by Gregg Herken
1. Belmont to Ladd, June 5, 1953, sec. 14, JRO/FBI.
2. Ibid.
3. Pfau (1984), 145.
4. June 5, 1953, Dean diary, Dean papers; Hewlett and Holl (1989), 53.
5. Hewlett and Holl (1989), 55–62, 71–72; Pfau (1984), 146–48. Although Eisenhower hoped that “Atoms for Peace” might be a spur toward disarmament, Strauss was under no such illusion. FRUS: 1952–1954, vol. 2, pt. 2, 1218–20.
6. Ladd to Hoover, May 25, 1953, sec. 14, and Hoover to Attorney General, Apr. 13, 1954, sec. 24, JRO/FBI.
7. Teeple: Kamen (1986), 252–53, 323; “Senator Hickenlooper Aide Is Ordered by Court to Give Testimony in Libel Suit,” Washington Post, Nov. 19, 1954.
8. Nov. 7, 1942, Dean diary, Dean papers; “Dr. J. Robert Oppenheimer,” Dec. 14, 1959, box 3, JRO/AEC.
9. The fact that Oppenheimer never went to the White House on the appointed day convinced Strauss that Oppie was either “a spy or a liar.” Oppenheimer’s appointment book indicates that he had scheduled a meeting with Cutler for Sept. 1. Bernstein (1990), 1435; Belmont to Ladd, Sept. 2, 1953, sec. 14, JRO/FBI; Pfau (1984), 147.
10. Nearly five years after his humiliation at Oppenheimer’s hands over the export of isotopes, Strauss wrote to Rabi claiming that he had evidence vindicating his claim that one of the recipients of isotopes given to Norway was a Communist. Strauss to Rabi, Oct. 20, 1953, Strauss folder, Isidor Rabi papers, Library of Congress.
11. Wilson to Bush, Aug. 25, 1954, box 120, Bush papers, Library of Congress; Smyth to Wilson, Sept. 9, 1954, box 39, Smyth papers; Gordon Arneson, “R. Gordon Arneson: Memories of the State Department’s ‘Mr. Atom’” (unpublished manuscript, n.d.); Gordon Arneson, Mar. 12, 1992, personal communication.
12. Arneson later discovered that his FBI dossier included the complaint of an irate neighbor. Arneson interview (1979).
13. Strauss (1962), 345–46.
14. Joe-4: Rhodes (1995), 523–24; Holloway (1994), 305–8. Joint Committee chairman Sterling Cole boasted in a letter to Ike: “we are now well ahead of the Soviets—both in fission weapons and in thermonuclear developments.” FRUS: 1952–1954, vol. 2, pt. 2, 1185–86.
15. Pfau (1984), 148.
16. Allardice to files, Dec. 21, 1953, no. CMXXV, JCAE; unsigned draft memo, Sept. 1, 1953, no. DCXXXIX, JCAE.
17. Mansfield to Teller, Nov. 10, 1953, Teller folder, JCAE.
18. Borden’s lengthy brief on Oppenheimer came as something of a shock and a revelation to Allardice. Allardice to file, June 13, 1953, no. DCXLIX, JCAE.
19. Cotter to Allardice, Oct. 22, 1953, no. 3687, JCAE. Allardice wrote at the bottom of Cotter’s memo: “I concur.”
20. In an assessment for the Joint Committee, Cotter disputed many of the points made by Borden in his letter to Hoover. Cotter to Allardice, Dec. 16, 1953, no. CMXXI, JCAE; Frank Cotter, Oct. 6, 1997, personal communication.
21. Chairman to president, May 21, 1953, no. DCXXXVI, JCAE.
22. Hickenlooper apparently talked Cole out of sending the letter to Hoover. Belmont to Ladd, Nov 27, 1953, sec. 15, pt. 1, JRO/FBI; Cole to Hoover, Nov. 24, 1953, no. CMXXII, JCAE.
23. In Dec. 1953, Allardice told an FBI agent that he and Cotter had “concluded it was best all around not to do anything except continue to watch the case.” Allardice to files, Dec. 21, 1953, no. CMXXV, JCAE.
24. One of the things that caused Borden to suspect Oppie of being a spy was Fuchs’s conclusion “that the Soviets had acquired an agent at Berkeley who informed them of electromagnetic separation research during 1942 or earlier.” Borden to Hoover, Nov. 7, 1953, Oppenheimer file, JCAE. Borden letter: Allardice to Strauss, Aug. 14, 1953, no. DCXXXV, JCAE; ITMOJRO, 839; Pittsburgh field report to Hoover, Dec. 6, 1953, sec. 15, pt. 2, JRO/FBI; Teller (2001), 389.
