by Jean Meslier
It’s already plenty, and it’s even completely impossible, entirely inconceivable to have to suppose like this, in a single being, who has, however, neither body nor extent, who has neither arms nor legs nor feet, nor hands, nor head, nor eyes, nor brain, nor anything other than what might be imagined; it’s already plenty, I say, completely impossible and entirely inconceivable to have to suppose in such a being, which is only imaginary, a knowledge and a presently infinite power. For, since we have no idea of knowledge except with respect to what we can gain by ourselves by the acts of our knowledge and of our understanding, and since we also have no ideas of force and power except with respect to what we know by the motive force that we have within ourselves, and since we see all other bodies moving of themselves, it is plain that, according to this idea, there can’t be and it can’t even be conceived that there is any knowledge
or any power in a being who would have no body, no extension, who would have neither arms nor legs, who would have neither feet nor hands, and who would have neither head nor brain, nor anything like them, that, I say, can’t be that is absurd, and it is inconceivable that it might be. Equally it is plain that, according to this idea that we have of knowledge and power, there can be no individual being, endowed with understanding, who is capable of presently infinite knowledge, or any particular being who is capable of infinite force, since every individual is limited and no individual and finite being is can contain in itself an infinite force and an infinite power.
But what truly surpasses this belief and all human intelligence is that, for a single individual, omnipotent and infinitely wise and enlightened being to thus produce all the effects of nature, and for it to be able to impress and regulate, as I’ve said, the movements of every single particle of matter, in some body and some part on any body whatsoever, it’s also necessary that this supposed single, omnipotent, infinitely wise and enlightened being, who would thus produce all these movements and effects, to completely penetrate or suffuse all the bodies whose least parts it would thus move, i.e., it would be necessary, for example, that that which would form the bodies of the animals, who would move them, who would guide and govern all the finest and subtlest parts thereof, it would be necessary, I repeat, for it to suffuse all their flesh, all their bones, all their marrow, all the fibers of their flesh, all their muscles, all their intestines, their heart, their brain, their veins, their blood, and generally speaking everything involved in the composition of their bodies: for, how could it form, move, regulate, and guide all those parts unless it suffused them all? How could it form and move the animal spirits in the nerves and in the veins, and even direct, as needed, the course of their movement in all parts of the body, if it didn’t work immediately by itself in their formation and if it didn’t immediately impress, by itself, and to each of them, the motions that were pertinent and individualized for each of them, to produce this or that effect in this or that body part? It is indisputable that none of these things could happen without the one who would be their author or the first mover seeing, discerning, and touching, immediately, alone, all the finest and subtlest parts of all the bodies it would form? And how could it see and distinguish them, lacking eyes to see them, and fingers and hands to handle them, to join and organize them, or to bind, join, and attach them, as needed, to each other? And even if this supposed first mover and this capable worker had sufficiently keen sight to distinguish all of them and hands and fingers fine enough to so skillfully make and fashion all the beautiful and amazing things, large, small, and medium-sized, it would be necessary, as I’ve said, for it to completely suffuse all the substance of all the bodies it would form, and if it suffused them completely, then it would necessarily be itself, not only whole and entire in all the body, but also whole and entire within each part of all bodies, i.e., whole and entire within the heart of each animal, whole and entire within the head, whole and entire within the stomach, whole and entire within the intestines, whole and entire within the eyes, whole and entire within the liver, whole and entire within the lungs, whole and entire within the feet, whole and entire within the hands, and finally, whole and entire within each of the parts of these parts; such that it would even be whole and entire within each atom of matter, i.e., whole and entire in each of the tiniest parts of matter, and it’s like saying that there would be as many Gods as there were atoms of matter, or that every atom of matter would be God or would contain in itself all of nature and all the substance of a God. And, since all these atoms, which are the smallest parts of matter, are infinite in number, it’s like saying, again, that there were infinite numbers of Gods, all of which, nevertheless, were and formed together only one and the same God, who, without any body, or any parts in itself, would not fail to be infinitely extended and supremely omnipotent everywhere. What could be more ridiculous and more absurd than all these fantasies?
Plainly that cannot be, for if such an omnipotent being were, as is thought, complete and entire in all bodies and entire in each part of the bodies, then it would be, either without division of itself, or by dividing itself: neither of which is possible. 1). It can’t be without division of itself; for how could it be whole and entire in each of the different bodies that are so distinct and distant from each other, without dividing itself? That’s not conceivable, it can’t be. It couldn’t be with division of itself; for it’s quite evident that nothing can be divided from itself and still remain whole; nevertheless, this all-powerful Being, who would thus suffuse all other beings, was divided from itself so many times, or even as many times as there are atoms separated from each other in the whole extent of matter. But what could be imagined that would be vainer, or more ridiculous, or more absurd than that? You’d have to close your eyes to all the lights of Reason to believe such things.
