by Neil Sheehan
“It is estimated,” the agency’s report said, “that the infiltration of men and supplies into SVN can be sustained.”
The sequence of events was interrupted on June 7, the study relates, when Washington learned that a Canadian diplotmat, Chester A. Ronning, was on his way to Hanoi to test North Vietnam’s attitude toward negotiations, a mission for which he had received State Department approval.
Secretary Rusk, who was traveling in Europe, cabled President Johnson to urge that the oil strikes be postponed until it could be learned what Mr. Ronning had found out.
“I am deeply disturbed,” Mr. Rusk said in his cablegram, “by general international revulsion, and perhaps a great deal at home if it becomes known that we took an action which sabotaged the Ronning mission to which we had given our agreement. I recognize the agony of this problem for all concerned.”
President Johnson, responding to Mr. Rusk’s request, suspended the oil raids, the study discloses. When Mr. Ronning returned, Assistant Secretary Bundy flew to meet him in Ottawa, but quickly reported that the Canadian had found no opening or flexibility in the North Vietnamese position.
While Mr. Ronning was in Hanoi, Secretary McNamara had informed Admiral Sharp by cablegram of the high-level consideration of oil attacks and told him:
“Final decision for or against will be influenced by extent they can be carried out without significant civilian casualties. What preliminary steps to minimize would you recommend and if taken what number of casualties do you believe would result?”
Admiral Sharp “replied eagerly,” the study declares, with a list of precautions: The strikes would be carried out only under favorable weather conditions, with experienced pilots fully briefed, and with especially selected weapons. He predicted that civilian casualties could be held “under 50.”
With Mr. Ronning’s return and Admiral Sharp’s assurances, the stage was set for the oil-tank strikes.
On June 22, Washington [see Document #114] gave the execution message authorizing strikes on the oil targets in the Hanoi-Haiphong area. The Pentagon analyst terms the execution message “a remarkable document, attesting in detail to the political sensitivity of the strikes.” The message said:
“Strikes to commence with initial attacks against Haiphong and Hanoi P.O.L. on same day if operationally feasible. . . . At Haiphong avoid damage to merchant shipping. No attacks authorized on craft unless U.S. aircraft are first fired on and then only if clearly North Vietnamese.
“Decision made after SecDef and C.J.C.S. [Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff] were assured every feasible step would be taken to minimize civilian casualties. . . . Take the following measures: maximum use of most experienced Rolling Thunder personnel, detailed briefing of pilots stressing need to avoid civilians, execute only when weather permits visual identification of targets and improved strike accuracy, select best axis of attack to avoid populated areas, maximum use of ECM [electronic countermeasurers] to hamper SAM [surface-to-air missiles] and AAA [antiaircraft artillery] fire control, in order to limit pilot distraction and improve accuracy, maximum use of weapons of high precision delivery consistent with mission objective, and limit SAM and AAA suppression [bombing] to sites located outside populated areas.
“Take special precautions to insure security. If weather or operational considerations delay initiation of strikes, do not initiate on Sunday, 26 June.”
It is not clear, the Pentagon account says, why what it calls the “never on Sunday” order was issued.
Because of bad weather, it was June 29 before the oil strikes were finally begun, reportedly with great success. The Haiphong dock facility appeared about 80 per cent destroyed, the study says, and the Hanoi “tank farm” was apparently knocked out. Only one United States aircraft was lost to ground fire.
A report from the Seventh Air Force in Saigon called the operation “the most significant, the most important strike of the war.”
“Official Washington reacted with mild jubilation to the reported success of the P.O.L. strikes and took satisfaction in the relatively mild reaction of the international community to the escalation,” the Pentagon analyst recounts. “Secretary McNamara described the execution of the raids as a ‘superb professional job,’ and sent a message of personal congratulations to the field commanders involved in the planning and execution of the attacks.”
