by Gregg Herken
74. Strauss met Lawrence in fall 1939, when Ernest was looking to fund the 184-inch. Strauss had known Teller since 1938, when Edward spoke at Temple Emanu-El in New York, where Strauss was president of the congregation. Virginia Walker to Teller, May 5, 1959, Teller folder, Lewis Strauss papers, Herbert Hoover Presidential Library, West Branch, Iowa (LLS/HHPL); Lawrence to Strauss, Apr. 4, 1940, folder 52, carton 16, EOL; Richard Pfau (1984), No Sacrifice Too Great: The Life of Lewis L. Strauss (University of Virginia Press, 1984), 55.
75. Strauss insisted that his name be pronounced “Straws.” His inflexible self-righteousness more than once cost Strauss friends and delayed his promotion in the navy. Pfau (1984), 49, 75.
76. San Francisco field report, Oct. 24, 1946, sec. 3, JRO/FBI.
77. Hewlett and Anderson (1990), 640; Lewis Strauss, Men and Decisions (Doubleday, 1962), 213.
78. Lilienthal (1964), 95; Hewlett and Anderson (1990), 621.
79. Lilienthal (1964), 107.
80. Ibid., 109; Hewlett and Anderson (1990), 642.
81. In late spring or early summer 1946, Groves ordered the Military Intelligence Division’s files consolidated at Oak Ridge and shipped to the FBI in Washington. However, these evidently did not include his own “investigation files,” on Oppenheimer and others. Rhodes to Groves, Jan. 16, 1947, file 313.3, entry 5, MED/NARA; and Fred Rhodes interview (1998). As late as 1948, the army’s wartime investigative files had to be “borrowed” from the FBI by the AEC. Gingrich to Lilienthal, Nov. 9, 1948, series 1, “Div. of Security” file, AEC/NARA.
82. Groves later passed these files along to his successor at AFSWP, Kenneth Nichols, when he stepped down in 1948. J. Dossett to Colonel Lampert, Oct. 7, 1948, and Groves to Nichols, Feb. 29, 1948, MED investigative files, Defense Nuclear Agency records, RG 374, Army Corps of Engineers archive, Ft. Belvoir, Va.
83. GAC: Hewlett and Anderson (1990), 648; Richard Hewlett and Francis Duncan, Atomic Shield: A History of the United States Atomic Energy Commission, vol. 2, 1947–1952 (University of California Press, 1990), 15–17.
84. McMahon later claimed that “when the Commission took over, there were exactly two bombs in the locker.” The size of the U.S. nuclear arsenal had also been a shock to Lilienthal: “Actually, we had one [bomb] that was probably operable when I first went off to Los Alamos; one that had a good chance of being operable.” Borden to files, July 5, 1951, no. 2365, JCAE; Herken (1980), 196–97. Early U.S. atomic arsenal: Rhodes (1995), 282–83; David Alan Rosenberg, “U.S. Nuclear Stockpile, 1945 to 1950,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, May 1982, 25–30.
85. Bacher had just returned from personally inventorying the atomic stockpile at Kirtland Air Force Base. Transcript of Bacher interview, n.d., 108, Robert Bacher papers, Caltech archives, Pasadena, Calif.; “Draft Minutes of the General Advisory Committee,” Feb. 2–3, 1947, no. 79441, CIC/DOE.
86. McCormack to Wilson, Apr. 16, 1947, Radiological Warfare folder, box 1223, AEC/NARA.
87. Oppenheimer’s comments were widely reported in the press. Chicago Tribune, Dec. 6, 1945.
88. Oppenheimer to Truman, May 3, 1946, box 73, JRO. Crossroads: Jonathan Weisgall, Operation Crossroads: The Atomic Tests at Bikini Atoll (Naval Institute Press, 1994).
89. The project was finally canceled by President Kennedy in 1961. Nuclear-powered bomber: Hewlett and Duncan (1990), 106–7.
90. “The H-bomb Chronology,” 17, no. DLXXXIV, JCAE; minutes, GAC no. 2, Feb. 2–3, 1947, no. 79441, CIC/DOE; and Oppenheimer to Lilienthal, Apr. 3, 1947, GAC no. 3, LANL.
