Here, I first provide a brief account of Pakistan’s relations with the United States and China, drawing largely from the scholarly and peer-reviewed literature. Because very few Pakistanis engage in peer-reviewed scholarship on this subject, this discussion may well be overly influenced by and even biased toward American, or at least non-Pakistani, points of view. Next I dilate upon the narrative tropes in which Pakistan’s defense publications describe these same relations. As will become apparent, China and the United States have had similar trajectories and courses of action with respect to Pakistan. Both have been tentative in approaching Pakistan and highly utilitarian in their engagement. However, Pakistan’s defense literature treats these important partners in very different ways. Whereas Pakistani defense writers uniformly describe the United States as a perfidious ally, a necessary evil that Pakistan’s weaknesses force it to endure, China appears as an all-weather friend, one that has not imposed onerous conditions on its support for Pakistan. On those occasions when China has fallen short of meeting Pakistan’s expectations, defense writers are quick to rationalize this failure, omitting the acrimony and antipathy they reserve for the United States. This tendency is both a part of Pakistan’s strategy to maximize the benefits of the relationships and a means of sustaining what Ganguly (2001), drawing from the work of Van Evera, calls false optimism among Pakistan’s security elites, which in turn conditions Pakistan’s risk-seeking behavior with respect to India and other states. In other words, the army’s strategic culture requires these understandings of its partnerships to sustain its course of revisionism with respect to India.
Pursuing the Americans: An Alliance for Survival
Both American and Pakistani commentators agree that Pakistan, born during the Cold War, immediately leaned toward the West. In September 1947, Mohammad Ali Jinnah proclaimed during a cabinet meeting that “Pakistan [is] a democracy and communism [does] not flourish in the soil of Islam. It [is] clear therefore that our interests [lie] more with the two democratic countries, namely, the U.K. and the U.S.A., rather than with Russia” (Kux 2001, 20). (India, in contrast, pursued neutrality.) Academic accounts of the postwar period depict the United States as somewhat aloof toward South Asia and as struggling to define its regional interests and, concomitantly, its policies toward the region; the Harry S. Truman Administration was content to let the United Kingdom take the lead in South Asia. Both Britain and the United States sought to develop relationships with India and Pakistan simultaneously in hopes that the two states would formally or informally align with the West and oppose the Soviet Union. United States planners and their British counterparts tended to view India as the most important diplomatic prize and were wary of antagonizing its prickly leadership (Kux 2001; McMahon 1994; Pande 2011). Ultimately, however, with US attention concentrated upon Western Europe, the Middle East, and East Asia, senior US officials paid scant regard to either India or Pakistan in the initial years after their independence. The US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) never mentioned India or Pakistan by name or even referenced the region generally in the 1947 and 1948 editions of its annual “Review of the World Situation as it Relates to the Security of the United States.”
Academic accounts of this period focus on Pakistan’s destitution, mounting refugee problems, eviscerated institutions, and critical human capital shortages. Within just two months of becoming a state, Jinnah “invited the United States to become the principal source of external support” for Pakistan and requested a $2 billion loan over five years (McMahon 1994, 69; see also Kux 2001; Pande 2011). As Jinnah envisioned it, these funds would be used to help Pakistan build up its armed forces and to jump-start various agricultural and industrial projects. While Pakistan’s leaders really sought assistance to underwrite its security vis-à-vis India, they were aware that America’s principal concern was the Soviet Union and thus couched all requests within strong anti-communist rhetoric.
