by Gregg Herken
104. Childs (1968), 492–93; Davis (1968), 352.
105. Pfau (1984), 188.
106. Hewlett and Holl (1989), 288–91. Privately, Strauss was more forthright. Minutes, AEC Meeting no. 1062, Feb. 23, 1955, AEC/NARA.
107. Strauss and Libby: Hewlett and Holl (1989), 287–88, 293–95.
108. Dixon-Yates: Pfau (1984), 183–85; Hewlett and Holl (1989), 247–49.
109. Hewlett and Holl (1989), 243.
110. FRUS: 1955–57, vol. 20, 119.
111. Ironically, Murray’s views on tactical nuclear weapons were nearly identical to Oppenheimer’s in Vista. Hewlett and Holl (1989), 336–38.
112. Ibid., 338.
113. Ibid., 338–40. After Strauss failed in his efforts to have Murray’s Q clearance lifted, he ordered all copies of the commissioner’s letters and memos on the test ban recalled at the AEC. Earl Voss, Nuclear Ambush: The Test-Ban Trap (Regnery, 1963), 78; Jack Crawford, Aug. 15, 2001, personal communication.
114. Because of the distinctions that Murray made concerning what he called “rational nuclear armament,” he and Strauss agreed on the need to continue testing in order to develop the clean bomb.
115. Francis (1996), 107–8. ICBM and von Neumann report: Mansfield to file, Mar. 5, 1955, no. DCCCLXII, JCAE; York (1987), 91; Borden to Jackson, June 27, 1955, folder 37, box 18, Henry Jackson papers, Special Collections, University of Washington, Seattle, Wash.
116. Bradbury wrote: “Everyone will ultimately have all the weapons in all the variety wanted, and the number will probably be more than the world can safely tolerate being used.” But he would come to regret his “frankness.” Bradbury to Johnson, Nov. 21, 1955, folder 12, carton 32, EOL; Libby to Strauss, Nov. 14, 1955, Murray papers; Bradbury to Strauss, Feb. 7, 1956, no. 125634, CIC/DOE.
117. “Airborne H-bomb Exploded by U.S. over Pacific Isle,” New York Times, May 21, 1956.
118. York (1987), 75; Francis (1996), 97.
119. Zuni: Hansen (1995), vol. 5, 192–95.
120. Hewlett and Holl (1989), 345–47.
121. Murray to Strauss, July 26, 1956, no. 74363, CIC/DOE.
122. “Statement by the President,” July 8, 1956, no. 107756; Murray to Strauss, Aug. 3, 1956, no. 74359; Strauss to Murray, Aug. 6, 1956, no. 74358; Murray to Strauss, Sept. 11, 1956, no. 74356, CIC/DOE.
123. Hewlett and Holl (1989), 301, 360.
124. Pfau (1984), 201.
125. Hewlett and Holl (1989), 349; FRUS: 1955–57, vol. 20, 419.
126. Task force report: “Disarmament Study,” Jan. 1956; “Personnel Requirements for Nuclear Inspection,” June 1, 1956; Stassen to Twining, Feb. 2, 1956, box 66, USDS/NARA; Arnold Kramish, personal communication; Starbird to Strauss, Dec. 26, 1956, no. 72441, CIC/DOE.
127. Griggs suggested that inspection stations in Russia could also be used to secretly eavesdrop on Soviet radio communications. “Verbatim Record,” 97; Odom to Stassen, May 22, 1956, box 64, USDS/NARA.
128. Hewlett and Holl (1989), 367–69; Divine (1978), 84–104; Ambrose (1984), 349.
129. Divine (1978), 105; “The Nuclear Test Issue,” Washington Post, Oct. 17, 1956. Lawrence complained to the university’s president when two Rad Lab veterans joined Stevenson’s campaign. “He seemed to be very much upset by this but not very clear as to what he thought I could do about it,” wrote Sproul in his office diary. Nov. 2, 1957, memos, Sproul papers.
130. Divine (1978), 105.
131. “[Strauss] encouraged his friends Edward Teller and Ernest Lawrence to tell the public that ‘we are never sure a device will work until it is tested.’” Pfau (1984), 199.
