by Jean Meslier
Confirmation of this is that if time truly were something created or some particular being, it would follow that the hours, years, and whole centuries could be created at once, in a single and selfsame moment. But it is repugnant that the years and whole centuries could be created at once in a single and selfsame moment, therefore, time is not a real being which could have been created. It will be objected that time is of such a nature that the moments of which it is composed can only be created successively, one after the other, and thus, hours, years, and whole centuries can only come one after the others, and not all together in one instant. I admit the truth of this, but that’s the very reason why it must be said that time is not a being that can be created; for if it truly were a being that could be created, then all its parts could be created at once, as with any other being. But to say that time is a real being but that all its parts can’t be created together, is to say that it takes time to create time, and that it takes, for example, an hour of time to create an hour, a year of time to create a year, and a whole century to create a century, etc., which is completely ridiculous and absurd: for this is like saying that to create matter, matter is needed, that to create a foot or a yard of matter, it would take a foot or a yard of matter, and to create a world, a whole world would be needed, it’s clear that this cannot be the case, therefore we must conclude that time is not a being which could have been created.
3). If time were a being that could have been created, doubtless it could have been alone; for what need would there be to create other beings along with that one? Doesn’t that seem right? But if time had been created alone, I would like to know whether this being would have been body or if it would have been spirit, if it would have been corporeal or spiritual. What sort of idea should be formed of such a being? For, in the end, when we speak, we have to know what we’re saying, and have distinct ideas of all the things asserted[729]; it’s against reason to claim what we don’t know and what we aren’t acquainted with. It’s shameful, as a judicious writer[730] says, for men of intelligence and philosophers, who are obliged by all sorts of reasons in the search and defense of the truth, speaking without knowing what they say, and are satisfied with what they don’t understand[731]. It’s shown sufficiently above that time can’t have been created, we now see if we might also demonstrate that place, space, or extension, which are more or less the same thing, can’t have been created.
If place, space, or extension, which are nearly the same thing, where something created, as our God-cultists claim, then it’s certain that there would have been no place, no space, or any extension before these were created. By space, extension, or place here I mean the same thing, as I said, with the single difference that place is only a space or a limited extension which contains its body, and extension in general a space without limits or end, which contains all imaginable beings, places, and spaces. I say, therefore, that if place, space, or extension are something created, then there must have been no place, or space, or extension before they were created; for if they had already been, they would have had no need to be created, since they would already have been all that they ever could be, before their supposed creation. But if then there was no place, any space, or any extension, where, then, was he who would have created them? It is evident that it can’t have been in any place, or any spot, since there would still be no play or spot where it could have been; such that it wasn’t anywhere, then. But that which is nowhere is nothing at all, and that which is nothing cannot create anything; therefore, place, space, and extension cannot have been created. It would be futile to say that he who would have created them was truly nowhere or in any particular spot; but that He was nevertheless in Himself, and that, being omnipotent in Himself, He created all that exists in terms of places, spaces, and extensions; it is, I say, futile to say that, since that which is nowhere, doesn’t have itself, is absolutely not, and cannot be something in itself; for, to not be and to be nowhere is equivalent to the same thing. So, this supposed creator of place, space, and extension, who was nowhere, could not be something in Himself, since He did not have Himself: for, just as not to exist precludes all sorts of ways of being, being nowhere also precludes all sorts of ways of being.
In addition, that which is nowhere can neither act nor do anything anywhere, therefore that which would have been nowhere, could have created nothing anywhere. It would already have been a wonder if something that was nowhere could have made and truly had made everything everywhere, this is beyond all understanding and all possibility. In addition, this being who is supposed to have been in Himself, although He was in fact nowhere, this being, I say, was either extended in Himself, or He wasn’t: if He was extended in Himself, then there was already extension and space where He Himself was; for it is not possible that there was extension without space, or space without extension; and since it’s posited that this being was nowhere, it must then be said that this extension and space were nowhere, which is already repellent to reason on this side of things. And since, according to the same hypothesis, this extension or space would precede any creation, it follows that it couldn’t have been created, and consequently, extension or space can’t have been created since they would then precede any creation. That if, on the other hand, it’s said that this being who was nowhere and who nevertheless would have been in Himself, had no extension, how then could He have created space, which is of such a vast, even infinite extent? That is absolutely impossible, because there must be at least some relationship, or some proportionality, between the cause and the effect, between that which does something and that which is done. But it is evident that there is no relationship, and no proportionality between a being which has no extension and a being of an infinite extension, and consequently a being with no extension cannot be the efficient cause of a being with an infinite extension. The finite cannot make the infinite, and that which has no extension is necessarily finite and even so small and finite that it can no longer be such; therefore, that which has no extension cannot create extension, which is necessarily infinite, I say necessarily infinite, because, far from being able to expand its borders, there is always necessarily a beyond, which also necessarily assumes an extension; therefore, this extension has no end; and thus it can’t have been created by a being without any extension. Besides, whatever is made or created necessarily depends, in its creation or production, on the will or the power of whoever makes or creates; but, since the extension is, as I said, necessarily infinite in its totality, it cannot depend on anything, it cannot depend on the will or power of any creator; for if it could depend on this, the creator could have made and created, as He pleased, i.e., He could have created it more or less large, He could have created as much and as little of it as He pleased and He even might not have created at all, and He might even now annihilate all there is; but no, that can’t be true, extension in its totality is, as I’ve said, necessarily infinite, it is necessarily and presently all that it can be, nothing can be added to it, or taken from it, it has necessarily always been as it is, and will necessarily always be such and that, independently of all will and all power, as it can be, and consequently, it can’t have been created.