The magnitude of Pakistan’s request revealed how disengaged Karachi (then the capital of Pakistan) was from the realities of American postwar interests. The amount of $2 billion was simply outlandish. By way of comparison, it is useful to recall that the entire US Marshall plan, which was a four-year effort to rebuild war-torn Europe beginning in April 1948, totaled about $13 billion (George F. Marshall Foundation n.d.). The Defense Department budget for 1949 was $14 billion (US Bureau of the Census 1950). Not only was the amount absurd in absolute terms, but it was even more so given that the United States had virtually no interest in South Asia whatsoever when Pakistan made the appeal. Yet Pakistan was unremitting in its efforts to enlist the United States in a quid pro quo, in which Pakistan would align with the United States in exchange for American subsidies. Pakistan’s foreign minister, Zafrullah Khan, for example, opined that the “well-known friendship of Pakistan toward the US and Pakistan’s obvious antipathy to Russian ideology would seem to justify serious consideration by the US Government of the defense requirements of Pakistan” (Kux 2001, 21). Not only did the United States rebuff these appeals, but in March 1948 (in response to the 1947–1948 Kashmir War) it also imposed an informal arms embargo on both India and Pakistan. The simplest reason for America’s lack of interest in the Pakistani proposals was that South Asia was not a priority. Moreover, the US government assessed that any benefits of arming Pakistan would be offset by the animosity and ill will that doing so would inspire in New Delhi (Kux 2001; McMahon 1994; Pande 2011).
In an effort to improve relations with India, the United States hosted Jawaharlal Nehru on a formal state visit in October 1949. Although Nehru did not budge from his stance on nonalignment, Pakistan was horrified by the prospects of closer ties between the United States and India. Pakistani diplomats worked furiously to secure a state visit for Pakistan’s prime minister. They succeeded in doing so only by first orchestrating a Russian invitation for Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan, naturally causing renewed American attention to Pakistan. Pakistan’s ambassador to Washington, M. A. H. Ispahani, wrote to Liaquat that the maneuver had been a “masterpiece in strategy. … Until a few months ago, we were unable to obtain anything except a few sweet words from middling State Department officials” (McMahon 1994, 71). Thanks to this overture, he gushed, the United States began taking heed of Pakistan overnight.
Most US officials believed that Pakistan presented no serious likelihood of communist leanings, and they tended to take Pakistan’s Western orientation for granted. But Liaquat Ali Khan’s government was vulnerable to persistent domestic criticism that its alignment with the United States had failed to secure a favorable US position on Kashmir, much less financial support, while India, which maintained its nonaligned status, remained the focus of US diplomatic overtures in South Asia. In light of this fact, some within the Truman Administration became more attentive to the relationship with Pakistan. As the decade drew to a close, assistant secretary of state George McGhee began urging the United States to find some way of engaging the Pakistanis in case the United States might “expect aid from them … in time of future need” (McMahon 1994, 73). Despite McGhee’s efforts, however, Pakistan was doomed to disappointment. Its continued appeals for aid would receive greater scrutiny after Pakistan refused to contribute troops to the United Nations (UN) force fighting in Korea (Kux 2001; McMahon 1994).
The onset of the Korean War in June 1950 motivated the US government to become more directly involved in security arrangements in the Middle East rather than to continue its previous course of deferring policy initiative to the British. Great Britain had been seeking to establish a Middle East Command as a means of retaining its access to and standing within the region. The Suez Canal was of particular importance to the United Kingdom; however, Egypt vigorously opposed further British meddling. The British, conscious of their diminished clout and financial weakness, turned to the Americans for help, but the United States was wary of any new commitments that would require weapons or troops. In 1953, Secretary of State Allan Dulles went on an extensive tour of the Middle E
ast and North Africa (including Egypt, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Turkey) as well as Greece, India, and Pakistan. He returned convinced that the British concept was not viable but that a more modest northern tier defense concept could prove valuable in defending the Middle East from Soviet expansionism. Dulles was particularly impressed with Pakistan and Turkey, both of which were ready to participate in such an alliance (Goktepe 2003; Kux 2001; McMahon 1994).
The final years of the Truman Administration saw growing support for involving Pakistan in the defense of the Middle East. Washington backed the proposal more enthusiastically than Great Britain, which remained concerned as to how a defense pact with Pakistan would affect its relations with India. Ultimately, however, despite Pakistan’s willingness to participate, the Truman Administration’s plans were derailed by yet another military crisis between India and Pakistan. Reigniting during the summer of 1951, this renewed dispute over Kashmir forced the Truman Administration to abandon any discussion of a defense pact with Pakistan. But the northern tier defense concept would in time provide the framework for engagement with Pakistan under the Dwight D. Eisenhower Administration (Kux 2001; McMahon 1994; Pande 2011).
