by Jean Meslier
If a lord, for example, or a King decided, acting on some bizarre whim, to order his servants or his subjects to humbly offer him daily prayers, asking for particular graces and favors, which he had decided never to give them, wouldn’t we consider this Lord or King insane for issuing such a decree? Yes, we certainly would, and rightly so; the same thing would go for God, if, as our God-cultists say, He commanded men to worship him, to serve Him and humbly beseech Him with prayers and sacrifices, for benefits that He wouldn’t deign to grant them, and that He had even decided never to grant them; it might even be called madness for our God-cultists to attribute such insanity to a God, i.e., to a being who is supposed to be infinitely perfect, infinitely good, and infinitely wise. Thus, no matter how they take it, they get confused by their errors and by their vain thoughts.
But let’s return to this supposed immutability that they attribute to their God. He is, they say, so immutable in His nature and in His ways that, although they give Him all the various affections and passions that are found in men, and give Him, for example, love and hate, kindness and wrath, rage and revenge, sadness and joy, pleasure and pain, desire and contentment, jealousy and displeasure, regret and repentance, and other similar affections, isn’t it nevertheless that they want all those affections to be in their God without any passion, without any alteration, and without any change in Him. This is how their great Mirmadolin St. Augustin addresses this point, speaking to his God: “My Lord,” he tells him, “you have already told me loudly in the mysterious ear of my heart, that you are eternal, because you never change, either by the impression of a new form, or by the vicissitude of any movement; your will, equally, is not subject to the inconstancy of time, as much as a will which shifts in its resolutions, however that may be, cannot be immortal in its duration. I see he says[745], “this truth clearly in your presence; the same lights that you have shared with me,” he continues, “show me that the disobedience of any of your creatures does no harm to you, nor does it upset the order of your empire, whether in heaven or on earth.” Here is also what he says in another place, as if he were addressing God again: “You are jealous,” he tells Him, “although you are always in security; you repent, but without any feeling of pain, you become angry, but you are always calm.” Zelas et securus es, pœnitet te sed non doles, irasceris et tranquillus es. Indeed, He must remain quite calm and peaceable, since among so many arguments and debates as arise among men with respect to Him, and since so many of them deny, blaspheme, and offend Him, as it were, by their crimes and their wickedness, and so many others who offend Him every day by their disobedience, He takes less interest than anyone in defending His own cause. It’s only men who speak on His behalf, and they only speak according to their imaginations. For their imagination is the only source of everything they say about Him and for Him: and they wouldn’t even take it upon themselves to tell us what they do say about Him, if they didn’t see a way to benefit from it. Our God-cultists would persuade us it’s their God who provides, by His divine Providence, for all that concerns creatures. But how would He provide for His creatures, since He doesn’t provide for that which is closest to Him and concerns Him most of all: the manifestation of His glory and the adoration of the heart, which would be His due, along with complete obedience to His commandments?
Here is what Ambrose also says about this supposed immutability of God: “God,” he says, “does not think in the same way as men do, as if new thoughts came into His Mind, which He didn’t have before; nor does He become enraged in the same way as men get upset, as if He were subject to changes; but we still use this way of talking, and saying that God thinks, that He gets upset and repents, to express,” he says, “the grievousness of the offense of sin against God, and which is such,” he says, “that it would seem it should provoke God to wrath, although He naturally can’t be subject to any movement of anger or passion: Neque enim, nihil cogitat sicut homines ut aliqua ei nova succedat sententia, neque irascitur quasi mutabilis, sed ideo haec leguntur ut exprimatur peccatorum nostrorum acerbitas quae divinam meruerit offensam tanquam ejusque pervenerit culpa, ut etiam Deus qui naturaliter non movetur et iracundia aut passione ulla provocatus videatur ad iracundiam.
