by Thomas Leahy
The trouble was that republican leaders overestimated their importance to the British government in 1975. As Ó Dochartaigh argues, republicans overlooked the ‘countervailing pressures from loyalists, unionists, the security forces … the Irish government’, and the SDLP. This pressure meant that the British government would not prioritise republican demands. Nor did they need to focus on placating republicans. The IRA did not have an electoral mandate in 1975. Without a strong electoral mandate across Ireland, or an IRA victory, there was very little leverage that the IRA could get towards British withdrawal. Furthermore, the British government were primarily concerned with keeping the unionist population on side to avoid a two-front war. After the ceasefire collapsed, the Provisionals realised the importance of an electoral mandate, a position they adopted in the 1980s.40
The UDA’s failure to take part in the Convention elections in 1975 also decreased the British government’s ability to grant concessions to the paramilitary groups. Since elected unionist representatives, including Ian Paisley and Bill Craig, alongside the SDLP and the Irish government, would only accept Northern Irish independence as a last resort if the British government were going to withdraw,41 the inability of republicans and loyalists to politicise meant that any move towards independence for the North became difficult to justify. For the British government to promote independence was to ignore the democratically elected representatives in Northern Ireland. The UDA and republican grass-roots’ reluctance to participate in elections restrained British options for independence.
Were the British government deluded in their belief that there were ‘doves’ within the IRA ready to make substantial compromises in 1975? Frank Cooper told Rees and Wilson on 17 January 1975 that the initial ceasefire had broken down because the Provisional militarist ‘hawks’ had overcome the political ‘doves’.42 As mentioned, some republicans were serious about considering an independent Northern Ireland.43 Talk of ‘hawks’ and ‘doves’ within the IRA leadership was not plucked out of thin air. Those speaking on behalf of republicans told British representatives that such divisions existed. Father Denis Faul of Dungannon and Father Patrick Conning of Dublin spoke of divisions within republican ranks to Michael Oatley in April 1973: ‘O’Connell was anxious for peace and a move to politics … Adams … might readily be persuaded to the same point of view … Twomey was … intransigent’.44 Reverend Dr Edward Daly agreed. On 7 January 1975, he met leading Provisionals and noted ‘division between hawks and doves’. In particular, Ó Conaill was praised for ‘being sincerely interested in peace. Twomey however struck the Bishop as … extremely nasty’.45
In that year, there were divisions throughout the republican movement over what would represent an acceptable political compromise. Bradley stated that he ‘didn’t want a political settlement, [I] wanted a withdrawal’.46 In contrast, O’Doherty recalls in Derry: ‘[t]hose giving support to the ceasefire process argued that it was absolutely necessary … to translate … suffering into some realistic deal with the British … Some individuals … regarded [it] as … a traitorous sell-out’.47 There were other differences between republicans. Later, many younger republicans such as Gerry Adams would be against a nine-county Ulster parliament, as they felt that it enabled unionists to deny all-Ireland self-determination. Conway certainly felt that it: ‘seemed entirely insane … to propose giving the whip-hand straight back to the unionists in the event of our success’. He added: ‘this particular policy [Éire Nua] was … hard sold … in places like Belfast, which had been under the unionist cosh since partition’.48 The concept of Éire Nua was eventually removed from the Sinn Féin constitution in the early 1980s under Adams’s direction.49 Ó Brádaigh also told Duddy, on 7 May 1975, that McGuinness was ‘causing trouble’, implying that the latter was against the ceasefire.50
It seems that the British misunderstood the nature of republican divisions. British ministers appeared not to fully grasp the information they were gathering from Duddy on IRA intentions and the importance of a declaration of intent to withdraw. Disagreements between republican leaders were centred on tactical issues, such as: was the IRA’s campaign the sole vehicle leading to a united Ireland? Should the organisation announce a ceasefire before the British granted major concessions? And was an independent northern state acceptable considering that it would mean British withdrawal? What republican leaders did not disagree on in 1975 was the need for a British declaration of intent to withdraw before any political compromise could emerge. The republican delegation meeting with British intermediaries continually asked for a declaration of intent to withdraw. The ‘doves’ did not disagree with the ‘hawks’ that a declaration of intent to withdraw, given in private if necessary, was crucial before any political settlement could be agreed with unionists and loyalists.