But how, again, is it that such a universal and intimate suffusion, and such a supreme force and power of action don’t make themselves felt, or perceived anywhere? Indeed, the substance of this being, which would thus suffuse all the others, must have been quite fine, thin, and subtle, since it slid and insinuated itself so imperceptibly and gradually everywhere, without having any place anywhere, and without making itself felt or perceived in any particular spot. But how could the force of its power be so supreme and efficacious since nobody can sense it or feel any impression made by its force? It’s plain to see, however little attention one gives it, that all those things are but hollow imaginations and chimeras, which surpass, not only all intelligence, but also all possibility; and, as I said, one would have to completely renounce the lights of reason to be convinced of such things. Besides, if we’re talking about an all-powerful being who is infinitely wise and enlightened, who forms and guides in us and in all other beings, both the inner motions and the outer ones which happen in bodies and in all of nature, how can there be in us and in all other beings any motions which are even slightly disorderly and irregular? Certainly, there could be no disorder or any irregularity in the movements that are formed in us, or in the movements that are formed anywhere in nature, since it would be an all-powerful, infinitely wise and enlightened being who would form and guide all of them. But it is indisputable and evident that, on a daily basis, countless disorderly and irregular movements occur throughout nature; thus, it can’t be said that they were formed or directed by an all-powerful, infinitely wise, and enlightened being.
If on the other hand it’s said that a single first mover wouldn’t really be sufficient to move or impress motion on the whole extent of matter, which is in infinite and boundless, and that by consequence a single mover would not be enough, or it would be overworked to provide regulation for all the bodies which are composed of matter; but that there would be many first movers which would give them their movement and that that is exactly where all the contradictions, oppositions, and antipathies, whether natural or casual, which are found between many kinds of things, both animate and inanimate, the first movers of these things, finding themselves then to be of an incompatible mood or na
ture, with some unable to agree to move their portion of matter in the same direction as others, but moving that in a contrary and opposite direction to the others. I would confess, based on this latter hypothesis, that it’s possible to give a plausible explanation for this based on the contrariety, opposition, and antipathy between several natural bodies, but I would always deny that such a hypothesis could remain, 1) Because it’s futile to resort to the plurality and contrariety of the first movers to explain this opposition and antipathy, which are naturally found between several bodies, 2). Because the plurality of these so-called first movers is no less repugnant that the unity of a single one.
For, 1). As for their number where could we establish it? How many would we admit? One? Two? Four? A hundred? Two hundred? Thousands or millions? Where can it be established if a single one isn’t sufficient to carry out everything that occurs in nature? It’s impossible to imagine it. No: 2, 3, 4, or even a hundred, a thousand, or a million such supposed beings wouldn’t be enough either, since it would require infinite power and knowledge to consciously and deliberately do, with knowledge of causes, all that goes on in nature, and that many thousands and millions of limited amounts of knowledge can’t come together to make an infinite knowledge. And will there be as many of these as there are natural bodies or as many as there are atoms in the whole extent of matter? Then it would be necessary to posit an infinity of them, since there would be no less than an infinity of bodies and an infinity of atoms in all of nature. But wouldn’t it be ridiculous and absurd to also posit an infinite number of movers?
2). As for the nature of these supposed first movers, it would be such that they would all have of themselves the power of motion, or they wouldn’t all have it. If it’s claimed that they all have the force of self-motion of themselves, why wouldn’t matter itself and all the atoms of matter also have it of themselves? There is certainly no more problem with assuming that atoms have of themselves the power to move, than to attribute it needlessly to imaginary beings like these first movers; it is, rather, far more suitable to attribute it to matter itself; for, in the end, there’s no doubt that matter is real and that this matter can divide into an infinity of parts, which can, if we like, be called atoms; and it is also beyond question that the parts of matter move, but how sure are we about their nature and their existence? What is known about their force, their power, their industriousness, and their intelligence? Nothing, since it’s not possible to form any true ideas about their being, or their way of being.
In addition, I would like to ask, if all these supposed first movers are dissimilar or have different natures, if they are of equal strength or power or if some are stronger or more powerful than others, whether they know each other or not, whether they find pleasure and contentment in moving like this next to each other, each pushing its own portion of matter, whether they are friends or enemies to each other, and many other questions that could legitimately be asked about them; which it would be ridiculous to try to answer positively, because this would obviously make us say a thousand things without any basis, about which nothing is known, and which, for this reason, when there would be no others, would deserve to be rejected and would be wholly incredible.
It is, therefore, far more fitting and safer to attribute to matter itself the force it has to move, than to encumber oneself in vain and without necessity with so many insurmountable difficulties, to seek outside of it a false principle of its motion. Thus, I would no more amuse myself in refuting this opinion of the plurality of these first supposed movers, which is self-refuting: this is why, as our God-cultists don’t halt now at this opinion of the plurality of the Gods and they all tend to recognize a single first mover, to which they attribute a perfect knowledge of all things, with a supreme omnipotence, to do all He likes and consequently to move matter and make it into all He likes, it’s necessary, although the opinion and hypothesis of this supposed infinite power and knowledge had already been sufficiently refuted and demonstrated false, we must add here another reason which would show its falsehood no less!
