26. See Waddington, La République des Provinces Unies. Lyons, 1891, pp. 400–5; Lundorp, IV, pp. 287–9; a full account is in Hennequin de Villermont, L’Infante Isabelle, II, pp. 388 f.
27. Gachard, Actes des États Généraux en 1632. Brussels, 1853, pp. 22–60.
28. Ibid., pp. 76–80,165–8.
29. Lonchay and Cuvelier, op. cit., II, pp. 659,664.
30. Prinsterer, op. cit., II, iii, pp. 37, 39–40.
31. Gachard, pp. 147 f., 162 f.
32. Relazioni dagli Ambasciatori, Spagna, I, p. 658.
33. Loc. cit.
34. Lonchay and Cuvelier, II, p. 659.
35. Gindely, Waldsteins Vertrag, p. 33; Hallwich, Wallensteins Ende, I, p. 412; see also Pekař, pp. 77–104.
36. See Pekař, Wallenstein, I, pp. 51 f.
37. Hallwich, Wallensteins Ende, II, p. 22.
38. Parallel facsimiles are given in Foerster, Wallenstein, III.
39. Veit Valentin, Wallenstein after Three Centuries. Slavonic Review, 1935, p. 160.
40. Bandhauers Tagebuch, p. 268.
41. Khevenhüller, Conterfet Kupfferstich. Leipzig, 1722, II, p. 261.
42. Foerster, Wallenstein als Feldherr und Landesfürst, p. 436.
43. Hallwich, Wallensteins Ende, I, pp. 41–2.
44. See Srbik, Wallensteins Ende. Vienna, 1920, pp. 31 ff.; Gliubich, p. 368; Foerster, Wallenstein, II, p. 316; Irmer, Die Verhandlungen Schwedens, II, p. 24.
45. Poyntz, p. 136; Priorato, Historia delle Guerre, 1643, p. 98; Gindely, Wallenstein während seines ersten Generalats, I, p. 74.
46. The name is Germanized into Terzka, or, in Schiller’s Wallenstein, into Terzky.
47. Opel and Cohn, p. 342:
Gewissen hin, Gewissen her,
Ich acht viel mehr die zeitlich Ehr,
Dien nicht um Glauben, dien um Gelt,
Gott geb, wie es geh in jener Welt.
48. Ritter, Deutsche Geschichte, III, p. 558.
49. Brefvexling, II, viii, pp. 97, 99, 117.
50. Hallwich, Wallensteins Ende, I, p. 117.
51. Brefvexling, II, viii, p. 119.
52. Ibid., pp. 97, 110, 124, 126 f.
53. Hallwich, Wallensteins Ende, I, pp. 98, 149, 224, 230, 239, 260, 273, 300, 312, 327, 379.
54. Ibid., p. 426.
55. Irmer, Die Verhandlungen Schwedens, II, pp. 136–41; Aubéry, Mémoires pour l’histoire du Cardinal Duc de Richelieu. Paris, 1860, II, pp. 399–401; Feuquières, I, pp. 152 f.
56. Brefvexling, II, viii, p. 100.
57. Hallwich, Briefe und Akten, IV, pp. 124–6.
58. Lonchay and Cuvelier, III, p. 2.
59. Srbik, p. 39.
60. See Gaedeke, Wallensteins Verhandlungen, p. 173.
61. Hallwich, Wallensteins Ende, I, pp. 546–7.
62. Gaedeke, Holks Einfall, p. 153; Sondén, Lars Tungel, p. 176.
63. Hallwich, Wallensteins Ende, I, pp. 553–4.
64. Gaedeke, Holks Einfall, I, p. 179.
65. Feuquières, II, p. 274; Sondén, Lars Tungel, pp. 166, 459–60, 462–4; Gaedeke, Wallensteins Verhandlungen, II, pp. 305, 339, 341.