Conway argues: ‘[t]here have been suggestions … that the British followed a policy of … stringing [us] along … It is not at all clear that they were that clever, or our negotiators that stupid’, particularly as the Irish government even felt that the British were trying to withdraw.51 Reservations about the ceasefire only emerged once some time had passed and the British had shown no signs of withdrawal. At that point, opposition even emerged within the so-called doves camp. Duddy records how ‘O’Connell … decided on war’ in June 1975.52 The evidence we have so far seen shows that the objective of obtaining a British declaration of intent to withdraw was key for grass-roots republicans as well as for many IRA leaders.53 Subtle differences between the ‘doves’ and ‘hawks’ were never really understood by the British government, who focused on their desire to end the persistent conflict by 1975 and protect the UK mainland from further attacks.
Conclusion
The main factor motivating the IRA to call an indefinite ceasefire in 1975 was the republican leadership’s belief that British withdrawal was on offer. Without a substantial decline in the IRA’s ability to continue its campaign outside of Belfast, and without a political mandate, republican leaders saw no reason to accept British rule in any form in 1975. This chapter has also asked whether the IRA and British governments were deluded in their expectations of each other in 1975. They both misunderstood how flexible their opponents were willing to be in order to reach a political settlement. Republicans persistently stressed the need for a British declaration of intent to withdraw, although some leaders would consider an independent Northern Ireland as a transitional arrangement to be entered into before the goal of a united Ireland could be achieved. The British government mistakenly believed that an appetite to politicise republicanism on the part of Ó Conaill and others was evidence that they might forgo a declaration of intent to withdraw. There was no major distinction between the ‘hawks and doves’ in the IRA at this time in terms of their demand for a British declaration of intent to withdraw. The differences surrounded whether the idea of an independent Northern Ireland reluctantly accepted by some IRA leaders was an acceptable compromise. In the eyes of some IRA leaders, technically, Northern Irish independence was British withdrawal. But grass-roots republicans did not support the idea.
The evidence suggests that the British government did not lie about withdrawal. However, republican leaders did not see that the British government were unlikely to grant withdrawal without significant military and political pressure being applied. The British government were always conscious of the need to placate unionists to avoid a two-front war. In this sense, both the 1972 and 1975 ceasefires were missed opportunities for republicans. They may have acquired further concessions from the British government if they had applied political pressure via an electoral mandate, or via an alliance with the SDLP and Irish government on nationalist objectives.54 Of course, we cannot say whether such an alliance would have worked, nor whether Sinn Féin would have received considerable electoral support, although Duddy claims John Hume contacted the republican leadership for talks in September 1975.55 Nonetheless, this chapter has provided examples to demonstrate that by mid-1975, the fear of a British wit
hdrawal saw significant elements within the SDLP and Irish government consider negotiated Northern Irish independence as a potential political solution. Republican leaders who favoured negotiated independence themselves as a last resort seemed to share a similar position to other nationalists by mid-1975. But republicans continued to be ignored by other nationalists because they lacked a political mandate to promote their ideas. In addition, leading republicans had failed to politicise their grass-roots and promote the merits of political concessions in order to achieve their central objective of British withdrawal. Opposition to the ceasefire from south Armagh, Belfast and Tyrone republicans demonstrates this point. Republican leaders did learn the lesson about the importance of a political mandate after 1975. They began to actively organise politically and advocate political solutions to the conflict from the early 1980s. The process of convincing republican volunteers of the merits of political action, and, eventually, political compromise took place gradually from then on.
