by Ami Pedahzur
The attempt on his life did not stop Haddad from increasing his involvement in international terrorism. However, he became more suspicious and vigilant. The Baath regime in Iraq, which took him under his wing, provided him with breathing space so that he could continue to hatch his plots from his new and highly secure home in Baghdad. However, Mossad did not pass up the chance of “settling the score” with him. Operatives of the Tsomet unit who collected intelligence from agents who were active in Iraq learned about Haddad’s weakness for fine chocolate. Procuring this kind of chocolate in the Iraq of those days was no simple feat, so a plan was devised in which Belgian pralines would be delivered to his residence by means of a Palestinian delivery boy who was also a Mossad collaborator. The organization assumed that the gluttonous Haddad would not share his sweet prize with anyone else. Before being wrapped, the pralines were injected with a fatal biological substance that had been developed at the Research Institute of Biology at Nes-Ziona. Several weeks later, the burly Haddad began to shed pounds. Laboratory tests showed that his immune system had collapsed. All attempts to diagnose the source of the problem led to naught. In great agony, Haddad slowly deteriorated. He died a few months later.23
The death of Haddad, however, had only a short-term effect on the PFLP. After a year of silence (1980) the organization returned to its campaign of terrorism, initiating attacks against Israeli targets worldwide as well as inside Israel’s borders.
MISGAV AM
On the night of April 6, 1980, eight toddlers were asleep in the children’s nursery at Kibbutz Misgav Am: four in the Rotem wing and four in the Narkiss wing. That night, kibbutz members Esti Shani and Yehudit Guri were on duty in the Rotem wing, and Meir Peretz in Narkiss. Before Shani went to bed, she asked her husband Sami, the kibbutz secretary, to check out a problem with the electricity. On his way to the nursery he was ambushed and shot. The shooting was carried out by five members of a cell belonging to the Arab Liberation Front, commanded by Kamal Ka’ush. A short while before, the five had crossed the Lebanon-Israel border near the village of Adaisa, on the seam between the territories controlled by the Irish and Nigerian battalions of the UN peacekeeping force. They had cut through an electric fence at the border, but because the electricity was down, no warning had sounded. From there, the walk to the kibbutz, which is very close to the border, was a short distance.24
After they reached the nursery the terrorists split into two groups and took control of the two wings of the building. The two women in the Rotem wing heard the shots that killed Sami Shani, and each picked up the infant closest to her and ran to hide in the showers. The terrorists took the remaining two babies with them to the Narkiss wing, where they rejoined their three cohorts, who had already tied up Meir Peretz. The kibbutz members woke to the sounds of gunfire and gathered next to the dining room. They decided to encircle the nursery. The terrorists, noticing the movement, opened with indiscriminate fire. Under cover of the confusion, a member of the kibbutz, Ze’ev Assaf, assisted by three young people, managed to sneak through the back door of the Rotem wing and rescue the women and two babies. While this was happening, the security forces were informed and army units began to fill the kibbutz.25
Just before 3:00 a.m., the intervention team of Sayeret Golani, a reconnaissance platoon of the Golani Brigade, which belongs to the Northern Command, arrived from Kiryat Shmona. The force, whose training in hostage rescue missions was limited, prepared to secure the area until takeover forces could arrive. The IDF commanders on site, however, led by Avigdor (Yanush) Ben-Gal of the Northern Command, believed that the situation was deteriorating quickly and that the children were in great danger. He ordered the Sayeret Golani team to storm the building. The commander of the force was the first to get to the door of the nursery. When he tried to breach it, the terrorists opened fire and threw hand grenades. The officer was wounded in the stomach, and one of his men was hit in the limbs. The force of the explosion threw the two into the nursery yard. In the meantime, three more fighters were wounded from another grenade. The team’s medic, Eldad Tzafrir, was shot in the head and died on the spot. A number of grenades were thrown toward the backup team as it attempted to break through a side door, and they were forced to take cover. By this stage, the Golani force had one dead and six wounded, three of them critically. Ben-Gal decided to halt the operation. Around 5:00 a.m., Minister of Defense Ezer Weizman arrived with Chief of Staff Rafael Eitan and took command of the situation. Sayeret Matkal teams landed in the area a short time later.26