66. Irmer, Die Verhandlungen Schwedens, II, pp. 188–9; Hallwich, Wallensteins Ende, I, pp. 548 ff.
67. Ibid., p. 594.
68. Ibid., p. 583.
69. Gaedeke, Wallensteins Verhandlungen, p. 139.
70. Sondén, Lars Tungel, I, p. 190.
71. Hallwich, Wallensteins Ende, II, pp. 44–66 passim.
72. Aretin, Beyträge, II, iii, pp. 63 ff.
73. Brefvexling, II, vii, p. 141.
74. Aretin, Beyträge, II, iii, pp. 70 f.
75. Hallwich, Wallenstein Ende, I, p. 540.
76. Ibid., II, pp. 153, 157.
77. Aretin, Wallenstein, I, p. 58.
78. Irmer, Die Verhandlungen Schwedens, III, pp. 68–74.
79. Gaedeke, Wallensteins Verhandlungen, pp. 214–15.
80. Sondén, Lars Tungel, pp. 106–7.
81. Feuquières, I, pp. 155–60, 258, 290–1; II, pp. 1–9, 68.
82. Irmer, Die Verhandlungen Schwedens, III, p. 95.
83. Foerster, Wallenstein, III, pp. 114–28.
84. Srbik, p. 381; Gliubich, p. 418.
85. Hallwich, Wallensteins Ende, II, pp. 136–7.
86. Irmer, Die Verhandlungen Schwedens, III, p. 168; Pekař, p. 600.
87. Foerster, Wallenstein, III, p. 177.
88. Srbik, pp. 84–6.
89. See Srbik, op. cit., p. 82.
90. Ibid., p. 82.
91. Gaedeke, Wallensteins Verhandlungen, pp. 259–60.
92. Irmer, Die Verhandlungen Schwedens, III, p. 287.
93. Gaedeke, Wallensteins Verhandlungen, pp. 281–2.
94. Hallwich, Wallensteins Ende, II, pp. 229–35.
95. Irmer, Verhandlungen, III, p. 289; Hallwich, Briefe und Akten, IV, p. 616.
96. Foerster, Wallenstein, III, pp. 230, 254.
97. Irmer, Die Verhandlungen Schwedens, III, pp. 210, 211, 276.
98. Mailath, Geschichte des oesterreichischen Kaiserstaates. Hamburg, 1842, III, pp. 368–71.
99. Ibid., pp. 373–5.
100. Ibid., p. 370.
101. Srbik, pp. 385, 390.
102. Ibid., p. 185.
103. Ibid., p. 386; Irmer, Die Verhandlungen Schwedens, III, pp. 291–3.
104. Irmer, Die Verhandlungen Schwedens, III, pp. 284, 301, 306.
105. Irmer, Die Verhandlungen Schwedens, III, p. 383.
106. Hallwich, Wallensteins Ende, II, p. 485.
107. See Taaffe’s relation in Mailath, III, pp. 373–5.
108. See Hallwich, Wallensteins Ende.
109. Gliubich, p. 418.
110. Mailath, III, pp. 369, 374.
111. Poyntz, p. 99.
112. Feuquières, II, pp. 214, 225–7.
113. Fiedler, p. 122.
114. Carafa, pp. 268–9; Fiedler, pp. 189–90, 277–8.
115. Fiedler, p. 279.
116. A. Langel, Le Duel de Marie de Médicis et de Richelieu. Revue des Deux Mondes, Nov. 1877, p. 362.
117. Avenel, IV, p. 480.
118. Lonchay and Cuvelier, II, p. 718.
119. Aitzema, op. cit., II, pp. 94–5.
120. Mémoires de la Grande Mademoiselle, ed. Petitot, II, XL, p. 373.
121. Feuquières, pp. 96–8, 103, 195, 243, 285.
122. Struck, p. 20, n. 3.
123. Roese, Herzog Bernhard der Grosse. Weimar, 1828–9, I, pp. 174–5.
124. Melchior Jauch und sein Stammbuch. Archiv für Sächsische Geschichte, IV, p. 208.
125. See supra, pp. 177, 180.
126. Aubery, Mémoires de Richelieu, p. 395.
127. Hanotaux and le Duc de la Force: Revue des Deux Mondes, March, 1935, p. 380.
128. J. V. Andreae, Gustavi Adolphi Suecorum Regis Memoria. Berlin, 1844, p. 13.