It’s that, even by the admission of our God-cultists, this single supposed mover, which they call God, and to whom they attribute an infinite power and knowledge, is a being which, according to their Doctrine, is not only without body and without form, and without any extension, but is also entirely immobile, unchanging in His nature, immutable in Himself, immutable in His thoughts, immutable in His knowledge, immutable in His plans, and immutable in His will; such that He can in no way be subject to any change or to any of the vicissitudes of time. With that being assumed, it is clear and evident that such a being, if He truly existed, could never cause matter to move. I prove it thus: A being, who is entirely immutable in Himself, can move nothing outside of itself; for how could it move anything, when He could move Himself, it is in no way possible to conceive that a being who remains immutable and who is even by nature immutable, can never move anything: there is no connection between the idea of an immutable being, and the motion of any other being that moves, and there can’t be one. But, according to the doctrine of our God-cultists, is immutable in Himself and immutable in His nature; thus, He can move nothing, and consequently, He cannot move matter, or be the first author of its motion, and thus it’s necessary to recognize that matter has its motion of itself, and that it is entirely futile to point to the existence of an omnipotent God, than it is to make it move; and not only is it futile for our God-cultists to want to attribute the principle of the motion of matter to the supposed omnipotence of a God, since, if this were true, He couldn’t move itself, since He is immutable by nature; but for this same reason it is also completely futile for them to pray and worship Him, and it is futile for them to offer Him sacrifices, as they do, to thereby obtain from Him some benefit or favor whatsoever, which they might need. For since He is immutable by nature, as they suppose, and as all His thoughts, all His desires, all His wishes are taken from all eternity, it is sure that He will not change His thought or wishes with respect to them, for all the prayers they might offer Him, or for all the adoration they might give Him, any more than for all the sacrifices they might offer Him; nothing can bend Him, or make Him lean to one side more than the other; and thus, whether one prays or doesn’t to such a being, whether one worships or doesn’t worship Him, whether one offers sacrifices to Him or not, He will never do anything, good or bad, but that which from all eternity He has resolved to do; this is even noted in their supposed Prophets, when, making their God speak, they absolutely make Him say that His counsel and plans remain firm and that all He has resolved to do, will be done[744]; Consilium meum stabit et omnis voluntas mea fiet, and so it is vain and futile for our superstitious God-cultists to pray to God. It’s vain for them to worship Him and offer sacrifices to Him, seeking, by such means, to obtain some needed favor, which they think He won’t otherwise give them. If one knew, for example, that a powerful King had made some resolution, and that He would never change his mind or intentions for any reason, would it not be futile in that case to beg such a person, such a King to do otherwise, or to act differently than he had resolved to do? Certainly, it would be futile, and it would be a kind of madness to try to make him change his mind. Since, then, our God-cultists are aware that their God is immutable, and since they know that all His intentions are set in stone from all Eternity, and since they also know that He will never change His mind for any reason, since He is immutable by nature, it is clear and evident that it is futile for them, and even a kind of madness for them to hope and claim to be able to gain anything from Him by their prayers, worship, and sacrifices, since it’s certain that such things can’t change His aims, and that all such efforts will in no way help them gain what they are after.
But, it will be said, it’s God Himself who wants to be prayed to, and who commands men to pray to Him, to worship Him, and to offer Him sacrifices, to then grant them, due to the merits of their prayers and sacrifices, the asked-for favors, and which He has resolved from all eternit
y to grant them. But I will also say that they speak blindly about things, about which they know nothing, and about which they can give no true proof. If they say that God has revealed His thoughts and wishes to them, I also say that there is no lie, or error in religious matters which the superstitious God-cultists won’t claim to base on the word and authority of their God: thus, they shouldn’t be taken at their word, or be heard in what they say, without a convincing proof, since any impostor could say no less. 2). If God had issued, as our God-cultists say, such commandments to men, that they must pray, worship, and offer sacrifices to Him, then He surely would, or at least He should have more consideration for those who faithfully observe His commandments than to those who don’t observe them, and He would surely be, or at least He ought to be, more favorable to those who would pray to Him, who would worship Him, and who would devoutly offer sacrifices to Him, than to those who wouldn’t pray to Him, who wouldn’t worship Him, and who wouldn’t offer Him any sacrifices at all. But we clearly see every day He has no more respect or consideration the first than the second sort, and that good and evil come and happen equally to both sorts of people. There is, therefore, no reason to think that God gave such commandments to men. 3). We see clearly, daily examples of the fact that an infinity of those who pray and offer sacrifices and who devoutly serve their God, and who invoke and call on Him, with all their heart and all their strength, in their pressing needs, still fail to obtain the effect of their requests, or of their prayers, but they often perish miserably in their needs or languish in their misery, until the end of their days. Why are their prayers not granted? Why do their petitions fall on deaf ears? It’s because, according to our God-cultists, it didn’t please God to grant them, or to extend the effect of their wishes, it was not His will and it never was. If, then, God commanded them, on such occasions, to turn to Him in prayer, asking for the grace and help they need, He would have commanded them to ask Him, by prayer and sacrifice, for the grace and favors which He had neither the will nor the intention to grant them, and which He had even decided never to grant them, which is far from credible for a God who is supposed to be infinitely good and infinitely wise.