Soon after dawn, an Arabic-speaking soldier equipped with a megaphone was sent to the nursery and asked the terrorists what they wanted. They replied with a list of demands, including one calling for the immediate release of fifty terrorists from Israeli prisons and their transfer to Lebanon, accompanied by a representative of the Red Cross. The terrorists threatened to execute the infants at 7:00 a.m. if these demands were not met. When they were asked to extend the period of the ultimatum, the terrorists agreed to do so and even accepted bottles of milk for the children. Sayeret Matkal took advantage of the negotiations to prepare an assault plan. At the same time, Yamam fighters were making efforts to get to the site with a plan of their own. A few minutes before 10:00 a.m., Rafael Eitan ordered the Sayeret Matkal force to storm the building. In retrospect, Chief of Staff Eitan explained that despite its expertise in takeover situations, Yamam still lacked the necessary experience to carry out such an attack. He also made no effort to hide his lack of sympathy for the unit’s commander, Assaf Hefetz.27
Two Sayeret teams participated in the assault. Besides enlisted men, several officers also joined in, including Omer Bar-Lev and Shai Avital, future commanders of the unit. The first team breached the entrance door of the building, and the second was to enter through a large glass window. The terrorists were ready for them. They threw a grenade that wounded the commander of the first force and some of his men. After pulling himself together, one soldier from this force penetrated the building, with several others following his lead. They killed three of the terrorists, and the other team, which in the meantime had got through the window, shot two more. During the operation six men were wounded, including the unit commander, Uzi Dayan, and officers Omer Bar-Lev, Amos Ben-Avraham, and Ziv Kolberg. One of the infants, Eyal Gluska, was killed in the exchange of fire. Meir Peretz, who had been held by the terrorists, was also wounded. After the operation, the frustrated Yamam forces assembled, collected their police identity cards in a bag, and threw them away in protest. Misgav Am was the first in a long series of conflicts and disagreements between the two units.28
How is it possible to explain the repeated decisions of the heads of the security apparatus to entrust rescue operations to Sayeret Matkal, especially once the Yamam had already been perfectly qualified to carry out such operations? As hypothesized, one of the problems of Sayeret Matkal and other such units is that they mostly participate in operations that take place far from the eyes of the media and the public. In most cases, the operations are secret, technical, and are carried out on enemy territory. In comparison, counterterrorist operations, especially hostage rescues, are prestigious and receive much attention. Such operations help units to enhance their prestige both in the eyes of the public and policymakers. This explains the struggle among infantry regiments, whose role within the armed forces is completely different, to train and take part in such operations.The Entebbe raid was only one example for this rivalry. In addition to the passion for action and glorification of the unit, there is another factor—the culture of improvisation that has developed in elite military units since the period of the Palmach, through the times of the 101st Unit, and until this day. Officers and soldiers in elite units who are required to show resourcefulness in dangerous circumstances relating to their specializations tend also to be confident in their ability to adapt quickly to other unexpected events, especially those involving counterterrorist situations. Policymakers, for their part, tend to buy in to the myths developed by the u
nits and accept the word of their officers without question. Representatives of the security apparatus who supervise these crises are military people who used to be more familiar with Sayeret Matkal than the Yamam. Some served in the unit, and a few even commanded it. Consequently, even though they are aware that the Yamam is the task force most capable of carrying out such operations, time and again they follow their hearts in favor of the Sayeret.