25. Hoover’s suspicions were shared by others. Nichols (1987), 306; Pfau (1984), 150.
26. Hoover to Tolson et al., Dec. 3, 1953, sec. 15, pt. 2, JRO/FBI.
27. Murray had become increasingly distrustful of Strauss. Hoover to Tolson and Ladd, Nov. 25, 1953, sec. 14, JRO/FBI; Pfau (1984), 155.
28. Hoover to Brownell, Dec. 3, 1953, sec. 15, pt. 2, JRO/FBI; Pfau (1984), 148–49.
29. Hoover to Tolson et al., Dec. 2, 1953, sec. 15, pt. 2, JRO/FBI.
30. Pfau (1984), 151.
31. Ibid.
32. Robert Ferrell, ed., The Eisenhower Diaries (Norton, 1981), 261–62; Belmont to Ladd, June 5, 1953, sec. 14, JRO/FBI.
33. Hewlett and Holl (1989), 69.
34. Hoover to Tolson et al., Dec. 3, 1953, sec. 15, pt. 2, JRO/FBI; Hewlett and Holl (1989), 69–70.
35. Hoover to Tolson et al., May 19, 1953, sec. 14, JRO/FBI.
36. Hoover to Tolson and Ladd, June 24, 1953, sec. 14, JRO/FBI.
37. Pfau (1984), 141.
38. Minutes, Aug. 25, 1949, no. 1203, JCAE. Volpe’s comment had been made in the context of the AEC’s reinvestigation of Berkeley’s scientists. See chapter 10.
39. Hoover to Tolson et al., Dec. 3, 1953, sec. 15, JRO/FBI.
40. Pittsburgh field report to Hoover, Dec. 4, 1953, sec. 15, pt. 2, JRO/FBI.
41. Borden to Allardice, Dec. 6, 1953, Borden correspondence, JCAE.
42. Bernstein (1990), 1439.
43. Nichols (1987), 297; Strauss to Nichols, May 7, 1952, folder 70, box 4, Kenneth Nichols papers, Army Corps of Engineers archives, Ft. Belvoir, Va.
44. Bernstein (1990), 1448.
45. Teller-Strauss meeting: Teller to Strauss, Nov. 6, 1953 and Dec. 11, 1953, LLS/HHPL; Teller (1987), 63.
46. Nichols to Tolson, Dec. 3, 1953, sec. 15, pt. 2, JRO/FBI.
47. Allardice’s original informant was probably William Consodine, Groves’s wartime lawyer. The Consodines were longtime friends of Allardice and his wife. Nichols to Tolson, Dec. 14, 1953, sec. 16, JRO/FBI; Joseph Volpe, Aug. 9, 2000, personal communication.
48. Hoover to Cleveland Special Agent-in-Change, Dec. 10, 1953, sec. 16, JRO/FBI.
49. Strauss immediately telephoned Allardice after talking to Groves. Belmont to Ladd, Dec. 14, 1953, sec. 15, pt. 2, JRO/FBI; telephone log, Dec. 1–30, 1953, box 6, LLS/NARA.
50. Belmont to Ladd, Dec. 14, 1953, sec. 15, pt. 2, JRO/FBI.
51. The following day, Lansdale wrote to Groves, at the latter’s request, with his recollection of the Dec. 1943 meeting in Groves’s office: “You had promised J. Robert that the information would not be given to the F.B.I. and so directed me. I will confess that in this one instance I disobeyed your instructions and orally passed the information along to the F.B.I.” Lansdale to Groves, Dec. 16, 1953, box 5, Groves/NARA. My thanks to Stan Norris for a copy of the Lansdale letter.
52. Belmont to Ladd, Dec. 29, 1953, sec. 16, JRO/FBI.
53. Belmont to Ladd, Dec. 17, 1953, sec. 16, JRO/FBI.
54. Groves was not able to see either Strauss or Nichols, so he met with LaPlante. Groves visit to FBI and AEC: Belmont to Ladd, Dec. 17, 1953, sec. 15, pt. 2, JRO/FBI; LaPlante to files, Dec. 17, 1953, AEC/NARA.
