even today stuns us. He entrusted the fl eet not to one of his senior offi cers
but to his pilot, Antiochus, an old friend but someone of a lower rank and
without experience.
Antiochus. We know him! Back when Alcibiades was in the Assembly
and released his quail, it was Antiochus who, amid the commotion, caught
it and brought it back. 13 That was the beginning of a close friendship between the two men. But he was not a very respectable individual. Plutarch
calls him a common fool. And when Alcibiades was later accused of put-
ting the command in the hands of foolish drunkards, the kind of men
who had infl uence with him, they were no doubt thinking of Antiochus. 14
For him to have been chosen, Alcibiades must have greatly mistrusted the
others, probably supporters of his enemies; or he simply could not resist
his old fondness for provocation and wanted to show that the choice was
his alone, without regard for rank or custom, that he was free to do as he
pleased. And in fact, if Antiochus had obeyed his orders, the decision might
have been inconsequential. Lysander was not going to attack while his fl eet
was undergoing repairs, and Alcibiades had left very clear orders—he told
Antiochus not to engage the ships of Lysander. It was clear and direct.
Alas, Alcibiades put too much trust in his friend.
Once more, it is important to say it: in Athens, the city that in theory
was so egalitarian, again and again we keep fi nding these “friends” and
“enemies.” We encounter these little cliques everywhere, each one hostile
to the other, surrounding a leader, spying on each other!
Besides the organized groups, like the hetaereiai , 15 politics was run by connections stripped of any offi cial character or ideological basis. In this
case it appears that the same patterns had penetrated the military domain.
In any case, his friend was too zealous. He wanted to thank Alcibiades
for his confi dence by producing a surprise victory. Contrary to orders, he
entered the port of Ephesus with the triremes!
13. The incident is described above, chapter 2.
14. Plutarch 36.2.
15. See above, chapter 3.
Slightly More Than One Hundred Days 159
The accounts of the battle differ in Xenophon and Diodorus. Xeno-
phon says that Antiochus sailed into the port with two triremes, which
would have been an irrational provocation. Diodorus and the Hellenica
of Oxyrhynchus mention ten of his best ships (13.71). Diodorus also says
that Antiochus had warned the others to be ready. In both cases, the prov-
ocation was fl agrant. Xenophon says Antiochus “sailed from Notium into
the harbor of Ephesus and coasted along past the very prows of Lysander’s
ships” (1.5.12). Plutarch says that in addition to this he was “making
coarse gestures and calling out rude comments to them” (35.6). In both
cases, his intentions were obvious.
Naturally, a battle ensued. Lysander put only a small number of ships
to sea, to follow Antiochus; the Athenian fl eet came to Antiochus’s aid in
a more or less orderly fashion, and Lysander then attacked with his whole
fl eet in a line. He won a great victory, and the Athenians lost at least fi fteen
triremes as well as their crews 16 —possibly as many as twenty-two, according to Diodorus and the Hellenica of Oxyrhynchus .
Alcibiades returned to Samos and wanted to continue the battle. Ly-
sander was too clear-sighted to risk that. He was satisfi ed with the battle
he had won in Alcibiades’s absence.
The battle at Notium was Alcibiades’s downfall. His enemies emerged
at once. And the wild confi dence that had greeted his return was extin-
guished with this fi rst defeat. Too much had been expected of him. As
Plutarch wrote:
Alcibiades seems to be a clear case of someone destroyed by his own rep-
utation. His successes had made his daring and resourcefulness so well
known that any failure prompted people to wonder whether he had really
tried. They never doubted his ability; if he really tried, they thought, noth-
ing would be impossible for him. So they expected to hear that Chios had
fallen too, and the whole rest of Ionia, and were therefore irritated when
they heard that he had not managed to accomplish everything as quickly or
instantaneously as they wanted. (35.2–5)
There were other circumstances involved as well.
16. Fifteen triremes, according to Xenophon and Plutarch ( Lysander 5.2).
160 Chapter
10
We have referred to the incidents at Cyme that followed immediately after
the defeat at Notium. To that we must add, if we are to believe Diodorus, 17 a bold move by the forces at Decelea against the walls of Athens itself. Alcibiades had nothing to do with it, but the attempt exposed the fragility of his
rule: it was retaliation for his success during the procession of the mysteries.
The sense of betrayal was intense. It echoed even after his death. In a
brief speech about Alcibiades’s son, Lysias said of the father: “For if dur-
ing his exile it was his power that enabled him to injure the city, how was
it that, having obtained his return by deceiving you and being in command
of many ships of war, he had not power enough to expel the enemy from
our land or to regain for you the friendship of the Chians whom he had
alienated, 18 or to do you any other useful service?” 19
He had promised too much, as always. Only this time the deception
was too great. Because of the defeat, the battle waged by a subordinate,
the delay in responding to the situation, all the confi dence that had been
placed in him suddenly vanished.