2. To create one must act, to act one must move, and space is required for motion; for it is evident that motion only occurs in space and that action only happens by motion; such that, just as it is impossible for there to be action without motion or change, both on the side of the actor as on the side of that which is done by the action, just as it is impossible for there to be any motion or any change, whether of place or position, without some space. Since, then, all creation is action and since all action includes some motion or some change, whether of place, position, and since all motion or change necessarily implies some space where they happen, it necessarily follows that space precedes all action and all motion and therefore it cannot have been created by any action.
It might be replied that the creation of time and space and of all other things was done without any motion at al
l, or any change on the part of he who had created them. But this can’t be right: for, since He created nothing before He had begun to create, He couldn’t have started to create and doing what He hadn’t been doing, if there hadn’t been some change in Him. Here is the proof. All action is a modification of being and diverse actions are diverse modifications of being. Now, creation is or would have been an action on the part of the creator, thus it would have caused in Him a new modification of being and consequently a new change in Him, for if there had been no change in Him, He couldn’t have done anything new. Here is further proof. That which is always the same, can’t but remain the same at all times, is a common maxim among Philosophers, and is indisputable. Idem manens idem, semper facit idem. But this being, who is supposed to have created all things, created nothing before He began to create them; therefore, He would never have created, if He had always remained as He was when He created nothing. That is evident, according to the maxim I’ve just cited. idem manens idem, semper fuit idem. And, since they want Him to have created all things, it’s necessary for Him not to have remained as He was when He hadn’t created anything, and therefore some change must have taken place in Him, on the occasion of which He began to do what He hadn’t done previously, which is manifestly contrary to the response to the above argument, derived from motion and change, which are necessarily found in all actions, and consequently this response is defeated, and the argument retains all its force. Thus, if being were only considered as acting and as not acting, which are two different states, or two different ways of being, it is inconceivable that no being can pass from one to the other without any alteration or change; and, as no alteration can be done without some movement or some change in place and situation, and since any change of location or situation necessarily occurs in some space, it always follows that space necessarily precedes all motion and all action, and consequently, it can’t have been created without the motion of any action.
This is also confirmed by the following argument. If space were something created, it is certain that whoever would have created it, could only have created it where it wasn’t, i.e., where there was no space or any extension: for if such were already there, then obviously He would have had nothing to do in creating it, since there was already as much as could ever be there: for, that which is already and of itself a being, as much as it can be, cannot receive its being once again by the creation. It would be absurd to say that God would create things which are already created, i.e., which already have their being and existence, such that, if space or extension have been created, it’s necessarily the case that they were created where there was no space, or any extension; and consequently He who would have created them would have had no need for space to create space, or need for extension to create extension; all that is clear and evident.