132. Childs (1968), 474.
133. Wilkes subsequently wrote of the incident: “My recollection is that Ernest made it clear that AEC Chairman Strauss encouraged such a statement.” Wilkes, “Notes for discussion…,” Nov. 9, 1986, Wilkes folder, box 2, John Lawrence papers, LBL; Wilkes to Lawrence, n.d., folder 9, carton 17, EOL; Childs (1968), 498–99.
134. The final version deleted Teller’s pitch for the clean bomb and did not mention Ernest’s role on Stassen’s task force. Press release, Nov. 4, 1956, folder 9, carton 17, EOL; “2 Scientists Back Tests of H-bomb,” New York Times, Nov. 6, 1956.
19: A Cross of Atoms
1. Hewlett and Holl (1989), 380.
2. Notes on Oct. 10, 1958, memo, Murray papers; Murray to Strauss, Mar. 28, 1957, no. 72358, and McGruder to Strauss, Apr. 3, 1957, no. 108370, CIC/DOE.
3. Clinton Anderson made Murray a special consultant to the Joint Committee. “Dear Mr. President,” n.d., Murray papers; Hewlett and Holl (1989), 331, 408; Hansen (1995), vol. 5, 276–77.
4. Appleby (1987), 252; Pfau (1984), 204.
5. Murray feared that Henry Luce might spike the piece, or that Strauss would blackmail the magazine’s advertisers into stopping publication. Personal communication, Jack Crawford, Mar. 11, 1993. Three weeks after Murray’s article appeared, Luce wrote to Strauss with an apology. Luce to Strauss, May 23, 1957, H. Luce folder, LLS/HHPL.
6. “The civilized tradition has always declared that an unlimited and indiscriminate use of force in warfare is unjust,” Murray wrote.
7. Livermore received the contract for a subsequent ICBM, the Titan. Francis (1996), 112–13.
8. Nobska: Ibid., 119–21; Project Nobska: The Implications of Advanced Design on Undersea Warfare, final report, Dec. 1, 1956, Committee on Undersea Warfare, “Physical Sciences, 1956” file, National Academy of Sciences, Washington, D.C.
9. Just a few days earlier, York had notified the AEC that Livermore was on the verge of developing a small, lightweight H-bomb, based upon two ideas that had shown promise in the last Nevada tests. Hansen, “Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile Warheads” (unpublished manuscript); Teller (2001), 421.
10. Murray to Strauss, Dec. 20, 1956, no. 74345, CIC/DOE.
11. Appleby (1987), 248.
12. Hewlett and Holl (1989), 398; Divine (1978), 146.
13. Hewlett and Holl (1989), 399.
14. Bryan to Strauss, June 20, 1957, Cole folder, and Strauss to Lawrence, July 1, 1957, LLS/HHPL; Strauss to Gerard Smith, Sept. 12, 1957, no. 108301, CIC/DOE.
15. Childs (1968), 504.
16. Teller and Strauss had previously talked, for example, of using nuclear explosions to change the dust content of the atmosphere or to clear away Los Angeles’s famous smog by blowing a hole in the city’s surrounding mountains.
17. Stassen had raised the idea of an “open” test in a previous memo to Lawrence’s task force. Stassen to Lawrence, box 66, Arneson file, USDS/NARA.
18. June 24 meeting: Childs (1968), 504; Hewlett and Holl (1989), 400–401; Divine (1978), 148–50; Ambrose (1984), 399–400; Gerard Smith to Stassen, July 1, 1957, box 127, Arneson file, USDS/NARA; FRUS: 1955–57. vol. 20, 638–40.
19. After also listening to the scientists’ appeal, Dulles had written to Eisenhower, urging the president not to reverse his position on the test ban. Appleby (1987), 212; 249.
20. In their own press conference, immediately following the White House visit, Teller and Lawrence had spoken of weapons that were 96 percent “pure.” Transcript of press conference, June 26, 1957, Public Papers of the Presidents: Dwight Eisenhower, 1957, 497–501; Dulles to Stassen, July 1, 1957, FRUS: 1955–57, vol. 20, 649–50.
