by Neil Sheehan
What General Westmoreland asked for added up to a total force of 44 battalions and the June 7 message became known as the “44-battalion request.”
Just as intense internal debate was beginning on the request, there was a “credibility” flare-up deriving from President Johnson’s injunction of secrecy on the change of missions for the marines authorized on April 1 in National Security Action Memorandum 328.
“The long official silence between the sanction for U.S. offensive operations contained in NSAM 328 and the final approval [in negotiations with Saigon] of the conditions under which U.S. troops could be committed was not without cost,” the study asserts. “The President had admonished each of the N.S.C. members not to allow release of provisions of the NSAM, but the unduly long interregnum inevitably led to leaks.” In addition, the marines had 200 casualties, including 18 killed, as they went about “tidying up,” as the study puts it, their newly assigned area in April and May.
“The Commandant of the Marine Corps,” the study continues, “raised the tempo of speculation by saying to the press during an inspection trip to Vietnam in April that the marines were not in Vietnam to ‘sit on their dittyboxes’—and they were there to ‘kill Vietcong.’
“An honest and superficially innocuous statement by Department of State Press Officer Robert McCloskey on 8 June to the effect that ‘American forces would be available for combat support together with Vietnamese forces when and if necessary’ produced an immediate response [in the press].
“The White House was hoisted by its own petard. In an attempt to quell the outcry, a statement was issued on the 9th of June which, because of its ambiguity, only served to exacerbate the situation and to widen what was being described as ‘the credibility gap’.”
The White House statement said: “There has been no change in the mission of United States ground combat units in Vietnam in recent days or weeks. The President has issued no order of any kind in this regard to General Westmoreland recently or at any other time. The primary mission of these troops is to secure and safeguard important military installations like the air base at Danang. They have the associated mission of . . . patrolling and securing actions in and near the areas thus safeguarded.
“If help is requested by the appropriate Vietnamese commander, General Westmoreland also has authority within the assigned mission to employ those troops in support of Vietnamese forces faced with aggressive attack when other effective reserves are not available and when, in his judgment, the general military situation urgently requires it.”
Discussing this statement, the Pentagon analyst says: “The documents do not reveal whether or not the ground rules for engagement of U.S. forces had actually been worked out to everyone’s satisfaction at the time of the White House statement. There is good indication that they had not.” The analyst also notes that during the battles of Bagia and Dongxoai, the Government forces “were desperately in need of assistance,” but that United States forces were not committed although the marines were available for Bagia and the 173d Airborne Brigade for Dongxoai.
The study reports that the first major ground action by United States forces took place northwest of Saigon from June 27 to June 30, and involved the 173d Airborne Brigade, an Australian battalion and South Vietnamese forces.
“The operation could by no stretch of definition have been described as a reserve reaction,”, the study says. “It was a search and destroy operation into Vietcong base areas. . . . The excursion was a direct result of the sanction given to General Westmoreland . . . [as a result of National Security Action Memorandum 328 and the enemy offensive] to ‘commit U.S. troops to combat, independent of or in conjunction with GVN forces in any situation in which the use of such troops is requested by an appropriate GVN commander and when in [General Westmoreland’s] judgment, their use is necessary to strengthen the relative position of GVN forces’.” The wording of this sanction came in a State Department message.
However, as the study notes, “At that juncture the 44-battalion debate was in full swing and the enclave strategy, as a means to limit the amount and use of U.S. combat force in Vietnam, was certainly overcome by events,” and by “a much more ambitious strategy sanctioned by the President.”
Recapitulating the situation just before the debate, the study gives this picture of deployment: At the beginning of June, the enclave strategy was in its first stages with Marine Corps forces at Phubai, Danang and Chulai, and Army forces in Vungtau. Other enclaves were under consideration. Approved for deployment—but not all arrived in South Vietnam yet—were approximately 70,000 troops in 13 maneuver battalions; with third-country forces the total came to 77,250 men and 17 maneuver battalions.
This was the situation when, on June 7, General Westmoreland asked for reinforcements “as rapidly as possible.”
General Westmoreland’s message, the Pentagon study says, “stirred up a veritable hornet’s nest in Washington,” because his request for large reinforcements and his proposed strategy to go on the offensive “did not contain any of the comfortable restrictions and safeguards which had been part of every strategy debated to date.”
“In such a move,” the study continues “the specter of U.S. involvement in a major Asian ground war was there for all to see.”
Just as Ambassador Taylor had consistently resisted involvement of United States forces, the study says, so General Westmoreland had been equally determined to get the troops into the war and have “a free hand” in using them.
At the time of his message, the general had available in Vietnam seven Marine and 2 Army maneuver battalions, plus an Australian battalion. Now, he was asking for a total of 33 battalions, and if the 173d Airborne Brigade’s two battalions—which were on temporary assignment—were added, the total came to 35. But in a subparagraph, General Westmoreland also identified nine other United States battalions that he might request at a later date. Thus the total of 44 battalions, and hence the name given the request. In the total was included an airmobile division of nine battalions to be formed later.