In the early 1980s, the wave of hostage-taking incidents declined. Some analysts attribute this to changes in the nature of world terrorism, while others explain it as a result of the IDF’s efforts to drive PLO forces away from Israel’s borders during the First Lebanon War. The defensive model, which Israel applied mostly but not exclusively in airplanes and airports, had also contributed considerably. The terrorists slowly realized that in order to execute successful hostage-taking incidents, they would first have to penetrate heavily protected territories, a mission that over the years had become almost impossible.29
CHAPTER FOUR
THE LEBANESE PUZZLE
IN THE EARLY 1970S, the threat from the northern border loomed larger. With the help of the residents of Palestinian refugee camps in southern Lebanon, Arafat and his people had become a significant military force in the region, which became known as Fatahland. They established a paramilitary force consisting of three infantry brigades. The proximity to Israel’s northern border enabled the Palestinian fighters to launch a series of attacks inside Israel, some of which have been discussed in the previous chapter. Small cells that invaded Israel by land, lay in wait, and fired at Israeli cars carried out many of these attacks. This was not their only tactic. In several cases, the terrorists broke into frontier settlements and kidnapped or murdered civilians. Fatah seaborne forces breached Israel’s beaches, stealing in on rubber dinghies. These terrorists drew on the element of surprise and attacked civilian centers near where they had landed.1
One of the methods that proved particularly effective in thwarting terrorist incursions was the introduction of a dense visual-intelligence (VISINT) network that covered Israel’s land borders, as well as its air and marine space. To this end, the IDF established new observation outposts aided by advanced optic technologies, keeping a particular eye on Lebanon. Hawkeye spy aircraft and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) were also put into operation at that time. This facilitated the immediate dispatch of forces to locations where suspicious movement was identified. When terrorists still managed to penetrate Israeli territory and reach population centers, military intervention and takeover units were urgently deployed.2
Despite all Israeli efforts, the Palestinian attacks on Israeli population centers continued to increase. The most famous attack against Israel that originated in Lebanon at the time was known as the “Blood Bus” attack. On March 11, 1978, eleven Fatah members landed by sea near Highway 2, which connects Haifa and Tel Aviv. They hijacked a bus and two taxis. In the ensuing battle with security forces, thirty-five passengers were killed and seventy-one were injured. Within the political and the military establishments there was consensus that retaliation was unavoidable after such a bloody attack. Central figures in both circles concluded that in order to deter the Palestinians from continuing their attacks, the high cost of such attacks should be made clear to them. Prime Minister Menachem Begin declared in the Knesset: “Gone forever are the days when Jewish blood could be shed with impunity!” At a meeting with the families bereaved in the attack, Deputy Prime Minister Yigael Yadin implied that the Israeli response would be offensive and that revenge was imminent.3
Three days later, Israel reaffirmed its commitment to the war model. IDF forces invaded Lebanon. During the operation, the forces conducted searches and punitive actions against Palestinians situated in South Lebanon and pushed Palestinian forces beyond the Litani River. Yet it was not an effective solution to the attacks on northern Israeli communities. Fatah, which had already struck Israeli targets with Katyusha missiles in the late 1960s, adjusted to the new situation by returning to this method in the early 1980s. During May-June 1981, Fatah forces intensified Katyusha missile attacks against Israeli settlements, resulting in intensive retaliation by the Israeli Air Force. However, the inability of Israeli aerial forces to reduce the Katyusha attacks led to the signing of cease-fire agreements between the two sides in June 1981. For the first time, Israel had agreed to negotiate (although through an American arbitrator) with Fatah. While the cease-fire agreements resulted in some decline in the violence in northern Israel, Fatah operatives intensified their terrorist campaign against Israeli targets worldwide, conducting no less than nine attacks on Israeli targets between May 1981 and June 1982, mostly against Israeli diplomats and Jewish community centers. Israeli policymakers, most notably the longtime architect of Israel’s counterterrorism doctrine, Ariel Sharon, and military officers awaited the opportunity to strike again. In the meantime, they devised the Oranim Plan, a detailed scheme for an Israeli invasion of Lebanon and for the elimination of the entire Palestinian terrorism infrastructure.4
THE FIRST LEBANON WAR
On a Thursday afternoon in June 1982, the phone rang on the ground floor at 52 Evelyn Gardens in the Kensington neighborhood of London. The concierge lifted the receiver, and a man on the other end asked her to call Nawaf al-Rosan, who lived on the first floor. During a brief conversation, al-Rosan, a member of the Abu Nidal group, received instructions to set out on his mission. A short time later he packed his suitcase and walked to the Hilton Hotel on Park Lane. From the lobby of the hotel he made two phone calls, the first to Marwan al-Banna and the second to Hussein Said, instructing them to meet him at the hotel at 9:30 p.m. When they arrived, al-Rosan revealed their mission—the assassination of the Israeli ambassador to the United Kingdom, who at that moment was dining at the Dorchester Hotel.