91. Bethe to Frankel and Richtmyer, Apr. 5, 1946, folder 11, box 11, Hans Bethe papers, Special Collections, Cornell University archives, Ithaca, N.Y.
92. A Joint Committee memo noted that Fermi’s H-bomb lectures occurred shortly after the Trinity test and “were attended by almost everyone in the laboratory.” Walker to file, Jan. 13, 1953, no. 3344, JCAE. Fuchs–von Neumann patent: Anderson to Borden, June 30, 1952, no. 2910, JCAE. The secret patent—S-5292X, “Improvements in Methods and Means for Utilizing Nuclear Energy”—was signed by Fuchs on June 5, 1946, just nine days before he returned to England. Four years later, interviewed in prison by FBI agent Robert Lamphere, Fuchs was asked whether he or von Neumann had suggested using implosion to ignite the Super: “[Fuchs] stated laughingly that this was his, Fuchs’, suggestion, and that he did not furnish information concerning the ignition of the super bomb by the implosion process.” Lamphere to Hoover, June 6, 1950, serial 1412, Klaus Fuchs file, no. 65–58805, FBI. The author would like to thank Joe Albright and Marcia Kunstel for a copy of the document that Fuchs gave to the Russians, and Jennifer DeCapua for locating the Lamphere interview in FBI files.
93. Rhodes (1995), 254; Chuck Hansen, “The Apr. 1946 Super Conference” (unpublished manuscript, 2001). My thanks to Chuck Hansen for a copy of his unpublished chapter on the superbomb meeting.
94. Ironically, Teller himself admitted in a 1993 interview that he was the one responsible for initially discouraging the idea of compressing the thermonuclear fuel. Teller interview (1993).
95. Morrison to Serber, Mar. 26, 1946, correspondence, Bethe papers.
96. Carson Mark, “A Short Account of Los Alamos Theoretical Work on Thermonuclear Weapons, 1946–1950,” LA-5647-MS, (LANL, 1974); Rhodes (1995), 254.
97. “We agreed on a text.” Serber interview (1992).
98. Fuchs did not leave Los Alamos, however, until after he had read Teller’s report on the superbomb conference. Rhodes (1995), 259.
99. “Edward went back to the original report. He just forgot about all the changes we had agreed on.” Serber interview (1992); Serber (1998), 150–51.
100. The April conference also revived interest in whether a fusion bomb might ignite Earth’s atmosphere. Teller left the calculations up to his colleague Emil Konopinski. Their joint report concluded that “no self-propagating chain of nuclear reactions is likely to be started.” The same phenomenon that stood in the way of realizing the Super—the loss of heat through radiation—likewise protected the planet from accidental incineration by overreaching scientists. E. J. Konopinski, C. Marvin, and E. Teller, “Ignition of the Atmosphere with Nuclear Bombs,” LA-602 (LANL, 1946).
101. Alarm Clock: Rhodes (1995), 305–6; Mark (1974), 3–5; Hansen (1988), 45–46. Teller noted that the Alarm Clock was born on the same day as his daughter Wendy: Aug. 31, 1946. Walker to file, Jan. 13, 1953, JCAE.
102. Rhodes (1995), 307; Mark (1974), 5.
103. Teller, “Proposed Outline of Laboratory Program,” Oct. 1, 1946, no. 125647, CIC/DOE.
104. Bradbury to AEC, Nov. 14, 1946, no. 125518, CIC/DOE.
105. Bradbury to Nichols, Nov. 16, 1946, no. 71787, CIC/DOE.
106. Teller to Mayer, n.d. [fall 1946], box 3, Mayer papers.
107. ITMOJRO, 35. Oppenheimer spent part of the third week of each month teaching at Caltech. Oppenheimer to Dubridge, Sept. 3, 1946, box 111.3, DuBridge papers, Caltech.
108. Childs (1968), 376.
109. Birge, vol. 5, xvii–11.
110. Oppie had described the institute as a “madhouse”—“its luminaries shining in separate and helpless isolation”—in a 1935 letter to Frank. Smith and Weiner (1980), 327; Childs (1968), 393; Rhodes (1995), 308.