Admiral Sharp favored the request in a message to the Joint Chiefs on June 7, saying, “We will lose by staying in enclaves defending coastal areas.”
The Joint Chiefs, the Pentagon analyst says, favored bolstering the United States troop commitment. As far back as March 20, the Joint Chiefs had advocated sending three divisions—two American and one Korean—with the objective of “destroying the Vietcong.”
Now, the study states, General Westmoreland’s request “altered drastically the role of the J.C.S. in the build-up debate.
“Up to that time,” the study continues, “the J.C.S. had, if anything, been ahead of General Westmoreland in advocating allied forces for Vietnam. The 27 battalions of their three-division plan were in themselves more than Westmoreland ever requested until 7 June. After that date, the big push came from Westmoreland in Saigon, and the J.C.S. were caught in the middle between the latter and the powerful and strident opposition his latest request for forces had surfaced in Washington.”
On June 11, the Joint Chiefs cabled Admiral Sharp that something less than General Westmoreland’s request was close to approval, but they wanted to know, the study says, “where Westmoreland intended to put this force in Vietnam.”
He replied on June 13 in detail and the study comments: “This message was extremely important, for in it [he] spelled out the concept of keeping U.S. forces away from the people. The search and destroy strategy for U.S. and third country forces which continues to this day and the primary focus of RVNAF on pacification both stem from that concept. In addition, Westmoreland made a big pitch in this cable for a free hand to maneuver the troops around inside the country. . . .”
Ambassador Taylor, in a report on June 17, “confirmed the seriousness of the military situation as reported by General Westmoreland and also pointed up the very tenuous hold the new government had on the country.” This was the Government of President Nguyen Van Thieu and Premier Nguyen Cao Ky
.
“This report apparently helped to remove the last obstacles to consideration of all of the forces mentioned in Westmoreland’s request of 7 June,” the analyst says.
On June 22, General Wheeler cabled General Westmoreland and asked if the 44 battalions were enough to convince the enemy forces that they could not win. General Westmoreland replied, the study says, “that there was no evidence the VC/DRV would alter their plans regardless of what the U.S. did in the next six months.”
“The 44-battalion force should, however, establish a favorable balance of power by the end of the year,” the study quotes the general as having said. “If the U.S. was to seize the initiative from the enemy, then further forces would be required into 1966 and beyond. . . .”
On June 26, the general was given authority to commit U.S. forces to battle when he decided they were necessary “to strengthen the relative position of GVN forces.”
“This was about as close to a free hand in managing the forces as General Westmoreland was likely to get,” the analyst says. “The strategy was finished, and the debate from then on centered on how much force and to what end.”
Divergent Views at Home
The opposition to General Westmoreland had “its day in court,” late in June and early in July, the study says. The embassy in Saigon, “while recognizing the seriousness of the situation in South Vietnam, was less then sanguine about the prospects for success if large numbers of foreign troops were brought in.”
Another critic of General Westmoreland’s recommendations, the account reports, was Under Secretary of State Ball who was “convinced that the U.S. was pouring its resources down the drain in the wrong place.”
“In Ball’s view,” the account continues, “there was absolutely no assurance that the U.S. could with the provision of more ground forces achieve its political objectives in Vietnam. Instead, the U.S. risked involving itself in a costly and indeterminate struggle. To further complicate matters, it would be equally impossible to achieve political objectives by expanding the bombing of the North. . . .” [See Document #103.]
Assistant Secretary William P. Bundy, the study says, “like so many others found himself in between Westmoreland and Ball.”
In a memorandum to the President on July 1, Mr. Bundy gave his position, as summarized in the Pentagon study:
“The U.S. needed to avoid the ultimatum aspects of the 44 battalions and also the Ball withdrawal proposal. . . . The U.S. should adopt a policy which would allow it to hold on without risking disasters of scale if the war were lost despite deployment of the full 44 battalions. For the moment, according to Bundy, the U.S. should complete planned deployments to bring in-country forces to 18 maneuver battalions and 85,000 men. . . . The forces in Vietnam, which Bundy assumed would be enough to prevent collapse, would be restricted to reserve reaction in support of RVNAF. This would allow for some experimentation without taking over the war effort—a familiar theme.”
As for Secretary McNamara’s views, the study comments: “It is difficult to be precise about the position of the Secretary of Defense during the build-up debate because there is so little of him in the files.”
“There are plenty of other indications in the files that the Secretary was very carefully and personally insuring that the Defense Establishment was ready to provide efficient and sufficient support to the fighting elements in Vietnam,” the study continues. “From the records, the Secretary comes out much more clearly for good management than he does for any particular strategy.”
The Secretary went to South Vietnam for a four-day inspection starting July 16. The study says that while he was in Saigon on July 17, he received a cable from Deputy Secretary of Defense Vance informing him that the President had decided to go ahead with the plan to deploy 34 battalions.
