Panderer to Power: The Untold Story of How Alan Greenspan Enriched Wall Street and Left a Legacy of Recession

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Panderer to Power: The Untold Story of How Alan Greenspan Enriched Wall Street and Left a Legacy of Recession Page 41

by Frederick Sheehan


  When the FOMC decides to raise rates (synonymous with tightening money), the Federal Reserve sells Treasury bills to the banks and receives dollars in return. The banks then have less money to lend. If the current rate was 4.5 percent, and the FOMC decided to raise the rate to 5.0 percent, the Fed will keep selling Treasury bills into the market until it rebalances supply and demand at 5.0 percent.

  When the Fed discusses whether it will or will not “move,” this refers to whether or not it will change the fed funds rate, either up or down.

  Acknowledgments

  I am thankful to Jim Grant, John Lukacs, and Maggie Mahar for their advice and for reading the early drafts.

  I thank my father and John Lukacs for their encouragement when nobody wanted to publish a book about Alan Greenspan. I know this, since my attempts to raise interest in the publishing world were met with glazed eyes and “there are enough books about him already.” The observation is correct, but all the others were written before Greenspan’s fall.

  McGraw-Hill was the only publisher with the foresight to anticipate Greenspan’s demise. Its farsightedness led to Greenspan’s Bubbles, published in 2008. Jim Grant suggested that McGraw-Hill contact me, since I had already done much of the research. Bill Fleckenstein wrote Greenspan’s Bubbles while I fed him the evidence. Leah Spiro, my editor at McGraw-Hill for Panderer to Power, was even more farsighted. She thought there was a lot more to the Alan Greenspan story than could be discussed in Greenspan’s Bubbles.

  A number of people have offered advice. Most important were conversations with Bill Fleckenstein. Since Greenspan’s Bubbles was a short book, the discussion needed to be compressed. For instance, my excavations sometimes unearthed compelling evidence of Greenspan’s misjudgments but these misjudgments were, at the same time, difficult to interpret. Our protagonist made statements that compromised his previous arguments. I’d ask Bill, “Why did he say that?” During one such discussion, Bill memorably replied: “I don’t know what’s running through his head. Our job is to record that he said it.”

  And so, if the reader of Panderer to Power wonders,“Why did Greenspan say that?” and finds little explanation from me, it is because I am no more a mind reader now than I was during the writing of Greenspan’s Bubbles. Filling pages with possibilities and probabilities is of limited value. What Greenspan (and anyone else discussed) did and said is generally accessible; why he (and others) made these decisions is fodder for discussion.

  Editors, fact checkers, and proofreaders who gave me valuable help include Leah Spiro, Ruth Mills, Anne Greenberg, Ron Martirano Scott Pilutik, Cynthia Newberry, my father, and my daughter, Anna.

  Bill Fleckenstein read several chapters in this book, for which I am most grateful. Others who read chapters, often on topics that they had personally observed or added valuable insights, include Caroline Baum, Frank Castle, Seth Daniels, Marc Faber, Earl Kishida, Bob Landis, John Lukacs, Hans Merkelbach, Jeff Poppenhagen, Dana Robinson, and Don Stanton. I thank them. They offered opinions; however, I wrote the book. All the mistakes and flaws are mine.

  Most of all, I am thankful to my wife, Margaret, my daughter, Anna, and my son, Frederick.

  Index

  A

  ABX.HE 07–01, 332

  ACC (American Continental

  Corporation), 88

  ACC Wholesale (ACC Capital

  Holdings), 328

  ACE Securities, Series 2005-HE5

  CDO, 314

  Ackerman, Joseph, 345

  Adelphi Communications, 250 Adjustable-rate mortgages, 107,

  292–293, 328–329, 344

  Advisory Commission to Study the

  Consumer Price Index

  (see Boskin Commission) Aetna Life & Casualty, 112

  AFL-CIO, 43

  Agnelli, Giovanni, 75

  AIG (American International

  Group), 306, 347n.48,

  The Age of Turbulence (Alan

  Greenspan), 303, 337–341 Air Products and Chemicals, 130 Albright, Madeline, 323

  Allen, Richard V., 70

  Amazon.com, 198

  American Continental Corporation

  (ACC), 88

  American Express, 212, 306

  American Financial Corporation,

  80, 87, 88

  American-made products, 51 Ameriquest Mortgage,

  165, 328

  Ameritrade, 212

  Anderson, Martin, 3, 6, 15, 32, 68,

  69, 83

  Angell, Wayne, 122, 131–132 Appraisal fraud, 280

  Arthur Andersen, 246

  Artus, Patrick, 342

  Asian markets, in late 1990s, 169,

  171, 172

  Askin Capital Management, 130 Asset bubbles, 289, 302–303 Asset deflation, 359

  Asset inflation, 321, 343, 359 Asset-backed derivatives, 164 Associates First Capital

  Corporation, 274

  Astor, Brooke, 75

  AT&T, 233

  Aurora Loan Services, 274

  Automobile industry, 51, 62,

  246–247

  B

  Back from the Brink (Steven K.

