Further, it is just as much a travesty to exclude members of the Royal Navy, the merchant marine and the many ancillary services, from the Anti-Aircraft Command and Observer Corps, to the members of the Royal National Lifeboat Service, who did sterling and often very dangerous work.
But then properly to define the role of the people in general, who took part in the battle either within some organized, uniformed service, or as ordinary people who simply endured and survived, not only changes how we perceive our history, but also about how we feel about ourselves – and our governments.
At many levels, we can acknowledge that, under the leadership of Winston Churchill, our government played a poor hand much better than expected. Even if an outright victory was not delivered, what many expected to be certain defeat was averted. But, at another level, we can also accept that some people found themselves in a position where, had they completely trusted and obeyed their government, they might have died. Many of those took the more sensible course of seeking their own salvation, in this case by taking advantage of the shelter afforded by Underground stations, despite active, official opposition.
The result of this spirited episode of rebellion, when the people exerted their will, was that the government conformed to the wishes of the people. In this case, it went about providing the facilities, such as toilets, bunk beds and queuing systems, to make the choice tolerable and safer. And that is how it should be – the government as servant, not master.
It also cannot be denied that some who trusted government – or in the absence of choice, relied on its good sense and fidelity – were killed. These included some of the unfortunates who took refuge in the trench shelters, the reinforced basements and, for want of better provision, shallow Tube stations such as Balham.
But there was another group, the very airmen who are so fulsomely applauded as the “few”. They were also let down. Putting their lives at risk, they had a right to expect their government and employer to take reasonable steps to safeguard them. Furthermore, it was in the national interest to do so, fighter pilots being a valuable asset, in short supply and essential to prosecuting the ongoing battle. Through the egregious failing of the RAF to provide anything like an adequate air-sea rescue service many died needlessly, at a critical stage of the battle. And while, in “Digger” Aitkin, there was evidence of how individual initiative could solve the problem, not only did government ignore the lessons, it disbanded the voluntary system – then taking an inordinate time to secure a replacement.
How ironic it was that in July 1940, the First Sea Lord, Admiral Dudley Pound, said of the Hitler regime that complete disregard of losses could be expected if this would help them gain their objectives. At that time, the “ruthless Nazis”, with their dedicated air-sea rescue services, took better care of their pilots than did the British.
As to the consequences of its inadequate and lethal policies, the State used its powers of censorship and its propaganda resources to conceal them. That highlights another lesson, that censorship and government power over the flow of information are invariably used to protect the government from the consequences of its own actions, rather than for the purpose intended.
Without taking this too far, we could therefore aver that important lessons which emerge from a wider overview are that, if you rely completely and uncritically on government, its neglect may kill you. Having done so, it will seek to obscure its actions and its responsibility for them. From this, we could further state that, even in times of extreme peril – or, perhaps, especially so – salvation does not lie entirely in government. In such instances, it is necessary to take the initiative and make government conform to the wishes and needs of the people, rather than the other way around. Government is a poor master. But it can be an adequate servant, if forced to be so.
There is also that broader issue. Without doubt, the Battle of Britain was a victory of the people of Britain, those who endured a most grievous and terrifying assault, held fast and survived, without tearing down their government and crying for peace. But, as we have seen, over the years, credit for that most important victory has been stolen from them. They have been recast as supplicants and passive beneficiaries, rather than active collaborators in their own salvation.
To restore that history is to change the way we think about ourselves. We are part of a nation which, in time of great peril, rallied and by collective endeavour engineered its own salvation. With the considerable help of the British Commonwealth, the Empire and the fighting men and women of conquered and captive nations, as well as the USA, Churchill’s island people prevailed. That makes us a different people from the passive, shadowy inhabitants of a myth – and all the more powerful. What we could do once, we can do again.
Notes
NOTES ON INTRODUCTION
1 BBC website: http://www.bbc.co.uk/archive/battleofbritain/11431.shtml
2 Even though the aircraft never existed, a Hurricane pilot of No. 213 Sqn claimed to have shot down one over Dunkirk in May 1940. Pilot Officer Boot reported having a dogfight with one in September 1940. Air Marshal Dowding referred to them in his report on the Battle of Britain. German reports of its introduction were part of an elaborate disinformation ploy.
