern Ireland under loyalist rule in the short term, this sparked intense interest on the British side up to the highest levels.75 In a telegram from Rees to Wilson at the end of November, Rees describes how:
[w]e discussed at Chequers on 24 October the approach which we had had through contact [Duddy], from … Sinn Fein. Contact had said that they were ready to contemplate a future Loyalist government in a six-county Ulster … they wanted first from us a private indication of intent to withdraw from Ireland … We replied through contact on 27 October … expressing interest combined with readiness to talk … but not to give a Declaration of Intent.76
Wilson and Rees were contemplating a six-county Northern Ireland led by loyalists, even if that meant granting Northern Ireland independence. But they would not consider a private or public British declaration of intent to withdraw. Rees feared that such actions would provoke a ‘massive confrontation with the Protestant population in Northern Ireland’. As IRA activities continued, and with the Provisionals insisting on at least a private declaration of intent to withdraw, British interest in further conversations decreased. On 29 November 1975, Rees was confident that the IRA had lost support, declined in its military capabilities, and that its campaign would ‘peter out as others have done before it’.77 Despite the British engaging with republicans in talks in February 1976,78 the prospect of republicans and loyalists reaching an agreement was almost non-existent after an increase in sectarian attacks. The ‘[c]ontinuation of direct rule’ was gradually accepted as the way forward from November 1975.79
Nevertheless, the gradual shift in British political policy from late 1975 should not detract from the fact that leading British ministers and civil servants had sought to withdraw from Northern Ireland by encouraging an agreement towards independence. This political objective accounts for ambiguous statements that British representatives gave republicans about ‘structures of disengagement’ in talks. At a formal meeting in early April 1975, republican representatives requested a declaration of intent to withdraw. British intermediaries replied:
a firm public undertaking [of declaration of intent to withdraw] is … absolutely out of the question. This would lead to a Congo-type [civil war] which both Brits and [republicans] wish to avoid … If on the other hand [the republican movement] helps [Her Majesty’s Government] create circumstances out of which the structures of disengagement can naturally grow, the pace quickens immensely … The only way to develop is to get the ground work right. HMG cannot say they are leaving Ireland because the reaction will prevent that happening.80
The British government feared provoking a loyalist uprising if they reneged on the principle of consent for the majority in Northern Ireland.81 Instead, Wilson and others felt that dialogue between loyalists and republicans could investigate whether both sides would accept negotiated independence in 1975. If an agreement between all sides occurred, the British could accept ‘structures of disengagement’.
Rees and Wilson aimed to create engagement between the ‘extremes’. As Michael Oatley, an MI6 mediator with republicans in early 1975, admits, ambiguous statements were deliberately made to enable all sides to see the ceasefire as beneficial.82 When Duddy said that the British had a ‘something might turn up’ approach, he was right.83 What the British hoped would ‘turn up’ was a republican and loyalist agreement. All the British government felt they could do was to encourage dialogue. It was up to the parties to reach an accord. Sunningdale had taught the British government this point. Not everybody agreed with Wilson’s and Rees’s radical ideas. But there was no significant obstruction from within the government, MI5, MI6, the British Army or the Northern Ireland Office.84 The British state was not monolithic. But the government’s agenda in Northern Ireland was primarily driven by Wilson, Rees and Frank Cooper. They held the positions of power from which to directly influence Northern Irish affairs. Furthermore, as Wilson and Rees were encouraging and waiting for republicans, loyalists, nationalists and unionists to create a suitable agreement, if an agreement on independence emerged it would have been difficult for the UK parliament to reject. Opponents of Northern Irish independence within the British state would have been unlikely to reject an agreement that the political and armed actors in Northern Ireland suggested.