American accounts of this period described Pakistan’s political elites as insistent that the United States substantively engage with Pakistan. The October 1951 assassination of Liaquat, who had sustained scathing domestic criticism for his alliance with the United States, somehow failed to spark American concern over Pakistan’s stability or its future orientation. A mere two days after his death, former foreign secretary Mohammad Ikramullah traveled to Washington with the express goal of obtaining “as much military equipment as he could” either “as a gift, under a loan arrangement, or outright purchase” (McMahon 1994, 142). Ikramullah told high-level US officials that Pakistan was eager to participate in the defense of the Middle East and warned that “if Pakistan does not get assistance from the West, the Government’s position will be grave. Pakistan may turn away from the West” (143). But Washington’s dilemma persisted: its diplomats were appreciative of Pakistan’s reliability, especially in contrast to India’s abrasive contrarianism, but were unsure of how to proceed given the unpredictable costs and benefits of doing so. Nonetheless, the Truman Administration awarded Pakistan a small percentage of the requested military supplies and offered to provide economic and development assistance.
THE PAKISTAN TILT
The incoming Eisenhower Administration, however, almost immediately signaled that it was more positively disposed toward Pakistan than India. In early 1953, Pakistan, which was enduring a severe food shortage, requested urgent aid from the United States. While the new administration readily agreed to send 1 million tons of grain, the act required congressional approval. Dulles and Eisenhower agreed that Dulles should travel to Pakistan in May 1953 (as part of a larger tour of the Middle East and South Asia) to obtain more information before formally submitting the request to Congress. Dulles, whose trip coincided with the ascendency of the military and bureaucracy in Pakistani politics, was so favorably impressed by Pakistan’s potential as an ally that he urged the United States to provide Pakistan with defense assistance even in the absence of a formal arrangement. Upon his return to the United States, Dulles rejected the British proposal for a Middle East Defense Organization, a scaled-down version of the old Middle East Command with Egypt at the center. Instead, he revived the northern tier concept first envisioned by the Truman Administration, proposing a defensive ring composed of Turkey, Pakistan, Iraq, and Iran. In mid-June, Eisenhower requested, and swiftly received, congressional approval for the loan of 1 million tons of wheat; that same summer the administration began to move forward on the northern tier concept despite British reservations and a lack of clear American vision for Pakistan’s role in the defense of the Middle East (Kux 2001; McMahon 1994; see also Goktepe 2003).
Pakistan’s insistence on a defense guarantee against India had long proved one of the major obstacles to a US–Pakistan defense agreement. This demand remained a deal-breaker for the United States: while it was not pleased with India’s nonaligned position, it generally aspired to better relations with the larger South Asian state. Moreover, the United States had no interest in being dragged into the intractable Indo-Pakistan conflict. But although Pakistan’s new government under Prime Minister Muhammad Ali Bogra continued to demand a guarantee, Gen. Ayub Khan, now Pakistan’s army chief, was anxious to get the alliance moving forward. During a September 1953 visit to the United States, he exclaimed to the assistant secretary of state for Near Eastern Affairs, Henry Byroad, “For Christ’s sake … I didn’t come here to look at barracks. Our army can be your army if you want us. But let’s make a decision” (Kux 2001, 57). Eisenhower, who raised the issue in a January 1954 meeting with Dulles and Defense Secretary Charles E. Wilson, remained concerned that increased closeness to Pakistan would adversely influence American relations with India. His fear was valid: India responded publicly and derisively to the news of the US–Pakistan discussions. Although Washington was not entirely certain as to how Pakistan would fit into defense of the Middle East, the resulting public furor in India made it impossible for the United States to back down. Eisenhower was unwilling to allow India, under the imperious Nehru, to dictate his foreign and defense policies (Kux 2001).