  Beckner), 116

  Bagehot, Walter, 103

  Baker, James, 110, 323

  Baker, Molly, 141

  Bangalore, Asha, 307

  Bank of America, 347n.48

  Bank of United States, 352–353 Bank reserve requirements, 367

  changes by Federal Reserve in 1950s–1960s, 21n.9

  changes by Federal Reserve in 1990s, 104, 124, 134–135,135n.7 Bankers Trust, 184

  Banking:

  1980s real estate lending, 105, 114–115

  and 1987 stock market crash, 112 in 1994, 128

  2007 crisis in, 334

  2009 bailouts for, 132

  deregulation of, 99–100, 102 and Federal Reserve System, 367–368

  financial concentration in,

  100–101

  hedge funds opened by, 321 and home loans (see Mortgages) international banking

  crises, 311

  large bank mergers, 277

  leveraged bank balance

  sheets, 331

  leveraged buyout, lending by, 318–319

  and liquidity of banks, 36

  and recession of early 1990s, 122, 124

  regulation of, 182–183, 185, 186, 188

  and Y2K problem, 210–211, 215 (See also Commercial banks; Investment banks)

  Barron’s 133, 233, 244, 248

  Bartiromo, Maria, 322

  Barzun, Jacques, 63–64

  Baum, Caroline, 293, 348

  BEA (see Bureau of Economic Analysis)

  Bear Stearns, 125, 272, 275, 321, 332, 346, 347n.48

  Beckner, Steven, 116, 142, 143

  Being There (Jerzy Kosinski), 75, 119

  Benjamin, Keith, 231

  Beresford apartments (New York City), 352–353

  Bergen, Candice 75

  Bernanke, Ben, 151, 186, 263,

  287–288, 292, 299, 302, 303, 310–312, 325, 330–331, 333–335, 338, 346–347, 359, 361

  refers to debt as “wealth,”

  208, 307, 308

  “Bernanke put,” 306,338

  Bernstein, Carl, 74

  Berry, Scott, 279

  Bitsberger, Tim, 272

  Blackstone Group, 311–312,

  317–318, 320

  Blankfein, Lloyd, 354, 356

  Blessing, Karl, 37–38

  Blinder, Alan, 137–139, 159, 297 Blodget, Henry, 198, 232, 233, 248 BNC Mortgage Incorporated, 274 Bond market:

  by 1987, 115

  in 1990s, 169

  leveraging in, 125–126

  Bonds:

  inflation-indexed, 147

  yields on, 72

  Bono, 353

  Boskin, Michael, 147

  Boskin Commission, 146–149, 152 Bosworth, Barry, 148

  Bowie, David (securitization), 164–165

  Branden, Barbara, 27, 339

  Branden, Nathaniel, 3, 14–15, 21, 27,
300, 339, 362

  Bresciani-Turroni, Constantino, 301 Bretton Woods Conference (1944), 22, 41

  Broadcast.com, 174

  Broaddus, Al, 262–263

  Brooks, John, 36, 319–320

  Bruck, Gilbert, 16, 351

  Bubbles:

  asset, 289, 302–303

  and central banks, 203, 204

  credit, 302, 319

  Greenspan’s statements on, 192, 203–204, 285, 350

  in housing market, 245, 261, 311, 333, 343

  in mortgages, 331

  stock market, 145, 155, 160–164, 169–178, 191–210, 285–286 Buchan, James, 281

  Buchwald, Art, 75

  “Bulldog” (repo man and credit adjuster), 165

  Bundesbank (see German

  central bank)

  Bunning, Jim, 163, 164,

  227–229, 348

  Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), 153, 197, 200, 218, 219,

  230, 230n.11

  Bureau of Labor Statistics, 147, 149, 150, 152

  Burke, James, 200

  Burns, Arthur, 3, 12–14, 21, 32, 37, 40, 41, 42, 44, 48–50, 65, 66n.25, 114, 147, 201, 300