111. San Francisco field report, May 9, 1947, JRO/FBI.
112. Birge, vol. 5, xvii–11.
113. Public announcement of the feat was followed in midmonth by a private reunion of those who had endorsed Lawrence’s original appeal to the Rockefeller Foundation. As before, Loomis picked up the bill.
114. Between January and Apr. 1947, the Rad Lab budget for the coming year had increased by almost $1 million, to $8.85 million. An earlier version had been pegged at $10 million, but Oppenheimer urged restraint. Priestly to Lawrence, Dec. 9, 1946, folder 37, carton 21, EOL; and Peterson to Williams, Apr. 3, 1947, file 121.4, Central Correspondence series, AEC/NARA.
115. Ernest’s encounter with the AEC caused him to miss Groves. Kelly to Lawrence, M
ar. 10, 1947, Contract 48 files, SBFRC.
116. “The University of California Case Study,” Report of the Advisory Committee on Human Radiation Experiments, supplemental vol. 2, Sources and Documentation (U.S. Government Printing Office, 1995), 600–630.
117. Fisk postponed a decision on support for the Rad Lab, pending determination of the “extent to which the University of California will continue its functions as somewhat of a national laboratory.”
118. Peterson to Fields, Jan. 20, 1947, file 121.4, Central Correspondence series, AEC/NARA.
119. Hewlett and Duncan (1990), 98.
120. Army-university negotiations: Underhill to Nichols, Sept. 20, 1946, series 5, MED/NARA; Underhill to Bradbury, June 24, 1947, Underhill papers, LANL.
121. Originally, the meeting was to have been held at Berkeley. But more pressing concerns—including the still-uncertain status of Los Alamos, and bottlenecks in the production of atomic bombs—forced a postponement.
122. Lilienthal confirmation: Hewlett and Duncan (1990), 48–53.
123. Lilienthal (1964), 234.
124. Lawrence to AEC commissioners et al., June 19, 1947, folder 28, carton 30, EOL.
125. The first night at the Grove was spent developing “a mutual understanding of each other’s problems,” Cooksey wrote. Cooksey to Loomis, Aug. 25, 1947, folder 28, carton 30, EOL.
126. Bohemian Grove meeting: Hewlett and Duncan (1990), 108–9. My thanks to Richard Rhodes for a copy of the AEC’s unofficial minutes of the meeting.
127. “We’ve given our notice and that’s that. It stands,” Neylan claimed he told Strauss. Notes of interview with Neylan, May 6, 1960, box 2, Childs papers.
128. Childs interview with Neylan, box 2, Childs papers.
129. Underhill to file, Sept. 10, 1947, Underhill papers, LANL.
130. Transcript of interview with Arthur Hudgins, n.d., LLNL.
131. Cooksey to Loomis, Aug. 25, 1947, folder 28, carton 30, EOL.
10: Character, Association, and Loyalty
1. Cooksey to Strauss, and Cooksey to Loomis, Aug. 25, 1947, folder 28, carton 30, EOL.
2. Joseph Volpe, Aug. 31, 1998, personal communication; Stern, (1969), 105; “Re: Dr. J. Robert Oppenheimer,” Apr. 16, 1954, Robert Oppenheimer file, FBI.
3. Groves to Lilienthal, Nov. 14, 1946; Lilienthal to Groves, Dec. 4, 1946; Groves to Lilienthal, Dec. 19, 1946; Rolander to Ford, Sept. 2, 1948, box 2, JRO/AEC; Groves (1962), 397.
4. Bernstein (1990), 1398.
5. Washington, D.C., field report, Apr. 7, 1947, Robert Oppenheimer FBI file, box 2, JRO/AEC.
6. San Francisco field report, Apr. 5, 1947, and Riley to files, July 17, 1947, Robert Oppenheimer FBI file, box 2, JRO/AEC.
7. Hoover to Vaughan, Feb. 28, 1947, president’s secretary’s files, Harry Truman papers, Truman Library, Independence, Mo. Hoover had first sent Robert Oppenheimer’s file to Vaughan in November 1945 and forwarded Frank’s file a few months later. Bernstein (1990), 1396; Hoover to attorney general, Mar. 18, 1946, box 3, JRO/AEC.
