He was not wrong. Across the Channel, over 4,000 craft had now been requisitioned, including 1,600 motorboats. Most had been assembled at the embarkation ports, or were on their way there. The whole fleet would be ready for use by 19 September. However, the vital minesweeping programme was well behind schedule, delayed by bad weather. The area west of the Dover–Calais line was giving some concern and doubt was being expressed as to whether the mines and obstacles close to the English coast could be located by the target date.
Captain Gustav Kleikamp had his own problems. As commander responsible for the Calais group of the transport flotilla, he was worried about the lack of large-scale exercises. The “inadequate training of personnel and deficiencies in the material assembled”, he complained, could not be made good in the time available. There would have been the very greatest difficulty getting a transport fleet to the landing area, especially at night. Captain Scheurlen, commanding the Le Havre Group, was also extremely dubious about the fleet capability. Among his problems, crews of the motor sailing vessels were almost entirely boys under 17 years of age.29
The Luftwaffe was continuing its attacks on RAF airfields. Four were badly hit, including Eastchurch. But there were also raids on aircraft factories. Short Brothers at Rochester was attacked. The Vickers factory at Brooklands was bombed by Me 110s, flying in from very low level. They caused much damage. Over 80 workers were killed, with 700 casualties in all. The production of Wellingtons was halted for four days. Dowding ordered maximum air protection for Hurricane and Spitfire production centres at Kingston, Langley, Brooklands and Southampton. Among other sites bombed were Canterbury, Faversham and Reigate.
Beaverbrook was getting increasingly concerned about the effects of air-raid warnings on aircraft production. There were as problematical as the raids themselves. At the Castle Bromwich Spitfire plant in Warwickshire, he had been appalled to find that on 31 August 700 men had quit work at lunchtime without authorization, and a further 700 at five in the evening. There had been 3,500 men at work over the weekend, but there had been “a marked disinclination” to continue at work after an air-raid warning had been sounded. Production had fallen off and prompt action was necessary if the situation was not to deteriorate further. He wanted the sounding of the sirens discontinued, and asked the Cabinet to consider compulsion to keep men at work during air raids.30
Led by Churchill, in an evening session, the Cabinet debated the disruptive effect of air-raid warnings on war production, at some length. The meeting offered changes to the warning system, to minimize production losses. Everybody engaged in useful work, and not in a position of special danger, should continue his or her work on receipt of the “red “ warning, and should not seek shelter until specific instructions were received (or until guns or bombs were heard).31
Fighter Command on the day flew 678 sorties, losing 19 aircraft. Three Bomber Command aircraft brought the losses to 22, with exactly the same number lost by the Luftwaffe, including 2 He 111s to a Blenheim night fighter, aided by searchlight batteries. By night, the Germans were back on the prowl with nearly 200 bombers in the air. Liverpool was hit again. The attack was directed mainly at Edge Hill goods station and Lister Drive power station. There was damage to surrounding houses. The Dunlop rubber works and Tunnel Road Cinema were damaged. Overnight, progressing into the next day, there was a heavy raid on Bristol, with 47 aircraft attacking.
