by Sandy Tolan
King Hussein's concerns about "USG" favoring Israel were delivered as an "oral message" to the U.S. ambassador in Amman and cabled to the "highest USG authorities" in Washington ("National Security File, Mideast Crisis, NSC History," Vol. 1, Tab 36). The same file, Tab 38, contains Secretary of State Dean Rusk's May 26 "Memorandum for the President," which notes Israel's conclusion that Egyptian and Syrian attacks were imminent, and Rusk's observation that "our intelligence does not confirm this Israeli estimate." LBJ's urgent May 27 telegram to Eshkol is in FRUS Vol. XIX, document 86.
Nasser's "we are ready!" remark is quoted in Mutawi, p. 94. These statements had special meaning for the Israeli public, for whom "the memory of the Holocaust was a powerful psychological force that deepened the feeling of isolation and accentuated the perception of threat" (Shlaim, p. 238).
Michail Fanous, an Arab of Ramla, confirmed Dalia's recollection of preparations. Additional detail, including the ten thousand graves, comes from Oren, pp. 135-36. The "push the Jews into the sea" remark is recalled by Dalia and cited to me in many interviews by both Arabs and Israelis. For perceptions of the strength of the Israeli army, see Shlaim, pp. 239-40. Numerous Arab sources express skepticism that the "push them into the sea" comments were ever uttered. Heikel (p. 141) suggests this was "a remarkably successful piece of disinformation." He recalls that following Indian president Nehru's concerns about the quoted threat, "a committee consisting of senior officials from Yugoslavia, India and Egypt was set up to sift through all public remarks by Nasser and Egyptian ministers," and that they found "no trace of the alleged comment." Hirst (p. 417) cites British parliamentarian Christopher Mayhew's offer of five thousand British pounds for anyone who could "produce any statement by an Arab leader which could be described as 'genocidal' in intent," and that "no statement was produced." Still, as mentioned above, the "push into the sea" remarks are specifically recalled by Arabs and Jews I interviewed, and even if the statement was never uttered in those precise words, the threats of Nasser and other Arab leaders toward Israel, and their effects on the Israeli public, are clear enough.
Heikal, p. 128, cites the visit to Nasser by the Soviet ambassador. Mutawi discusses King Hussein's position on pp. 85-121.
The rupture in Eshkol's cabinet is described by Shlaim, pp. 238-41, where he recounts Rabin's twenty-four-hour attack of "acute anxiety" and his dressing-down by Ben-Gurion, who told Rabin: "I very much doubt whether Nasser wanted to go to war, and now we are in serious trouble."
McNamara's conversation with Meir Amit is summarized in the June "Memorandum for the Record" (FRUS Vol. XIX, document 124). The "I, Meir Amit" and "seven days" quotes appear as a footnote in the memorandum, quoting Amit's recollection of the meeting with McNamara at a 1992 conference on the Six Day War. These and other details are also contained in Richard B. Parker's The Six-Day War: A Retrospective, (Gainesville, Florida: University Press of Florida, 1996, p. 139). Nasser's remark to Mayhew is cited in Mutawi on p. 94. His conversation with Robert Anderson, and the upcoming visit of Mohieddin is summarized in two telegrams to LBJ and Rusk that Anderson sent on June 1 and 2 from the U.S. Embassy in Lisbon, Portugal (FRUS Vol. XIX, documents 123 and 129). Walt Rostow, in a note to LBJ four hours after Anderson's June 2 cable arrived, wrote, "In the light of this picture of Nasser's mind, we must work out most carefully the scenario for talks with Mohieddin. . . . It is urgent that we decide whether we should inform the Israelis of this visit. My guess is their intelligence will pick it up. We would be wise to have Sec. Rusk tell [Israeli Ambassador Avraham] Harman," (FRUS Vol. XIX, document 129, footnote 1).
Nasser's June 2 telegram to President Johnson is in the LBJ Library, "National Security File, NSC History, Middle East Crisis, May 12-June 19, 1967," Tab 101. The June 3 CIA memorandum, "The Current Focus of the Near East Crisis," is located in "National Security File, Country File, Middle East Crisis, CIA Intelligence memoranda," Folder 3).
The Israeli intelligence analysis is quoted by Schleifer in The Fall of Jerusalem, pp. 102 and 113.
