by Neil Sheehan
Moreover, the Pentagon study notes two important underlying assumptions for the report. The first was that South Vietnamese problems—whether the Army’s lack of spirit or President Diem’s bottlenecks—“could be cured if enough dedicated Americans become involved.” There was great implicit faith, the study goes on, that Americans could provide the South Vietnamese “with the élan and style needed to win.”
The second major assumption, the analyst notes, was that “if worse comes to worst, the U.S. could probably save its position in Vietnam by bombing the North.”
Both these assumptions, as the Pentagon narrative recounts in later sections, were essential ingredients of the advice given to President Johnson in late 1964 and 1965, as he made the decisions to move forcefully into the war.
As the Taylor recommendations were submitted to President Kennedy, he also received a special national intelligence estimate forecasting that American escalation would be matched by Hanoi. According to the Pentagon account, the Nov. 5 estimate considered four possibilities—expanding the American advisory mission, plus an American airlift for Vietnamese troops; sending an 8,000-to-10,000-man flood-relief task force; sending a 25,000-to-40,000-man combat force, and warning Hanoi, in conjunction with any of those steps, that the United States “would launch air attacks against North Vietnam” unless Hanoi stopped supporting the Vietcong.
“The gist” of the intelligence estimate, the Pentagon account says, “was that the North Vietnamese would respond to an increased U.S. commitment with an offsetting increase in infiltrated support for the Vietcong.” The greater the American involvement, the intelligence estimate prophesied, the stronger the North Vietnamese reaction. The estimate also implied, the narrative goes on, that “threats to bomb would not cause Hanoi to stop its support for the Vietcong, and . . . actual attacks on the North would bring a strong response from Moscow and Peiping. . . .”
Nonetheless, the Taylor recommendations received backing from Secretary McNamara, Deputy Secretary Gilpatric and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In a memo on Nov. 8 to President Kennedy, reprinted in the study, Mr. McNamara summarized their position:
“We are inclined to recommend that we do commit the U.S. to the clear objective of preventing the fall of South Vietnam to Communism and that we support this commitment by the necessary military actions.
“If such a commitment is agreed upon, we support the recommendations of General Taylor as the first steps toward its fulfillment.”
But the memorandum warned President Kennedy that the 8,000-man task force “probably will not tip the scales decisively,” meaning that “we would be almost certain to get increasingly mired down in an inconclusive struggle.”
“In short,” the study comments, “the President was being told that the issue was not whether to send an 8,000-man task force, but whether or not to embark on a course that, without some extraordinary good luck, would lead to combat involvement in Southeast Asia on a very substantial scale.”
The Pentagon narrative says that while the Joint Chiefs’ position was clear, Mr. McNamara’s position “remains a little ambiguous,” especially in view of his qualified phrase “inclined to recommend” sending ground troops. The implication seems to be that Secretary McNamara was willing to go along with the Joint Chiefs to this extent to draw them out for President Kennedy on the full, long-term meaning of their recommendations.
Moreover, as the study records, three days later Mr. McNamara joined Mr. Rusk in a quite different recommendation and, the analyst says, “one obviously more to the President’s liking (and, in the nature of such things, quite possibly drawn up to the President’s specifications).” [See Document #30.]
This memorandum, almost totally adopted by President Kennedy as policy, contained stronger rhetoric than the earlier McNamara note but milder recommendations. The memorandum, quoted nearly in full in the Pentagon account, began wth a strong exposition of the domino theory:
“The loss of South Vietnam would make pointless any further discussion about the importance of Southeast Asia to the Free World; we would have to face the near certainty that the remainder of Southeast Asia and Indonesia would move to a complete accommodation with Communism, if not formal incorporation within the Communist bloc.”
The language on the troop issue, omitting any mention of the flood-relief task force, seems carefully drafted:
“The commitment of United States forces to South Vietnam involves two different categories: (A) units of modest size required for the direct support of South Vietnamese military effort, such as communications, helicopter and other forms of airlift, reconnaisance aircraft, naval patrols, intelligence units, etc., and (B) larger organized units with actual or potential direct military missions. Category (A) should be introduced as speedily as possible. Category (B) units pose a more serious problem. . . .”
The italicized emphasis is in the original document.
The two Secretaries recommended that the United States “now take the decision to commit ourselves to the objective of preventing the fall of South Vietnam to Communism and that, in doing so, we recognize that the introduction of United States and other SEATO forces may be necessary to achieve this objective.” But for the present it said only that the Pentagon should prepare plans for ground combat forces.
Three lines of reasoning for opposing a commitment of ground combat troops emerge from this document.
The first and possibly the most significant, the Pentagon study suggests, is that such a move “prior to a Laotian settlement would run a considerable risk of stimulating a Communist breach of the cease-fire and a resumption of hostilities in Laos,” leaving the President the unattractive choice of “the use of combat forces in Laos or an abandonment of that country to full Communist control.” The second reason was the need “to involve forces from other nations” as well; otherwise it would be “difficult to explain to our own people why no effort had been made to invoke SEATO or why the United States undertook to carry this burden unilaterally.” The third was the dilemma underlying the troop proposals—that “if there is a strong South Vietnamese effort, they may not be needed [but] if there is not such an effort, United States forces could not accomplish their mission in the midst of an apathetic or hostile population.”