But if we assume this, a manifest absurdity follows, which is that God, for example, who would have created space and extension as He pleased, where there was none, might again, now, if He liked, create other similar spaces or extensions, where there are none, or where there is only very little, i.e., that He could create a space and an extension as large as this whole universe in the hollow, for example, of a small bottle, or in the center of a hazelnut, and even in the hollow center of a pin’s head, which is patently absurd: because it’s absurd to say that in the middle of a hazelnut or the hollow of the head of a pin there is as much space and extension as in the whole universe. But it remains clear that this absurdity would follow if space or extension had been created, as our God-cultists claim: for what would keep this same God, who would have already created all of space and the whole extent of this universe, from also creating as many and even countless times more in the hollow of a hazelnut or the hollow of the head of a pin; for a lack of power wouldn’t keep him from it, since he is always thought equally omnipotent in one time as in another. Nor would it be the lack of room or sufficient extension in the hollow of a hazelnut or the hollow of a pin’s head, since He doesn’t need such to create enough thereof, and since it’s by the creation itself that He makes space and extension, as He pleases, where there is none, as is also claimed. It’s not, I say, that either that would keep Him from being able to create in the hollow of a hazelnut or the hollow of a pin’s head, a space just as large as this whole universe. It is therefore evident, in this hypothesis, that nothing could prevent it: however, since this is an absurd conclusion, it follows naturally that the hypothesis is false and therefore that space cannot have been created. Confirmation of this is the fact that it is inconceivable that there was no extension. If it is inconceivable that there was no extension, then it necessary existed, and if it necessarily existed, it always has and always will, necessarily. For if it hadn’t always existed, it would be no more necessary for it to exist now than when there was none. And if it always was, then it is eternal and never began to exist; and if it never began to exist, it can’t have been created, and consequently, no creator for place, for space, or for extension, any more than for time.
It remains to be proved that matter can’t have been created, and if that has been shown, it must be considered obvious that absolutely nothing was created, and consequently that there is no creator. If all our God-cultists and all the Philosophers shared the views of these new Cartesians, who make the whole essence of matter consist in extension alone, and who find no difference between matter and extension, or between extension and matter, which they say is absolutely nothing but a single and selfsame thing, it would be easy to prove that matter can’t have been created, since the same reasons and the same arguments offered above, which conclusively prove that extension can’t have been created, would equally and conclusively also prove that matter can’t have been created, any more than extension, since they would be the same thing according to the Cartesians. But, since not all the God-cultists share that view, and neither do I, it must be proved by other arguments that matter can’t have been created.
Here is the first argument. If matter had been created, or if it could have been created, then it could only have been created by a being that wasn’t made of matter: for if this being who would have created it was also material, as many serious writers have formerly thought, it would only be a case of one matter creating another one, which can’t be: for where would this or that matter, and not another, get the power of creating its like? And why would a matter not be as uncreatable as that which would have created it? There is certainly no more reason to attribute the power of creating to any particular portion of matter; matter for matter, it’s all matter; it’s inconceivable that one part of matter could create another one; could an atom, for example, create another one? Could a grain of sand create another grain of sand? Could one mountain create another one? Or could this whole world create another world? No, certainly not. This is also why there is no reason to say that this or that part of matter was created while another one wasn’t. So, if it’s agreed some matter was not created, it must be admitted that no matter at all was created, i.e., that no matter was made from nothing. For this is how the word create is understood, to distinguish it from begetting, from producing, and from building, all of which mean to make something from something else that already existed. Now, we can readily conceive that a material being can beget, produce, or make some other thing or being that that would equally be material; for this happens every day, and every day it is seen, in the arts by in human industriousness, and in nature by its generations and productions of new people, which are the outcome of a reorganization of the parts of matter. But that matter, or material being, might make, from nothing, some other matter or some other material being, simply does not happen, and this is impossible for matter to do: thus, it can’t be said that matter was created by a being, which itself would be matter. Let’s see whether it could have been created by a being that wouldn’t be material, for this seems equally impossible; here is the proof.
