by Jean Meslier
But it is easy to respond that, since it is plain as day that only the possible thing stated above, for example, and all others like them, are, in form, only works of art or works of nature, which have their beginning and their end, and in this respect there is no denying that they are effectively dependent on art or nature, i.e., on the material being that formed them; but as to their substance, which always remains, whatever form it may assume, they are certainly only portions of the material and perceptible being, and portions of this eternal being that I’ve said had, of itself, its possibility and its existence: and in this respect, they can’t be said to be the works of art or the works of nature, or that they are really new beings, since they are always the same portions of the material and perceptible being and of the eternal being, which appear in various new forms and shapes, which is also carried out, not by any alien power or force, but only by the power or motive force of nature itself, i.e., of the material being, which, by its natural motion, of itself assumes all sorts of forms and shapes in various subjects, and which, by the various modifications and configurations of its parts, as well as through its various motions, inspires and gives to men industriousness in the arts and sciences, to the animals their instincts and suitable inclinations, and to plants, along with other inanimate things, all the virtues and all properties found in them, by which it is clear and evident that the supposed objection avails nothing against what I have said regarding the independence of the possibility and of the eternal existence of the material and perceptible being. All those arguments, which are derived from the principles of Metaphysics, are entirely conclusive within their genre; but it takes a bit of mental application to see their evidence clearly. But let’s return to our principle: we see clearly, as I said, there is a world, this world is the material and perceptible being, which I’ve demonstrated to be, not only possible in itself, independently of the power and will of any other being, but which I’ve also demonstrated as having its own existence, independently of the power and will of any other being, and that being the case, the necessary conclusion is that the world has always been, at least with respect to its substance, inasmuch as if it hasn’t always been, it would never have been able to give itself being or existence, when it wouldn’t have had it, and as we see it presently as it is, and as we can’t doubt it, we must necessarily conclude that it has been, at least with respect to its substance.
As confirmation of which I would also add this argument. We see new productions of nature every day, these new productions have their proximate and immediate causes, and although these proximate and immediate causes are themselves produced by other, more remote causes, there still must be a first, unproduced cause in all these productions, which is, consequently, of itself and independent of any other cause, or if there is no such first, unproduced cause, we must necessarily go back from cause to cause, to infinity. But it is repugnant to go in this way from cause to cause to infinity; therefore, we must recognize that there is a first unproduced cause, which is consequently of itself, independently of any other cause. Everyone must agree with this principle or this argument; we also see that Atheists agree no less than the God-cultists, and the God-cultists as well as the Atheists, and if the God-cultists refused to agree, they couldn’t say that their God would be the Creator of all things, as they say, but they don’t agree on the name or the particular qualities which are suitable for this first cause. The God-cultists give it the name of God and the Atheists give it the name of Nature or the material Being, or simply the name Matter. If it were only a question of the name, it would be easy to bring these parties together; for, as names don’t produce or change the nature of things, it would be rather unimportant to call this first cause God or Nature or Matter, and there would be no need to argue much about it. But, as the God-cultists grant it the power of creating and governing all things with a supreme intelligence, and with an almighty will, from which they also derive several false conclusions and many vain pretexts to impose, as they like, laws and commandments on men, and make them believe whatever they want, and as the Atheists absolutely deny it has this power of creating and this supreme intelligence, as well as this supposed all-powerful will, this is their principal point of difference, and this is what we must examine in particular, by refuting the opinion of this supposed power of creating and this supposed government of all things by an all-powerful will and a supremely perfect intelligence.
71. THE CREATION IS IMPOSSIBLE; NOTHING CAN HAVE BEEN CREATED.
Firstly, as for this supposed power of creation, I prove that it cannot be: to create is to make something from nothing, and there is no power that can make something from nothing: therefore, there is no power to create. I know well that the usual response to this is that there is effectively no created and limited power which can make something from nothing, but that there is an uncreated and infinite power, such as that of an all-powerful God, which can make something from nothing, and consequently that it can indeed create: but, aside from the fact that this response is unsatisfactory, since it assumes gratis that which is in question, I will absolutely prove that there is no power that can make something from nothing. There is no power that can create and make something from nothing; if anything can have been created and made from nothing, that is nearly identical, but there is nothing that can have been created and made from nothing: Therefore, etc. I prove the second proposition of this argument which is the only one that can be denied. If there were something that could be created and made from nothing, it would be, for example, time, place, or space and extension, and matter, for if these things and none of these things can truly have been created and made from nothing, it will be easy to show that nothing is creatable, since there is truly nothing in nature but time, place, space, extension, and matter which can be thought of has having been created or being creatable. I’m not referring to what is usually called spirits or spiritual substances; for, as these supposed substances don’t exist and aren’t even possible, they cannot have been created, or, consequently, have been made from nothing. But, I will show that neither time, nor place, nor space, nor extension, nor even matter are creatable, and can’t have been made from nothing, therefore there is no power that can create and make something from nothing.