“Even though God,” says another author, “cannot be enraged, or rejoice or desire or empathize or repent, still He does all that is done by those who are enraged, who are saddened, who repent or rejoice, etc., for He punishes,” he says, “although without anger, He is gratified in certain thing, although without any movement of joy, He abhors evil, although without sorrow or sadness; He wants the good, although without desire, He comforts the afflicted, although without compassion. In sum,” he says, “all we do by all these different motions of our appetites and our passions, God and the Angels,” he says, “do by a simple act of their will, since they are pure spirits.” That’s how our God-cultists and our Christ-cultists speak of the immutability of their God, and, although they attribute to Him, as I just said, love and hate, gentleness and anger and even wrath and indignation, sadness and joy, pleasure and pain, desire and compassion, regret and repentance etc., they don’t, however, claim to take these terms literally, as if God were actually enraged or rejoiced or saddened, etc., or as if He were truly subject to any of these movements, which we feel in ourselves, when we love or hate, when we become angry, or when we rejoice, when we are sad or when we repent, etc., no, that’s not at all what they mean by the terms that I’ve noted; what they mean is something completely different, but which they can’t explain or distinctly help others to understand, because they themselves can’t comprehend or conceive what they claim to mean in what they say. But this is clearly how they talked, that God loves without love, i.e., that He loves without loving, that He hates without hatred, i.e., that He hates without hating, that He becomes angry without anger, that He is irritated without irritation, that He rejoices without joy, that He is saddened without sadness, and that He repents without regret, etc. Equally, according to their manner of speaking, when they say that He is good without qualification and that He is huge and immense without largeness and without extension, it’s like saying that He is good without goodness and that He’s good without being good; that He’s huge without largeness, i.e., large without being large, and thus, according to this fine doctrine of our God-cultists, these very terms of doing and wanting something, which they attribute to their God, must not and cannot be taken literally, any more than the terms like loving, hating, being angered, repenting, etc. For even as, in their view, God would love without any feelings of love, He would hate without any movement of hatred, He would be gratified without any glad feelings, and that other things would displease Him without any feeling of sadness, or He would repent without any feeling of regret or repentance, etc., so also they have to say that He does all things without any movement of action, without being agitated, without moving, and if He wants what He wants without forming any act of the will, which is certainly like saying that He wants without wanting and without any will; and according to this way of talking, they must also say that He is without being and that He exists without existence, since He has no particular way of acting, or any particular way of doing, or any particular way of existing; for, to do is not without action, nor willing without an act of the will, any more than being without essence or existing without existence.
Now, our God-cultists acknowledge and agree that their God wants all things without any motion of His will, and that He does all things without any motion of action, which is like saying that He wants unwillingly, that He acts without acting, and that He does everything without doing, and thus they must also acknowledge and say that He has no particular way of being, or any particular manner of existing; for that which has no particular manner of being, or any particular manner of existing, certainly doesn’t exist at all. This is where our superstitious God-cultists are reduced to by their fine doctrine of the supposed existence of their God; by wanting to make Him perfect and great and amazing and incomprehensible in
all things and in all ways, they completely destroy Him, and by wanting to divest and free Him from all imperfections or any real and imaginable qualities, they truly reduce Him to nothing. They must, therefore, frankly recognize and confess that He is not, and that He is nothing, since He effectively is not and He effectively is nothing.
74. IT IS RIDICULOUS AND ABSURD TO SAY THAT A BEING WHO IS VERY POWERFUL AND INFINITELY PERFECT WOULD NEVERTHELESS HAVE ANY VISIBLE AND PERCEPTIBLE PERFECTION.
Let us pass on to other arguments. God, as seen by our God-cultists, is a being who is, as I have said, all-powerful, who is eternal, who is infinitely good, infinitely wise, and infinitely perfect in all sorts of perfections, who is also omnipresent, who sees all, who knows all, who sustains everything, and who organizes everything as He pleases; such that there is nothing, as they say, which can evade His rule, or go in any manner against the inviolable order He has established everywhere by His omnipotence and supreme Providence.
The first thought that presents itself to the mind about such a wise, good, beautiful, great, excellent, perfect, and loving being is, that if there truly were one, He would appear so clearly and visibly before our eyes and to our sense organs that nobody could doubt the truth of its Existence. But, since this supposedly supremely perfect being doesn’t show itself, doesn’t make itself felt or known anywhere in any way whatsoever, there is certainly no reason to say or to believe that there really is such a being; on the contrary, there is every reason to believe and say that there isn’t. For how can a being who is so supremely perfect and supremely good and loveable be everywhere, without any of its supreme perfections being visible anywhere? Certainly, a being who is not visible or tangible at all, can’t be supremely beautiful, or supremely good and kind, it isn’t supremely perfect. For, to the extent that the natural perfections of a being are great, they are all the more visible and tangible, similar in this way to a light, which, to the extent of its immensity, all the more is it visible and noticeable, or like heat, which, as it is large, to the same extent is it noticeable. Since, then, nobody sees or even notices this being anywhere, which is said to be so supremely perfect, and since nobody sees or notices any of the supreme perfections attributed to it, there is no reason to believe or say that there truly is such a being. This argument, as simple and natural as it is, doesn’t fail to conclude quite plainly in the negative with respect to this supposed divine being which is said to be so supremely perfect. But it must be also confirmed by clear and plain examples, such as those that follow:
If it were said, for example, that there was a Sun that was infinitely bright and luminous but that the brightness or light of this supposed Sun wasn’t visible anywhere, would it not be right to say that this supposedly infinitely bright Sun didn’t exist? Yes, certainly, it would be right to say that, and it could even be said that a person would have to be out of their mind and their common sense to say that there was a brightness and infinite light where none could be seen. If someone said, for example, again, that there was an infinitely beautiful being everywhere, but that the beauty of this being was nowhere visible, wouldn’t it be right to say that it wasn’t real? Surely. If it were said that there was an infinitely hot fire, or an infinitely cold air, but that the heat of this fire or the coldness of this infinitely cold air weren’t detectable anywhere, would it not be correct to say that such things didn’t exist? Finally, if it were said that there was a being everywhere, the substance of which was of an odor or flavor that was infinitely pleasant to the palate or the nose, and the sound of which was infinitely better than any other sound, but that this sound couldn’t be heard anywhere, nor could its scent be smelled anywhere, or could the taste of this amazing substance be tasted anywhere, would it not be right to say that this being wasn’t real, since it was completely undetectable? Yes, certainly, it would be right to say this, and if some people nevertheless got it in their head to maintain that such beings were nevertheless truly everywhere, they certainly wouldn’t fail pass for madmen and visionaries and even fanatics; for it would truly be a kind of madness and fanaticism to get such fancies in one’s head.