A being which has neither body nor parts that can move and move itself, can’t do anything
, or create anything; now, a being which is not matter has neither body, nor parts which can move and move themselves: therefore, a being which is not matter can’t have made or created matter. That a being without body or parts that can move or move themselves, cannot do anything or create anything, it is obvious: for, as I’ve said, to act is to move; and a being with neither body nor moving parts remains necessarily always in the same state and can’t begin acting when it is not; and that which can’t begin to act, can’t act, or do anything: therefore, that has neither body nor moving parts, can’t act or create, and consequently a being which is not matter, having neither body nor moving parts, can in no way have created matter. In addition, beings which have neither bodies, nor parts, and which are, as is claimed, purely spiritual beings, if there were such beings (which is not agreed upon) they could in no way act on matter, or have any effect, or make any impression on it, since to act and make an impression on it, one must be able to touch and handle it. But that which has neither body nor moving parts, cannot touch or handle matter: thus, it can’t act, or make any impression on it. Tangere enim nisi corpus nulla potest res. According to the maxim, to touch and to be touched is only a property of bodies. The usual response to this is that a being which is not matter, being a spiritual substance, doesn’t act corporeally by the motion of its parts, like corporeal beings do, but that it acts spiritually, by understanding and will, without any movement of body or parts. But it is clear that this response consists only of vague terms that mean nothing real. For 1). To say beings who have neither body nor parts are substances is to say something one doesn’t conceive of, it’s nearly to state that nothings or that things which are nothing, are substances. 2). To say that there are beings and even substances which are purely spiritual and wholly exempt of all matter and all extension is to dissemble, to guess, to posit things, without any need or basis, which are not conceived, i.e., which one doesn’t understand, and which are not even susceptible of understanding, since nobody can form any idea of these supposed beings and substances, which are supposed to be exempt of all matter and all extension. 3). To say that beings who have neither body nor parts that can move, can still act by the understanding and the will, is equally to talk about what one does not understand, and something that’s impossible to understand and conceive, and consequently, it’s to talk about things that don’t deserve a hearing. 4). To say that purely spiritual beings and substances which have neither body nor parts are capable of understanding and will, i.e., that they are capable of vital actions: for the understanding and the will are effectively vital actions, but to say that beings without bodies or moving parts, are capable of vital actions, is equally, again, to dissemble, to guess, to assume without need or basis, things that cannot be and things that cannot be conceived: for vital actions are impossible without life, or life without motion, since life itself is essentially and really a vital movement; action and life are essentially modifications of being, and various modifications of being necessarily entail various changes, which cannot be found in beings without bodies, or parts which can move. 5). To say that spiritual substances act by the understanding and the will, is only to say that they are capable of thinking or willing; but merely thinking and wanting don’t produce anything externally: thus, beings who can only think and will, can’t do anything, or create anything outside of their thoughts or their wishes. It will be replied here that thinking and willing in created and limited beings don’t truly produce anything externally, but that thinking and willing in an uncreated and omnipotent being can do everything: but I add that this is to dissemble and to assume gratis, without need or basis, things which are in no way conceivable. To apply reason in this way is not to philosophize, since it’s to talk without knowing what one’s saying; and it would be madness to accept and to voluntarily accept such fictions: for, finally, all that is said of these sorts of spiritual substances, and of their supposed power and will are only fictions and imaginations, of which no real and true effect has ever been seen. 6). These sorts of supposed spiritual substances without bodies or moving parts certainly have no extension; if they have no extension, then they are reduced to imperceptible points, to mathematical points and even, if possible, to something less than mathematical points. But that being the case, how likely does it seem that a being of such odd smallness could have created matter, which is infinitely extended. This is surely thinking and saying things that are absolutely ridiculous and absurd. But it will be said that there is an uncreated and supremely omnipotent being who, although having no extension, or any parts, nevertheless doesn’t cease to be immense and to be, by its immensity, present and omnipotent everywhere. But I also say that to talk like this is to constantly multiply absurdities and always advance toward more and more impossible things and more and more inconceivable and absurd things. For, to say that a being lacking in any extension or parts is nevertheless everywhere due to its immensity, is to utter something completely repugnant and contradictory, it’s saying that a being lacking in all extension nevertheless has an extension that is infinite and unlimited and is infinitely extended: for what is an unlimited immensity, but an infinite extension which has no limits? To also say that this being is everywhere due to its immensity, although it is nowhere, and to say that it has no parts relating to the various parts of this whole immense space it contains, but that it is whole and entire everywhere, relative to its immensity and whole and entire in each part of this immense space, relative to the simplicity and the indivisibility of its nature, is to push absurdities beyond all limits, and it’s to say and imaginarily forge things that are not only more impossible, but even the most absurd and ridiculous things imaginable. This is the extremity to which our God-cultists are necessarily reduced, for wanting to maintain the existence of a being that is only imaginary; they have to say a thousand things that are absurd, inconceivable, which they can’t conceive of, and which they don’t understand. They talk without knowing what they’re saying, since they do not understand and can’t conceive what they’re saying. They would oblige us, by arguments they don’t understand, to credit opinions they can’t understand, as one Author says[732]. But those who speak this way, without knowing what they’re saying, certainly don’t even deserve to a hearing. By which it is evident that our superstitious God-cultists are mistaken, and that they are no better grounded now in the belief in a single and unique, spiritual and immaterial God than they formerly were in believing in many corporeal and material Gods: and, as they were ultimately obliged to acknowledge their mistaken belief in all these false corporeal and material Divinities, they must also now acknowledge their mistaken belief in this single and unique, spiritual and incorporeal Divinity, since such a Divinity can only be an imaginary and completely chimerical being.