In February 1954, with Washington’s encouragement, Turkey and Pakistan negotiated a bilateral treaty for military, economic, and cultural cooperation, the first meaningful step toward the northern tier. Later that month, Iraq and Turkey signed a military agreement; the alliance, now known as the Baghdad Pact, was soon joined by Iran, Pakistan, and the United Kingdom. (In 1959, the new Iraqi regime withdrew, and the pact became known as the Central Treaty Organization, or CENTO.) The Pakistan–Turkey agreement provided the necessary justification for a formal military arrangement between the United States and Pakistan. In May 1954, the United States and Pakistan signed a Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement (MDA), the first bilateral security agreement between the two states and the legal basis for US aid to Pakistan. Under its terms, the United States would “make available to the Government of Pakistan such equipment, materials, services or other assistance as the Government of the United States may authorize in accordance with such terms and conditions as may be agreed” (Khan and Emmerson 1954, 338). In turn, Pakistan agreed that it would “use this assistance exclusively to maintain its internal security, its legitimate self-defenses, or to permit it to participate in the defense of the area, or in the United Nations collective security arrangements and measures, and Pakistan will not undertake any act of aggression against any other nation” (339).
Pakistan lost no time in following the signing of the agreement with a request for military assistance, which Eisenhower approved (over India’s strenuous objections). Yet scholarly accounts make clear that Pakistan continued to be unimpressed by the level of American assistance, even threatening to undo the pact because it considered the initial figure of $30 million inadequate recompense for its new responsibilities. Dulles responded that he was under the impression that “Pakistan had undertaken its anti-communist stand because it was right, not just to make itself eligible for certain sums of dollar aid” (Kux 2001, 68). In the end, Washington offered a $171 million program, a figure that was more to Pakistan’s liking (Kux 2001; Pande 2011).
Wary of involving itself in quarrels between the various Arab states, and equally concerned to protect its relationship with Israel, the United States decided not to seek full membership in CENTO. Thus, the United States maintained its “observer” status, allowing the British to shoulder most of the load. Although America’s hesitation made Ayub doubtful that CENTO membership offered significant benefits to Pakistan, Turkey’s leadership assuaged his fears by assuring him that membership would not add to Pakistan’s defense burdens. Pakistan’s cabinet approved membership in September 1955, with the proviso that it “implied no commitment that would detract from Pakistan’s defen
se capabilities or involve the country in a military engagement relating to Turkey’s membership in NATO” (Kux 2001, 73). (CENTO collapsed in 1979 following the Iranian revolution and Iran’s withdrawal from the pact.)
Although US apprehensions about communist expansion in the Middle East prompted the Americans to consider bringing Pakistan into formal defense arrangements against the Soviets, in fact the first anti-communist regional alliance that Pakistan joined was the Southeast Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO), formalized in September 1954, two weeks prior to CENTO. (Pakistan did not formally become a member of what was then the Baghdad Pact until spring 1955.2) The US Department of Defense in fact opposed Pakistani membership in SEATO, fearing that its inclusion would drive away other Asian states, and the skeptics were not entirely wrong: the Philippines and Thailand were the only other Asian states to join the pact. Pakistan, however, insisted on participating, perhaps hoping that membership would afford some protection for troublesome East Pakistan. Pakistan’s foreign secretary, Zafrullah Khan, attended the SEATO organizational meeting in Manila in 1954 with the unusual goal of obtaining a security guarantee against all aggression, not simply against threats from communist states. Dulles, who had no interest in allowing the United States or SEATO to become ensnared in the Indo-Pakistan dispute, not only outright refused but also even added explicit language to the treaty declaring that SEATO defense guarantees covered only communist aggression. Khan was supposed to seek further instruction from his ministry if he failed to obtain this guarantee. Instead he signed the treaty without consultation, arguing that backing down after lobbying so hard to be included would do little to help Pakistan. Despite its reservations, the cabinet ratified the treaty in early 1955 (Kux 2001; McMahon 1994; Pande 2011).
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