After that, events happened quickly. In his absence, Athens reacted.
Charges were brought. Someone came from the democratic side in Samos
to describe the people’s unhappiness and the chaos that was spreading in
the army. There was talk of new scandals. Suspicions were raised about
Alcibiades’s actions in Thrace. Very quickly another representative of the
democrats, the demagogue Cleophon, whose hostility toward Alcibiades
was well known, 20 published an offi cial charge. It was all starting again.
The Assembly immediately removed Alcibiades and the other generals
who were held responsible for the defeat; in the elections that followed, at
the beginning of 406, he was not reelected. The same fate befell the other
general who had been compromised earlier: the faithful Thrasybulus him-
self was removed. As a result, confi rmed democrats were elected. 21
17. Diodorus 13.73. Xenophon does not mention this fact, but Diodorus gives many de-
tails, and there is no reason to doubt him (there are numerous omissions in Xenophon).
18. The accusation is valid. See above, chapter 7.
19. Lysias, Against Alcibiades 14.36.
20. See above, chapter 9.
21. Critias, the author of the decree recalling Alcibiades, was also banished, possibly
around the same time. There are references to his time—and to conspiracies then—in Thes-
saly (Xenophon, Hellenica 2.3.36), and Aristotle ( Rhetoric 1.1375b) states that he was attacked . . . by Cleophon!
Slightly More Than One Hundred Days 161
A line was drawn. The triumph of one spring ended before
the next
spring, and concluded—with no major offense to blame—in a total collapse.
Past offenses and all the acrimony that accrued—these had not sud-
denly been erased by the noise of the cheering: they were always there.
It is overly simplistic to relate the event by itself without reference to
the vacillation of the people. There is no doubt they were fi ckle; fi fth-
century authors wrote about it. Thucydides uses strong and compelling
language to express his scorn for this capriciousness, adding “according
to the way of the multitude.” As an example, he cites the occasion when
the Athenians, right after fi ning Pericles, forgot their anger and put him
in charge of all their affairs. 22 Just a few years later Aristophanes used a clever phrase to describe the Athenians who are “quick to decide” and
“quick to change their minds.” 23 Closer in time to the events that concern this story (but still prior to the events involving Alcibiades), Euripides, in
Orestes , uses more colorful language to describe this quality: in that play
Menelaus says, “For when the people fall into a vigorous fury, they are
as hard to quench as a raging fi re.” But if you don’t oppose them, they
may calm down. “They have pity, and a hot temper too, an invaluable
quality if you watch it closely” (696–704). This fault was a familiar one,
frequently lamented, and increasingly apparent.
Still, for the Athenians to reject Alcibiades a second time suggests that
their attitude toward him had more specifi c causes.
It is clear that the weight of the past continued to be a burden for him. We
should not forget how long it took Alcibiades before he was ready to return,
nor the apprehension of many when he did return. After all, between the
herms and the mysteries, after the small and large scandals of his youth, he
had betrayed his country and caused it great harm. Then he had plotted with
the oligarchs only to rejoin the democrats. He had toyed with Tissaphernes;
he had exploited vulnerable people. How could Athenians have forgotten or
forgiven? They had been led by his promises and ceded to the pressures of the
time. But the fi nancial problems had not been solved. The Persians had not
come to the aid of Athens; just the opposite. How could they have trusted
him? The slightest lapse of judgment (and we have seen an example!) should
have made the incredible precariousness of the situation quite obvious.
22. Thucydides 2.65.3–4.
23. Aristophanes, Acharnians 632.
162 Chapter
10
What, then, is the lesson from this? The past, when it is so strongly
written into history, cannot be erased. And character does not change.
This time, where does he go? No city and no ruler could welcome
Alcibiades.
He was neither condemned nor exiled. He could have returned to Ath-
ens and tried to explain himself. He must have known that that was hope-
less. He must have grasped some time ago that this might happen, for he
had made preparations for it, securing a distant refuge, in Thrace. As soon
as he was demoted, stripped of his command, he abandoned the fl eet,
gave up on returning to Athens, and departed, without further delay, 24 for Thrace, initially for the Chersonese, on the Thracian border. Xenophon
says: “So Alcibiades, who was in disfavor with the army as well, took a
trireme and sailed away to his castle in the Chersonese” (1.5.17).
“Castle” is probably an imperfect translation: the Greek says he en-
tered his walls. He had apparently foreseen the necessity and acquired
several forts in the region.
These forts had belonged to him for two years. Their acquisition dates to
the time of his victories on the shore beside the straits; they were never a pur-
chase. Having led the negotiations with Thrace, he was able to obtain sup-
port for the war but also, apparently, some advantages for himself. (This is an
aspect of politics found in every age). We know the locations of these forts.