55. SAC Newark to Hoover, Dec. 22, 1953, and Hoover to Brownell, Dec. 22, 1953, sec. 16, JRO/FBI.
56. Hoover to Brownell, Dec. 22, 1953, sec. 16, JRO/FBI; Stern (1969), 69.
57. Joseph Learned to Hoover, Dec. 31, 1953, sec. 16, JRO/FBI. Hoover passed along the interview with Frank to Strauss on Jan. 7, 1954. “Dr. J. Robert Oppenheimer,” Dec. 14, 1959, box 3, JRO/AEC.
58. Bernstein (1990), 1442; telephone log, Dec. 1–30, 1953, box 5, LLS/NARA.
59. Bernstein (1990), 1447–48. Entry of Dec. 9, 1953, LaPlante diary, AEC/NARA; Murray to Strauss, Dec. 7, 1953, sec. 15, pt. 2, JRO/FBI.
60. Hewlett and Holl (1989), 78.
61. Among the traits that Strauss praised at Campbell’s confirmation hearings was the latter’s “personal loyalty.” Campbell was the only commissioner to whom Strauss revealed Ike’s “blank wall” order prior to the Dec. 10 meeting. Hewlett and Holl (1989), 31, 75.
62. According to Strauss’s telephone log, Strauss talked to Groves twice on the morning of
Dec. 10; Strauss also talked to Allardice in between Groves’s calls. While it is likely that the topic of discussion was the story that Allardice had given the FBI a week earlier, no subject is indicated in the log. Telephone log, Dec. 1–30, 1953, box 5, LLS/NARA.
63. Nichols stopped by Green’s office twice that weekend to remind the young lawyer to include the Chevalier incident in the list of charges. Nichols (1987), 307.
64. Hewlett and Holl (1989), 75–77; Stern (1969), 228–30.
65. Dec. 10, 1953, LaPlante diary, AEC/NARA.
66. Hoover to Strauss, Dec. 18, 1953, sec. 16, JRO/FBI; Williams and Cantelon (1984), 144–47.
67. Belmont to Ladd, Dec. 14, 1953, sec. 16, JRO/FBI.
68. Belmont to Ladd, Dec. 17, 1953, sec. 16, JRO/FBI.
69. As an indication of his innocence—or his hubris—Oppenheimer asked the trustees of Princeton’s Institute for Advanced Study to pay the $12,000 he had spent in legal fees preparing for the Weinberg trial. Strauss informed the FBI that “finally the ‘long-haired professors’ on the Board went along with him” and rejected Oppie’s appeal. Belmont to Ladd, June 19, 1953, sec. 14, JRO/FBI.
70. Oppenheimer to P. Spero, Apr. 29, 1953, Weinberg folder, box 77, and Reynolds to Oppenheimer, Dec. 31, 1953, box 47, JRO.
71. Paris visit: Legal attaché, Paris to FBI, Apr. 19, 1954, sec. 30, and telex, Apr. 26, 1954, sec. 31, JRO/FBI; Stern (1969), 213–15.
72. Belmont to Ladd, Dec. 4, 1953, sec. 15, pt. 2, JRO/FBI; Dec. 12, 1953, Nichols diary, folder 77, box 4, Nichols papers.
73. Belmont to Ladd, Dec. 14, 1953, sec. 15, pt. 2, JRO/FBI; Pfau (1984), 157.
74. Nichols (1987), 308.
75. Oppie had at one time looked to Strauss to defend him against such attacks. Nichols (1987), “Meeting with Dr. J. Robert Oppenheimer…,” Dec. 21, 1953, folder 80, box 4, Nichols papers; Hewlett and Holl (1989), 78–80.
76. Nichols (1987), 308.
77. Dec. 22, 1953, Nichols diary, folder 80, box 4, Nichols papers; Hoover to Brownell, Dec. 21, 1953, supplemental releases, JRO/FBI.
17: The Good Deeds a Man Has Done Before
1. Garrison: Stern (1969), 244.
2. Robb: Ibid., 243; Jan. 26, 1954, Nichols diary, Nichols papers.
3. In addition, the bureau tapped at least one of Oppie’s lawyers and also had an informant at Princeton’s Institute of Advanced Study. Wiretaps: Branigan to Belmont, Apr. 7, 1954, sec. 15, JRO/FBI. Hewlett and Holl (1989), 80; Heinrich to Belmont, June 29, 1954, supplemental releases, JRO/FBI; Bernstein (1990), 1451.
