by Jean Meslier
The author of the Recherche de la vérité can’t help but acknowledge the absurdities that would follow from such reasoning, and he claims that there is a difference between the conclusion he draws from this argument in favor of God’s existence, and other similar conclusions that might be drawn from it in favor of the existence of any other being. This is how he explains it:
It is true that, if I made such an argument, one should attribute to a thing that which is clearly conceived as contained in the idea which represents it. Necessary existence is clearly conceived as contained in the idea of an infinitely perfect body, therefore an infinitely perfect body exists. It is true, I say, that if I argued this way I could rightly be told that this wasn’t conclusive as to the actual existence of an infinitely perfect body, but only, note this well, that, supposing that there is such a body, it would have its existence of itself, whose reason is that the idea of an infinitely perfect body is a mental fiction, or rather a composite idea, and which, consequently, might be false or contradictory, as it indeed is: for nobody can clearly conceive[830] of infinitely perfect bodies, of an individual and finite body, as the body is, being inconceivable as universal and infinite. But the idea of God or of being in general, of being without restriction, of an infinite being, is not a fiction of the mind, it’s not a composite idea which contains some contradiction. Nothing could be simpler than it, although it includes all that is and all that can be. But this simple and natural idea of being, or of infinity, contains necessary existence; for it is evident that being, not a certain being, has its existence of itself, and the being can’t fail to be presently, since it is impossible and contradictory for the true being to be without its existence[831].
Let’s take a look at our author’s argument. The reason, according to him, why this argument is not conclusive about the existence of an infinitely perfect body, as it is about the existence of an infinitely perfect God, he says, is because the idea of an infinitely perfect body is a fiction of the mind; as if the idea of another being which is conceived of as infinitely perfect, wasn’t equally a fiction of the mind as the idea of an infinitely perfect body. Certainly, both ideas are fictions of the mind; and so, the argument is no more conclusive in favor of the existence of either of the two. And, since it’s not conclusive about the existence of a body conceived of as infinitely perfect, as the author concedes, it’s certainly no more so about the existence of another being who is conceived of as infinitely perfect; and if this author persists in claiming that the idea one forms of another infinitely perfect being isn’t a fiction of the mind, it’s up to him and all his adherents to prove, with clear and evident arguments, the reality of this alleged infinitely perfect being, and this would be as hard for them, and even as impossible to do, as to prove the existence of their God. And thus, as long as they haven’t proved, with better arguments and better reasons, the reality of this supposed infinitely perfect being, we will always be equally justified in saying that He is only imaginary and that the idea they form of Him is truly only a fiction of their mind, and consequently that their supposedly conclusive argument proves nothing with respect to the existence of their God, or the existence of a body that is conceived of as infinitely perfect. The author adds that the idea of an infinitely perfect body is a composite idea, and that, consequently, he says, it may be false or contradictory, as it is indeed; for nobody, he continues can clearly conceive of infinitely perfect bodies. But how is the idea they form of their supposedly infinitely perfect being, any simpler, or less composite, than the idea they form of an infinitely perfect body? It can’t be simpler or less composite in itself, I mean in its nature and in its being as an idea, for, although it’s often said that some thoughts are finer and subtler, or more vulgar than others, but nobody claims for all that that some are really more material or more corporeal than others. All the operations of the soul, or the mind, are of the same nature in that respect, and all are as spiritual as each other, and consequently, as simple in themselves as each other; that is beyond doubt. It is, therefore, evident that an idea can’t be called simpler and less composite than any other, except because it doesn’t contain in itself the idea of many other things, which another idea would contain. Thus, for example, we say that the idea of a home is a complex idea, because it contains the idea of several other things, such as the idea of the wood or stone it is made of, the idea of a roof and walls that comprise it, and the idea of the doors and the windows, as well as the idea of the chimneys and hearths in it; and even the mere idea of a roof will also be a composite idea, because it also contains the idea of tiles, or slate, the idea of boards and rafters and the idea of the braces that support the entire covering, and instead it will be said that the idea of extension contains no idea aside from extension.
To know, then, that the idea of a God, or a being which is conceived of as infinitely perfect, is simpler, or less composite, than the idea of a body that is also conceived of as infinitely perfect, we must see whether the idea of a God, or of an infinitely perfect being, contains the idea of as many perfections as the idea of an infinitely perfect body would contain; for if it contains the idea of as many perfections as the idea of an infinitely perfect body might contain, then it is obvious that both ideas are equally composite, and that they will, therefore, be fictions of the mind in both cases. Now, it is clear and evident that the idea of a God, or an infinitely perfect being, contains the idea of all possible perfections. For if it didn’t contain the idea of all possible perfections, it wouldn’t be the idea of an infinitely perfect being, but the idea of a being lacking in certain perfections, and consequently, it wouldn’t be infinitely perfect. But it is evident and also quite clear that the idea of an infinitely perfect body couldn’t contain more than the idea of all possible perfections; therefore, the idea of a God, or of an infinitely perfect being, is not simpler or less composite, than the idea of an infinitely perfect body, and consequently, they are both nothing but fictions of the mind, neither of which proves the existence of any infinitely perfect being.