Cornelius Nepos is the only source for the names of all three places: Bisanthe,
Ornoi, and Neon Teichos. Different sources name one or the other. 25
Amazingly (and this is the second parallelism between these two indi-
viduals), the same fortresses were given to Xenophon, who refers to them
in the Anabasis ; his offhand reference in the Hellenica has led some scholars to think that the Hellenica was written before he was aware of them. 26
Naturally all these dealings had become known and were used by the
accusers of Alcibiades.
But that would not have prevented him, while waiting for things to get
better, from living peacefully in the country where he had had successes,
and where he was at home. Furthermore, it was not incriminating. And if
24. According to Diodorus he was awaiting the arrival of his replacement; but Xenophon
is quite clear and closer to the truth: see Hatzfeld, 318, n. 1.
25. Cornelius Nepos, Alcibiades 8.4. See Plutarch, Alcibiades 36, citing a fortress built near Bysanthe. Lysias 14.25 mentions “Ornoi” but gives no details.
26. Hatzfeld, preface to the Hellenica, supported by E. Delebecque, Essai sur la vie de Xé-
nophon, 33.
Slightly More Than One Hundred Days 163
these fi ckle Athenians revoked their decision, he would have been avail-
able. Who can say whether or not Alcibiades was still hopeful?
This time, however, the people did not change their mind. We know
from the literature of the time that opinion was divided. Evidence for this
came just a year later, brought to us in the words of Aristophanes’s play
the Frogs .
This comedy was presented in January 405. The play suggests, or
rather states, that despite his betrayals and his ambition, only one man
could save Athens: Alcibiades. And it blames Cleophon, the infamous
democrat, sole leader at the time, for all of Alcibiades’s troubles. Was it
simply coincidence that the play alludes to the chorus of the Mysteries of
Eleusis, 27 for which Alcibiades had so proudly opened the way at the time of his return? Aristophanes even asks the question directly. As we know,
the play presents a competition in the Underworld between Aeschylus and
Euripides (Euripides had died in 406) in which the judge is Dionysus.
Near the end of the poetry contest, Dionysus explains that he will bring
back to life one of the two individuals most capable of giving good advice
to the city: “On the subject of Alcibiades, what will we do with him?
That’s the fi rst question” (1431–32).
So people were still talking about him. Thinking about him again,
thinking about him always. The text is direct: “Alcibiades was like a baby
who gave the state birthing pains.”
It is actually diffi cult to know Aristophanes’s own thoughts on the
subject. Ultimately, the two tragedians are in agreement in offering harsh
criticism of Alcibiades.
Euripides provides sharp condemnation, concurring with the judgment
of Thucydides on the subject of corrupt politicians: “I hate the citizen
who, by nature well endowed, / Is slow to help his city, swift to do her
harm, / to himself useful, useless to the community” ( Frogs 1427–29). 28
Aeschylus has his own
style and turns to analogy. His advice: “We should
not rear a lion’s cub within the state. / But if we rear one, we must do as
it desires” ( Frogs 1431–32).
27. Aristophanes, Frogs 369–82.
28. Four Comedies, trans. Richmond Lattimore (University of Michigan Press, 1969).
164 Chapter
10
This comparison with the lion is apt, recalling a passage in Agamem-
non and the description of Helen, a passage so beautiful it merits quoting
in full:
A man reared a lion’s offspring
In his house, unsuckled, just as it was,
In the beginnings of its life
Gentle, dear to children,
And a delight to the aged.
And often he took it in his arms
Like a newborn child
Bright-eyed, and fawning on the hand
As its belly’s needs compelled it.
But in time it showed the temper
It had from its parents; for returning
Kindness to those that reared it
With horrid slaughter of their cattle
It made a feast unbidden,
And the house was befouled with blood
Woe irresistible to the servants,
A vast havoc of much slaughter.
(
Agamemnon 717–34 ) 29
The comparison with the lion also evoked a king, an absolute ruler: Al-
cibiades, whether or not he was a tyrant, was inclined to such absolute
power, power that was sown with risks for the future.
Some scholars 30 have taken this to suggest Aristophanes’s endorsement of Alcibiades’s return, knowing that he came with a certain style—in other
words, as a dictator. But announcing it in the middle of the theater was tan-
tamount to a rejection. Even the idea of a lion, in whatever fashion, only
reinforced that impression. The play actually poses the problem more than
a solution. We can say that ultimately the two tragedians are in agreement.
29. Translated by Hugh Lloyd-Jones (University of California Press, 1979).
30. See Hatzfeld, 330–31. On the comparison with the lion, see E. F.Bloedow, “On ‘Nur-
turing Lions in the State’: Alcibiades’ Entry on the Political Stage in Athens,” Klio 73 (1991): 49–63, which uses the image to condemn Alcibiades’s beginnings.
Slightly More Than One Hundred Days 165
After these observations, Aristophanes has Euripides and Aeschylus
The Life of Alcibiades Page 24
