by Gregg Herken
61. San Francisco to Moscow, Jan. 10, 1945, Venona decrypts; Benson, Venona Historical Monograph, no. 3, 3.
62. San Francisco to Moscow, Apr. 3, 1945, Venona decrypts.
63. San Francisco to Moscow, Apr. 6, 1945, Venona decrypts; Alexander Feklisov, The Man Behind the Rosenbergs (Enigma Books, 2001), 53.
64. Earlier, Apresyan informed Moscow that he had “already established official contact with [Map’s] institution,” presumably the American-Russian Institute in San Francisco. San Francisco to Moscow, Apr. 3, 1945, Venona decrypts.
65. San Francisco to Moscow, May 4, 1945, Venona decrypts. White and the UN: Romerstein and Breindel (2000), 48–49; Weinstein and Vassiliev (1999), 168 fn.
66. The previous summer, when Kheifets was about to return to Moscow, Chevalier had given him a letter of introduction to the daughter of the Mexican ambassador in Moscow. Chevalier to Jane Quintanilla, June 29, 1944, “Correspondence, 1944–45,” Chevalier papers.
67. While Bransten defended Moscow resolutely, Chevalier was more critical of communist dogma. San Francisco field report, Jan. 26, 1945, sec. 3, Chevalier file, FBI.
68. It was evidently at this reception that Ernest joined the American-Russian Institute, a step that would later get him into trouble with the FBI, which obtained ARI membership rolls in a black-bag operation. Unidentified agent to Whitson, Oct. 6, 1949, and San Francisco field report, Feb. 20, 1951, Ernest Lawrence file, no. 116–10798, FBI.
69. “Report of Meeting with the President,” Apr. 25, 1945, file 24, series 1, part 1, MED/NARA.
70. “Summary Russian Situation,” n.d., “Recently Declassified Extracts,” MED/NARA. Groves estimated it would take the Russians twenty years or more to produce a bomb. Transcript of telephone conversation, May 21, 1945, file 12, series 1, pt. 1, MED/NARA.
71. Entry, May 28, 1945, Groves diary, Groves/NARA. The Soviets hoped to use the occasion to forge personal links with several U.S. atomic scientists. Moscow to New York, Apr. 3, 1945, Venona decrypts; Weinstein and Vassiliev (1999), 209–10.
72. Interim Committee: Martin Sherwin, A World Destroyed: The Atomic Bomb and the Grand Alliance (Vintage, 1987), 169–70.
73. Scientific Panel: “Notes of an Informal Meeting,” May 9, 1945, file 100, MED/NARA; Hewlett and Anderson (1990), 344–45; Sherwin (1987), 169; May 10, 1945, Groves diary, Groves/NARA.
74. “Memorandum for the Secretary,” May 30, 1945, and “Memorandum for Mr. Schott,” May 30, 1945, file 100, MED/NARA.
75. “Notes of the Interim Committee Meeting,” May 31, 1945, file 100, MED/NARA; James Byrnes, All in One Lifetime (Harper, 1958), 283.
76. “He felt that research had to go on unceasingly.… He thought it might be possible one day to secure our energy from terrestrial sources rather than from the sun.”
77. Oppenheimer suggested that “we might open up this subject with them in a tentative fashion and in the most general terms without giving them any details of our productive effort.”
78. The quotation is from Lawrence’s subsequent account of the meeting in a letter to a friend, Karl Darrow, a historian of science. Darrow to Lawrence, Aug. 9, 1945, and Lawrence to Darrow, Aug. 17, 1945, folder 20, carton 28, EOL; Compton (1956), 238.
79. Bush and Conant, for example, had raised the possibility of a demonstration—of the bomb or possibly radiological poisons—in a Sept. 30, 1944, memo to Stimson. Sherwin (1975), 286–88. The demonstration was also discussed on at least two occasions at Los Alamos, in meetings of Mar. 1943 and late 1944 that Robert Wilson helped to organize. Oppenheimer spoke against the demonstration at the 1944 meeting, Wilson later recalled. Author interview with Robert Wilson, Los Alamos, N. Mex., Apr. 15, 1983.