The idea of an infinitely perfect body, says the same author of the Recherche, is a composite idea, which might be false or contradictory, as it indeed is. I agree with him that this idea is composite, that it is false, and that there can be no infinitely perfect body; but it must also be admitted that there is no other being that can be infinitely perfect, since the idea of an infinite perfection is a fiction of the mind, as I’ve noted. “It’s impossible,” he says, “to clearly conceive of an infinitely perfect body,” and I agree; but is it any more possible to conceive of any other infinitely perfect being? By no means; rather, it’s far easier to conceive of perfections in a body which is extended and which has parts, than in a being which has neither form nor shape, parts, or any extension. It is easy, for example, to conceive of beauty and goodness in a body that is extended and has parts, but how can we conceive of beauty or goodness in a being which has neither form, nor shape, nor parts, nor any extension? Certainly, that is inconceivable. How could anyone conceive of infinite beauty and goodness, since nobody can even conceive of any degree of beauty or goodness therein that are perceptible? And finally, how can anyone conceive of infinity in a being which has no parts or any extension? Certainly, once again, this is impossible, contradictory, self-refuting, and even repugnant in its terms.
“An individual and finite being, like the body, cannot,” he says, “be conceived as universal and infinite, true, but it is also clear and obvious that a being who has no extension, can’t be conceived of as universal and infinite; that, I say, is contradictory, and that is self-refuting. But the idea of God, it’s said, the idea of being in general, of being without restriction, of infinite being is not a mental fiction, it’s not a composite idea that contains some contradiction, nothing is simpler, although it includes all that is and all that might be. But, he adds, this simple and natural idea of being, or of infinity, contains necessary existence, for it is evident,” he continues, “that being, I don’t mean any
particular being, note this well, has its existence by itself, and that being cannot be presently, since it is impossible and contradictory for the true being to be without existence.
The entire latter argument by our author is quite true; but note the artifice, or the blunder he makes (I have to talk this way); for, intentionally or inadvertently, he confuses being in general, the being without restriction, and the infinite being with the infinitely perfect being, and the present and necessary existence of being in general and the infinite being, he subtly concludes in favor of the present and necessary existence of the infinitely perfect being, as if these were one and the same thing. If he made this fallacious argument on purpose, and if he also confuses these two things on purpose, then his artifice is in bad faith, and is unfitting for a wise philosopher; and if it’s by an oversight that he confuses the two, this is a massive blunder, and a considerable error: for it is clear and evident that there is a very great difference between the being in general, and the infinitely perfect being. The being in general and without restriction, as our author says, refers only to the being that exists, however it may exist; but the infinitely perfect being means, not only a being that exists, but it necessarily also refers to a being which has all possible perfections, and which has them in a supreme and infinite degree of perfection; for if it didn’t have all of them, or if, having them all it didn’t have all of them to a supreme and infinite degree of perfection, it is manifest, clear, and evident that it wouldn’t be infinitely perfect, since it would lack some perfection, if it didn’t have all of them, or at least to some degree of perfection, if it didn’t have them all to a supreme and infinite degree of perfection; thus it is manifest, clear, and evident that the being in general and without restriction and that the infinite being is not one and the same thing as the infinitely perfect being; and the being in general and without restriction and the infinite being doesn’t refer to an infinitely perfect being. The being in general and without restriction, or the infinite being, is nothing other than matter or extension itself, assuming that matter and extension are one and the same thing, as our Cartesians claim, which is not necessary to examine here.
It is manifest, clear, and obvious that matter, or at least extension, necessarily exists, and that it is infinite; for, when you think about it, it is inconceivable that there is no extension, or to conceive that there would be any end to extension, because wherever one might claim to demarcate it, or impose limits on it, one also conceives clearly that there is necessarily something beyond these boundaries, and consequently that there is extension, infinite extension, even, because in whatever place one might claim to impose or assume boundaries to it, one clearly also conceives that there will necessarily always be something beyond said boundaries and consequently that there will be extension, and also an infinite extension which will always go on without an end. And thus, we see and conceive, and clearly know, in the idea of matter, or in the idea of extension, the present and necessary existence of the being in general, of the being without restriction, and the infinite being, as our author says, and he was right to say that the simple and natural idea of this being contains all that is ,and all that might be, because all that is, and all that might be, are effectively nothing but matter or extension, modified in various ways. He was right to say that the idea of this being contains necessary existence and that this being has its existence by itself, since it is not possible that the true being could be without existence: but it was not right to conclude from this as to the existence of an infinitely perfect being, since there is no necessary connection between the clear and natural idea of a matter, or an extension, which is really infinite, and the chimerical idea of an infinitely perfect being which is nowhere and would not even have the wherewithal to receive, or have in itself, any true perfection, since it wouldn’t have in itself any form, or shape, or any extension.