72. TIME CAN’T HAVE BEEN CREATED, NOR CAN EXTENSION, PLACE, AND SPACE: CONSEQUENTLY, THERE IS NO CREATOR.
Christus sator omnium
Rex atque Factor temporum.
Hymn of Lent.
I start then with time, which I will prove is not creatable, i.e., it can’t have been created. This is how I do it. If time were creatable, and if it had been created, as the God-cultists claim, it certainly could only have been created by a being who would have preceded it; for if this being hadn’t preceded it, how could it have created it? And if it had preceded it, it could only have done so thanks to the very time that it would have preceded; for to say that it would have preceded it thanks to Eternity, and not time, is a sheer illusion, because Eternity is only a perpetual continuity of Time, without beginning or end; and thus to say that it preceded it thanks to Eternity is to grant, unknowingly, more than was required, for it is to suggest that it preceded it by an infinite time, i.e., by a time which would have had no beginning, and which consequently cannot have been created, or have been preceded by any cause. For it is clear and evident that nothing can precede that which never had any beginning; this is precisely what is in question: if it’s said that it only preceded it by a limited time, equivalent, for example, to the length of a few days, a few months, or a few years, this will not do. 1). Because it is repugnant that a supreme creator of all things, who is necessarily assumed to be eternal, would only have preceded its creatures and its works by a certain quantity of time, equivalent to some finite number of days and years; for if it had only preceded them by such a time, it would necessarily also have had a beginning, it couldn’t have always been there, it wouldn’t have been eternal as is supposed; and not only could it not be eternal, but it couldn’
t even have begun to exist, because, not always having been, it couldn’t have given itself being, when it didn’t have it, nor could it receive it from another, because nothing would have been there to give it to it. Thus, it can’t be said that time was created by a being which would only have preceded it by a limited and finite space of time.
Secondly, I say that if this being, the supposed creator of time, had preceded time by only a space of time that was limited and finite, it would necessarily follow that this limited space of time had not been created, since it would have preceded the creation of time itself; for if it were created itself, it wouldn’t absolutely have preceded the creation of time itself, but only the creation of certain parts of time, which would then have been created. Or, if this space of time is also supposed to have been created itself, the argument comes back in full force, and I say that it can’t have been created, except by a being who would have preceded it, and have preceded by a certain space of time; and if this time is also supposed to have been created, and so on with the rest, then we would necessarily have to go back to infinity and posit infinite creations of time, each in turn, and posit a creator who would have preceded each of them, which is entirely repugnant to Reason, since nothing can precede the supposedly infinite times. And besides, it would also be necessary to posit new creations of time at each moment of time; for, as time is essentially in its continuous flow and as there are aren’t only two parts of time, small as they may be, which can be or exist together, at every imperceptible moment of time it would be necessary to posit new creations of time, which would be ridiculous and absurd to do. Or, if instead it’s asserted that this being, who would have created time, would have preceded it by a time which would not have been created, then it’s futile to suppose a creator of time, since it would be necessary to recognize a time which wouldn’t have been able to be created. For, if there is a time that can be said to have never to been created, it must be said that there was no time that could have been created, since no time in particular is more or less creatable than another.
2. Time could only have been created by a cause which would have preceded it, as was just said, and can have preceded time, thus, nothing can have preceded time. That nothing can have preceded time, is proved by the following:
If something could have preceded time, this thing or being who would have preceded it, would have been prior to time and wouldn’t be prior to time, which, contradictory as it is, shows that this isn’t possible. It would be prior to time, since it would have preceded it, as is thought, and yet it wouldn’t be prior to time, since it couldn’t be prior to time without being time itself, which would necessarily be coeval with itself[728]. It might be said that this being, the creator of time, would only have preceded it by a priority of nature and not a priority of time, and thus, although the one is not prior to the other, with respect to time, yet the one can be the cause of the other, and consequently the one can have created the other, as, for example, although the Sun and light don’t have a respective priority with respect to time, that still doesn’t keep the Sun from being the cause of light, for it’s the Sun that produces or makes daylight. To this I respond that if the being who is claimed to be the creator of time, only precedes time by a priority of nature and not a priority of time, it’s necessary for time and the supposed creator of time to be coeval with respect to time, i.e., that they should both be eternal, since the alleged creator would be eternal, just as in the example of the Sun and light, the Sun and light have to be equally ancient and that if the Sun is eternal, equally its light must be eternal, assuming that the one only precedes the other by a priority of nature. But if time and the supposed creator of time are eternal, then neither of them can have had any beginning; that which has no beginning can’t have been created, thus, if time is eternal or co-eternal with its supposed creator, as must necessarily be assumed, it can’t have been created, and thus there is no creator of time. This is proved even more clearly by another argument, to wit.