See Mutawi, pp. 94-96, for more on Nasser's motivation and intentions. He quotes King Hussein and other prominent Jordanians as saying they did not believe Nasser wanted war. Rabin's "I do not believe Nasser wanted war" quote comes from Hirst, The Gun and the Olive Branch, p. 337, and was published in a Le Monde article of February 29, 1968. Rabin added: "The two divisions he sent into Sinai on May 14 would not have been enough to unleash an offensive against Israel. He knew it and we knew it." Matitiahu Peled, an Israeli general at the time, and later a prominent member of the Israeli peace movement, told Ma ariv in 1972, "It is notorious that our General Staff never told the government that the Egyptian military threat represented any danger to Israel or that we were unable to crush Nasser's army, which, with unheard-of foolishness, had exposed itself to the devastating might of our army." Oren (pp. 92-97, 119-121), unlike most writers on the 1967 war, makes much of "Operation Dawn," an alleged plan by Egyptian war minister Amer to strike first against Israel, though he acknowledges that Nasser may not have even known about "Dawn" until days before it was to be implemented, raising questions as to whether this was a genuine plan. In any case, Oren writes, Nasser scuttled the alleged plan in late May, and it was never implemented.
The "strong warning" quote comes from Heikal, at the time a Nasser aide, on p. 126.
The start of the war is described by Herzog on pp. 151-53. Herzog mentions 1:45 as the moment the war began; Oren (p. 170) mentions 7:10. Eshkol's message to King Hussein is quoted by Shlaim on p. 244. The scene on the streets of Ramallah was described in various interviews, including with Nicola Akkel, and is corroborated in descriptions in Homeland, a collection of Palestinian oral history interviews, p. 62.
The Voice of the Arabs broadcasts emanating from Cairo are described by Mutawi on p. 133 and Oren on p. 178. Bashir recalls hearing such broadcasts on June 5 and his elation that the Arabs were winning. His cousin Ghiath told me the Umm Kolthum story in an interview.
The destruction of the Egyptian air force and the timing of the Israeli attack are described by Herzog on pp. 151-52. The coded message sent from Egypt to Jordan, containing "completely false information," is quoted by Mutawi on p. 123.
King Hussein's mistrust of Eshkol and the Israeli promises not to attack are outlined by Mutawi on p. 130. The "Brother Arabs" quote comes from archival tape provided me by radio archivist Andy Lanset of WNYC in New York. I used this tape in a December 2001 broadcast on the Arab view of the West for the public radio documentary program American Radio Works. Ahmad Said's "Zionist barracks" declaration is quoted in Morris (Righteous Victims, p. 310). The attacks and the destruction of Arab air forces are described in multiple sources, including Herzog (p. 171), Oren (pp. 186-95), and Mutawi (p. 129). The explosions in Ramallah on June 5 and 6 are described by numerous sources, including Bashir; Husam Rafeedie in the oral history Homeland, p. 63; and Raja Shehadeh's memoir, Strangers in the House, pp. 3747. Herzog (p. 175) mentions the radio transmitter in Ramallah being "put out of action" and on p. 176 describes the obliteration of the Jordanian infantry troops coming from Jericho. The reports of the Old City being surrounded is in Herzog, p. 176, and Mutawi, p. 134.
The "rapidly deteriorating" quote from Riad, the Arabs' choices, and the cables and telegrams between Amman and Cairo are described by Mutawi, pp. 138-39, quoting directly from original documents in Arabic.
The fall of Ramallah is described by Bashir and Akkel and in Strangers in the House by Shehadeh, who recalls his father's words, whispered as he was "totally enveloped in a troubled silence":
It's a repeat of 1948. . . . Just like 1948, so much talk and no action, just bravado: We will show the enemy, the Arabs declare, but when the fighting starts they disappear.
The near defenselessness of the Jordanian army and its retreat late on June 6 are depicted by Mutawi on pp. 138-40; however, he also cites an interview with Habes Majali, commander in chief of the Jordanian armed forces, as saying that the reports of Jordanian losses
in the West Bank were exaggerated by field commanders. Clearly, though, without air cover the Jordanian army had become essentially unable to defend itself or the residents of the West Bank against the power of the Israel Defense Forces.
The image of white flags in the form of T-shirts and handkerchiefs comes from an interview with Nicola Akkel in Ramallah.