129. Brefvexling, II, viii, pp. 126 ff.; Pufendorf, VIII, p. 40.
130. K. Jacob, Von Lützen nach Nördlingen. Strassburg, 1904, pp. 65–6, 166–7.
131. Sverges Traktater, V, ii, pp. 92–100.
132. Ibid., pp. 71–4, 105–9.
133. Feuquières, II, p. 96.
134. Brefvexling, II, viii, pp. 97,110,124, 248 f.; VI, pp. 51–2.
135. Prinsterer, II, iii, p. 55.
136. Lundorp, IV, pp. 425–7.
137. Brefväxling mellan Oxenstierna och Svenska Regeringen. Handlungen rörande Skandinaviens Historia, XXIX, pp. 251–2.
138. Lundorp, IV, pp. 384–9.
139. Ibid., pp. 416–18; Feuquières, II, p. 35.
140. Brefvexling, II, vii, p. 201.
141. Ibid., II, viii, p. 275.
142. Ibid., II, vi, pp. 122 ff., passim.
143. Ibid., I, i, p. 205.
144. Brefvexling, II, viii, p. 162; Brohm, Johann von Aldringen. Halle, 1882, p. 109.
145. Brefvexling, II, viii, p. 164.
146. Feuquières, II, p. 387.
147. Sverges Traktater, V, ii, pp. 200–5.
149. Ibid., II, vii, p. 233.
150. Ibid., p. 231.
151. Ibid., viii, pp. 235–9.
152. D. de Aedo y Gallart, Viaje del Infante Cardenal Don Fernando de Austria. Antwerp, 1635, p. 114.
153. Chemnitz, II, Stockholm, 1653, p. 529.
154. Aedo y Gallart, p. 127; see also Canovas del Castillo, Estudios del Reinado de Felipe. Madrid, 1888, IV, p. 436.
155. Aedo y Gallart, p. 128.
156. Ibid., p. 130.
157. Gualdo Priorato, Historia di Ferdinando III Imperatore. Vienna, 1672, p. 492; Chemnitz, II, p. 534.
158. Poyntz, p. 111.
159. Bandhauers Tagebuch, p. 313; the account of the battle is composed, except where other references are given, from Horn’s account in Brefvexling, II, viii; from the Spanish account in Aedo y Gallart, pp. 130 f.; from the contemporary documents in Canovas del Castillo, Estudios del Reinado de Felipe IV, pp. 427–42; more recent authorities include Leo, Schlacht bei Nördlingen. Halle, 1900, and the brief but masterly comments of Delbrueck, pp. 243–8.
160. Oxenstierna, on the other hand, reckoned the total loss at twelve thousand killed and prisoners. His view is probably as generous on the one side as that of the imperialists on the other. Brefvexling, I, i, p. 208.
161. Aedo y Gallart, pp. 146–7.
162. Ibid., p. 151.
163. Priorato, Historia, III, 1672, p. 495; Annales, XII, p. 1230.
164. Brefvexling, II, vii, p. 235.
165. Ibid., I, i, pp. 208–9; Feuquières, II, pp. 422, 426, 427–9.
166. Archenholtz, II, p. 46.
167. Feuquières, II, p. 426.
168. Canovas, Bosquejo Historico, p. 253.
169. Aedo y Gallart, p. 146.
170. Lonchay and Cuvelier, III, p. 21.
171. Brefvexling, II, vii, p. 241.
172. Ibid., I, i, pp. 209–11.
173. Ibid., II, iii, pp. 347 f.
174. See Baner’s letters throughout 1634 in Brefvexling, II, vi, pp. 122–50.
175. Brefvexling, I, i, p. 216.
176. Ibid., p. 224.
177. Sverges Traktater, V, ii, pp. 241–54; Lünig, V, i, pp. 297–301.
178. Brefväxling mellan Oxenstierna och Svenska Regeringen. Händlingar rörande Skandinaviens Historia, XXXII, pp. 198, 201, 206; XXXII, p. 3.