80. No notes were taken of this lunchtime discussion, and two conflicting versions exist. Herbert Childs interview with Arthur Compton, n.d., Childs papers.
81. The phrase is from Lawrence’s letter to Darrow, Aug. 17, 1945, folder 20, carton 28, EOL.
82. Sherwin (1987), 302.
83. Oppenheimer to Groves, May 7, 1945, “Bomb Design and Testing” folder, Army/NARA.
84. Franck report: Sherwin (1987), 210–15; Alice Kimball Smith, A Peril and a Hope: The Scientists’ Movement in America, 1945–47 (MIT Press, 1971), 371–83.
85. The demonstration had been resurrected as well by Glenn Seaborg, one of the contributors to the Franck report, in a letter that Lawrence received just before leaving for Los Alamos. Seaborg to Lawrence, June 13, 1945, folder 22, carton 30, EOL.
86. Peter Wyden, Day One: Before Hiroshima and After (Simon and Schuster, 1984), 170–71. Teller claimed that Fermi asked his opinion on how the bomb should be used about this time, and that his answer was “noncommittal”—not realizing that Fermi was on a panel advising on the weapon’s use. “Had I known, I would have said that it should be tested and then shown, but not used.” Edward Teller, Feb. 26, 1999, personal communication.
87. Although Compton had commissioned the Franck report, he did not agree with its conclusion about the demonstration. Compton’s arguments against the demonstration were in a dissent that he disguised as a cover memo to Stimson’s copy of the Franck report. Compton (1956), 238–41; Sherwin (1987), 213.
88. Childs (1968), 363.
89. Robert Serber claimed that Oppenheimer took the demonstration option seriously enough to explore it with high-ranking representatives of the army’s air force; but the latter were, Serber later remembered, “adamantly opposed.” Author interview with Robert Serber, New York, N.Y., Oct. 26, 1984.
90. “There was not sufficient agreement among the members of the panel to unite upon a statement as to how or under what conditions such use [of the bomb] was to be made,” Compton later wrote. Compton (1956), 240; Wyden (1984), 171; Oppenheimer to Secretary of War, June 16, 1945, no. 76, Harrison-Bundy file, MED/NARA.
91. Oppenheimer to Secretary of War, June 16, 1945, no. 76, Harrison-Bundy file MED/NARA. The recommendation on the immediate use of the bomb is reprinted in Sherwin (1987), 304–5.
92. Scientists at Los Alamos later remarked upon Ernest’s “obvious distress that weekend though they did not know the cause.” Wyden (1984), 170; “Memorandum for the Secretary of War,” June 26, 1945, no. 77, Harrison-Bundy file, MED/NARA.
93. In an earlier letter to Maria Mayer, Teller noted that he had asked Harold Urey “to talk with the Boy-scout about postwar plans.” It is unclear whether the “Boy-scout” in this case was Lawrence or Groves. Teller to Mayer, n.d., box 3, Mayer papers.
94. Szilard’s petition urged that the bomb not be dropped until the surrender terms had been made public in detail and the Japanese, knowing those terms, had still refused to surrender. Lanouette (1992), 269–75.
95. Oppenheimer’s report to Stimson on the views of the Scientific Panel noted: “With regard to these general aspects of the use of atomic energy, it is clear that we, as scientific men, have no proprietary rights.” The report is reprinted in Sherwin (1987), 304–5.
96. In a 1993 interview, Teller claimed that Oppenheimer had argued that scientists should not take sides for or against the use of the bomb. When he later discovered that the Scientific Panel had done just that, Teller said he felt betrayed. Teller did not mention Oppenheimer’s opposition to the petition in his letter to Szilard since he knew that Oppie would see the letter before it was sent. Teller to Oppenheimer, and Teller to Szilard, July 2, 1945, LANL; Edward Teller, Feb. 26, 1999, personal communication. Teller’s letter to Szilard is reprinted in Blumberg and Owens (1976), 156–57.