21. Lilienthal (1969), 232.
22. Strauss to Mills, July 3, 1957, Mills folder, LLS/HHPL; Hansen (1995), vol. 5, 321.
23. Morse to Teller, July 3, 1957, Morse folder, LLS/HHPL; Hansen (1995), vol. 5, 321.
24. York calculated that the weight of a clean bomb would be three to five times that of a “standard” H-bomb. York to Starbird, Oct. 24, 1956, no. 74348, and York to Starbird, July 11, 1957, no. 103901, CIC/DOE. Clean-bomb limitations: Livermore interviews; Hansen (1995), vol. 5, 89; York to Huston, Apr. 25, 1955, no. 74365, CIC/DOE.
25. Murray to Strauss, May 29, 1957, no. 74336, and Starbird to Fields, June 4, 1957, no. 103903, CIC/DOE.
26. Hansen (1995), vol. 5, 3
28.
27. Ibid., 274–75.
28. “Conference with the President,” Aug. 9, 1957, no. 33078, CIC/DOE; Ambrose (1984), 344.
29. Rabi interview (1983).
30. Rabi’s influence upon Eisenhower was already subtly evident. When Strauss urged Ike to approve additional high-yield H-bomb tests, the president replied that a 40-megaton weapon would only cause about half again the damage of a 10-megaton bomb because “the scaling laws apply on a cube route [sic] basis.”
31. Pfau (1984), 208; Killian, Sputniks, Scientists, and Eisenhower: A Memoir of the First Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology (MIT Press, 1977), 8.
32. Sputnik reaction: Killian (1977), 6–12; Pfau (1984), 209.
33. FRUS: 1955–57, vol. 20, 607–10.
34. Rabi proposal: Ibid., vol. 19, 615–17, 308–9; Herken (1992), 103.
35. Should the Soviets be allowed to continue testing, Rabi told Ike, they “seem certain to discover the feature that they now lack.” Ferrell (1981), 348–49.
36. Gordon Gray—about to replace Cutler as Ike’s national security adviser—was a silent witness to the confrontation in the Oval Office.
37. FRUS: 1955–57, vol. 20, 755–56; Strauss to file, Nov. 6, 1957, Teller file, LLS/HHPL.
38. Ferrell (1981), 348–49; Teller to Fields, May 29, 1957, no. 137190, CIC/DOE; Teller to Strauss, June 4, 1957, Teller folder, LLS/HHPL; Mark interview (1991).
39. Killian and PSAC: Killian (1977), 20–30; Herken (1992), 104–5; Divine (1978), 171.
40. Killian (1977), 37.
41. Stassen: Hewlett and Holl (1989), 384, 469–71; Ambrose (1984), 447.
42. FRUS: 1958–60, vol. 3, 49–51, 567–72.
43. Ibid., 572.
44. Author interview with Hans Bethe, Pasadena, Calif., Jan 1, 1991. FRUS: 1958–60, vol. 3, 551–53.
45. Jeremy Bernstein (1981), 109.
46. FRUS: 1958–60, vol. 3, 575–89.
47. Hewlett and Holl (1989), 479; FRUS: 1958–60, vol. 3, 589–90.
48. FRUS: 1958–60, vol. 3, 597–98; 603–4. “Cessation of testing, in the judgment of the group, would leave the United States in a position of technical advantage for a few years, which will otherwise be lost,” Killian told Ike.
49. At the Ramey meeting, PSAC concluded that a moratorium before Hardtack stood no chance of approval by the AEC and Pentagon. Bethe interview (1991).
50. Teller (2001), 343–44; York (1987), 117–18; York interview (1997).
51. Appleby (1987), 272; Hewlett and Holl (1989), 477.
52. Hewlett and Holl (1989), 302; J. D. Hunley, “Polaris and Minuteman: The Solid-Propellant Breakthrough in Missiles” (unpublished manuscript, 2001).
53. Hansen (1995), “W-47,” 8–9; Strauss to Quarles, Jan. 2, 1958, no. 72458, CIC/DOE.
54. Strauss to Eisenhower, Jan. 29, 1958, no. 101731, CIC/DOE.
55. Agnew to Mills, Mar. 28, 1958, no. 123855, CIC/DOE. Open shot: “Demonstration Shot for Operation Hardtack,” Oct. 17, 1957, no. 72401, and teletype, Dec. 12, 1957, no. 123862, CIC/DOE; “Description of Devices,” n.d., box 99, LLNL.