8. Stern (1969), 101; Lilienthal (1964), 157.
9. Hoover to Lilienthal, Mar. 8, 1947, and Rolander to Mitchell, Feb. 18, 1954, box 2, JRO/AEC.
10. Both files are in box 2, JRO/AEC; Lilienthal (1964), 157. Neither report made any mention of Chevalier approaching Frank for information to pass to the Soviets.
11. Wilson to file, Mar. 11, 1947, box 2, JRO/AEC; Conant to Lilienthal, Mar. 29, 1947, file 1193/4/2, general administrative files, MED/NARA.
12. Davis (1993), 273; Lansdale to Davis, Oct. 18, 1968, box 5, Groves/NARA. My thanks to Stan Norris for a copy of Lansdale’s letter.
13. Groves to Lilienthal, Mar. 24, 1947, box 3, JRO/AEC. Patterson wrote that he had “confidence in [Oppenheimer’s] character and loyalty to the United States.” ITMOJRO, 375–77.
14. Author interview with Joseph Volpe, Washington, D.C., May 30, 1996. In other cases, Strauss showed himself to be the AEC commissioner most concerned with security. Hewlett and Duncan (1990), 101.
15. Stern (1969), 104.
16. One bureau informant turned out to be a twelve-year-old boy. Los Angeles field report, Apr. 4, 1947, Robert Oppenheimer FBI file, box 2, JRO/AEC.
17. Relations between Lilienthal and Hickenlooper had been strained from the start. In one of his first acts as JCAE chairman, the senator had asked the commission for both Robert and Frank Oppenheimer’s files; Lilienthal refused.
18. Lilienthal objected to the fact that the bureau refused to identify the source of the allegations contained in its reports. Volpe interview (1996).
19. Wilson to file, Mar. 12, 1947, box 3, JRO/AEC; ITMOJRO, 379. Starting in Apr. 1948, the AEC provided its personnel security files to the Joint Committee. Lilienthal to Clark, June 19, 1949, Justice Department file, series 11, AEC/NARA.
20. Menke to file, Mar. 12, 1947, and Menke, “Analysis of Report on J. Robert Oppenheimer,” Mar. 14, 1947, box 2, JRO/AEC.
21. T. O. Jones to file, Mar. 27, 1947, file 1143/4/2, general administrative files, MED/NARA.
22. Davis (1993), 275.
23. Hoover to Lilienthal, Apr. 12, 1947, box 3, JRO/AEC; Rhodes to Hickenlooper, July 18, 1947, no. 201, JCAE; Riley to file, July 17, 1947, box 3, JRO/AEC.
24. Jones to Belsley, July 18, 1947, box 3, JRO/AEC.
25. Jones to file, July 14, 1947, box 2, JRO/AEC.
26. Jones to Uanna, Aug. 11, 1947; and Uanna to AEC, Aug. 14, 1947, box 2, JRO/AEC.
27. Hoover sent Attorney General Clark the results of the 1947 investigation of Oppenheimer on Aug. 25, 1948. “Re: Dr. J. Robert Oppenheimer,” Apr. 16, 1954, Robert Oppenheimer file, FBI.
28. The disillusionment may have been mutual. The ICCASP had withdrawn an invitation to Oppenheimer to speak on its behalf because of Oppie’s support of the May-Johnson bill.
29. That February, in a speech at the University of Denver, Oppenheimer described Soviet communism as “deeply abhorrent.” The following month, a speech that Oppenheimer wrote in response to the Russians’ latest attack on the Baruch plan reportedly had to be toned down before it could be delivered by the U.S. representative to the UN. Stern (1969), 100; New York field report, Apr. 7, 1947, Robert Oppenheimer FBI file, box 2, JRO/AEC. Fermi’s comment is in a Chicago FBI field report of Apr. 3, 1947, in the same folder.
30. ITMOJRO, 41, 344.
31. Branigan to Hoover with memo, Jan. 31, 1947, CINRAD file, FBI.
32. Glavin to Tolson, Sept. 29, 1948, HUAC file, no. 54, FBI.
33. The FBI noted that no prosecution “was instituted in regard to Nelson or Weinberg, apparently because the only information obtained indicating their espionage activities was obtained from a combination microphone-technical surveillance on the residence of Steve Nelson.” HUAC file, 54, FBI.