The destruction of Imwas, Beit Nuba, and Yalo is described by numerous historians, including Oren on p. 307. Today there is almost no trace of the villages; in their place is "Canada Park." A plaque reads:
The Valley of Springs in Canada Park has been developed through the generosity of Joseph & Feye Tanenbaum, Toronto, Ontario, Canada. Jewish National Fund.
The flight of at least 200,000 Palestinian refugees during and after the 1967 war is one of the lesser-known effects of those six days. Oren makes no mention of it in Six Days of War. He writes that the "Palestinian community" was "for the most part retained in [its] prewar positions. . . ."
Segev, author of a recent book in Hebrew on the 1967 war, wrote me that the figure of displaced Arabs in 1967 was about 250,000, which included Syrian civilians who fled the Golan Fleights. Andrew I. Kilgore, former U.S. ambassador to Qatar and publisher of the Washington Report on Middle East Affairs, used a figure in March 1990 (www.washington- report.org/backissues/0390/9003017.htm) of 200,000 Palestinians displaced. The report.org/backissues/0390/9003017.htm) of 200,000 Palestinians displaced. The Israeli government's Ministry of Foreign Affairs (www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/MFAArchive/ Israeli government's Ministry of Foreign Affairs (www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/MFAArchive/ Israeli government's Ministry of Foreign Affairs (www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/MFAArchive/ 2000_2009/2000/2/Displaced+Persons+-+1967.htm) acknowledges "displaced persons" from the 1967 war but does not use a number.
The Permanent Observer Mission of Palestine to the United Nations, in a 1998 statement, used a figure of 325,000, part of what it called a "systematic policy of deportation and forced migration." Sayigh, on p. 174, describes "the exodus of another 300,000 refugees" after the 1967 war. John Quigley, professor of international law at Ohio State University, cites a figure of 350,000 in Palestine and Israel: A Challenge to Justice, a number "that represented 25 percent of the population" of the West Bank and Gaza Strip.
A September 1967 UN Special Representative's field investigation report estimated that 200,000 left for the East Bank and more were displaced within the West Bank area. The report also documented specific incidents, including home demolitions and intimidation, which led to the flight of the Palestinian population during and after the war. The UN report states that in the West Bank town of Qalqilya, "three weeks after they left their city, the population was allowed to go back. . . . Upon their return they found that out of a total of some 2,000 dwellings approximately 850 had been demolished" (United Nations General Assembly, "Report of the Secretary-General under General Assembly Resolution 2252 [ES-V] and Security Council Resolution 237 [1967]," September 15, 1967). Oren, on p. 307, states that "nearly half the houses in Qalqilya were reportedly damaged, though later repaired by Israel."
The lawyers' strike was recalled by Bashir in a December 2003 interview and corroborated in my correspondence with George Bisharat, author of Palestinian Lawyers and Israeli Rule: Law and Disorder in the West Bank, who reviewed relevant sections of this and later chapters for accuracy. Bashir, characteristically modest, would not say that he was a leader of the strike, but Ghiath Khairi insisted that his cousin was indeed "the leader." Bashir's comments to the Israeli colonel are recalled from his memory, as are the figures of eighty lawyers. Bisharat believes the number was closer to fifty. The establishment of military courts is mentioned in the United Nations "Report of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories," October 1, 1976.
The quote of "no reconciliation" comes from Sayigh, Armed Struggle and the Search for State, p. 143. Bashir confirmed the sense of clarity and freedom that settled over many Palestinians immediately following the occupation.
The definition of fedayi (plural fedayeen) is from Bassam Abu-Sharif in Best of Enemies. Abu-Sharif s account of Habash, of joining the PFLP, and of his own father's dismay is on pp. 52-63. His "eternal foreigner" and "rather be dead" quotes are on p. 53.
The stories of Palestinians returning to their old homes are too numerous to count; I have heard dozens over the years, and most involve a spontaneous journey across the "Green Line," though some travelers indicated they applied for and received permits. In each case, however, it is important to stress that the border was much less defined: not only less defined than it is now, with the construction of the separation wall and fence, but less even than in the 1980s and 1990s, when tensions led to far more checkpoints and patrols between Israel and the occupied territories.
Chapter 9
The notes for this chapter are comparatively short. The chapter relies largely on recollections from Bashir and Dalia as told to me in more than a dozen interviews in 1998, 2003, 2004, and 2005 and as recounted in Bashir's memoir in Arabic (see notes for chapter 1). Ghiath Khairi, Bashir's cousin who also traveled to Ramla that day, provided additional details in interviews in January 2005.