  Bush, George H. W., 69, 70, 122–123, 306, 323

  Bush, George W., 247, 278, 308, 339 BusinessWeek, 52–53, 54, 55, 60, 81, 209–210, 233

  Butz, Earl, 56

  C

  California real estate, 63, 86–87, 88–91, 165, 273, 274, 279, 289, 292, 293, 295, 331

  Campbell, Kirsten, 233

  Capital, 364

  Capitalism, 362–364

  Carlyle Group, 323

  Carry trade, 125–126, 128, 162 in 2006, 313

  in late 1990s, 166

  Carter, Jimmy, 62–63, 67, 77

  Casey, William, 69

  CDOs (collateralized debt

  obligations), 313–314

  CDS (credit default swaps),

  314–316

  CEA (see Council of Economic Advisers)

  Central banks, 126

  1998 rate cuts by, 195

  and bubbles, 203, 204

  currencies degraded by, 305–306 and price stability, 287, 298

  (See also specific banks)

  Centrust Savings Bank (Miami, Florida), 89

  CEOs (see Chief executive officers)

  Chambers, John, 235

  Chase Manhattan Bank, 112

  Chemical Bank, 35

  Chicago, Ill, 45, 295

  Cheney, Richard “Dick,” 54, 300

  Chief executive officers (CEOs), 128, 235, 318

  Chinese central bank, 308–310

  Chrysler, 62, 246

  Churning, in mortgage markets, 262

  Cisco Systems, 177, 207, 216, 235, 237, 238, 243, 248

  Citicorp (Citigroup), 78, 79, 114–115, 275, 276, 347n.48, 354

  Clark, Jim, 141

  Clinton, Bill, 136–138, 142, 143, 216–217, 323, 339

  Clinton, Hillary, 339

  CMBS (commercial mortgagebacked security) market,

  273–274

  CMOs (collateralized mortgage obligations), 130

  CNBC, ix, 55n.33, 64, 104, 119, 193, 198, 212–213, 297, 322, 342

  Cohen, Abby Joseph, 174–175, 208, 232, 248–249

  Cohen, Steve, 324

  Collateral, LTCM failure and, 185

  Collateralized debt obligations (CDOs), 313–314

  Collateralized mortgage obligations (CMOs), 130

  The Collective, 14–15

  Columbia Savings and Loan (Beverly Hills, California), 89, 90, 93

  Columbia University, 12, 27, 28, 333

  Commercial banks:

  bailouts of, 72, 78–79

  derivative contracts held by, 312 in early 1990s, 125

  mortgages held by, 312

  Commercial mortgagebacked security (CMBS) market,

  273–274

  Commercial paper 90, 117, 306

  Community Reinvestment Act (1995), 273, 277

  Computer industry:

  in 1997–1998, 197–198

  in 1999, 207

  profit losses in, 218

  Computer prices, adjustment of, 153, 230

  Conference Board, 13

  Conglomerates, 33–36, 349

  Consumer debt, 251–258

  in early 2000s, 271

  in mid–1990s, 134

  renewing economic growth through, 311

  (See also Mortgages)

  Consumer Price Index (CPI):

  in 1960s, 39

  calculation of, 147–152

  changes to, 50

  and inflation of asset prices, 170–171

  Consumer spending, economic growth and, 291, 292, 311

  Consumerism, 22, 51, 52, 63

  Continental Illinois National Bank and Trust, 78–79, 306

  Cooper, Sherry, 344

  Coraine, Richard, 355

  Corporate bonds, yields on, 72 Corporate (business) debt, 99, 134

  Corporate executives, priorities of, 209–210

  Corporate growth, 77

  Corporate profits:

  as measure of productivity, 197 and price of stocks, 175, 177–178, 194, 216

  Council of Economic Advisers (CEA): under Carter, 61

  under Ford, 5, 47, 50, 52–57, 97 under Kennedy, 26

  Counterparty risk, 182

  Countrywide Bank, 334

  Countrywide Credit, 165, 279

  Countrywide Financial, 271, 273, 277, 347n.48

  CPI (see Consumer Price Index)