179. Aedo y Gallart, p. 194.
180. Brefvexling, I, i, p. 224; Avenel, IV, pp. 603, 618–19.
181. Ranke, Sämmtliche Werke, XXXVIII; Die römischen Päpste, p. 376.
182. Riezler, Geschichte, VI, p. 164.
183. Ibid., V, p. 536.
184. Brefvexling, II, viii, p. 101.
185. Annales, XII, p. 1299.
186. Hallwich, Wallensteins Ende, I, p. 633.
187. Avenel, V, pp. 380–1.
188. Taken at Nördlingen, he was beheaded as a traitor; he had made the error of deserting from one side to the other without going through the formality of resigning his commission!
189. H. Hallwich, Aldringens letzter Ritt. Mitteilungen des Vereins für die Geschichte der Deutschen in Böhmen, XLV, p. 27.
190. Grimmelshausen, Simplicissimus.
191. Gaedeke, Wallensteins Verhandlungen, p. 163.
192. Brefvexling, II, vi, p. 529.
193. Brefväxling mellan Oxenstierna och Svenska Regeringen. Händlingar rörande Skandinaviens Historia, XXX, pp. 84–5.
194. Hurter, Friedensbestrebungen Ferdinands II, p. 71.
195. Dässler, Diplomatischer Zusammenstoss zwischen England und Sachsen. Neues Archiv für Sächsische Geschichte, LVI, pp. 113 f.
196. Opel, Eine politische Denkschrift. Neues Archiv für Sächsische Geschichte, VIII, p. 189; see also Hitzigrath, Die Publicistik des Prager Friedens. Halle, 1880.
197. Irmer, Hans Georg von Arnim. Leipzig, 1874, pp. 307, 316 f.
198. Lünig, VI, i, pp. 391–3.
199. Roese, II, pp. 437–9.
200. Ibid., pp. 444, 447.
201. Roese, pp. 457–61, 463–6.
202. Händlingar rörande Skandinaviens Historia, XXXIII, pp. 27 f.
203. See Feuquières, pp. 429–30, 458.
204. Avenel, IV, pp. 612, 630.
205. Aitzema, II, pp. 117 ff., 198–201; Mémoires de Frédéric Henri, p. 174; see also Waddington, La République des Provinces Unies, pp. 421, 432–3; Avenel, IV, p. 424.
206. Brefväxling mellan Oxenstierna och Svenska Regeringen. Händlingar rörande Skandinaviens Historia, XXXIV, p. 12.
207. Avenel, IV, p. 735.
208. Sverges Traktater, V, ii, pp. 18–19; see also Brefvexling, I, i, pp. 558–9.
209. Avenel, V, pp. 82–3.
CHAPTER NINE
THE STRUGGLE FOR THE RHINE
1635–9
Le sentiment de Sa Majesté est, que vous teniez toutes sortes de propositions de paix pour non seulement suspectes, mais même très dangereuses, comme moyens desquels vos ennemis se voudraient servir pour vous surprendre.
FEUQUIÈRES
1.
The Emperor’s position in Germany was stronger than it had ever been. His armies and those of his allies occupied almost the whole right bank of the Rhine, Württemberg, Swabia, and Franconia. The Austrian lands could enjoy a respite while these new conquests were bled to support the troops. John George had made himself the subordinate ally of Ferdinand, and Maximilian of Bavaria, protesting but helpless, shortly after did likewise.
He had no choice. If he refused to sign the Peace of Prague the only alternative was to join with Richelieu; but Richelieu and his ally Oxenstierna had alike embraced the cause of his dispossessed and now fatherless Palatine cousins. Neither for the first nor for the last time Maximilian’s retreat was cut off by that ambitious folly of 1622. He must subscribe therefore to the Peace of Prague, and agree to the dissolution of the Catholic League and the enrolment of all his remaining troops under the imperial command, on the same terms as John George of Saxony. For the first time in his career he was constrained to espouse the cause of the House of Austria without any guarantee that he would have a voice in its affairs.
Ferdinand sweetened the pill with some cheap concessions. Maximilian was confirmed in his Electorate, his brother in the bishopric of Hildesheim. A further bribe was offered: Maximilian’s childless wife had died, and Ferdinand suggested his own daughter, the Archduchess Maria Anna, a princess nearly forty years his junior, as her successor. Maximilian accepted. The marriage was quickly solemnized in Vienna, and within a few weeks the bridegroom paid for his bride by ratifying the Peace of Prague.