56. Bradbury to York, Nov. 5, 1957, no. 101852, CIC/DOE.
57. Lawrence was interested in closing a loophole that his task force had identified in the inspection scheme: the possibility that the Russians might hide nuclear tests by exploding their bombs in space. Starbird to Lawrence, July 8, 1956, and Fields to Lawrence, Mar. 7, 1957, box 99, LLNL.
58. Christofilos and Argus: York (1987), 128–32; Beckerley to Thornton, Mar. 2, 1953, folder 10, carton 30, EOL; Loper to Chairman, July 3, 1958, no. MCCLXXXIII, JCAE.
59. Fields to Lawrence, Mar. 7, 1957, no. 137176; Strauss to Eisenhower, Nov. 23, 1957, no. 28933, CIC/DOE. Two of the high-altitude detonations, Teak and Orange, were also weapons-effects tests for a possible antiballistic missile system. Libby to Durham, Apr. 8, 1958, no. 7808, JCAE.
60. Starbird to Bradbury, Feb. 13, 1958, no. 125211, CIC/DOE.
61. Teller interview (July 30, 1993); Teller and Brown (1962), 72; Teller (2001), 434.
62. “The Compelling Need for Nuclear Tests,” Life, Feb. 10, 1958; Edward Teller and Albert Latter, Our Nuclear Future: Facts, Dangers, and Opportunities (Criterion Books, 1958); Hewlett and Holl (1989), 475; author interview with Albert Latter, Los Angeles, Calif., Mar. 11, 1985.
63. “If this goes on we shall just become a factory for making atomic bombs in whatever size or shape the customer wants and will boast, annually like the automobile manufacturers, of our fantastic improvements—although to the jaundiced eye, only the fenders have been changed,” Bradbury wrote. Bradbury to Starbird, Jan. 8, 1958, no. 125654, CIC/DOE.
64. Author interview with Edward Huddleson, San Francisco, Calif., Dec. 17, 1992.
65. Transcript of Don Gow interview, box 1, Childs papers; Childs (1968), 500.
66. Early in 1958, Lawrence feared “a severe reduction in the Berkeley program.” Lawrence to Tammaro, Jan. 15, 1958, folder 15, carton 30, EOL.
67. Neylan to Regents, July 13, 1954, box 171, Neylan papers.
68. Rabi to Strauss, Dec. 22, 1954, GAC file, AEC/NARA.
69. Dec. 14, 1955, GAC file, AEC/NARA.
70. “He saw no connection between higher energies and useful things, and then his enthusiasm dropped.” Lofgren interview (1998).
71. York interview (1997); Davis (1968), 351.
72. Feldman was invited back in 1955 but declined the invitation. David Feldman, Nov. 3, 1993, personal communication.
73. “Luis was telling Lawrence how to run the lab,” observed the Rad Lab’s amazed business manager. Transcript of Wallace Reynolds interview, 82, Bancroft Library; Alvarez (1987), 189, 205.
74. Dec. 9, 1957, confidential memos, box 4, Sproul papers.
75. Aebersold to Hamilton, Feb. 24, 1956, folder 22, carton 32, EOL.
76. Von Neumann had also died of cancer, ten days earlier.
77. Childs (1968), 516.
78. Teletype, Apr. 7, 1958, folder 1751, box 185, LLNL. Teller persuaded Mills’s widow to write to Eisenhower, urging completion of Hardtack. Author interview with Polly Plesset, Woodside, Calif., May 14, 1988.
79. Childs (1968), 518.
80. When Teller announced that he was “extremely unhappy about any agreement which starts with the word ‘don’t,’” Louis Ridenour dryly observed that God and Moses had previously found the formulation convenient. “Discussion on ‘Ban the Missile,’” Oct. 21, 1955; and “Task Force Meeting,” Mar. 1, 1957, box 64, Arneson file, USDS/NARA.
81. “Verbatim Record…,” May 19, 1956, 93, Arneson file, USDS/NARA.
