by Thomas Leahy
An effective counterterrorist strategy needs to be able to monitor, investigate, capture and prosecute the adversary in order to prevent attacks, imprison those who posed a threat, and reduce levels of terrorist activity. But it must do all this without raising the political temperature in a way that could contribute to radicalisation. It must aim instead to lessen support for terrorism and reduce the numbers of people seeking to get involved in militant networks.128
In rural areas, the use of lethal force in select incidents did not appear to reduce the political temperature and ‘lessen support for terrorism’. Nor did it deter further paramilitary activities, for example in south Armagh and north Armagh. The involvement of RUC units in the ‘shoot-to-kill’ incidents undoubtedly maintained tensions between the republican community and police, which was part of the reason the RUC were reformed and renamed after 1998. Even if the security forces were not actually seeking to reduce republican support, they did want IRA violence to be reduced to ‘an acceptable level’. The controversial incidents arguably encouraged further IRA activity in many areas, rather than containing the republican threat in the long term.
As McKearney suggested, rural units frequently evaded arrest and potential pressure to inform by escaping across the border to the Irish Republic. British security forces certainly felt the border was rather porous. In ‘Future Terrorist Trends’ in 1978, Glover commented that ‘the Republic … provides many of the facilities of the classic safe haven so essential to any terrorist movement’.129 In the late 1980s, the British Army reported that the majority of rural IRA units were based in the Irish Republic.130 The British state’s area review for Fermanagh suggested: ‘[t]he main threat to security … comes from cross-border PIRA terrorists’. It added: ‘[t]he collection of intelligence presents difficulties, as few terrorists in the region live north of the border’.131 The ability of rural units to evade extensive arrests was significant. Séanna Walsh explains the consequences of fewer arrests: ‘you didn’t have to replenish your ranks. As you do replenish your ranks you are opening up the possibility of bringing people in with an ulterior motive.’132 Without numerous arrests, it was difficult to gain an opportunity to try to ‘turn’ rural volunteers for British intelligence in the first place. A former British soldier suggests: ‘[i]f you are looking at the issue of source development in [rural areas], the major problem was that the IRA was in the south. Where are you going to start making inroads?’133 With a few volunteers from places such as Fermanagh living across the border, any ‘loose talk’ in pubs was challenging for British intelligence to act on.
The cross-border activities of rural units raises questions about the effectiveness of Garda security and intelligence services. Whilst accepting that the Garda lacked resources and funding, Matchett blames political pressure by various Dublin administrations for preventing greater cooperation between Garda and RUC officers. Matchett argues: ‘Ireland’s failings facilitated the IRA to conduct a prolonged terrorist campaign in Northern Ireland.’ He controversially concludes that ‘Ireland’s failings’ partly resulted from the Dublin government realising that if the IRA achieved their shared objective of a united Ireland ‘by proxy’, this would be politically popular.134 Based on the available evidence it does not appear that the Irish state’s intelligence services offered any significant restraint on cross-border IRA units. The British area review for Fermanagh in the early 1980s commented: ‘[a]t the moment, Garda penetration of PIRA is not good enough to provide [intelligence coverage]’.135 The south Armagh report reached a similar conclusion.136 In many cases, it was not that the Garda did not want to help. On the contrary, the Fermanagh report stated: ‘[a]lthough Gardai willingness to cooperate … [is] good, the strength, nature and equipment of their force produce practical limitations on their effectiveness’.137 A former British soldier agrees:
the Garda … had no money or resources … When people talk about the Garda not doing very much, they basically couldn’t because they were such a small force. And during the seventies the Irish Army was heavily committed in Lebanon … working with the UN, and the Irish Army got paid by the UN. So the number of troops that they could provide to patrol a huge border was limited.138
Crucially, Operation Banner suggests: ‘[t]here was … no guarantee that any possible Dublin Government measures in the Border areas would have been effective: the Garda and Irish Army forces available were small’.139 These quotes highlight that the lack of resources and funding available in the Irish state meant that policing the border was difficult. The sheer size and terrain of the border made it challenging to monitor.140