97. Tolman to Lansdale, June 19, 1944, file 400.112, series 5, MED/NARA.
98. May 5 and May 8, 1945, Groves diary, Groves/NARA.
99. York interview (1997).
100. Rhodes (1986), 601.
101. Lyall Johnson interview (1996).
102. Oppenheimer told Groves that the probable date for the test was July 18 and that Fat Man’s plutonium core weighed 6.2 kilograms. “Notes Taken at Meeting at Y,” June 27, 1945, file 20, MED/NARA.
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bsp; 103. Another two words—or without—were placed before “the Continental United States” in the description of where the work of the contract would take place. Underhill interview, n.d., Underhill papers, LANL.
104. Oppenheimer to Lawrence, July 5, 1945, folder 15, carton 29, EOL.
105. Groves (1962), 290; July 13, 1945, Cooksey diary, EOL.
106. Unmarked folder, carton 48, EOL. The talk at dinner was mostly about Lawrence’s plans for the postwar Rad Lab. Fidler interview (1992).
107. Lawrence requested an annual postwar budget of $1 million—more than thirty times what the Rad Lab had received from private sources before the war. Lawrence to Groves, July 13, 1945, folder 38, carton 29, EOL.
108. July 11, 1945, Groves diary, Groves/NARA.
109. Teller and Brown (1962), 16–17.
110. “A hundred-to-one it’s not needed, but what do we know?,” observed Teller, according to Joe Kennedy, who was also standing nearby. Seaborg (1992), vol. 4, 4.
111. Author interview with Willie Higinbotham, Los Alamos, N. Mex., June 9, 1993.
112. “O.E. [sic] Lawrence’s thoughts,” July 16, 1945, file 4, series 1, part 1, MED/NARA. Eyewitness accounts by McMillan, Serber, Alvarez, and others are in the Trinity file, Tolman papers, OSRD/NARA.
113. Serber (1998), 91–93. The intensity of the light was so unexpectedly great that the following day some Los Alamos scientists suggested using it as a weapon. Bradbury et al. to Parsons, “Proposal for a Modified Tactical Use of the Gadget,” box 29–9, LANL.
114. Alvarez (1987), 141–42.
115. Frank Oppenheimer interview (1983). Oppie’s much more famous formulation from the Gita—“Now I am become Death, the Destroyer of Worlds”—evidently came later.
116. Vannevar Bush interview, reel 7, 422, MIT.
8: A Stone’s Throw from Despair
1. A passenger on the plane, Admiral John “Chick” Hayward, recalled that there was even talk of recalling the cruiser Indianapolis—already on its way to Tinian with the uranium rings for the Hiroshima bomb—and substituting the more powerful and efficient implosion gadget. Interview with John “Chick” Hayward, Jacksonville Beach, Fla., Mar. 6, 1996; telex, Oppenheimer to Groves, July 19, 1945, and Groves to Oppenheimer, July 19, 1945, Oppenheimer folder, LANL.
2. Two days after Trinity, Lawrence met with George Harrison at the Pentagon to urge that Groves be promoted. Lawrence to Harrison, July 18, 1945, Harrison-Bundy file, MED/NARA.
3. “Development of Atomic Weapons,” Jan. 30, 1950, no. 1447, RG 128, Records of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy (JCAE), National Archives; ITMOJRO, 32.
4. Groves to Secretary of War, July 27, 1945, box 6, MED history, Army/NARA.
5. Telegram, n.d., John Manley papers, folder 3, box 7, LANL.
6. Alvarez (1987), 144–45.
7. Author interview with Luis Alvarez, Los Alamos, N. Mex., Apr. 14, 1983.
8. Teller and Brown (1962), 18.
9. Molly Lawrence interview (1992).
10. Lawrence, “To Radiation Laboratory Employees,” Aug. 9, 1945, folder 23, carton 30, EOL; transcript of telephone conversations, Aug. 6, 1945, book 7, box 1, Rad Lab records.
11. Shane, “Autobiography,” chap. 7, p. 31, Donald Shane papers, Lick Observatory archives, University of California, Santa Cruz, Calif.
