by Jean Meslier
Let us move on to what they say concerning the nature and condition of animals. They refuse to recognize that animals have any knowledge, or any feelings of pain or pleasure, or that they love or hate anything. In animals, they say, there is neither intelligence, nor soul as commonly understood; they eat without pleasure, they screech without pain, they grow without knowing it, they desire nothing, they fear nothing, etc., and the only argument they give for this is that they can’t conceive that matter shaped in one way or another, such as a square, a circle, an oval, or something else, can constitute pain, pleasure, heat, cold, color, odor, sound, etc., and that they can’t conceive that matter which is extremely subtilized and agitated, from bottom to top and from top to bottom, in a straight line or a circle, a spiral, a parabola or ellipse, could constitute love, hatred, joy, sadness, etc. If it’s conceivable, they say, that matter with a certain shape, for example, a square, a circle, an oval, could be pain or pleasure, heat, coldness, color, odor, sound, etc. it can be said confidently that the soul of animals, as material as it may be, is capable of feeling; if it’s not conceivable, then it shouldn’t be said; for it’s no good making claims about things that aren’t conceived of. Equally, they add, if it’s conceivable that matter which is extremely agitated from top to bottom and from bottom to top, in a circular, oblique, or spiral line could produce love, hatred, joy, sadness, etc., it can be said that animals have the same passions as us. If it’s not conceivable, then it shouldn’t be said, without wishing to talk without known what’s being said.
And thus, the only reason why they refuse to recognize that animals have knowledge and feeling is because they can’t conceive that any modification of matter can produce any knowledge, or any feelings. But do they have any better conception, these fine Gentlemen, do they themselves have any better conception of how any modification of matter can cause and form, in a mind or in a spiritual substance, any thought, any knowledge, or any feeling of pain and pleasure? For they say that the various modifications and changes of bodies kindle in the soul various thoughts and various sensations:
The least things can produce great movements in the delicate fibers of the brain, and they stimulate, as a necessary outcome, the violent feelings of the soul[911]; it’s because the force of the mind consists in a certain temperament of volume and agitation of the animal spirits with the fibers of the brain. The motion, for example, that causes pain, often differs only slightly from the one that causes the ticklish sensation[912]. It is not necessary for there to be an essential difference between these two movements; but it is necessary for there to be an essential difference between the ticklish sensation and the pain caused by these two movements in the soul, because the trembling of the fibers which accompanies the ticklish sensation displays the proper constitution of the body to the soul; but, since the motion that accompanies pain is more violent and since it’s capable of harming the body, it must be warned by certain unpleasant sensations, to put it on its guard[913]. The tracks in the brain are interconnected, they are followed by the movement of the animal spirits, and the tracks in the brain awaken ideas in the mind, and the movements stimulated in the animal spirits excite passions in the will... the entirety of the alliance of mind and body consists in a mutual and natural correspondence between the thoughts of the soul and the tracks in the brain, as well as the soul’s emotions and the movements of the animal spirits; when the soul[914] receives new ideas, new tracks are imprinted on the brain, and when objects produce new tracks, the soul receives new ideas; not that it is conscious of these tracks, since it knows nothing about them, not that these traces contain these ideas, since they have no relation to them, and finally, not that it receives these ideas from these tracks, since it is not conceivable that the mind would receive anything from the body and become enlightened, turning towards it[915]. Likewise, when the soul wants the arm to move, despite its ignorance about what it must do to move it, the arm moves, and when the animal spirits are agitated, the soul finds itself moved, even though it’s doesn’t even know that the body contains animal spirits, because there is a connection between the tracks on the brain and the movements of the spirits, and a connection between the soul’s ideas and emotions, and that all the passions depend on them.
The same author of the Recherche says that:
If my mind were struck by the idea of God at the same time that my brain was struck by the sight of these three letters, J. A. O., or by the sound of the same word, it would be enough if the tracks that these letters or their sounds would have produced were aroused, making me think of God; and I can’t think of God without the production in my brain of certain muddled traces of these letters which would have accompanied the thoughts I’d previously had of God. For the brain is never without its tracks, it always has those which relate to what we’re thinking about.
Next he says that there is a natural reason, which doesn’t depend on our will, between the tracks that produce a tree or a mountain that we see, and the ideas of trees and mountains; between the tracks that produce in our brain the cries of a man or an animal that’s suffering and that we hear complaining, the look on the face of a man who’s threatening us or who’s afraid of us, and the ideas of pain, force, weakness, and even between the feelings of compassion, fear, and courage which are produced in us. “The natural connections[916] are the strongest of all, in general they are similar in all men, they are absolutely necessary for the preservation of life; thus, they don’t depend on human will.”