Patrick Mulroe also suggests that fears of collusion between loyalists and British security forces affected Garda cooperation with the RUC and British Army in certain areas. These suspicions were mutual. The British Army and RUC also suspected IRA and Garda collusion in some areas. Mulroe accepts that political influence by Dublin on the Garda tried to ensure the focus was on protecting their own state from a growth in republican support and activities. But Mulroe reminds us that RUC levels were too low in areas such as south Armagh, hampering cross-border cooperation. Although relating specifically to the 1970s, available evidence suggests that his arguments can certainly be applied to cross-border cooperation (or the lack of it) during the 1980s as well.141
The vast rural terrain aided the rural IRA in hiding its activities from ‘nosey’ neighbours in the countryside. A former British soldier noted: ‘rural areas were better at preventing infiltration … If you saw somebody loading chemical drums into … a van, it is very difficult to hide that in a city … Doing that in a rural area is a lot easier’.142 Getting around border obstructions also prosed few problems for rural volunteers. Local people could find routes across the border to avoid capture and potentially being put under pressure to inform.143 Vehicle checkpoints were often avoided too. In fact, static checkpoints or observation towers presented targets for attacks. On 1 May 1992, for instance, the South Armagh IRA staged an audacious attack against the Cloghogue permanent vehicle checkpoint on the border. This checkpoint was positioned by the main Dublin–Belfast railway line. The IRA hijacked a JCB digger to lift a brown transit van onto the railway line. They fitted the van with tyres to enable it to travel along the tracks. It was loaded with explosives controlled by a command wire. The van detonated as it approached the checkpoint. This attack killed one soldier and injured another twenty-three.144 Earlier, on 13 December 1989, the IRA killed two British soldiers and injured others during a large-scale attack on Derryard checkpoint in Roslea, County Fermanagh, on the border with Monaghan. The attack involved using a flamethrower.145 Operation Banner concludes that permanent and snap vehicle checkpoints posed few problems for the rural IRA.146
McKearney suggests that rural units tended to consist of ‘friends or work mates’. Of course, he is right to say that ‘[t]he downside of this … was that if one member was exposed, the others came immediately under suspicion’.147 Ambushes by the SAS in Tyrone could demonstrate the dangers of operating with local friends or family. Since these ambushes did not occur to the same extent in Fermanagh or south Armagh, it suggests that there was a deep sense of loyalty and trust between many rural IRA volunteers. Other factors such as working or socialising together meant that rural nationalists had greater knowledge of and personal connection with rural volunteers, potentially making it less likely that the latter would inform.148 A former British soldier certainly felt that connections between IRA volunteers and the local community in rural areas made infiltration difficult: ‘[i]n the rural areas … [the IRA] could get away with it because they knew everybody’.149 These close ties between nationalists extended across the border into the border counties of the Republic of Ireland, such as parts of Louth, Cavan and Monaghan. These cultural and family connections posed further challenges for the Irish or UK security forces in their attempts to apprehend rural IRA volunteers from the North, as it was difficult to get the intelligence necessary to catch volunteers red-han
ded.150
A crucial factor in explaining why many rural IRA units escaped significant infiltration was their semi-autonomous nature in terms of vetting volunteers and preparing operations. The available evidence suggests that Stakeknife had limited access to rural units, apart from Newry, where a collapse of the IRA campaign in the late 1970s permitted interference from Belfast.151 A former British soldier familiar with rural IRA units said: ‘anyone coming in from Belfast PIRA thinking that they were going to … check on … rural units would be told to think again’.152 Eamon Collins remembers the South Armagh IRA refusing to allow the internal security unit to carry out extensive reviews of local volunteers and operations.153 Since the South Armagh, North and Mid-Armagh and Fermanagh IRA did not appear to suffer substantial infiltration, it seems that Stakeknife and the internal security unit were not vetting these units. Otherwise, there would have been a greater number of failed operations. The general pattern in most rural areas was that they vetted their own recruits and maintained a degree of autonomy, which was a crucial security measure. As Paul Larkin concludes about Stakeknife: ‘he … questioned IRA volunteers after certain operations and in certain areas. He was … never in a position to walk into a particular area and demand prior details of an operation.’154 These are essential points to remember about Stakeknife, which have previously been overlooked in academic literature when assessing his impact on the IRA based on the available evidence.