3 A full analysis of Gardner’s errors is on the Dover War Memorial Project website: http://www.doverwarmemorialproject.org.uk/Information/Articles/Incidents/Flames.htm
4 BBC Listener Research Report: http://www.bbc.co.uk/archive/battleofbritain/11432.shtml
5 Ship casualty details from: http://www.naval-history.net/xDKWW2-4007-20JUL01.htm
6 See: Dixon (2008) and Ray (2000). These two volumes, in particular, give some of the background to the controversies surrounding Dowding and his conduct of the battle.
7 First published in the London Evening Standard of that date. By arrangement, Low’s cartoons were often reproduced in the Manchester Guardian a few days later.
8 Battle of Britain London Monument website: http://www.bbm.org.uk/participants.htm. There are small variations between different sources.
9 For a lucid account of the anti-aircraft defences, see: Dobinson (2001). The defences were augmented by an ingenious network of decoy sites. Initially dummy airfields, known as K- and Q-sites (respectively for day and night use), were built. By the end of 1941, Q-sites had been attacked 359 times. The airfields from which they had been lured away suffered 358 raids. The idea was extended to create dummy industrial sites, some with decoy fires to attract raiders. Smoke generators were used to conceal real sites. See: Norman (1993).
10 This is the concluding statement in the official Air Ministry account of the battle. See: Anon (1941b).
11 Overy (2001), p. 121.
12 The role of No. 2 Group Blenheims is very poorly recognized. No single source attests to its considerable exploits. This is a significant lacuna, noted by Mike Henry, Editor of the Blenheim Society Journal, writing in the Daily Telegraph (letters) in May 2003. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/comment/3592017/Bomber-recognition.html
13 RAAF Museum: http://www.airforce.gov.au/raafmuseum/research/units/10sqn.htm
14 The Royal Navy was also multinational, in men and ships, including Empire warships. But some foreign assets were acquired while the Royal Navy destroyed the French fleet (or part of it) in Mers-El-Kebir on 3 July. In a parallel operation, French ships in British ports were seized, including two (obsolete) battleships, four light cruisers, some submarines, eight destroyers and, according to Churchill, “about two hundred smaller but valuable minesweeping and anti-submarine craft”. The vessels were manned by about 3,500 Free French. Thus, more French sailors fought in the Battle of Britain than did British fighter pilots. In addition, most of the Polish Navy, comprising about thirty vessels, was already based in Britain, including motor torpedo boats and a complete motor gun boat flotilla. There was also a section of the Royal Navy, comprising escaped Belgian sailors. It manned two corvettes, a squadron of mine sweepers and three patrol boats. There were remnants of the Royal Norwegian N
avy and a cadre of escaped Danes. Dutch and Norwegian seaplanes complemented Coastal Command patrols.
15 The firemen eventually included a contingent from the Corps of Canadian Firefighters, who came over to augment the service in 1942. See: Leete (2008).
NOTES ON CHAPTER 1
1 HC Deb 18 June 1940 vol. 362 cc.51–64.
2 War Cabinet: WP (40) 168. ‘British strategy in a certain eventuality.’ National Archives.
3 Douhet (1998). The currently available edition is a reprint of the 1942 English translation. The volume consists of five separate works: the original 1921 edition of Command of the Air, a second edition of 1927, a 1928 monograph titled “Probable aspects of future war”, a polemical article of 1929 called “Recapitulation” and the 1930 study “The war of 19–”. Douhet’s book was translated into German in 1935, but many of his writings were translated as early as 1929. Douhet is widely quoted but, one suspects, little read in the original. And it is unlikely that all of the pundits citing effects of “terror bombing” in this period had actually read his works. He is very rarely cited in the British press, with only two references recorded in the Daily Express between 1934 and 1945 – both in 1939.
4 HC Deb 10 November 1932 vol. 270 cc.525–641. Baldwin was later to tell the Commons: “Since the day of the air the old frontiers have gone, and when you think of the defence of England you no longer think of the chalk cliffs of Dover. You think of the Rhine”. Reported on the front page of the Daily Mirror, 31 July 1934.