The Rusk-McNamara memorandum fully acknowledged that even sending support troops and more advisers would mean openly exceeding military ceilings imposed by the 1954 Geneva accords. The memorandum proposed an exchange of letters with President Diem in which President Kennedy would assert “the necessity now of exceeding some provisions of the accords in view of the D.R.V. violations.” It also called for the release of a white paper, “A Threat to Peace,” reporting on infiltration from North Vietnam and on Vietcong terrorism.
Embracing the essence of Mr. Rusk’s message from Japan, the joint memorandum added a demand for reform from President Diem before the United States build-up would be put in motion.
The President accepted all major recommendations, according to the study, except for the unqualified commitment to the goal of saving South Vietnam from Communism. His decisions were formally embodied on Nov. 22 in a national security action memorandum, No. 111, entitled “First Phase of Vietnam Program.”
But on Nov. 14 Washington sent a summary of the President’s decisions—evidently made the day before—to Ambassador Nolting. The message demanded “concrete demonstration by Diem that he is now prepared to work in an orderly way [with] his subordinates and broaden the political base of his regime.” For the first time it sought to inject the United States more deeply into managing the war by asserting: “We would expect to share in the decision-making process in the political, economic and military fields as they affect the security situation.”
Possibly to assuage President Diem’s expected disappointment, it noted that the decision on combat-support troops and many more advisers “will sharply increase the commitment of our prestige to save SVN.” It concluded by asserting that while the Pentagon was preparing
contingency plans for ground combat forces, the “objective of our policy is to do all possible to accomplish [our] purpose without use of U.S. combat forces.”
No Presidential paper in the Pentagon record clearly details Mr. Kennedy’s thinking, but two documents shed light: the Nov. 14 message and some unsigned notes of a National Security Council meeting that, according to the Pentagon account, took place on Nov. 15.
The notes included these entries: “Pres expressed concern over 2-front war. Another bother him, no overt Chicom aggression in SVN, unlike Korea. These Diem’s own people; difficult operating area. If go beyond advisers need other nations with us . . . Pres receiving static from Congress; they against using U.S. troops.”
At another point, Mr. Kennedy reportedly asked why it was important to retain South Vietnam and Laos. The notes record the reply from Gen. Lyman L. Lemnitzer, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: “We would lose Asia all the way Singapore. Serious setback to U.S. and F.W. [free world].”
President Kennedy was also reportedly concerned about the lack of support from the British and worried about the proposed letter acknowledging that the United States would be breaking the Geneva accords. “Pres asked Rusk,” the notes say, “why do we take onus, saying we are going to break Geneva accords (in letter to Diem). Why not remain silent. Don’t say this ourselves. Directed State to reword letter.” The parentheses were in the original notes.
The Nov. 14 message reflects similar reasoning. The implication is that one important consideration for President Kennedy was fear that sending ground combat forces to South Vietnam, in the language of the message, “might wreck chances for agreement” in Laos and lead to a breakdown of the cease-fire there.
A second drawback cited in the message was the risk of provoking confrontations with the Soviet Union elsewhere—the “two front” problem—especially in Berlin where the acute crisis had eased less than a month before.
The decision disappointed President Diem who, according to the Pentagon study, was seeking a firm U.S. commitment to him. The account reports that Ambassador Nolting cabled Washington on Nov. 18 to say that the South Vietnamese leader had immediately inquired about ground combat units. After hearing Mr. Nolting’s response, the Ambassador said, President Diem “took our proposals rather better than I expected.” Two days later the Ambassador said he was getting high-level reports that President Diem was upset and brooding.
If this was a bargaining tactic to get the United States to back down on its demands for reform, the study says, it worked. On Dec. 7 Washington sent the embassy new instructions, the account goes on, softening demands for reforms and settling for “close partnership” and frequent consultation with the South Vietnamese Government rather than insisting, as before, on taking part in decision-making.
Whether intentionally or not, the Pentagon study contends, the over-all effect of these actions was to give the military side of the war higher priority than the political side.
“To continue to support Diem without reform,” the study comments, “meant quite simply that he, not we, would determine the course of the counterinsurgent effort and that the steps he took to assure his continuance in power would continue to take priority over all else.” The account says that this emphasis came to plague the Kennedy Administration when South Vietnamese disaffection with the Diem regime boiled over in 1963.
Copters and Casualties
Even before the American decisions on the troop build-up were announced formally on Dec. 14 with a public exchange of letters between Presidents Kennedy and Diem, the first two American helicopter companies had arrived—400 men with 33 H-21C helicopters. On Feb. 5 the press reported that the first helicopter had been shot down by the enemy.