But, our superstitious God-cultists clearly fall victim to similar fanaticism, when they maintain the existence of their God; for they want Him to be infinitely perfect in all manner of perfections and to be everywhere present at the same time. But it is too obvious that He is not seen, that He is not felt, that He is not perceived, and that He is not found anywhere, and that He can’t even be seen, felt, perceived, or found anywhere. Thus, it is a massive error, even a kind of madness for them to want to maintain, as they do, that such a being as this truly is everywhere. It’s as if they wanted to say that there was in fact a Sun that was infinitely bright and luminous, where no brightness or light was visible; it seems that nobody with any common sense is capable of maintaining such propositions as those. And yet, this is what our God-cultists do every day, when they maintain the current existence of their God who is infinitely perfect and present everywhere, although He can neither be seen, perceived, felt, or encountered anywhere. It’s as if they said that there is everywhere a bright and infinitely luminous Sun, which, however, is visible nowhere, it’s as if, I say, they said that. For, as contrary to common sense as it would be to say that a being who is supposed to be infinitely perfect, everywhere present, would, however, not be visible anywhere, and as absurd as it would be to say that there was a perfectly bright and infinitely luminous Sun where no brightness was visible, nor any light, it would be no less absurd to say that there was an infinitely perfect being where neither could it be seen nor could any of these supposed perfections be perceived. Our Christ-cultists, who are amazingly apt for the spiritual in their way of thinking, will not fail to consider me here as a carnal and vulgar man, who can only judge things by the senses and they will certainly apply to me the words of their great Mirmadolin, St. Augustine, who said that for a carnal man the only rule of judging and thinking is his habit of seeing things; carnal men, he says, easily believe what they see, but they can’t believe what they don’t see: in homine carnali, he says, tota regula intelligendi est consuetudo cernendi, quod solent videre credunt, quod non solent non credunt. But that hardly bothers me, it’s easy to refute that argument by saying that, for ignoramuses and idiots, their whole rule of conduct for judging and thinking is to blindly believe whatever they are told, they won’t believe what they see, what they touch and handle, and they foolishly believe everything they are told, even against their own views, following this other maxim of their mirmadolin, the Angelic Doctor[746], who says, in reference to his lovely and adorable God of dough, that sight, touch, and taste are mistaken with respect to Him, and that there is certainly no reason to believe and accept anything but what is heard, that is, that which their faith teaches them only by hearsay:
Visus, tactus, gustus in te fallitur,
Sed auditu solo tuto creditur.
Would it be possible for a supreme and infinitely perfect being not to have any visible or tangible perfection in itself? If that were true, although it would be inconceivable to the mind, it would be necessary to say that all the tangible qualities, and that all the tangible perfections would be incompatible with the nature or with the invisible perfections of this supremely perfect being, or at least that they would not be conformable to the supreme dignity of this infinite being: for if they were not incompatible with its nature, or with its invisible perfections, or if they were not unsuited to the dignity of its supremely perfect nature, why would it not have these tangible and visible perfections? If it has them, why wouldn’t they be manifest in Him? And if they were manifest in Him, why would they not be visible? They would certainly be seen, and this all the more easily, than they would be in a higher degree of perfections. If our God-cultists say that the tangible qualities are incompatible with the nature and invisible perfections of this supreme being, or are unsuited to the dignity, purity, and simplicity of His infinitely perfect nature, and consequently that these sorts of tangible
qualities and visible perfections are not present in Him, and indeed can’t be in Him, due to the purity and simplicity of His nature, I will come to this presently. But how can they say that their God is, nevertheless, infinitely perfect, since He lacks so many perfections? For it is evident that an infinitely perfect being which lacks an infinity of perfections, can’t be infinitely perfect: but their God, according to what they themselves say, lacks all the visible perfections and all the tangible qualities, which are almost infinite in number, therefore he cannot be an infinitely perfect being.