Alternatively provoked and humiliated by Bomber Command’s pinprick raids on Berlin and other German cities, Hitler made a surprise speech in the Sports Palace in Berlin. The occasion was the opening of the Winterhilfe – winter relief – campaign. “I have tried to spare the British”, he said, then complaining that “[t]hey have replied by murdering German women and children”. He taunted the “blabbering” of their leaders Churchill and Eden; Duff Cooper he ridiculed as a “Krampfhenne” (nervous old hen). Then he went on, referring to the RAF raids on Germany, declaring:
And should the British Air Force drop 2000 or 3000 or 4000kg of bombs, then we will drop 150,000, 180,000, 230,000, 300,000, 400,000kg, yes, one million kilograms in a single night. And should they then declare they will greatly increase their attacks on our cities, we will erase their cities. We will put these night time pirates out of business, God help us! The hour will come when one of us will break – and it will not be National Socialist Germany!32
William L. Shirer, commenting on the speech in his diary, wrote of it being “grim and dripping with hate” for most of the evening, but he nonetheless picked out a “humorous, jaunty” moment: “In England they’re filled with curiosity and keep asking: ‘Why doesn’t he come?’” Said Hitler: “Be calm. He’s coming! He’s coming!” But it was the British who came first. RAF bombers were over Berlin just before midnight. That was also noted by Shirer, who had earlier witnessed the “hysterical applause” of Hitler’s audience – mainly women nurses and social workers.33
The reactions of the audience lent some weight to a secret assessment written by the British Chiefs of Staff. Collapse of the German Government had been considered the means by which the war would be brought to an end. But the Chiefs were now saying that there was no likelihood of this happening. In their 74-page document, they also “assumed” that any enemy attempt to invade would fail. The best probability of success and the greatest economic advantages would arise, they argued, from a naval and air attack on shipping and ports with a view to cutting off supplies, combined with air attack on industry and morale, and an intensification of the propaganda campaign.
DAY 58 – THURSDAY 5 SEPTEMBER 1940
Less than twelve hours after Hitler’s charge that the RAF had been “murdering German women and children”, a Luftwaffe bomb hit West Hill Hospital in Dartford, Kent. It demolished the maternity ward block, killing two nurses and twenty-two new and expectant mothers, trapping many more. One of the nursing staff, Sister Mary Gantry was quickly on the scene. Still in her nightclothes with an overcoat hastily thrown over them, she crawled in and out of the wreckage, giving morphine injections to trapped women.34
In response to Hitler’s speech, readers of the Daily Mirror were treated to an account of how London’s anti-aircraft guns had “roared into action and flung up a wall of flame against German raiders … only a few hours after Hitler had threatened new night after night blitzkrieg in answer to the RAF’s raids”.
“Hitler screams threats” was the offering from the Daily Express. The speech made the front page of the New York Times. References to Hitler dropping “hundreds of thousands of pounds” of bombs on England even found their way to New Zealand where, in the Evening Post, the story was given front-page lead. Closer to home, the Irish Times not only ran a front-page lead item, which noted that “Bombing of England to be intensified”, it embedded in the story a “box” with the more or less precise quote from Hitler: “If the British attack our cities we will simply erase theirs”.
The speech was covered in the Guardian. The two-column headers told the story: “Hitler threatens bombing night after night”, followed by the line: “Revenge for RAF raids”. Then there was the Hitler quote in capitals. Curiously, though, when it came to the British “paper of record”, The Times, the Hitler speech was not the main item. It got a down-page single column headed: “Hitler’s new bluster”. There was no mention of the threat to eradicate British cities.
This day, Kesselring launched twenty-two raids. Biggin Hill was on the list again, but an attack around eleven in the morning did no damage. However, the main railway line between Charing Cross and the coast was blocked by a salvo of bombs at nearby Chislehurst. Oil tanks at Thameshaven were set on fire, the pyre of smoke providing a convenient navigation marker for Luftwaffe crews for the days to come. Already, bombers from the Fifth Air Fleet in Norway and Denmark were being moved to airfields in Holland, to maximize the impact of the attack.35 Army High Command thought it should be coordinated with the invasion timetable, but the OKW staff conference was told that Göring was not interested i
n the preparations for Sealion, since he did not think the operation would actually be carried out.36
And if Göring was doing his best, in the open, to make the invasion unnecessary, behind the scenes there was another attempt to achieve the same thing, by a different route. As with Hitler’s speech of 19 July, peace feelers followed the day afterwards. They came via Victor Mallet, the British Minister in Stockholm. The British Government was told when he telegraphed the Foreign Office with details of a proposal received from the President of the Swedish High Court of Appeal, Professor Lars Ekberg. He in turn had received it from Dr Ludwig Weissauer, a Berlin barrister who had come to Sweden, a man “with very important connections” and “understood to be a direct secret emissary of Hitler”.37 This would have been the basis of the Chicago Daily News’ story. Mallet asked whether he should meet Weissauer. “I should of course say nothing to encourage him but it might be of interest to listen”, he wrote.38
In the afternoon, Churchill had been in the Commons to give his now routine monthly “war situation” report.39 Initially, his speech focused on the fifty geriatric destroyers from the USA. He spoke at some length about them. At last turning to the air war, he stated, “We must be prepared for heavier fighting in this month of September”, then telling MPs: “The need of the enemy to obtain a decision is very great, and if he has the numbers with which we have hitherto credited him, he should be able to magnify and multiply his attacks”. He did not mention Hitler’s speech, but did add that “Firm confidence is felt by all the responsible officers of the Royal Air Force in our ability to withstand this largely increased scale of attack”. Our Air Force to–day, he said:
is more numerous and better equipped than it was at the outbreak of the war, or even in July, and, to the best of our belief, we are far nearer to the total of the German numerical strength, as we estimate it, than we expected to be at this period in the war.