“The debate was over,” the analyst says. “McNamara left Saigon bearing Westmoreland recommendations for an even greater increase in forces. . . .”
The study says 34 battalions. This is not entirely clear, because in his request General Westmoreland had asked for a total of 33, and if the battalions of the 173rd Airborne Brigade were added, the total would be 35. The explanation apparently is that when the Airmobile Division was finally organized, it had eight rather than nine battalions. The 34 battalions were, of course, to be supplied immediately. The nine others were to be requested later if needed.
The Pentagon analyst apparently did not have access to White House memoranda, so he is able to give only a sketchy account of Mr. Johnson’s role. But he says: “There is no question that the key figure in the early 1965 buildup was the President.”
On May 4, the President asked Congress for a $700-million supplemental appropriation “to meet mounting military requirements in Vietnam.”
“Nor can I guarantee this will be the last request,” he said in a message. “If our need expands I will turn again to the Congress. For we will do whatever must be done to insure the safety of South Vietnam from aggression. This is the firm and irrevocable commitment of our people and nation.”
On July 28, the President held a press conference in which he said, “The lesson of history dictated that the U.S. commit its strength to resist aggression in South Vietnam.”
As for the troop increases, the President said:
“I have asked the commanding general, General Westmoreland, what more he needs to meet this mounting aggression. He has told me. We will meet his needs.
“I have today ordered to Vietnam the Airmobile Division and certain other forces which will raise our fighting strength from 75,000 to 125,000 men almost immediately. Additional forces will be needed later, and they will be sent as requested.
“I have concluded that it is not essential to order Reserve units into service now.”
During the questioning after the announcement, this exchange took place:
“Q. Mr. President, does the fact that you are sending additional forces to Vietnam imply any change in the existing policy of relying mainly on the South Vietnamese to carry out offensive operations and using American forces to guard installations and to act as emergency back-up?
“A. It does not imply any change in policy whatever. It does not imply change of objective.”
On July 30, the Joint Chiefs approved 44 maneuver battalions for deployment, involving a total of 193,887 United States troops. By the end of the year, United States forces in South Vietnam numbered 184,314.
“The major participants in the decision knew the choices and understood the consequences,” the study says in summation. The decision taken in mid-July to commit 44 battalions of troops to battle in South Vietnam “was perceived as a threshold—entrance into an Asian land war. The conflict was seen to be long, with further U.S. deployments to follow. The choice at that time was not whether or not to negotiate, it was not whether to hold on for a while or let go—the choice was viewed as winning or losing South Vietnam.”
Accompanying this decision to give General Westmoreland enough troops to embark on the first phase of his search-and-destroy strategy “was a subtle change of emphasis,” the study says, adding:
“Instead of simply denying the enemy victory and convincing him that he could not win, the thrust became defeating the enemy in the South. This was sanctioned implicitly as the only way to achieve the U.S. objective of a non-Communist South Vietnam.
“The acceptance of the search-and-destroy strategy . . . left the U.S. commitment to Vietnam open-ended. The implications in terms of manpower and money are inescapable.
“Final acceptance of the desirability of inflicting defeat on the enemy rather than merely denying him victory opened the door to an indeterminate amount of additional force.”
Precisely what President Johnson and Secretary of Defense McNamara expected their decisions of July to bring within the near term “is not clear,” the study says, “but there are manifold indications that they were prepared for a long war.”
KEY DOCUMENTS
Following are texts of key
documents accompanying the Pentagon’s study of the Vietnam war, covering the opening of the sustained bombing campaign against North Vietnam in the first half of 1965. Except where excerpting is indicated, the documents are printed verbatim, with only unmistakable typographical errors corrected.
# 90
Letter from Rostow Favoring Commitment of Troops by U.S.
Personal letter from Walt W. Rostow, chairman of the State Department’s Policy Planning Council, to Secretary McNamara, Nov. 16, 1964, “Military Dispositions and Political Signals.”
Following on our conversation of last night I am concerned that too much thought is being given to the actual damage we do in the North, not enough thought to the signal we wish to send.
The signal consists of three parts:
a) damage to the North is now to be inflicted because they are violating the 1954 and 1962 accords;
b) we are ready and able to go much further than our initial act of damage;
c) we are ready and able to meet any level of escalation they might mount in response, if they are so minded.
Four points follow.
1. I am convinced that we should not go forward into the next stage without a U.S. ground force commitment of some kind:
a. The withdrawal of those ground forces could be a critically important part of our diplomatic bargaining position. Ground forces can sit during a conference more easily than we can maintain a series of mounting air and naval pressures.
b. We must make clear that counter escalation by the Communists will run directly into U.S. strength on the ground; and, therefore the possibility of radically extending their position on the ground at the cost of air and naval damage alone, is ruled out.
c. There is a marginal possibility that in attacking the airfield they were thinking two moves ahead; namely, they might be planning a pre-emptive ground force response to an expected U.S. retaliation for the Bien Hoa attack.