The IRA Leadership and the IRA in England
The frequency of major operations in England during the 1990s indicates a lack of consistent infiltration of the IRA leadership. The IRA Army Council created and sanctioned IRA strategy and policies. Seven individuals sat on the Council, whose members were chosen by a separate twelve-person Army Executive. The Executive’s members, in turn, were chosen by IRA volunteers at one of the rare General Army Conventions. The IRA Chief of Staff – chosen by the Army Council – implemented IRA policy on a day-to-day basis.155 Operations and volunteers for the English department were carefully and secretly selected by the leadership.156 Gary McGladdery argues that attacks in England sought to ensure that an ‘unacceptable level of violence’ was maintained, particularly if IRA units were struggling in Northern Ireland. This is not to say that the IRA’s campaign in Northern Ireland was weakening.157 In fact, whilst IRA attacks increased in England in the 1990s, many rural and urban units remained problematic for the security forces back in Northern Ireland.
Despite a few devices exploding or being defused in Bristol, London and Liverpool, the number of IRA attacks in England temporarily declined in the late 1970s. Christopher Andrew hints at ‘success in penetrating PIRA’ as being responsible. He also points out that the IRA in England made some basic errors, such as purchasing a fake driving licence which had been used before, enabling the intelligence services to track those using it.158 Significant arrests occurred, including in Belfast. The RUC arrested Brian Keenan, who Ian Adams and Ray Wilson say helped organise IRA attacks in England during 1974 and 1975 and in March 1979.159 McGladdery also reports that the IRA decided to ‘lay low’ for a while by the late 1970s, so that new ‘sleeper cells’ would not be detected.160 Agents and informers still infiltrated English cells on occasion in the 1980s. The IRA’s leaders sometimes got their selection wrong and an informer slipped through. Sean O’Callaghan, an IRA volunteer from Kerry, was a Garda informer. Alongside disrupting IRA robberies and training camps in southern Ireland, O’Callaghan says that he acquired information on the English department following ‘loose talk’ on the part of one of its members. In late 1982, O’Callaghan claims that he was promoted to the English department and prevented an attempt to kill Prince Charles and Princess Diana, alongside disrupting attempted beach bombings in 1983. There is insufficient information available to corroborate these claims, although Garret Fitzgerald, Taoiseach at the time, endorsed O’Callaghan’s memoirs. O’Callaghan also received a royal pardon which exempted him from serving his entire prison sentence for the IRA activities he had engaged in before turning informer.161 The republican movement argues that he exaggerates his role.162
Other forms of intelligence via surveillance, signals or electronic means assisted the intelligence services in Britain against the IRA. Andrew recalls the arrest of Robert Fryers, a republican from Belfast in the 1990s. Fryers was tracked down to Scotland, where MI5 observed him in the company of an unknown republican, Hugh Jack. Further MI5 surveillance revealed that the pair were planning a new bombing offensive in Birmingham and Manchester. According to MI5, the arrest of Fryers in July 1993 represented a ‘serious blow’ to the republican movement’s mainland campaign. Fryers was jailed for twenty-five years and Jack for twenty in 1995, for conspiring to cause explosions.163 Earlier in 1985, Peter Sherry, described by Phoenix as a well-known Tyrone republican, was operating on the mainland. Phoenix does not disclose how he discovered this information. The RUC and Metropolitan Police Special Branch decided to follow Sherry, and eventually observed him meeting Patrick Magee, the Brighton bomber, in England. Phoenix’s undercover unit watched Magee and Sherry travel to a flat in Glasgow, before the police swooped, arresting five republicans including Magee and Sherry. All five were subsequently given life sentences for planning attacks. There were very few attacks in England thereafter until 1989, which suggests that these arrests hindered IRA operations.164
These arrests and convictions could have resulted from the IRA’s selection of well-known volunteers to operate in England. Using experienced volunteers posed a potential risk for their England units, as Tommy McKearney describes:
experienced operators if not necessarily always known to the security forces would certainly have been known to their colleagues at home. If they happened to leave the area it is difficult to stop tongues wagging … the assumption is made that [they] could be in England … once that word begins to filter through to the British intelligence … they put a photograph to the name. It’s not that difficult … to find that person.