Despite the Administration’s efforts to draw a careful bureaucratic distinction between support troops (“Category A”) and combat troops (“Category B”), this was hard to maintain in the field. The study records without comment that by mid-February President Kennedy was asked at a news conference if the Administration was being “less than candid” about American involvement in Vietnam. He acknowledged that American troops were “firing back” to protect themselves although he contended that these were not combat troops “in the generally understood sense of the word.”
The Pentagon study goes on to record that on April 11, two days after two American soldiers were killed in a Vietcong ambush while on a combat operation with Vietnamese troops, President Kennedy was asked at a news conference: “Sir, what are you going to do about the American soldiers getting killed in Vietnam?”
In reply, the President said: “We are attempting to help Vietnam maintain its independence and not fall under the domination of the Communists . . . We cannot desist in Vietnam.” Months later, he admitted to increased casualties along with the build-up he ordered.
According to Pentagon records, nearly 10 times as many Americans were killed or wounded in action in 1962 as in 1961—figures closely paralleling the tenfold build-up in American forces to 11,000 men by the end of 1962. The Pentagon statistics show that the number of killed and wounded in combat increased from 14 in 1961 to 109 in 1962 and to 489 in 1963.
Although the Pentagon study describes the Kennedy years as a period of new commitments, it does not indicate whether in this case President Kennedy—by putting American airmen in position to fly tactical air missions and ground advisers to take part in combat operations with South Vietnamese units—crossed an important firebreak in the American involvement in Vietnam.
Documents accompanying the Pentagon study amply recount the rapid tempo of the American build-up—rapid by standards of the previous seven years. A military briefing paper for the President on Jan. 9, 1962, cited in the Pentagon account reported:
• The number of American servicemen in Vietnam jumped from 948 at the end of November to 2,646 by Jan. 9 and would reach 5,576 by June 30.
• Two Army helicopter companies were flying combat support missions and an air commando unit code-named Jungle Jim was “instructing the Vietnamese Air Force in combat air support tactics and techniques.”
• United States Navy Mine Division 73, with a tender and five minesweepers, was sailing from Danang along the coastline.
• American aircraft from Thailand and from the Seventh Fleet aircraft carriers off Vietnam were flying surveillance and reconnaissance missions over Vietnam.
• Six C-123 spray-equipped aircraft “for support of defoliant operations” had “received diplomatic clearance” to enter South Vietnam.
At a news conference on March 18, 1962, Secretary McNamara acknowledged under questioning that American “training” of the South Vietnamese “occasionally takes place under combat conditions.” He added that “there has been sporadic fire aimed at U.S. personnel, and in a few minor instances they have returned the fire in self-defense.” News reports in the spring of 1962 told of American pilots flying in the front, or action, seats of “trainer” aircraft while Vietnamese trainees rode behind.
A Spurt of Optimism
Whatever public uneasiness was expressed in the news-conference questions, the Pentagon study notes, official American assessments on the war in the spring and summer of 1962 took on an increasingly favorable tenor.
One special object of praise and of American official confidence, the account notes, was the development of the strategic-hamlet program as an all-embracing counterguerrilla strategy in rural Vietnam. But the Pentagon study comments that the optimism proved misplaced.
Government documents available in the Pentagon records describe this strategy as a program to regroup the Vietnamese population into fortified hamlets in which the Government was to undertake political, social and economic measures designed both to weed out Vietcong sympathizers and to gain popular allegiance through improved local services and better security.
President Diem formally adopted the strategy for the Mekong Delta in mid-March, 1962, and made it nationwide in August. By Sept. 30, according to the study, the Diem Governmen
t was stating that more than a third of the total rural population was living in completed hamlets.
One flaw inherent in this strategy, the Pentagon study asserts, was that Saigon and Washington had different objectives for it: President Diem saw it as a means of controlling his population, non-Communist as well as Communist, while Washington saw it as a means of winning greater allegiance and thereby squeezing out the Vietcong.
Moreover, the account goes on, popular allegiance was so difficult to assess that even American officials turned increasingly to physical aspects of the program for statistical evaluations of progress. It left them vulnerable, the study notes, to exaggerated Vietnamese reports, which they did not uncover until after the Diem Government had been overthrown in 1963.
Fundamentally, the Pentagon analysts assert, the strategic hamlets “failed dismally,” like previous programs tried by the French and the Vietnamese, “because they ran into resentment if not active resistance” from peasants who objected to being moved forcibly from their fields and their ancestral homes.
The Pentagon study lays “a principal responsibility for the unfounded optimism of U.S. policy” in 1962 and early 1963 on inadequate and relatively uninformed American intelligence and reporting systems. The official optimism, the Pentagon account discloses, reached its peak in the plans for an American military “phase-out” in Vietnam on the assumption that the war against the Vietcong would be won by the end of 1965.
The tone was set, the analyst writes at a Honolulu conference on Vietnam strategy. On July 23, 1962, the same day that the Laotian peace agreement was signed in Geneva, Secretary McNamara ordered the start of planning for American withdrawal from Vietnam and long-term projections for reducing American financial aid to the Saigon Government.