Only then did he take on the prospect of imminent Armageddon, with a warning for his audience. “No one must suppose that the danger of invasion has passed,” he said:
I do not agree with those who assume that after the 15th September – or whatever is Herr Hitler’s latest date – we shall be free from the menace of deadly attack from overseas; because winter, with its storms, its fogs, its darkness, may alter the conditions, but some of the changes cut both ways. There must not be for one moment any relaxation of effort or of wise precaution, both of which are needed to save our lives and to save our cause. I shall not, however, be giving away any military secrets if I say that we are very much better off than we were a few months ago, and that if the problem of invading Great Britain was a difficult one in June, it has become a far more difficult and a far larger problem in September.
Churchill went on to tell the House that the government had been sending a “continuous stream of convoys with reinforcements to the Middle East”, including “sending some of our most powerful modern vessels” to reinforce the Mediterranean fleet. We also send war supplies to Malta, including a batch of modern anti-aircraft guns.
That day the aircraft carrier HMS Argus had arrived at Takoradi on the West African coast. It had on board thirty Hurricanes and their pilots, ready to fly overland to Khartoum the next day. Furthermore, the New Zealand Division, only recently arrived in England, had been earmarked for the Middle East. General Alan Brooke thought they would be “a great loss to the Home Forces”.40 Remarkably, with Fighter Command supposedly on the brink of collapse and with invasion imminent, one of the best units in the Army was on notice for deployment overseas and the government could afford to send thirty Hurricanes, with pilots, to Khartoum.
Back in the Commons, there was a debate on the coal industry.41 Mines Secretary David Grenfell admitted there was a problem of transport, “not an easy problem”. Internal consumption of coal had been very much higher than in recent years, and more had to be moved on the railways than before. There had been the restrictions on coastal shipping but a record number of trains had been sent from the extreme north to the south. Never before had so much Durham and Northumberland coal come by rail into the London area and into the south. Thus offered was a picture of a system under enormous strain. It gave adequate reason why the “Coal Scuttle” convoys could not be stopped.
In its weekly review of the air war, Flight magazine observed that the Germans had been changing or developing their tactics. Rather reluctantly, it would seem, “they have begun to indulge more than at first in night raiding”.
That night, the Luftwaffe roamed freely, hitting over forty towns and cities. Shops and buildings in Clifton, Bristol, were hit and four people killed. Liverpool Docks were bombed and Dunlop’s Walton works were hit. Domestic premises and shops in Bootle were damaged, and Rainhill Mental Hospital was hit. At Prescot, St Helens, four were killed in an attack. Other incidents included bombing at Wallasey and at Wigan where a Methodist church was destroyed. And the day’s fighting also had the Luftwaffe ahead on aircraft losses, with twenty-two down, compared with the RAF’s twenty-eight, including six bombers.
DAY 59 – FRIDAY 6 SEPTEMBER 1940
The air war was driven off the front pages by news of the British Navy routing the Italian fleet, before it had gone on to bombard Rhodes and other Italian naval bases. “The most brilliant action of the Mediterranean War”, the Daily Express declared. “Fleet kick at Duce’s door”, announced the Daily Mirror.