5 After the bombing, sleeping gas then subdued the population, following which the city was invaded by parachutists. The film thereby also raised fears of airborne invasion (and a gas attack, with the ubiquitous issue of gas masks), so much so that the Home Guard, established on 14 May 1940 following a radio appeal by War Secretary Anthony Eden, were originally known as “parashots”. Their formal title, Local Defence Volunteers (LDV – more unkindly as “Look, Duck and Vanish”) was changed to Home Guard on 20 July 1940.
6 This was certainly the view of Tom Harrisson, founder of Mass Observation. He argued that many Conservative and Liberal leaders never trusted the masses and “in a way deeply, privately, despised them”. This “continuing, deeply ingrained contempt for the civilian masses” undoubtedly had major effects on expectations. See: Harrisson (1976), pp. 21–5.
7 Michael I. Handel (1973), Intelligence and Military Operations. International Specialized Book Service. Cited by Earle Lund, USAF. The Battle of Britain A German Perspective. Joint Doctrine Air Campaign Course Campaign Analysis Study. 24 January 1996.
8 For the texts of Hitler Directives, I have relied on Trevor-Roper (1964).
9 War Cabinet: WP (40) 168, op cit.
10 Nuremberg Documents IMT 1776–PS. Parts were also read into the record during the cross examination of Alfred Jodl, on 6 June 1946. The authorized translation and of the document and the transcripts of the hearings are available online, the latter as part of the Nizkor Project. An excellent analysis is in Ansel (1960).
11 War Cabinet: WP (40) 169. ‘British strategy in the near future.’ National Archives.
12 Milward (1977), p. 275.
13 The techniques were well recognized, even at this early stage of the war. By far the most complete exposition was the book, The Strategy of Terror by Edmond Taylor, Paris correspondent of the Chicago Tribune. He writes of the “fabrication by propaganda of emotionally potent ideologies for the sole purpose of using them as political or diplomatic arms”, demonstrating how fully integrated were the propaganda, diplomatic and military arms (pp. 106 et seq.). Published in July 1940, the book is reviewed by Time magazine: http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,764180-1,00.html
14 The German–Soviet Pact, also known as the Ribbentrop–Molotov Pact, was also an issue. The considerable number of Communist sympathizers in the Labour movement were opposed to a war which might threaten the Pact and provoke a German invasion of the Soviet Union. Among these sympathizers, sentiment changed markedly after the German invasion.
NOTES ON CHAPTER 2
1 Details throughout the text relating to the German invasion planning, and related events, are a composite, mainly drawn from Assmann, Klee and Wheatley, augmented by Grinnell-Milne and Taylor, with occasional reference to Fleming and Robinson. See: the bibliography.
2 Taylor (1982) .
3 This is a theme to which Shirer constantly refers in his Berlin Diary.
4 The reference to Sweden was highly significant. In 1939, a Swedish businessman by the name of Birger Dahlerus, and friend of Hermann Göring, had been involved in an abortive attempt to broker peace with the British Government. In early July, he had met Lord Halifax in Germany. The Foreign Secretary had then met Göring. On 27 August, Dahlerus had flown to London to meet Neville Chamberlain, Halifax, Sir Horace Wilson and Sir Alexander Cadogan, in what has been called the Dahlerus Mission. He was again briefly involved in September when Göring was on stand-by to fly to London for last-ditch peace talks. See: Dahlerus (1946) . However, in oral evidence during the Nuremberg Trial (19 March 1946 – transcript online,, see: Nizkor Project), it emerged that Göring and Dahlerus had met in July 1940, when Göring had suggested that “His Majesty the King of Sweden should endeavour to bring the various Powers together for peace negotiations”.
5 For details of Luftwaffe directives and orders, I have relied on Klee (1955). His work is available online via the US Air Force Historical Research Agency website: http://www.afhra.af.mil/studies/numberedusafhistoricalstudies151-200.asp
6 An account of this raid can be found in Mason (1990), with a more detailed treatment in Saunders (2010).
7 References to Ciano throughout are drawn from his diaries. I have used the 2002 unabridged edition by Phoenix Press.
8 Churchill (1949), op cit, p. 239.
9 War Cabinet: WP (40) 264. National Archives. The 10 July Minute was bundled with an exchange of correspondence, dated 18 July.