4. Strauss was telling Bates by month’s end that the wiretaps “had been most helpful to the AEC in that they were aware before hand of the moves [Oppenheimer] was contemplating.” Belmont to Ladd, Jan. 5, 1954, and Jan. 28, 1954, supplemental releases, JRO/FBI.
5. Belmont to Ladd, Feb. 19, 1954, sec. 21, JRO/FBI.
6. Borden to files, Aug. 13, 1951, no. 3464, JCAE.
7. Hoover to Strauss, Jan. 18, 1954, sec. 17, JRO/FBI.
8. Belmont to Ladd, Feb. 25, 1954, sec. 21, JRO/FBI.
9. Hewlett and Holl (1989), 74.
10. “Details,” n.d., and Branigan to Belmont, Jan. 22, 1954, sec. 18, JRO/FBI.
11. “Summary for Jan. 22, 1954,” sec. 18, JRO/FBI.
12. Belmont to Ladd, Feb. 25, 1954, sec. 21, JRO/FBI.
13. Feb. 19, 1954, Nichols diary, Nichols papers. Groves asked Nichols what he should say in his testimony. The general’s former aide responded cheerily: “Tell Oppie to be very truthful about all matters—maybe you and I will learn the truth about the Chevalier matter. Is he protecting Frank?” Nichols (1987), 315.
14. Belmont to Boardman, Mar. 4, 1954, sec. 21, JRO/FBI; Mar. 3, 1954, Nichols diary, Nichols papers.
15. Belmont to Ladd, Jan. 26, 1954, sec. 19, JRO/FBI.
16. Belmont to Boardman, Apr. 11, 1954, sec. 31, JRO/FBI.
17. Admiral Deke Parsons died of a heart attack the day before he was to go to the secretary of the navy to denounce the investigation of Oppenheimer. The FBI obtained Parsons’s medical records for Robb, so that he might counter the widow’s claim that the attack on Oppie had killed her husband. Parsons: Branigan to Belmont, Mar. 22, 1954, sec. 23, JRO/FBI; Stern (1969), 224.
18. Belmont to Ladd, Feb. 19, 1954, sec. 21, JRO/FBI.
19. Exculpatory evidence, on the other hand, was buried. Rolander to file, Mar. 18 and Apr. 2, 1954; and Branigan to Belmont, Apr. 15, 1954, sec. 25, JRO/FBI.
20. Rolander to Nichols (1987), Jan. 21, 1954, AEC/NARA; Mitchell to file, Feb. 23, 1954, AEC/NARA. On May 4, at the end of the hearing, Nichols wrote in his diary: “I told LaPlante I don’t want anything in the files saying we determined Garrison doesn’t require clearance.” Mar. 29, 1954, and May 4, 1954, Nichols diary, Nichols papers.
21. Nichols (1987), “Memo for Record,” Jan. 19, 1954, Nichols papers. Samuel Silverman, Garrison’s legal partner, recalled that Marks “was the most opposed to getting a clearance—on principle.” Author interview with Samuel Silverman, New York, N.Y., Nov. 14, 2000.
22. Hoover to Strauss, Feb. 18, 1954, sec. 19, JRO/FBI.
23. Newark SAC telex, Mar. 25, 1954, sec. 23, JRO/FBI.
24. “I don’t really remember that the Chevalier incident came up at all in my conversation with Frank.” Silverman interview (2000).
25. Ibid.
26. Hewlett and Holl (1989), 86.
27. Hoover to Strauss, Jan. 22, 1954, file C, vol. 2, box 2, JRO/AEC. The log of Strauss’s telephone calls indicates that he talked to Allardice on Feb. 15, 17, and 18, 1954. Telephone log, Jan.–Mar. 1954, box 6, LLS/NARA.
28. Hewlett and Holl (1989), 86.
29. Rolander to file, Mar. 15, 1954, file C, vol. 2, box 2, JRO/AEC.
30. Ibid. Lawrence also accused Oppenheimer of trying to “plant a man from Princeton on me” who had later been turned down by AEC security. The Princeton physicist—David Feldman—was a former fellow at the institute whom Oppie had recommended that Ernest hire at the Rad Lab in 1950. Rolander to file, Mar. 18, 1954, box 3, AEC/JRO; David Feldman, Aug. 25, 1993, personal communication.