With four days to go before the countdown for Sealion was due to start, Grand Admiral Räder was summoned to meet Hitler in Berlin. At the meeting were Generals Keitel and Jodl, the naval adjutant, Commander von Puttkamer, and Admiral Schniewind. The blockade was intensively discussed, whence Räder sought and got permission for the “strict execution” of submarine warfare. This entailed the removal of all previously agreed restrictions on operations. When it came to discussing Sealion, Räder was not encouraging. Making it clear to Hitler that he meant no criticism of Göring, he told him that weather conditions and “the situation in air warfare” had delayed the planned minesweeping. Nevertheless the new deadline of 21 September could be met. Barges were in position and the transports would be ready in time for embarkation. The invasion appeared possible, “if attended by favourable circumstances regarding air supremacy, weather, etc”.42
Duncan Grinnell-Milne, author of Silent Victory, the book referred to in Chapter 2, argued that the “etc” referred to command of the sea.43 Räder was seeking to transfer to the Luftwaffe the responsibility for something which could not be gained by air power alone but which the Kriegsmarine was incapable of achieving. In effect, despite the apparently positive note, he was actually saying in a roundabout fashion that the operation could not succeed. Emphasizing that point, he said: “The crossing itself will be very difficult. The Army cannot rely on being able to keep the divisions together”.
The Grand Admiral then asked Hitler what the alternatives to Sealion were. At the same time, he reaffirmed his own belief that Germany should continue to give the appearance of mounting an invasion but resources should be redirected to industry through the release of personnel and shipping engaged in its preparation. His alternatives matched those offered by Jodl in mid-August – taking Gibraltar and the Suez Canal to exclude Britain from the Mediterranean area. Preparations for an assault on Gibraltar, he said, must be begun at once so that they were completed before the USA stepped in. The operation should not be considered of secondary importance, but as one of the main blows against Britain. The necessary orders to prepare for that attack were eventually formalized – in Führer Directive No. 18, issued on 12 November.
Räder later told his staff that the Führer had regarded a landing as the means of achieving an end to the war “at one stroke”. “Yet”, said the Grand Admiral, “the Führer has no thought of executing the landing if the risk of the operation is too high.” His impression was that Hitler’s decision to land in England was still by no means settled, as he was firmly convinced that Britain’s defeat would be achieved wit
hout the landing.
Overnight, the Luftwaffe had about 190 bombers abroad – less than the number of aircraft that had been flying during the day. But since so many of the day formations had been fighters, the capacity to do harm during the night was greater. One small example of that occurred at precisely 1.13 a.m. Sunderland Central Station was hit by two large bombs, smashing craters 30 ft across and 15 ft deep. So violent was the blast that a carriage was lifted clear off the rails and thrown across a platform. Another part of a carriage was hurled across the street, wrecking the frontage of a toy shop. Fortunately – because of the hour – no one was injured. However, an enemy aircraft crashed on a house in Sunderland causing fires and considerable damage to the property.44
The Sunderland raid barely registered in the press. Home Intelligence recorded continuing complaints that “important provincial towns have to hide their identity even from themselves”, while London still received “excessive publicity for its raids”. That problem was about to get considerably worse when the London Blitz started. Already low profile, much of the rest of the country, its hardship and suffering, became invisible.
This night, bombers were again roaming the land. Durham and Yorkshire were among the counties paid visits. In Lincolnshire, damage to property was caused at Horncastle and many incendiaries were dropped in other parts of the county. Only speedy intervention by locals avoided serious damage. In Essex, a number of bombs and incendiaries were dropped and damage was caused to overhead electric cables. Surrey, Oxford, Bucks, Somerset, Dorset and Devon were subjected to attacks, as were areas in South Wales. The Midlands reported bombs dropped over limited areas with damage to gas, water, electricity and telephone services. Liverpool was bombed again. Some houses were demolished and water mains were severed.
Many Not the Few: The Stolen History of the Battle of Britain Page 25