34. Lawrence to Buchta, Oct. 16, 1946, folder 11, carton 46, EOL.
35. Field report, Mar. 15, 1947, Frank Oppenheimer file, FBI.
36. Bureau agents were asking Buchta about Frank even before he got to campus. “They went there just to make him leary [sic] of me before I arrived,” Frank wrote. “The Tail that Wags the Dog,” unpublished manuscript, unmarked folder, Frank Oppenheimer papers.
37. Lilienthal suspected that Groves was behind these and other recent leaks. Lilienthal (1964), 224; Stern (1969), 109.
38. “U.S. Atom Scientist’s Brother Exposed as Communist Who Worked on A-Bomb,” Washington Times-Herald, July 12, 1947.
39. “Oppenheimer Hits Red Tag,” Oakland Tribune, July 13, 1947; F. Oppenheimer to Dean T. R. McDonnell, materials re HUAC, 1945–50, box 4, Frank Oppenheimer papers.
40. Higinbotham to F. Oppenheimer, July 14, 1947, materials re HUAC, 1945–50, Box 4, Frank Oppenheimer papers.
41. June 9, 1947, and Oct. 21, 1947, memos, Sproul papers; Birge, vol. 5, xix–20.
42. Lawrence to Oppenheimer, Oct. 21, 1947, box 45, JRO.
43. Alvarez (1987), 158.
44. Bevatron: Robert Seidel, “Accelerators and National Security: The Evolution of Sc
ience Policy for High-Energy Physics, 1947–1967,” History and Technology 2 (1994), 394–95.
45. Fisk to Lawrence, Dec. 1, 1947, folder 25, carton 32, EOL.
46. Hewlett and Duncan (1990), 117.
47. Underhill to Sproul, Dec. 15, 1947, Underhill papers, LANL; Dec. 31, 1947, memos, Sproul papers. Brookhaven-Berkeley rivalry: Robert Seidel, “Accelerating Science: The Postwar Transformation of the Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory,” Historical Studies in the Physical and Biological Sciences, 14, no. 2 (1983), 394.
48. Dec. 31, 1947, memos, Sproul papers; Underhill to Sproul, Dec. 29, 1947, and Dec. 31, 1947, Underhill papers, LANL.
49. Jan. 9, 1948, memos, Sproul papers.
50. Sproul to Wilson, Jan. 24, 1948, Underhill papers, LANL.
51. Bradbury’s induction into the University of California faculty took place in Sproul’s office. Feb. 26, 1948, memos, Sproul papers.
52. Minutes, CFBM, Feb. 24, 1948, UC; Underhill to Bradbury, Mar. 11, 1948, Underhill papers, LANL.
53. Bevatron: Hewlett and Duncan (1990), 249–51; Seidel (1983), 394–97.
54. Minutes, Apr. 23–25, 1948, GAC no. 9, CIC/DOE; Seidel (1983), 394.
55. Cooksey to Loomis, Mar. 24, 1948, folder 10, carton 46, EOL.
56. Childs (1968), 401.
57. Report, May 9–26, 1947, no. 356, JCAE.
58. Hickenlooper to Lawrence, Feb. 21, 1948, and Lawrence to Hickenlooper, Feb. 25, 1948, folder 26, carton 32, EOL.
59. Lilienthal (1964), 332.
60. Minutes, Apr. 27, 1948, folder 6, box 172, Neylan papers; Apr. 27, 1948, memos, Sproul papers.
61. Alvarez was an alternate on the panel. Interest in RW: Hamilton to Nichols, “Radioactive Warfare,” Dec. 31, 1946, folder 19, carton 32, EOL.
62. A few weeks earlier, Lawrence had presented his ideas to the service secretaries at the Pentagon and Secretary of Defense James Forrestal. Walter Millis, ed., The Forrestal Diaries (Putnam, 1952), 399.
63. David Lilienthal, The Journals of David E. Lilienthal, vol. 4, The Road to Change, 1955–1959 (Harper and Row, 1969), 205; Lilienthal (1964), 349.
64. Lilienthal (1964), 349.
65. Minutes, Feb. 6–8, 1948, GAC no. 8, CIC/DOE; Hershberg (1993), 333.