  Cramer, Jim, 208

  Cranston, Alan, 85

  Credit:

  in 1960s, 34, 37

  in 1970s, 48

  in 1980s, 77

  in 1990s, 166

  in 1999, 209

  in 2001, 245

  from 2005–2007, 312

  consumer, 252–257

  expanded access to, 296

  and Great Depression, 352

  and house prices, 290

  inflation in, 173

  from investment banks, 125 as liquidity, 363

  at mid-century, 21, 22

  and recession of early 1990s, 124 and rise in corporate/consumer debt, 134

  worldwide bubble in,

  302, 319

  Credit default swaps (CDS), 314–316 Credit-rating agencies, 270, 271, 314 Crime, inflation of 1970s and, 44–45 Crime, appraisal fraud, 280

  Crocker, Donald, 86, 87

  D

  Dallas Federal Reserve Bank, 288 The Darwin Awards, 236

  Daily Telegraph (London), 341, 344 Davis Polk & Wardwell, 116

  Day trading, 169, 211

  D.E. Shaw & Company, 323

  DeConcini, Dennis, 85

  Deflation, 287–288, 359

  de la Renta, Françoise, 75

  de la Renta, Oscar, 75

  Dell Computer Corporation, 130,

  207, 216

  Depression, deflation and, 285–286 Deregulation of banking,

  99–100, 102

  Derivatives, 111, 190

  in 2007, 303

  Congressional hearings on, 131 credit default swaps, 314

  and fed funds rate, 130

  Greenspan’s understanding of,

  189–190, 343

  held by commercial banks, 312 in late 1990s, 164–165

  and LTCM failure, 183

  mortgage securities, 273

  and recession of early 1990s,

  124–125

  risk of, 131

  synthetic CDOs, 313

  Deutsche Bank, 300, 345

  Dillon, Douglas, 26, 77

  Dingell, John, 115

  Discount rate, 1987 stock market

  crash and, 112–113

  DJIA (see Dow Jones Industrial

  Average)

  Dollar(s):

  in 1980s, 72

  and Asian financial crisis, 172–173 and gold standard, 22, 38, 41 and positive inflation, 288

  recycled into Treasury securities, 309

  shorting, 316–317

  value of,
1–2, 5

  as world’s reserve currency, 49 Dow 36,000 (James K. Glassman and

  Kevin A. Hassett), 198

  Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA),

  19, 29, 72

  and 1987 stock market crash,

  110–112

  in 1999, 198

  in 2000, 219

  in 2009, 257

  in mid–1970s, 43

  Drexel Burnham, 80, 116, 117

  Drexel Burnham Lambert, 117 Dunbar, Nicholas, 186

  E

  Earnings growth:

  analysts’ predictions of, 199–200 stock prices vs., 175, 177–178, 194, 216

  Eccles, Marriner, 20

  Eckstein, Otto, 42, 60

  Econometrics, 17, 40

  Economic forecasts (in general), 10, 43

  in 1995, 133

  by Greenspan, 3, 6, 13, 16–17, 25, 43, 54–55, 97–98, 119

  (See also Stock market analysts)

  Economic growth:

  and recovery from 1990s

  recession, 127

  and types of inflation, 166

  Economic power, struggle

  for, 364

  Economic stimulation, through monetary policy, 121

  Economics, 11–12, 96

  “New Economics,” 26–27, 39, 121, 350

  supply-side, 68–69

  Economist, 195, 286, 299

  Education, verbal inflation in, 63–64

  Efficient market hypothesis, 26, 81, 81n.37, 112, 187, 318

  Ely, Bert, 138

  Employment Act (1946), 23

  Enron Corporation, 183,

  247–248, 284

  Ertergun, Mica, 75

  Ertegun, Ahmet, 75

  E*TRADE, 212

  Eveillard, Jean-Marie, 140

  Excite@Home, 232

  Exxon, 112

  F

  Faber, Marc, 38–39

  Fannie Mae Corporation, 266–272,

  275, 279, 309, 310

  Fatbrain.com, 174

  FDIC (Federal Deposit and Insurance

  Commission), 78–79, 294

  Fed funds rate, 368

  and 1987 stock market crash, 113 in 1993, 162

  in 1994, 128–130

  in 1995, 136–137, 139–141,

  160, 162

  in 1996, 160

  in 1997, 161, 162

  in 1998, 187–189, 192

  in 1999, 208

  in 2000, 225

  in 2001, 238, 239, 245, 246, 249,

  258, 259

  in 2002, 258–260

  in 2003, 287

  in 2004, 293

  in 2007 and 2008, 338

  and global crisis, 338

  over the past two decades, 359 and recession of early 1990s, 122,

 

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