In early July, Mr. McNamara informed Admiral Sharp in a cablegram that the President wished the first priority in the air war to be given to the “strangulation” of North Vietnam’s fuel system. And he ordered Admiral Sharp to develop a comprehensive plan to accomplish this.
Throughout the summer of 1966, Operation Rolling Thunder was concentrated on destroying oil-storage sites, the narrative relates. By the end of July, the Defense Intelligence Agency reported to Secretary McNamara that 70 per cent of North Vietnam’s original storage capacity had been destroyed.
But “what became clearer and clearer as the summer wore on,” the account discloses, “was that while we had destroyed a major portion of North Vietnam’s storage capacity, she retained enough dispersed capacity, supplemented by continuing imports (increasingly in easily dispersable drums, not bulk) to meet her ongoing requirements.”
In August, the study says, with the large storage sites already destroyed and the small, dispersed sites hard to find and bomb, “it was simply impractical and infeasible to attempt any further constriction of North Vietnam’s P.O.L. storage capacity.”
And, it adds, the flow of men and supplies from North Vietnam to the Vietcong continued “undiminished.”
“It was clear,” the study says, “that the P.O.L. strikes had been a failure. . . . There was no evidence that NVN had at any time been pinched for P.O.L. . . . The difficulties of switching to a much less vulnerable but perfectly workable storage and distrubution system, not an unbearable strain when the volume to be handled was not really very great, had been overestimated. Typically, also, N.V.N.’s adaptability and resourcefulness had been greatly underestimated.”
“McNamara, for his part, made no effort to conceal his dissatisfaction and disappointment at the failure of the P.O.L. strikes,” the study continues. “He pointed out to the Air Force and the Navy the glaring discrepancy between the optimistic estimates of results their pre-strike P.O.L. studies had postulated and the actual failure of the raids to significantly decrease infiltration.”
“The Secretary was already in the process of rethinking the role of the entire air campaign in the U.S. effort,” the Pentagon study says. “He was painfully aware of its inability to pinch off the infiltration to the South and had seen no evidence of its ability to break Hanoi’s will, demoralize its population or bring it to the negotiation table.”
“The attack on North Vietnam’s P.O.L. system,” the study goes on, “was the last major escalation of the air war recommended by Secretary McNamara.”
Troops, More Troops
Another important factor in Secretary McNamara’s “disenchantment” during the summer of 1966, the Pentagon account declares, was General Westmoreland’s continual requests for more troops.
In June Mr. McNamara approved a new deployment schedule specifically designed to meet General Westmoreland’s requests. The new schedule, labeled Program 3, called for putting 391,000 American soldiers—79 battalions—into South Vietnam by the end of 1966 and 431,000 by June, 1967.
Because articles had begun to appear in the press that the Joint Chiefs were dissatisfied with the pace of the build-up in ground forces, the study relates, President Johnson and Mr. McNamara resorted to a bureaucratic “ploy” to insure that their new schedule met the Joint Chiefs’ requests.
On June 28 the President wrote a formal directive to the Secretary of Defense:
“As you know, we have been moving our men to Vietnam on a schedule determined by General Westmoreland’s requirements.
“As I have stated orally several times this year, I should like this schedule to be accelerated as much as possible so
that General Westmoreland can feel assured that he has all the men he needs as soon as possible.
“Would you meet with the Joint Chiefs and give me at your earliest convenience an indication of what acceleration is possible for the balance of this year.”
Secretary McNamara then passed this directive to the Joint Chiefs, who replied in a memorandum on July 7 that the new schedule did meet General Westmoreland’s requirements. In turn, Mr. McNamara replied formally to the President that he was “happy to report” that the new deployments were satisfactory.
Thus, the study says, the President and Mr. McNamara gained a record that could be easily pulled out to show any critic that in fact they were meeting the military’s requests.
But while President Johnson and Secretary McNamara were approving this schedule, General Westmoreland had already initiated a new request—for 111,588 men—which was passed through channels to the Joint Chiefs on June 18. The figure General Westmoreland said he would now need for 1967 was 542,588 troops.