10 War Cabinet: WM (40) 199. National Archives. The War Cabinet met most days, except Sundays, and most often was chaired by Churchill. Copies of the records of conclusions and associated memorandums are held by the National Archives, in the CAB series – and are also available online in searchable format. References to “War Cabinet” throughout this text relate to the record on the day indicated, unless indicated otherwise.
11 The Duke of Windsor was in Lisbon at the time. Clandestine German overtures were made to him, in the hope that he would support a peace initiative. He did not respond, and sailed on 1 August for Nassau, and his post as Governor of the Bahamas. See: Domarus (1990), p. 2071. Irving (1987b) covers this in some detail.
12 The complete sequence of telegrams is appended to the War Cabinet conclusion WM (40) 199, of 10 July 1940.
13 Kelly (1952), pp. 272–4. See also: Thompson (1966) and Anon (1957), in which Hohenlohe’s report of his meetings with Kelly, dated 18 July 1940 are published. The note on Hoare’s meeting was also published there.
14 Roberts (1991), p. 244.
15 Kelly, op cit.
16 Details from Assmann, and Appendix: OKW Directives for the invasion of the UK.
17 The list was assembled by Clive Pontin in his book 1940 Myth and Reality.
18 Unless otherwise indicated, figures for Fighter Command and Luftwaffe losses come from Mason’s Battle over Britain. Bomber and Coastal Command losses are taken from Larry Donnelly’s The Other Few. The air fighting narrative is a composite, based on these two sources, and on Wood with Dempster (1969), augmented by James (2000) and others. Naval warfare details are drawn largely from the website, naval-history.net. Individual entries in this narrative are referenced only when additional material is drawn upon.
19 Propaganda policy, Joint Memorandum by the Minister of Information and the Minister of Economic Warfare WP (40) 444, 15 November 1940. National Archives.
20 Additional material from an account published on 7 July 2010 in the Falmouth Packet: http://www.falmouthpacket.co.uk/news/fpboating/inport/825839
2.Deadly_raid_remembered/?ref=rss The date of the attack, as 10 July, is stated in War Cabinet: WP (R)(40) 185. ‘Civil Defence Report No. 20.’ National Archives.
21 Donnelly (2004), pp. 28–9.
22 Assmann, Klee, Wheatley, et al. (composite), op cit. In addition, Ansel (1960) provides a very detailed account of this conference: pp. 126–30. See also: Taylor (1967), p. 63, who has it that Räder’s main purpose in meeting Hitler was to impress upon him the difficulties and dangers of attempting an invasion, and to win him over to a strategy of economic blockade.
23 A good account of the propaganda effect of exaggerated claims is provided by Campion (2010). For instance, see: pp. 98–9. The issue is discussed at length by Mason (1990) and also in Wood with Dempster (1969).
24 National Archives. File KV 4/186. See also: West (2005) and Irving transcripts (online).
25 Nicolson (1967), Diaries and Letters, p. 101.
26 References throughout to “Home intelligence” or the “home front” refer to these reports, unless otherwise stated. See: Addison and Crang (eds) (2010).
27 The policy was not explained fully (to the Cabinet) until 7 October 1940, when it was admitted that “the results of this practice have not been very satisfactory”. It had “mystified the public”, “aggrieved the Provinces” and “removed from the Ministry of Information its proper function of controlling news”. War Cabinet: WP (G)(40) 254. National Archives.
28 War Cabinet: WP (R)(40) 185. ‘Civil Defence Report No. 20.’ National Archives.
29 Mason and others give brief details of weather conditions in their daily accounts. A more detailed summary has been published by: http://forum.netweather.tv/topic/63129-the-battle-of-britain-weather-diary in the “Weather diary”.
30 Brickhill (1954), pp. 131–2.
31 Mason, op cit, p. 123.
32 Ibid.
33 Pitchfork (2005), pp. 88–9. See also: Daily Telegraph, 16 January 2004 (Obituary): http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/obituaries/1451743/Group-Captain-John-Peel.html
Many Not the Few: The Stolen History of the Battle of Britain Page 48