12. Author interview with I. I. Rabi, New Haven, Conn., Sept. 21, 1982.
13. Field report, Apr. 18, 1952, 11, sec. 12, Robert Oppenheimer file, FBI.
14. Oppenheimer to Lawrence, Aug. 30, 1945, folder 30, carton 29, EOL; Childs (1968), 366, 372.
15. Harrison to Oppenheimer, July 20, 1945, Harrison-Bundy file, MED/NARA.
16. Conant was hoping to recruit Oppenheimer to Harvard. Conant to Oppenheimer, Aug. 24, 1945, and Oppenheimer to Conant, Sept. 25, 1945, Conant folder, JRO.
17. Oppenheimer to Lawrence, Aug. 30, 1945, folder 30, carton 29, EOL. The letter is also reprinted in Smith and Weiner (1980), 300–302.
18. Oppenheimer to Stimson, Aug. 17, 1945, reprinted in Smith and Weiner (1980), 293–94.
19. The telegrams exchanged between panel members are in folders 15 and 30, carton 29, EOL.
20. Oppenheimer to Secretary of War, Aug. 17, 1945, no. 77, Harrison-Bundy file, MED/NARA.
21. Oppenheimer to Lawrence, Aug. 30, 1945, folder 30, carton 29, EOL; Hewlett and Anderson (1990), 417.
22. “Memorandum for the Record,” Aug. 18, 1945, no. 77, Harrison-Bundy file, MED/NARA.
23. Oppenheimer to Lawrence, Aug. 30, 1945, folder 30, carton 29, EOL.
24. Oppenheimer to Herbert Smith, Aug. 26, 1945, reprinted in Smith and Weiner (1980), 297.
25. Oppenheimer to Chevalier, Aug. 27, 1945, supplemental files, Jon Else, The Day After Trinity: J. Robert Oppenheimer and the Atomic Bomb (Voyager CD, 1999).
26. Groves to Chief of Staff, Aug. 23, 1945, “Postwar Bomb Production,” MED history, Army/NARA.
27. Early postwar U.S. war plans: Rhodes (1995), 23–24; Gregg Herken, The Winning Weapon; The Atomic Bomb in the Cold War (Knopf, 1980), 195–218.
28. Teller to Maria Mayer, n.d. (Aug.–Sept. 1945), box 3, Mayer papers.
29. Teller to Mulliken, Sept. 22, 1945; and Teller to Mayer, Sept. 25, 1945, LANL.
30. Teller (2001), 105; Blumberg and Owens (1976), 13–20; Teller interview (1993).
31. Wheeler to Teller, Aug. 12, 1945, Teller file, LANL.
32. John Wheeler and Kenneth Ford, Geons, Black Holes and Quantum Foam: A Life in Physics (Norton, 1998), 190.
33. Blumberg and Owens (1976), 185. Teller’s anti-Russian views and his pessimism about the future were also reflected in other correspondence at this time. Teller to Stephen Brunauer, Dec. 29, 1945, Teller file, LANL.
34. Chemist George Kistiakowsky recalled Teller coming to him in late 1944 or early 1945 with a request that he and his division work on the Super. Kistiakowsky said his refusal cooled his subsequent relations with Teller. Carl Sagan interview with George Kistiakowsky, Feb. 1982, 137. My thanks to Steven Soter for a copy of the Sagan interview.
35. Teller wrote to his usual confidante that he was conflicted about whether to stay at the lab or go to Chicago. Teller to Mayer, n.d. (Mar. 1945), box 3, Mayer papers.
36. Lawrence to Lewis Akeley, Aug. 16, 1945, folder 12, carton 1; transcript, “The Atomic Bomb Project,” Aug. 17, 1945, folder 27, carton 40, EOL.
37. “The Atomic Bomb Project,” Aug. 17, 1945, folder 27, carton 40, EOL.
38. Minutes, Committee on Finance and Business Management (CFBM), Sept. 4, 1945, records of the University of California, Oakland, Calif. (UC).