82. “He wasn’t interested in a lot of things except the test ban, because he wanted to talk with the Russians.” Hayward interview (1996).
83. Author interview with James Gaither, San Francisco, Calif. Dec. 17, 1992. The Loomis fund paid for the Russian scientists’ visits to Berkeley.
84. Childs (1968), 511.
85. Waters to Hoover, July 12, 1955, Ernest Lawrence file, no. 116-10798, FBI.
86. “Verbatim Record…,” May 29, 1956, 138, Arneson file, USDS/NARA.
87. Donkin to Strauss, Mar. 4, 1957, “McKay Donkin’s Top Secret Material,” box 8, LLS/NARA.
88. FRUS: 1958–60, vol. 3, 604.
89. Voss (1963), 182; Davis (1968), 352; Killian (1977), 158; “Strauss Defeat on Delegates Is Disclosed,” Washington Evening Star, May 29, 1958; “Dr. Teller’s Influence with Ike Wanes After Error on ‘Clean Bomb,’” Buffalo Evening News, Apr. 12, 1958.
90. Smith interview (1992).
91. Pfau (1984), 215–17.
92. Appearing on a television talk show, Anderson raised doubts about Strauss’s veracity concerning the clean bomb. Transcript, Face the Nation, May 4, 1958, no. 100116; Kline to Anderson, May 8, 1958, no. 100132; AEC press release, May 4, 1958, no. 74322, CIC/DOE.
93. McCone: Hewlett and Holl (1989), 489–91.
94. Strauss to Lawrence, June 23, 1958, folder 52, carton 15, EOL.
&
nbsp; 95. Bacher later told Oppenheimer that Lawrence was “extraordinarily devoted” to the U.S. mission. Bethe confirmed that “Lawrence surprised us” with his willingness to accept a ban on testing: “He was entirely in favor of having that meeting with the Russians.” Bethe interview (1996); DuBridge to Cooksey, Sept. 23, 1958, folder 17, carton 6, EOL; Childs (1968), 523–24.
96. Davis (1968), 353.
97. Childs (1968), 521.
98. Ibid.
99. Hansen (1988), 77–79.
100. Hansen, “Announced U.S. Nuclear Detonations…,” 14–15; Bradbury to Starbird, June 3, 1958, no. 101951, CIC/DOE.
101. FRUS: 1958–1960, vol. 3, 612–13.
102. In May, the head of testing in the Pacific wrote to Starbird, “do every thing you can to cancel Pinon shot.” Ogle to Starbird, May 20, 1958, no. 101882, CIC/DOE.
103. Directors to General Manager, June 24, 1958, no. 101883, CIC/DOE.
104. Salisbury to Starbird et al., June 26, 1958, no. 101884, CIC/DOE. Starbird worried that Pinon “might unduly awe rather than mollify the observers.” Starbird to General Manager, Feb. 21, 1958, no. 72447, CIC/DOE.
105. Childs (1968), 524.
106. Dolly Eltenton had been Semenov’s secretary and George Eltenton his colleague when the Russian directed Leningrad’s Institute of Chemical Physics in the 1930s. Holloway (1994), 451.
107. Harold Brown and Hans Bethe confirmed Lawrence’s break statement. Observed Brown: “Lawrence in his grand statement to prevent a break appealed to the spirit of science and the fact that there were Nobel prize winners on each side.” Author interview with Harold Brown, Washington, D.C., June 28, 1996; Bethe interview (1996).
108. Spiers to “Phil and Vince,” July 5, 1958, box 85, Arneson file, USDS/NARA.
109. Tichvinsky, “Impressions…,” Aug. 23, 1958, folder 27, carton 17, EOL.
110. “It was most encouraging—Morse is genuinely worried from the point of view of a vigorous opponent of test suspension that there may be an agreement among the experts of the two sides.” Farley to Spiers, July 17, 1958, box 85, Arneson file, USDS/NARA.
111. Childs (1968), 527.
112. “U.S. Atomic Aide Ill,” New York Times, July 30, 1958.
113. Teller described Juniper as Livermore’s “most radical” Hardtack shot and “an entirely new concept in bomb design.” Strauss to Eisenhower, Jan. 29, 1958, no. 101731, CIC/DOE.