It is, therefore, established beyond doubt, by all the testimonies I’ve shared, that even the Cartesians acknowledge that the various modifications and changes of bodies are what give the soul its various thoughts and its various sensations, and they even acknowledge, as they themselves say, that these various modifications and changes of bodies give and naturally awaken in the soul various thoughts and various sensations, and there is a natural connection between these various modifications and changes of bodies and the thoughts and sensations they produce and awaken in the soul. But I’d like to ask them now, right now, whether they really conceive that a modification of matter can naturally cause and form in a mind, i.e., in a spiritual substance, or rather in an imaginary being, any thoughts or sensations. What relationship, or what natural connection is there between a modification of matter and an imaginary being, or if you like, a spiritual being, which has neither any parts nor any extension? I would eagerly ask them whether they really have a concept that the diverse modifications of matter should naturally produce in a being with no extension, i.e., in a being that is nothing, various thoughts and various sensations. What relationship and what connection is there between one and the other, or from some to others? For at bottom there is no difference between a mind, as they mean this, and a being which is only imaginary and which is nothing, as I’ve sufficiently demonstrated already. But even on the assumption that the mind is something real, as they claim; do they really conceive that the modifications of matter can naturally produce thoughts and sensations in in such a being, i.e., in a being which has no parts, or any extension, and which has no for or shape? What relationship and what connection might there be between the modifications of matter and beings of such a nature? There can’t be any. Do they really conceive that the least things, which would produce great movements in the delicate fibers of the brain, would necessarily provoke violent feelings in the soul? Do they really conceive that a certain temperament of the volume or delicacy of the animal spirits, and that a certain temperament of their agitation with the fibers of the brain naturally set the state for the strength or weakness of the mind? Do they really conceive that certain movements of matter can naturally cause pleasure or joy, pain and sadness in a being which has neither body nor parts, which has neither form nor shape, nor any extension at all? Do they really conceive that the tracks awakened in the brain awaken ideas in the mind; and that the movements provoked in the animal spirits provoke passions in the will, and even in the will of a Being who has, as I’ve ju
st said, neither form, nor shape, nor body, nor parts, nor any extension? Do they really conceive that a proper temperament of the humor, which is behind the life and the health of the body, as they say, is something round, square, or of a triangular or octagonal shape? Finally, to end, do they really conceive that the alliance of such a being with the body consists in a natural and mutual correspondence between the thoughts of the soul and the tracks of the brain, as well as in a natural and mutual correspondence of the emotions of the soul and the movement of the animal spirits; although the soul has no knowledge of these tracks, or any knowledge of the animal spirits? If they do have a conception of this, then they should teach us something of this wonder, and if they don’t have a good conception of it, they certainly shouldn’t say it, unless they want, as they put it, to talk without knowing what they’re saying.
But how can they conceive of things that are simultaneously so impossible, so ridiculous, and so absurd? They can’t even say that they do have a conception about such things, since they themselves recognize and affirm, on the other hand, that “the soul[917] is so blind that it doesn’t understand itself, and fails to see that its own sensations belong to it,” and since they say that “it can scarcely distinguish itself from the body, to which it attributes its own thoughts and its own sensations”, and since they also say that “the mind, which sees all the objects that surround it[918], is deeply ignorant of itself, and it only gropes along in a dark abyss, that it doesn’t know what it is, or how it is attached to the body, or how it has such power over all the springs of this body, of which it is ignorant and doesn’t know its own thoughts and its own wishes.”
They can’t say, then, that they have a conception of what they’re saying, when they speak, as they do, of the nature of the soul, of its connection with the body, and of its natural and mutual correspondence between the various operations of the soul and of the various movements and modifications of matter. And if they can’t conceive of what they’re saying on this subject, they shouldn’t say such things, unless they want, as I’ve already said, to talk without knowing what they’re saying.