On Aug. 5 the Joint Chiefs passed the new request to Secretary McNamara, expressing their view that the proposed increases were important and necessary.
Mr. McNamara replied the same day:
“As you know, it is our policy to provide the troops, weapons and supplies requested by General Westmoreland at the times he desires them, to the greatest possible degree.
“Nevertheless I desire and expect a detailed line-by-line analysis of these requirements to determine that each is truly essential to the carrying out of our war plan. We must send to Vietnam what is needed, but only what is needed.” [See Document #115.]
When the Joint Chiefs completed their detailed study of the new requests in the fall, the study relates, Mr. McNamara was no longer ready to approve troop increases automatically. And in October, for the first time, he would turn General Westmoreland down.
The major reason General Westmoreland gave for needing more troops, the account discloses, is that during the summer of 1966 North Vietnamese infiltration again appeared to be increasing.
Throughout the summer and early fall, the narrative says, General Westmoreland sent a steady stream of cables to Admiral Sharp and General Wheeler warning about the enemy build-up. [See Document #116.]
A Secret Seminar
During the summer of 1966, while Secretary McNamara was pondering the failure of the oil-storage strikes and considering General Westmoreland’s latest troop request, a secret seminar of leading scientists under Government sponsorship was studying the over-all results of Operation Rolling Thunder.
Their conclusions, the historian relates, would have a “dramatic impact” on Mr. McNamara and further contribute to his disenchantment. [See Document #117.]
The idea for a summer seminar of scientists and academic specialists to study technical aspects of the war had been suggested in March by Dr. George B. Kistiakowsky and Dr. Carl Kaysen of Harvard and Dr. Jerome B. Wiesner and Dr. Jerrold R. Zacharias of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
Dr. Kistiakowsky had been special assistant for science and technology under President Dwight D. Eisenhower and Dr. Wiesner had held that post under President Kennedy. Dr. Kaysen had been a Kennedy aide for national security.
Secretary McNamara liked the idea, the study says, and sent Dr. Zacharias a letter on April 16 formally requesting that he and the others arrange the summer study on “technical possibilities in relation to our military operations in Vietnam.”
The Secretary specifically instructed Mr. McNaughton, who was to oversee the project, that the scientists should look into the feasibility of “a fence across the infiltration trails, warning systems, reconnaissance (especially night) methods, night vision devices, defoliation techniques and area-denial weapons.”
The idea of constructing an anti-infiltration barrier across the demilitarized zone had first been suggested by Prof. Roger Fisher of the Harvard Law School in a memorandum to Mr. McNaughton in January, 1966, the narrative says.
The scientists—47 men representing “the cream of the scholarly community in technical fields,” the narrative says—met in Wellesley, Mass., during June, July and August under the auspices of the Jason Division of the Institute for Defense Analyses.
The Jason Division, named for the leader of the Argonauts in Greek mythology, was used to conduct “ad hoc high-level studies using primarily non-I.D.A. scholars,” the Pentagon study says. The scientists were given briefings by high officials from the Pentagon, the Central Intelligence Agency, the State Department and the White House, the study recounts, and they were provided with secret materials.
Their conclusions and recommendations, which were given to the Secretary of Defense at the beginning of September, had “a powerful and perhaps decisive influence in McNamara’s mind,” the Pentagon record says.
These were the recommendations, it goes on, of “a group of America’s most distinguished scientists, men who had helped the Government produce many of its most advanced technical weapons systems since the end of the Second World War, men who were not identified with the vocal academic criticism of the Administration’s Vietnam policy.”
Their report evaluating the results of the Rolling Thunder campaign began:
“As of July, 1966, the U.S. bombing of North Vietnam had had no measurable direct effect on Hanoi’s ability to mount and support military operations in the South at the current level.”