It may well be said that perfection necessarily means some good, some fine quality, and some perfect modification of being; and that infinity in perfection means something that’s necessarily infinite, beautiful, good and perfect modifications of being; and for a being to be infinitely perfect, it must necessarily have in itself infinite kinds of very beautiful, very good, and very perfect modifications, which is clear and evident. Similarly, a modification of being necessarily means some way of being, and consequently diverse and infinite sorts of modifications, i.e., diverse and infinite sorts of ways of being.
But, how can we conceive and how can there be various and infinite kinds of modifications, i.e., diverse and infinite sorts of ways of being that are infinitely good, infinitely fine, and infinitely perfect in a being who would have no form, no shape, and who wouldn’t even have any part, or any extension? This can’t be at all, that is manifestly ridiculous and absurd, and yet it is clear and evident that the idea that our God-cultists form about an infinitely perfect being who has no form, or shape, no part, nor any extension at all, is only a vain and chimerical idea, and that, consequently, it’s an illusion for them to claim to demonstrate the existence of a God by the chimerical idea they form of an infinitely perfect being.
And it’s still another illusion of theirs to imagine, as they do, that the being in general and without restriction are the same thing as an infinitely perfect being, since it is obvious that matter, or extension, are not infinitely perfect beings, although they are being in general, and being without restriction or limitation, and so it's another mistake for them to conclude, as they do, in favor of the existence of an infinitely perfect being, from the existence of a being which is only infinite in extension. And this can serve at the same time to show the weakness and vanity of the arguments made by Mr. de Cambrai on this subject; here’s what he says: “I find[832] that the being by itself would be in a state of supreme perfection. That which has being by itself is eternal and immutable; for always and equally carries it its own depths the cause and necessity of its existence[833]. It is by itself all that it can be, and it can never be less than what it is. To be this way,” he says, “is to exist at the highest degree of being, and therefore,” he says, “at the highest degree of truth and perfection[834].”
He finds that the being which would be by itself, would be in a state of supreme perfection. He is clearly mistaken in this, since it’s obvious that any matter and any body which are by themselves as they are, are not, nevertheless, in a state of supreme perfection. The matter, for example, which makes up a frog, a fly, or an earthworm, is by itself, yet it is clear and evident that it is not presently in a state of supreme perfection, i.e., in a state of the most perfect modification, because it could receive several other changes that would be more perfect, at least according to the way we judge things, because this is how I mean it and not otherwise. Such that, if anyone told me that modifications of being, i.e., of matter, were, for example, equally perfect in mud as in sunshine, that it would be as perfect in reeking carrion as in a fine living body, full of vigor and health, I wouldn’t even take the trouble to argue with him, for, as I know that matter is indifferent to all sorts of possible modifications, it may well be that all modifications are equally compatible with it, and consequently, that they would also be equally perfect in themselves, and that it’s only our judgment, or our opinion, which makes us find more beauty or perfection in some than others. And if, in this case, our God-cultists claim that each being, variously modified, would be in a state of supreme perfection of being, they would thereby make a God who would be in a state of supreme perfection: what a fine doctrine that would be!
“What has being by itself,” says Mr. de Cambrai, “is eternal and immutable. It is true that what has being by itself is eternal; but it is not true that what has being by itself is immutable. Extension and matter, if these are different things, equally has being by itself, as I’ve shown. It is true that extension is immutable, because it is always the same in all sorts of places; but it is evident that matter is not immutable, since it presently moves and changes at every moment in its mod
ifications and forms, and this may be a reason to think that matter and extension are not exactly the same thing, as our Cartesians claim.
The reason why Mr. de Cambrai claims that a being which would be by itself, would be immutable as well as eternal is, he says, because it always bears in its own depths the cause and necessity of its existence. This reason proves that it would be eternal and that it could never be destroyed; but it does not prove that it would be immutable: for the fact that a being is eternal and could never be destroyed doesn’t entail the idea that it must be immutable, as is manifestly apparent in matter, which is by itself eternal, which can’t be destroyed, and which, however, is not immutable, since it moves and changes, assuming new modifications and forms every day.