But why, again, do they prefer to speak this way, without knowing what they’re saying, than acknowledge that matter alone is capable of knowledge and feeling in men and in animals, or capable of giving, forming, or causing and producing knowledge and feelings in animals, on the pretext that they can’t conceive how that might be done? It’s utterly baseless and based on no good ration, that they want it to be this way. For, in the views of those who say that the mere movement of matter with its various modifications is sufficient to give knowledge and feelings to men and to beasts, there is only, as I’ve said, one sticky problem, which is to know or conceive how the movements and modifications of the parts of matter can give or stimulate knowledge and feeling in men and animals, which problem certainly comes, as I’ve also said, from the fact that these sorts of movements and modifications are the first principle in us of all our knowledge and all our sensations, and since, for this reason, we cannot and should not even see or conceive how they produce our knowledge and feelings in us; inasmuch, as I’ve said, that just as we see every day that the principles of sight aren’t available to sight itself, in the same way we should be sure that the principle of knowledge and feelings can’t and shouldn’t be available to knowledge or to the feelings, and consequently that we should be unaware how the internal movements and modifications of the matter of which we are composed, produce our knowledge and feelings in us, and we should be no more surprised at our ignorance and our inability in this area, since it must be so by nature; for it would be in a way like being shocked by the fact that a strong and robust man who easily holds up large and heavy burdens on his shoulders and back, is, however, unable to carry himself on his shoulders or back, or as if it were a surprise that a man with a good appetite, swallowing big chunks of various delicacies, can’t swallow his own tongue; as if it were a surprise that the eye which sees all can’t see itself; or finally, as if it were a surprise that a hand, which can easily grab everything, can’t grab itself; it is manifestly plain that to be surprised at such things are ridiculous, and anyone who was shocked at such cases of inability would be a laughingstock. The same would go for our own shock at on the subject of the internal modifications of our body and of our sensations or perceptions. If it was external and visible things, like those I’ve just mentioned, it would be ridiculous to be surprised at our ignorance about this, and it might even be ridiculous to try to understand and conceive that which we don’t know about it, because it would be plain as day that we shouldn’t be surprised by such ignorance, and that it would be impossible to conceive of what we don’t know about it.
But even though we don’t know how that happens, we are nevertheless certain and assured that it is immediately, by means of these movements and modifications, that we are able to think, that we can feel, and that we can perceive everything; and that without those movements and modifications we would be completely unable to have any thoughts, or any feelings. Moreover, we feel within and with strong certainly that we think with our brains, and that with our flesh we feel, just as that we see with our eyes and touch with our hands. And thus, we should necessarily say that all our thoughts, all our knowledge, all our sensations consist precisely in these kinds of internal movements and modifications of our flesh and our brain. And what confirms this truth even further is the fact that our knowledge and our sensations follow the natural constitution of our body, and that their clarity and perfection, and freedom, varies according to whether they proceed from a more or less good and perfect disposition and internal constitution, internal and external, of our body. And if it’s precisely in these kinds of internal movements and modifications of the matter which is in us and which acts in us, that our knowledge and sensations consist, then it clearly follows that all animals are capable of knowledge and feelings like we are, since we clearly see that they are made of flesh like us, of bones, blood, and veins, of nerves and fibers like ours, since they have all the organs of life and feeling like us, including a head, which is the organ of knowledge, and the clearly demonstrate, in all their actions and all their behaviors, that they have knowledge and feelings. Thus it is vain for the Cartesians to say that they aren’t capable of knowledge or feelings, on the pretext that they can't conceive how matter shaped or modified in particular ways, such as round or oval, etc., could constitute pain, pleasure, heat, odor, sound, etc., on the pretext that they can’t conceive that matter, agitated from bottom to top or vice versa in a circular, spiral, oblique, parabolic, or elliptic line, could constitute love, hatred, joy, sadness, etc., since it’s plain and indubitable according to their own principles even, that by the various movements and by the various modifications of matter which are formed in us, which also forms all our knowledge and all our sensations, and that there’s even a natural and mutual connection and correspondence, as our Cartesians call it, between these movements and these modifications of matter and the knowledge and sensations we have. It is clear, plain, and indubitable that similar movements and similar modifications of matter can be done, and consequently can also form similar knowledge and similar sensation, and it may be that there is, in the same animals, a similar connection and a similar natural and mutual correspondence between the various movements and modifications of their bodies, and the knowledge and sensations that they might have, since such a connection and correspondence between movements and sensations, between modifications and knowledge, is no more difficult on one hand than the other, and since it can be found just as easily in animals as in men; and that being true, since any reflection on this dispels all doubt, it’s an error and an illusion for our Cartesians to believe that animals are incapable of knowledge or feelings, and it is ridiculous for them to ask on this matter, whether it’s conceived that matter shaped in particular ways, such as squares, circles, or ovals, etc., can constitute pain, pleasure, heat, scents, sounds, or color, and whether it’s conceived that matter ag
itated from bottom to top or from top to bottom, in a direct, circular, and oblique line, could constitute love, hatred, joy, sadness, and they are, I say, laughable to ask that and to imagine that the solution to this problem depends on that, since it’s not in a measurable extension, or in any particular shape of matter, that thought, desire, fear, will, reason, etc., consist, but it consists only in the motion, in the internal modification of matter, of which living bodies are composed, without any consideration for their measurable extent, or their external shape. In the same way, that the proper temperament of men, which even in the view of our Cartesians is what produces the life, force, and health of the living body, consists not in any certain shape, or any certain extension of matter, but in certain movements and in certain modifications of matter, without any consideration for the extent or shape it might have.