The Elector of Brandenburg, the Dukes of Saxe-Coburg, Holstein, Mecklenburg, Pomerania, the regent of Württemberg, the princes of Anhalt, Hesse-Darmstadt, and Baden, the towns of Lübeck, Frankfort-on-the-Main, Ulm, Worms, Speier, and Heilbronn had already agreed to the deceptive settlement. The constructive diplomacy of the King of Hungary had placed his father at the head of a coalition which isolated the small Calvinist minority and forced them into the unpopular position of disturbers of the peace and allies of the foreigner. The exiled Elector Palatine, the Landgrave of Hesse-Cassel and the Duke of Brunswick-Lüneburg were left alone against a united Empire.
Outside Germany the Emperor’s position appeared almost equally strong. The enmity of the Swedish government brought him the friendship of Christian of Denmark. He cherished it for an emergency: it might be very convenient to explode a sudden mine behind Oxenstierna’s back. Ladislas IV, who had succeeded the wily Sigismund as King of Poland, was at first a less certain ally. He had agreed to a twenty-six years’ truce with Sweden and contemplated marrying a no less suspect person than Elizabeth, eldest daughter of Frederick of Bohemia.[1] The King of Hungary intervened with the counteroffer of his sister, the Archduchess Cecilia Renata, incontrovertibly, from all but the personal point of view, the better match. Ladislas let himself be tempted and became once more the ally of Austria.
For the Spanish branch of the family the European sit
uation was equally favourable. The English government pursued a policy of European neutrality with a bias in favour of Spain. In the Netherlands, the Cardinal-Infant by his tact and charm repeated the feat of Don John sixty years earlier, in pacifying the Flemish;[2] now that France and the United Provinces were both actively in arms against them, they feared that they would be not liberated but torn in pieces between the invaders, and they clung to the House of Austria as to the protectors of their national integrity.
In the United Provinces, although apprehension of the results of Nördlingen had temporarily silenced it, a large peace party existed. The popularity of the Prince of Orange was ebbing; there were many in the state who feared the autocracy of the House of Orange more than they feared Spain. Inevitably the existence of this group would tell in time on the conduct of the war.
Yet the House of Austria failed to make full use of these advantages and the revival was foredoomed. Had Philip IV and Olivarez allowed some licence to the strength and intelligence of their allies in Austria and the Netherlands, all might have been well. Instead, they insisted on personally directing affairs, and forced the Emperor to obey them in return for their subsidies. Secretly they annulled the powers of the Cardinal-Infant by giving his nominal subordinate, and their own creature, Aytona, a mandate to place the orders of Madrid above those of the Cardinal.[3] Totally incompetent to solve the simplest problems of their own government, Olivarez and his King were determined on absolute dominance over the men of greater intelligence and better information who were actually on the scene of action in Germany and the Netherlands.
There was no remedy for the Cardinal-Infant’s predicament. He was governor under the King of Spain’s control and could not protest. The Emperor and the King of Hungary might perhaps have demanded greater liberty, had they not needed the bullion from the Peruvian mines. In the end they sold themselves for nothing. When, inevitably, disaster overwhelmed the government of Philip IV at home, he himself needed all his money, the supply failed and Spain dragged down Austria in her fall.
2.
The danger inherent in the Hapsburg position was concealed under immediate successes, and the years 1635 and 1636 were the most disastrous for the Bourbon and the Swedish cause in all the war. No sooner was the Peace of Prague signed than Baner’s troops mutinied. Of the twenty-three thousand men under his command hardly a tenth were Swedes, the rest of all nations, but predominantly German.[4] Saxon agents worked among these men, pointing out that both their duty and their interests should make them desert the Swedes. Their desertion would force Oxenstierna to make peace. By not making peace after Nördlingen he had sacrificed their lives in a hopeless cause, for he could not pay them and there was no hope of victory.[5]
The Thirty Years War Page 44