They then pointed out the reasons that they felt North Vietnam could not be hurt by bombing: It was primarily a subsistence agricultural country with little industry and a primitive but flexible transport system, and most of its weapons and supplies came from abroad.
These factors, the scientists said, made it “quite unlikely” that an expanded bombing campaign would “prevent Hanoi from infiltrating men into the South at the present or a higher rate.”
In conclusion, the Pentagon study says, the scientists addressed the assumption behind the bombing program—that damage inflicted on a country reduces its will to continue fighting. The scientists criticized this assumption, the study says, by denying that it is possible to measure the relationship.
“It must be concluded,” the scientists said, “that there is currently no adequate basis for predicting the levels of U.S. military effort that would be required to achieve the stated objectives—indeed, there is no firm basis for determining if there is any feasible level of effort that would achieve these objectives.”
As an alternative to bombing North Vietnam, the 47 scientists suggested that an elaborate electronic barrier, using recently developed devices, be built across the demilitarized zone.
The barrier would consist of two parts, the Pentagon report discloses: an anti-troop system made up of small mines (called gravel mines) to damage the enemy’s feet and legs, and an anti-vehicle system composed of acoustic sensors that would direct aircraft to the target.
Most of the mines and sensors would be dropped by planes, but the system would have to be checked by ground troops.
The whole system would cost about $800-million a year, the scientists estimated, and would take a year to build.
Secretary McNamara “was apparently strongly and favorably impressed” by the scientists’ ideas, the Pentagon study relates, and he immediately ordered Lieut. Gen. Alfred D. Starbird, an Army engineering expert, to begin research on the barrier.
On Oct. 10, 1966, the study reports, Secretary McNamara set out for Saigon to assess General Westmoreland’s latest troop request. He had ordered General Starbird to precede him there to begin an investigation of conditions for the barrier.
Characterizing Mr. McNamara’s attitudes toward the war, the Pentagon analyst says that the Secretary had gone from “hesitancy” in the winter of 1965 to “perplexity” in the spring of 1966 to “disenchantment” the following fall.
When he returned from his October trip to Saigon, the study relates, he would detail his feelings in two long memorandums to President Johnson and for the first time would recommen
d against filling a troop request from General Westmoreland.
KEY DOCUMENTS
Following are texts of key documents accompanying the Pentagon’s study of the Vietnam war, covering the period late 1965 to the summer of 1966. Except where excerpting is specified, the documents are printed verbatim, with only unmistakable typographical errors corrected.
# 106
State Department Memorandum in November on Bombing Pause
Excerpts from memorandum, “Courses of Action in Vietnam,” from the State Department, Nov. 9, 1965, as provided in the body of the Pentagon study. According to the study, the memorandum was speaking for Secretary of State Dean Rusk, and “a penciled note by [Assistant Secretary of Defense John T.] McNaughton indicates that Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson was the author.”
. . . The purpose of—and Secretary McNamara’s arguments for—such a pause are four:
(a) It would offer Hanoi and the Viet Cong a chance to move toward a solution if they should be so inclined, removing the psychological barrier of continued bombing and permitting the Soviets and others to bring moderating arguments to bear:
(b) It would demonstrate to domestic and international critics that we had indeed made every effort for a peaceful settlement before proceeding to intensified actions, notably the latter stages of the extrapolated Rolling Thunder program;
(c) It would probably tend to reduce the dangers of escalation after we had resumed the bombing, at least insofar as the Soviets were concerned;
(d) It would set the stage for another pause, perhaps in late 1966, which might produce a settlement.
Against these propositions, there are the following considerations arguing against a pause:
(a) In the absence of any indication from Hanoi as to what reciprocal action it might take, we could well find ourselves in the position of having played this very important card without receiving anything substantial in return. There are no indications that Hanoi is yet in a mood to agree to a settlement acceptable to us. The chance is, therefore, very slight that a pause at this time could lead to an acceptable settlement.