The conversations between Bashir and Dalia, of course, were not recorded; the quotes come almost entirely from Bashir's memory and Dalia's. There were cases where Dalia did not recall saying something Bashir attributed to her in his memoir or was sure she did not say; in such cases, I either did not include the quote or noted the discrepancy. Such discrepancies are minor, however: Essentially, Bashir and Dalia agree on what happened in the house in Ramla that day and in their subsequent meetings.
Both Bashir and Dalia have reviewed this and other chapters for accuracy. My hope is that I have reflected the spirit of the exchange as accurately and fairly as possible.
Bashir's talk with his family on his return to Ramallah was conveyed in his memoir and in the interviews with me. That conversations like the Khairis' were taking place across old Palestine in 1967 has been conveyed to me in dozens of stories and interviews over my last twelve years traveling through Israel, the West Bank, Gaza, Jordan, and Lebanon. Bashir's return trip with Kamel is conveyed in Bashir's memoir. That the dream of return was as ferocious as ever is evidenced by the political developments in the Palestinian movement after June 1967, which are conveyed in Sayigh's Armed Struggle in the Search for State, especially on p. 147, where he describes the "heyday of the guerillas."
The description of Arafat comes from multiple sources, including Bassam Abu-Sharif s account in Best of Enemies, from which the "Palestinian spirit" quote comes (p. 58). The analysis of the limitations of cross-border attacks is also discussed by Abu-Sharif on p. 58. Arafat's relaunching of armed struggle is described by Abu-Sharif on pp. 58-59; by Sayigh on pp. 161-64; and by Said K. Aburish, author of Arafat: From Defender to Dictator, on pp. 71-77. These accounts, as well as the Web site of Israel's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, indicate that these particular attacks, during this period, rarely resulted in civilian casualties. The legend of "Abu Amar" is laid out by Abu-Sharif (p. 59, coffee on fire story) and by David Pryce-Jones, a British journalist and author of The Face of Defeat (p. 41). Aburish (pp. 82-83) recalls Arafat's slogans and describes how the Fatah leader shaped his keffiyeh in the shape of historic Palestine. "The exercise took nearly an hour every morning," Aburish writes:
He donned the American-style sunglasses, which gave him an air of mystery and which he still wore indoors. . . . In many photos he carried a stick, an improvised field marshal's baton; not only did it distinguish him from people around him, it was also something which he could use constantly as a symbol of his power and to point out the locations of heroic acts or Israeli atrocities.
For the lawyers' strike and the impact of the occupation on Palestinian attorneys such as Bashir, see George Bisharat's Palestinian Lawyers and Israeli Rule, especially pp. 145-61. For the attitudes of Palestinians toward the Israeli annexation of East Jerusalem
, see Aburish, pp. 71-72, and Shehadeh, p. 46 and pp. 55-57. Early Israeli settlements in the West Bank are described by Morris in Righteous Victims, pp. 331-34. Military Order 145 is mentioned on p. 147; it was implemented in April 1968, according to the Web site of the Israel Law Resource Center.
Bashir recalled his arrest and incarceration of September 1967 in interviews. The wider context of the Israeli counterinsurgency is discussed by Sayigh on p. 180. The "no reconciliation" quote comes from Sayigh, p. 143. Portions of the text of United Nations Security Council Resolution 242 of November 22, 1967, are taken from the UN Web site (daccess-ods.un.org/TMP/7l67138.html).
For Nasser and King Hussein's attitude toward 242, see Sayigh, p. 143. For the attitudes of many Palestinians, including supporters of the popular factions like the PFLP, see Abu-Sharif, pp. 56-63, and Sayigh, p. 229 and p. 252. Sayigh, on p. 167 and p. 170, discusses Israeli arrests of Palestinian guerrillas and supporters; the figure of "1,000-1,250" activists in prison is on p. 172; this figure would rise to 1,750 (p. 203) by the end of 1968.
The emergence of the PFLP with the airport attack, and its tactical failure, is in Sayigh, p. 167; the date is also mentioned by Abu-Sharif (p. 51) as marking the founding of the PFLP, with a "manifesto" that "had only one item: the liberation of Palestine from Israeli occupation by means of armed struggle."