By late November 1975, Rees had decided to bypass the IRA. The British state prepared for a ‘long war’. They sought to bring about an acceptable level of violence, and a future power-sharing settlement within a Northern Ireland embedded within the UK. The intelligence war was again to play a crucial role in trying to reduce IRA activities and make the organisation, at the very least, politically and militarily irrelevant. Not everyone agreed with this approach. One British civil servant wrote in May 1976:
Republicanism … will not go away … recent years have shown that it has consistently enjoyed a good deal of political if not electoral support … Until we … involve the leaders of the Republican tradition in political life, the formation and execution of a coherent long-term political strategy will fail.56
As Ó Dochartaigh notes, this was a ‘losing paper’.57 The chapters in Part III reveal that this civil servant was somewhat prophetic. Not even agents and informers within the IRA’s hierarchy made the movement politically or militarily irrelevant by the 1990s.
Part III
The Struggle to Contain the IRA: January 1976 to April 1998
7
British Political, Military and Intelligence Strategy towards the IRA: 1976–1998
Between 1976 and 1989, the British government tried to create a political settlement between the SDLP and unionist parties. Meanwhile, British security policy focused on creating an ‘acceptable level’ of IRA activity: ‘a level at which normal social, political and economic activities can take place without intimidation’.1 The British state tried to bring about a situation whereby the IRA’s campaign and Sinn Féin’s political strategy would have little influence on political affairs in Northern Ireland. In this scenario, the IRA would be ‘forced’ either to continue with an ineffective campaign or to accept a political settlement over which they had little influence. In order to reduce IRA activity, the British state continued to gather and use intelligence, partly because it assisted its efforts to avoid targeting the nationalist community indiscriminately. It was particularly important to gather agents and informers from republican communities because of the IRA’s more clandestine nature following the implementation of smaller cell units in Belfast and Derry City after 1975.
The second part of Chapter 7 demonstrates a significant shift in British policy towards republicans by the 1990s. At this point, the British state had begun to re-engage with the republican movement in backchannel dialogue and public statements. The British government sought to draw republicans into a ceasefire and all-party talks. The intelligence campaign continued so that the IRA would promptly agree to a ceasefire and a political compromise. I also explain how the IRA leadership only persisted in its campaign in order to bring the British state back to the negotiating table, albeit whilst obtaining the strongest possible electoral mandate to potentially extract maximum concessions in future negotiations.2 This change in republican leaders’ strategy was evident from at least the early 1980s. The importance of this argument will be explained in the following chapters, in which I argue that the IRA was not facing terminal decline by the 1990s and that the British state did not ‘win’ the intelligence conflict.3
The Labour Government, 1976–1979
Harold Wilson and Merlyn Rees had contemplated granting Northern Ireland independence or dominion status in 1975. By 1976, however, the British government saw no prospect of the IRA grasping that option. Republican leaders wanted at least a private declaration of intent to withdraw from the British. There were other factors behind the British Labour government’s decision to end talks with the republican movement. Niall Ó Dochartaigh explains that republican leaders’ willingness to negotiate had the ‘perverse effect of providing incentives for the British government to minimise movement towards the Republican position’. He argues: ‘If the Provisionals were weakening and … were reluctant to restart their campaign it didn’t make sense for the British government to incur the costs involved in negotiating a settlement with them.’ The British state feared that including republicans in talks would provoke a unionist rebellion and create a two-front conflict.4 In Rees’s opinion, political settlements with the IRA were unnecessary by November 1975. Rees believed that the increasing arrests, the supposed declining support on the streets for the IRA, and the IRA leadership’s repeated calls for talks showed that republicans were getting ‘desperate’.5 From a British state perspective, there was nothing to gain by granting concessions to the IRA. On 8 May 1976, for instance, Brendan Duddy records angry exchanges with British intermediaries during a meeting in Belfast: ‘I said “the IRA want peace” … [Middleton] … said, “if the IRA is losing support, why should we aid them by giving them a way out?”’6