The dilemma for the IRA was that there was a need for experience and expertise whilst operating in England, in a hostile environment, but that this needed to be balanced against the risks of using experienced operators. The two cases above both demonstrate how the use of known volunteers exposed unknown members operating in England. McKearney also says that operating in England, Wales or Scotland carried other specific difficulties, such as the hostile population ‘actively watching for any suspicious activity’.165 According to Adams and Wilson, on the Pembrokeshire coastal path in Wales, workmen and a local birdwatcher discovered bomb-making equipment in autumn 1989. Metropolitan Police Special Branch were informed and set up a surveillance post near the materials, hoping that the IRA would come to retrieve them. A few months later two republicans came to get these items. The security forces arrested them and the two men were sentenced to thirty years imprisonment.166 The English IRA units’ need for supplies meant that there was greater contact with other personnel. This contact increased the risk of infiltration, or surveillance opportunities on supply dumps if these were discovered.167
Despite the surveillance and other intelligence measures deployed, the IRA managed to operate on the UK mainland frequently and with a significant economic and physical impact, particularly between 1989 and 1994. Even before O’Callaghan’s time, the IRA carried out deadly bombings in England, including in July 1982 when the Regent’s Park and Hyde Park bombs killed eleven British service personnel. A bombing at Harrods in December 1983 killed six people.168 The IRA also killed five people and nearly killed Margaret Thatcher at the Conservative Party conference at the Grand Hotel in Brighton in October 1984. The IRA’s activities declined in England between 1985 and 1988, partly following the arrest of senior republicans such as Patrick Magee. Magee was discovered after his fingerprints were found on a room registration card at the Grand Hotel.169 Surveillance operations before the Brighton bombing, however, had failed to apprehend Magee. Adams and Wilson say that Metropolitan Police Special Branch
had monitored him in the early 1980s when he was travelling elsewhere in England. During one surveillance operation, the republicans involved sped away in their vehicle. The intelligence services lost track of these republicans, which shows that the latter had developed ways of evading surveillance against them.170
The IRA maintained a persistent campaign in England between 1989 and 1994. Attacks included a number of high-profile incidents. For example, in September 1989, the IRA exploded a bomb at the Royal Marines School of Music in Deal in Kent, killing eleven. In July 1990, an IRA booby-trap bomb under a car killed Ian Gow MP, which Adams and Wilson claim resulted from Gow not taking appropriate security measures such as removing his name from the telephone directory and parking his car on his driveway.171 Adams and Wilson also suggest that poor security precautions led to the IRA wounding former Governor of Gibraltar Air Chief Marshall Sir Peter Terry in September 1990.172 In February 1991, the IRA fired mortars at Downing Street;173 in April 1992 they bombed the Baltic Exchange; in April 1993, an IRA bomb exploded near the NatWest Tower at Bishopsgate, killing one person, injuring thirty and costing an estimated £350 million pounds in damages, which almost bankrupted Lloyd’s of London;174 and on 9, 11 and 13 March 1994, IRA units fired mortars onto runways at Heathrow airport from outside the perimeter fence, although they did not explode.175