39. Lawrence to Groves, July 13, 1945, folder 38, carton 29, EOL.
40. Oppenheimer to Deutsch, Aug. 24, 1945, reprinted in Smith and Weiner (1980), 295; telegram, Stewart to Underhill, Aug. 17, 1945, and Nichols to Underhill, Aug. 20, 1945, folder 5, box 5, Underhill papers, LANL.
41. Neylan: Biographical sketch, n.d., John Neylan papers, Bancroft Library. The author would like to thank the president and regents of the University of California for allowing him access to these restricted papers.
42. The previous May, Neylan had vigorously protested Sproul’s plan to award an honorary degree to Soviet foreign minister Molotov at Berkeley’s 1945 commencement. Neylan to Sproul, May 1, 1945, folder 12, box 157, Neylan papers.
43. Minutes of regents meeting, Aug. 24, 1945, and Underhill to Neylan, Aug. 24, 1945, folder 1, box 171, Neylan papers.
44. Fidler to Washington Liaison Office, Aug. 20, 1945, box 3, AEC/JRO.
45. Ibid.
46. Fidler to Washington Liaison Office, Aug. 11, 1945, box 3, AEC/JRO.
47. Bernstein (1990), 1396.
48. “Report on Soviet Espionage in the United States,” Nov. 27, 1945, entry 11, RG 233 (Dies Committee records), National Archives.
49. Hoover to Attorney General, Dec. 4, 1945, and July 11, 1946, sec. 3, Eltenton file, FBI.
50. That October, the NKVD learned about the FBI’s electronic surveillance in do
cuments obtained from a source in the Justice Department. The woman who spied on the bureau—Judith Coplon, code-named Sima—provided Moscow with a copy of a May 1943 FBI memo concerning phone conversations between Robert Oppenheimer, Chevalier, and Thomas Addis. Following the twin defections of Elizabeth Bentley, a longtime courier in Washington, and Igor Gouzenko, a code clerk at the Soviet embassy in Ottowa that fall, Moscow instructed its control officers in the United States to break off contact with their active agents. Weinstein and Vassiliev (1999), 216, 276, 286.
51. San Francisco to Moscow, Nov. 13, 1945; San Francisco to Moscow, Sept. 13, 1945, Venona decrypts.
52. San Francisco to Moscow, Nov. 27, 1945, Venona decrypts.
53. John Titus to Groves, Feb. 20, 1946, entry 5, file 132.2, MED/NARA.
54. Lyall Johnson interview (1996); Harold Marsh, Mar. 31, 1997, personal communication.
55. Sept. 13, 1945, Cooksey diary, box 4, folder 23, EOL; Alvarez interview (1983); Alvarez (1987), 155.
56. Linac: Alvarez to Lawrence, Apr. 9, 1945, folder 16, carton 1, EOL; transcripts of telephone conversations, Apr. 14 and May 9, 1945, book 7, box 1, Rad Lab records. The surplus tubes, however, proved unusable for the Linac and remained in the warehouse. Childs (1968), 375; Alvarez (1987), 153–54.
57. McMillan and Synchrotron: Alvarez (1987), 154, 160; McMillan interview, Bancroft Library; McMillan, “Value of the Synchrotron as a Source of High-energy Electrons,” Nov. 29, 1945, folder 31, carton 12, EOL; Edward Lofgren, “The Principle of Phase Stability and the Accelerator Program at Berkeley, 1945–1954,” 1994, LBL. The phase stability principle was independently discovered at about the same time by Russian physicist V. I. Veksler.
58. Segrè (1993), 208–9.
59. Seaborg (1992), vol. 4, 99, 174.
60. Segrè (1993), 210–11.
61. Transcript of Serber lecture, “War: Tinian and Japan,” June 7, 1994, Brookhaven National Laboratory, N. Y.
62. Smith and Weiner (1980), 313.
63. Telegram, F. Oppenheimer to Lawrence, Aug. 18, 1945, folder 5, carton 29, and Lawrence to F. Oppenheimer, Jan. 31, 1945, folder 11, carton 46, EOL.
64. Fidler interview (1992).