The Sunningdale Agreement’s failure partly explains Wilson’s and Rees’s preference for independence. Donoughue argues that Wilson began considering independence after the Sunningdale Agreement collapsed. For Rees and Wilson, loyalist and unionist resistance to power-sharing and an Irish dimension accompanying any political settlement in Northern Ireland appeared to suggest that loyalists and unionists would accept nothing less than a return to majority rule. If an agreement between loyalists and republicans emerged on the subject of independence, it seemed a logical solution to an intractable conflict at the time. There was also a sense of despair and ‘fatigue’ within the British Labour government following Sunningdale. In December 1974, Donoughue writes that many officials and Cabinet members saw long-term direct rule as a ‘non-policy’.85
Wilson, Rees and others also promoted Northern Irish independence to satisfy public opinion on the UK mainland. Within Wilson’s private papers, he kept letters from families with relatives in the British Army in Northern Ireland: the writers often favoured withdrawal. In April 1974, for example, one voter wrote to Wilson, saying ‘I am a Labour supporter’ and that they had a son currently in the British Army. Their son was being sent to Northern Ireland in July 1974. The person protested: ‘I want you to bring the troops home from that evil place. The lads don’t want to go and the people over there don’t want them.’ They finished their letter by saying that Wilson should fulfil the pledge he had made whilst in opposition of setting a date for withdrawing the troops regardless of a political agreement beforehand.86 Opinion polls at that time suggest that this view was not an exception on the UK mainland. A Daily Telegraph poll in 1975 noted that 64 per cent of UK mainland citizens wanted British withdrawal from Northern Ireland.87 Wilson and Donoughue saw a need for radical options following Sunningdale. In Donoughue’s words, ‘I told [Wilson] that he could not get Ireland right because nobody could, but he must get the English political end right.’ Wilson clearly agreed, which led to discussions about independence.88 Donoughue also writes that during May 1974, Wilson said that they had ‘to consider the “unmentionable – British withdrawal from Northern Ireland”. He said that what was not tolerable was British troops being shot by both sides.’89 Wilson feared that loyalist defiance of Sunningdale was a sign that the British government could potentially face a two-front conflict. Wilson envisaged that this scenario would see more British soldiers killed, and pressure growing against the Labour government to pull British troops out.
The IRA’s attacks in England in late 1974 also influenced Labour government thinking. These attacks sometimes provoked further tension
between UK mainland citizens and Irish immigrants in England. For example, following the pub bombings in Birmingham in November 1974, thirty factories temporarily closed following clashes between English and Irish workers. In London, petrol bombs were thrown into a few Irish clubs in retaliation.90 These incidents began to cause concern in the UK government about the price of remaining in Northern Ireland. Meeting notes from a Downing Street discussion on 4 December 1974 said:
[t]here was a serious danger of an overspill of Northern Ireland conditions into … Britain which could inflict deep damage on our social fabric … the question that now faced us was the extent to which we could insulate Great Britain from the ills which afflicted the Province.91
Wilson, Rees and Cooper were all present during this meeting. Various Cabinet members shared the view quoted above. Jenkins commented during a Cabinet committee on Northern Ireland on 4 December 1974 that there was ‘the real prospect and danger … of the barbaric standards of Northern Ireland spreading to the rest of us’. Jenkins backed Rees’s calls to ‘distance’ Northern Ireland from the rest of the UK in 1975.92 For Labour, who sought the working-class vote in particular, it was a nightmare scenario to see Irish and British working classes within England turning against each other because of violence related to Northern Ireland. If distancing Northern Ireland from the UK could resolve these tensions, there is little surprise that the Labour leadership explored this option.
Wilson’s decision to use intelligence to see if a political compromise could be found involving the IRA and loyalists reflects his wider approach to security and intelligence matters during his time in office. Aldrich and Cormac remind us that Wilson had attempted to act as an intermediary between the United States and Vietnamese previously. In their opinion, Wilson was in favour of using intelligence to try to create peace. Wilson partly wanted to demonstrate his peaceful socialist intentions. But he also wanted to show that he was somebody ‘who could make deals and even shape history’.93 It is also important to remember that Wilson favoured Irish unity, although not its achievement through violence. For these reasons, Wilson allowed the intelligence services to meet republicans, and their intermediary Brendan Duddy. Wilson also enabled Rees, civil servants and intelligence staff to meet with loyalists. His Labour government was a keen collator of intelligence that could inform policy options.94 In this way, Wilson and Rees used intelligence gathered to carefully explore all possible options for ending the conflict, including talking to the IRA. Their actions are remarkable considering the outrage against the IRA in England at that time, particularly following the pub bombings in late 1974. So important was the progress of the talks with the IRA that Wilson personally met each week with the director of MI5 for updates.95 Rees displayed a similar level of willingness to investigate long-term options for political settlements using available intelligence.