31. Rolander to file, Mar. 15, 1954, file C, vol. 2, box 2, JRO/AEC; Cotter to Allardice, Sept. 7, 1954, no. 4888, JCAE.
32. Rolander to file, Mar. 15, 1954, file C, vol. 2, box 2, JRO/AEC.
33. Pfau (1984), 162.
34. Goodchild (1980), 231.
35. Hoover to Strauss, Jan. 4, 1954, sec. 17, JRO/FBI.
36. Gray: Stern (1969), 241; Hewlett and Holl (1989), 83. Although praised as “a man with no ax to grind,” Gray, a week before the hearing began, was already passing derogatory information on Oppenheimer to Robb. Hewlett and Holl (1989), 90.
37. Bravo: Hansen (1988), 62–68.
38. Bravo and Lucky Dragon: Minutes, May 29, 1954, GAC no. 40, no. 73405, CIC/DOE; Rhodes (1995), 542–43; Hansen (1988), 65–66.
39. Strauss told Eisenhower’s press secretary that the Lucky Dragon was probably a “Red spy ship” and the crew’s injuries faked. At Strauss’s request, CIA agents boarded the Lucky Dragon while it was in port in Japan. Robert Divine, Blowing on the Wind: The Nuclear Test Ban Debate, 1954–1960 (Oxford University Press, 1978), 6–9; Stephen Ambrose, Eisenhower, vol. 2, The President (Simon and Schuster, 1984), 168. Spy ship charge: Mar. 18, 1954, Nichols diary, Nichols papers; Hewlett and Holl (1989), 177; Herken (1992), 80; Pfau (1984), 166.
40. Two Livermore H-bomb tests were scheduled for Castle. The device to be tested first was a lithium-fueled, or “dry,” version of Ramrod dubbed “Morgenstern” (Morning Star) at the lab. The second device, called “Ramrod,” was a “wet,” or cryogenically cooled, version of the same device. Interviews.
41. Like Ruth, Livermore’s second hydride test, Ray, on Apr. 11, 1953, had also fizzled. The explosion, however, managed to level the bomb’s 100-tower. Hansen (1988), 67–68; interviews: York (1997) and Decker (1997).
42. Beset by last-minute doubts about the design of the radiation case, Livermore physicists surrounded the railroad car–si
zed Morgenstern with water-filled jerry cans. York interview (1997).
43. Interviews: LLNL (1997).
44. Strauss to LeBaron, Apr. 26, 1954, no. 72323, CIC/DOE. Both the Morgenstern device tested in Koon and Echo’s Ramrod were based upon Teller’s concept of a two-stage thermonuclear trigger for his original Super. Chuck Hansen, “Operation Castle,” unpublished manuscript, 57. The author would like to thank Chuck Hansen for a copy of his unpublished update to U.S. Nuclear Weapons: The Secret History.
45. Francis (1996), 69.
46. Rhodes (1995), 543; Stern (1969), 260–61.
47. Apr. 12, 1954, Nichols diary, Nichols papers.
48. ITMOJRO, 103.
49. Bates found the recording in the boxes of army CIC files that Groves turned over to the FBI at the end of the war. Nichols (1987), 315.
50. As Hoover and Strauss were aware, by sticking to the story that he told the FBI in 1946, Oppenheimer avoided a possible perjury indictment; the statute of limitation had already run out on any lie told to Pash in 1943. Branigan to Belmont, Apr. 19, 1954, sec. 31, JRO/FBI; Pfau (1984), 171.
51. Stern (1969), 280. Nichols told Strauss that he believed the reason Oppenheimer was taken by surprise at the 1954 hearing was that Oppie assumed the commission knew little of his prewar past. Strauss to file, Nov. 12, 1969, LLS/HHPL.
52. ITMOJRO, 137.
53. “How can any individual report a treasonable act on the part of another man and then go and stay at his home for several days? It just doesn’t make any sense to me,” Ike told his press secretary, James Hagerty. Hewlett and Holl (1989), 104.
54. ITMOJRO, 153. Wrote Nichols in his memoirs, published in 1987: “I certainly do not believe that Oppenheimer told Groves that it all was a ‘cock and bull story’ in the autumn of 1943.” Nichols (1987), 319.
55. ITMOJRO, 153.
56. Apr. 13, 1954, Nichols diary, Nichols papers.
57. ITMOJRO, 170–79. Robb did not ask Groves whether he considered Oppenheimer a security risk, but instead—quoting the May 1950 letter that the general had written for the physicist—asked whether “the expressions of confidence in him contained in this letter you wrote hold?” Groves answered, “you can draw your own conclusions as to what I feel today.”