If time were something creatable, and if it actually had been created, there would necessarily be something in itself that was real and special, distinct from all other beings; for the creation should necessarily terminate in something real, i.e., in some particular being, which would be made from nothing; for it is impossible to conceive of any creation, when nothing is made from nothing. If, then, time truly were created, it must necessarily be something real and special, which was made from nothing and which will be distinct from all other beings, I say distinct from all other beings, because it is evident that time is not, for example, what we call heaven and earth, or any particular being among those contained between heaven and earth; for nobody will say, for example, that stones, plants, or that men or other animals are time. In addition, all these beings have in themselves a certain permanent consistency, all their parts can remain, and presently do remain together, but time passes continually, and none of its parts remain together; the past, for example, can’t be with the present, or the present with the future, and even the present is so brief and so short that it no sooner is than it ceases to be; it’s like an indivisible point without any extension. Besides, it’s easy to conceive that all individual beings might not be and cease to be, it’s even easy to conceive that stones, plants, that all animals and all other such things might not be and might cease to be, it’s even easy to conceive that heaven and earth might not be and might cease to be what they are; but it’s not possible to conceive that there is no time and that time could end and cease to be. For, however one wishes to suppose that it ends or began, there is necessarily something that came before the beginning and something which comes after the end. But this pre- and post- necessarily indicate a difference in time, therefore, there is time; for there is no difference in time where there is no time. From which it follows that if time is a creatable thing, i.e., a being that could have been created, then this must be a real and particular being, distinct from all other beings.
I will show this even more clearly by the following argument. If time were a real being which was not distinct from other beings, the properties of time might be suitable for other beings, and in turn the properties of other beings might be suitable for time: for, according to the maxim of the Philosophers, things which are of the same nature as a third thing are of the same nature as each other. Quae sunt eadem uni tertio, sunt eadem inter se: if, then, time and the other beings are of the same nature as each other, then the properties of time must be suitable to other beings, and equally the properties of the other beings must be suitable for time. But it is evident that the properties of time cannot be suitable for other beings, nor can the properties of the other beings be suitable for time. If, then, time is a real being, capable of having been created, then it must be a real and particular being, distinct from all other beings. Firstly, that the properties of time can’t be suitable for other beings, here’s the clear proof of this. The properties of time are to be divisible into past, present, and future, to be divisible into centuries, years, days, hours, and moments. And there’s no being but time which can be so divided; therefore, the properties of time can be suitable for no other being but time. 2). That the properties of the other beings can only be suitable for time, here’s a further proof. All the other beings are corporeal or spiritual, in the view of some, i.e., body or spirit. The properties of the body are to be divisible into three dimensions, to wit, length, width, and depth, to be impenetrable, and bounded by a particular shape. But time can’t be bounded by any shape; for it can’t be called soft or hard like bodies, or that it can have the three dimensions of bodies; nor can it be called round, square, or triangular: for although it might be said in one sense that it’s short or long, still, it can’t be said that it’s wide or narrow, or that it’s thin or thick. Thus, the properties of bodies can’t be suitable for time, any more than the properties of time can be suited to bodies. Similarly, the properties of spirit can’t be suitable for time: here’s the proof of this. The properties of mind (if w
hat is called spirit is distinct from bodies) are to be immaterial substances, capable of thinking, willing, knowing, and feeling good and evil. But time is not a material or an immaterial substance, time is not a substance capable of thinking or willing, or able to feel what is good or bad, so if time is a being, it must necessarily be distinguished from body and spirit, and distinguished from all other particular beings. And it is not possible to conceive that time could be something real and particular, thus, it is not something that can have been created.
However, it must be noted that time is not entirely nothing or nothingness; for nothing has no properties, while we see that time has many, as noted above. The years, for example, the hours, and the moments which are the parts of time, are not entire nothings, since they’re counted every day and they multiply every day; and if they aren’t nothings, then they must be something, and something nonetheless which was not created and which is not creatable; since only real beings, which can be thought to have been created or to be susceptible to creation. What might time be then, since it isn’t a nothing but neither is it any real and particular being? If we’re thinking properly we’ll infallibly find that time can’t be anything other than a duration; such that, properly speaking, it’s duration which makes time; and that it’s only with respect to the brevity or length of duration that time is said to be short or long. Equally, it’s only by the different divisions of the parts of this duration that hours, days, years, and centuries are counted. But, as this term of duration or extent can only be said of something that is and actually lasts for a period, and that which is and which actually lasts cannot be without its duration, nor can duration without that which lasts, and that, besides, it’s not the duration of things that begin and end, which makes time, since time didn’t fail to be before their beginning, and it doesn’t fail to be after their end, it follows that it’s only the stable and permanent duration of a being that makes time what it is, and since only the first being is stable and permanent, and since only this first being is without beginning and without end, and since, besides, this first being could never be without its duration, or its duration without it, it follows that its duration, which is precisely what we call time, has neither beginning nor end: thus, time is not a being that can have been created, and consequently again, there is no Creator for time, any more than for the first being, which nobody can certainly say was created.