Al-Banna brought a brown case from his car containing a Polish WZ63 submachine gun and two magazines. He handed it over to Said in the restroom of the hotel. Said immediately set out for the entrance of the neighboring Dorchester Hotel. A few minutes after 11:00 p.m., the Israeli ambassador, fifty-two-year-old Shlomo Argov, left the hotel lobby with a friend. Colin Simpson, a bodyguard assigned to him by British security, was walking to their car when he heard the blast of gunshots. The ambassador fell to the ground and Simpson began chasing the gunman. When Simpson had narrowed the gap to a few yards, the assassin turned around and opened fire on him. Luckily, Said’s aim was off. Simpson drew his gun and shot him in the head before he could get off another round. Ambassador Argov was hospitalized and underwent a number of surgeries, but ultimately, he remained paralyzed for the rest of his life. The three terrorists were caught and sentenced to prison terms of thirty to thirty-five years.5
Three days later, on June 6, 1982, Israel responded: Army forces crossed the northern border and penetrated into Lebanese territory.The government of Israel used Argov’s assassination attempt to justify a wide-scale invasion of southern Lebanon. The declared objective of the campaign was to eliminate the Palestinian terrorist infrastructure in southern Lebanon, which had made life in the outlying northern regions of Israel intolerable. The armored regiments and infantry, however, did not stop when southern Lebanon fell under IDF control; a week after the outbreak of combat, the Israeli army had massed at the edge of Beirut. The question of why Israeli forces, in fact, advanced that far became the subject of much speculation.6
One explanation leads directly to the intelligence community, specifically to Mossad. Mossad agents had operated in Lebanon many years before the military invasion of 1982. Their relationship with the leaders of Maronite Christians began in the 1950s and had developed since the infiltration of Palestinian militias into Lebanon and the outbreak of the Lebanese Civil War. Cooperation with the Christians in Lebanon grew stronger over the course of the 1970s, to a large degree as a result of sharing a common enemy—Syria, which had invaded Lebanon in 1976 in order to help the Maronite camp during the course of the civil war, but soon afterward withdrew i
ts support. With the help of the Maronite elite, Israel had established an intelligence infrastructure in that country. In the months preceding the operation, Mossad had produced assessments asserting that Israeli military involvement would strengthen the political position of the Maronite Christians in the country and would lead to an historic process of reconciliation with Israel. As a result of the assessment, Israeli policymakers, led by Minister of Defense Ariel Sharon, who was eager to uproot the PLO stronghold in Lebanon, visited Phalange leaders in Beirut months before in order to prepare a plan of operation.7
In his visits to Lebanon, Sharon was accompanied by Mossad representative in Lebanon Avner Azoulai, deputy head of Mossad Menachem (Nachik) Navot, and David Kimche, who had previously been deputy head of Mossad and was at the time general director of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The decisive visit took place on January 12, 1982, when Sharon arrived in Beirut. This time he was accompanied by the deputy head of the general staff, Moshe Levy; the head of Aman, Yehoshua Sagi; and the commanding officer of the Israeli infantry, Lieutenant General Amos Yaron. During the course of the visit, the Israelis presented several alternatives. The Christians pledged their assistance to the IDF forces on the condition that they would not have to openly cooperate with the Israelis. They were concerned that their leader, Bashir Gemayel, would be regarded as a collaborator, and that this would hurt his chances of being elected president of Lebanon. In a follow-up meeting that took place at a villa in the town of Junia, Sharon presented a revised plan to the Gemayel family and representatives of the Maronite elite. Both sides left the meeting satisfied.
The plan went as expected. On August 23, two and a half months after the invasion, and owing to the presence of the Israeli army, Bashir Gemayel was elected president of Lebanon during a lightning parliamentary process. His leadership lasted only four weeks and ended in tragedy. An explosive device planted by the Syrian Social Nationalist Party at the Phalange headquarters in the Ashrafieh neighborhood of Beirut exploded while Gemayel was giving a speech, and the building collapsed on its occupants, including the president. Bashir’s brother Amine took over the seat of power, but his relationship with Mossad was much more restrained. Later, he even repudiated his dead brother’s commitment to sign a peace treaty with Israel. Indeed, the peace agreement between Israel and Lebanon was never implemented.8