As Ó Dochartaigh argues: ‘In 1976 … a dominant consensus [emerged within the British state suggesting] that the struggle against the Provisionals could be won and that it was not necessary to engage with them.’7 This sentiment was illustrated in November 1975. Rees told Wilson that the republican military campaign ‘will eventually peter out as others have done before it’.8 In April 1975, Frank King, the GOC, also believed ‘the present Provisional IRA campaign will … peter out if attrition is maintained for long enough’.9 The trend in British policy towards republicans after 1975 was to isolate republicans from political settlements whilst eroding the IRA’s armed capacity to a point where they no longer had any influence on Northern Irish politics.10
The British state’s new strategy against the IRA was encapsulated in a document entitled The Way Ahead for Security Policy, circulated in autumn 1977. Various civil servants, MI5 officers, the Northern Ireland Office and leading Army and RUC personnel had an input into its contents.11 The consensus was that increasing arrests and a decline in support was weakening the IRA. The authors foresaw a situation whereby: ‘[t]hose who recognise that the [IRA] campaign has failed … may revive attempts to negotiate a ceasefire’. They argued that the British government should reject any republican offer for further ceasefires and talks. The document argued: ‘PIRA is unlikely to sacrifice its basic principles – a declaration of intent to withdraw … and a commitment to a 32 county Ireland.’ For this reason, ‘we cannot see any negotiations having a lasting impact on the security situation’. Instead, the document explained:
[Her Majesty’s Government’s] policy is the restoration of law and order. This means treating [the IRA] through the courts and seeing them serve their prison sentences in the ordinary way. This is a long-term policy and leaves no scope for honourable or lasting ‘ceasefires’ or ‘stacking of arms’ by PIRA.
The paper also noted how ‘covert operations’ were vital ‘to maintain a high rate of attrition against PIRA terrorists’.12 The Way Ahead document reveals two key components of British policy towards republicans between 1976 and 1989: the British state was no longer interested in encouraging the IRA to accept a political compromise because PIRA was ‘unlikely to sacrifice’ its demand for British withdrawal; and a combination of increasing court convictions of IRA volunteers, alongside cov
ert operations, was the best way to reduce the IRA’s capacity for conflict. The overall ambition of British policy between 1976 and 1989 was to eventually reduce IRA activity and political support to such an extent that it no longer had any significant influence over Northern Irish political or socio-economic affairs.13 As Operation Banner puts it, British forces sought an ‘acceptable level of violence’: ‘a level which the population can live with, and with which local police forces can cope … and at which a political process can proceed without significant intimidation’.14
Rees ended Special Category Status for paramilitary prisoners in March 1976 in order to ‘criminalise’ the IRA. The British state hoped that ‘criminalisation’ could discourage more nationalists from backing the IRA.15 Roy Mason expanded on Rees’s efforts by focusing primarily on security policy. Mason was in complete agreement with The Way Ahead document from 1977: there would be no further negotiation opportunities for republicans.16 In January 1977, he explained to Prime Minister James Callaghan: ‘we have no intention of engaging in further talks with … Sinn Fein’. Mason ended the contact with Duddy.17
Despite a decline in IRA killings under Mason,18 this decrease resulted partly from changes in the organisation’s tactics and numbers.19 Evidence below also shows that criminalisation struggled to degrade the IRA’s armed capacity by 1979. Operation Banner addressed one difficulty with criminalisation: ‘[t]he security forces [often] had information about offences that was not strong enough to bring a conviction’. Consequently: ‘people suspected of up to a dozen or more terrorist offences [were] able to move openly in the community’.20 The IRA’s counter-intelligence methods contributed to this difficulty. Bradley recalls: ‘By 1976 you were worrying about forensics – cleaning up, burning stuff’.21 As Chapter 9 will demonstrate, the strategy of detaching the IRA leadership from direct involvement in its own operations made it challenging for the security forces to convict IRA Army Council members.
