Cannons for the Cause

Home > Other > Cannons for the Cause > Page 32
Cannons for the Cause Page 32

by Martin Ganzglass


  On March 17, 1775, the raucous St. Patrick’s Day celebration by Irish Catholic soldiers deeply offended the Calvinist, Puritan morals of Bostonians. It followed disruption by other British soldiers of a Fast Day, on March 16th, called by the Congregational clergy. The Massachusetts newssheets, gazettes and magazines accused General Gage of all manner of vices and even worse, of being a Papist, whose aim was to convert all of North America (the French of British Canada having been allowed to retain their Catholicism) to Catholicism. (Hackett-Fischer, Paul Revere’s Ride, pp. 70-71,73-74).

  Chapter 2 - The Road to Albany 1) When Knox’s artillery train arrived in Albany on January 5, 1776, the ice on the Hudson River was not solid enough to hold the cannons’ weight. Colder weather followed and the river froze. Knox’s hired teamsters transported all of the cannons successfully across to the eastern shore. However, since each sled followed the same tracks as the preceding one, the constant weight and wear and tear weakened the ice. The last cannon, an eighteen pounder weighing one ton, fell through the ice and was left until it was raised the next day with the help of the people of Albany. Knox, in recognition of the local citizens help, christened the “drowned” cannon, “The Albany.”

  Chapter 3 - A New Bargain at Great Barrington. 1) Massachusetts was in open rebellion long before Lexington and Concord. General Gage, in implementing the Coercive Acts, appointed judges to the various Crown Courts. The Colonialists refused to recognize them. In many cases, the newly appointed members of the judiciary were threatened by the Colonialists and were fearful of serving. In other cases the Colonialists refused to sit on juries in such courts, Paul Revere being one of them. On September 4, 1774, Revere wrote a friend in New York:

  “. . . our new fangled Councellors are resigning their places every day,[due to threats of the people against them]; our Justices of the courts, who now hold their commissions during the pleasure of His Majesty, or the Governor, cannot git a jury to act with them, in short the Tories are giving way everywhere in our Province.” (Cited in Hackett-Fischer, Paul Revere’s Ride, p. 48)

  The incident in Great Barrington in August 1774, prevented the King’s Sessions Court from sitting and exercising its authority. It also underscored the point that General Gage’s writ, and the King’s authority, extended only so far as it could be enforced by British troops.

  Chapter 4 - “Never Was a Road There Before or After” 1) Knox kept a diary of the trip hauling the cannons from Lake George to Cambridge, Massachusetts. Unfortunately, he failed to make daily entries and there are none for some of the crucial days, particularly the struggle through the Berkshires in the dead of winter. However, the diary is useful for the details Knox does note, such as the specifics about the cannons, howitzers and mortars, their weights, and the amounts Knox paid the teamsters he had hired. (See Drake, Life and Correspondence of Henry Knox).

  There are discrepancies as to the route. Until recently, the generally accepted version was that the “Noble Train of Artillery,” as Knox called it, went south from Albany, after crossing the Hudson, through Kinderhook down to Claverack, before turning east toward Great Barrington. (See North Callahan’s biography, Henry Knox, General Washington’s General, pp 44-45.)

  However, more recent research concludes that Knox cut the corner, not proceeding as far south as Claverack, and headed southeast from Kinderhook toward the New York-Massachusetts border. You can view the route and the Knox Trail markers in New York and Massachusetts by taking the Knox Trail –Heritage Tour Guide at www.nysm.nysed. gov/services/KnoxTrail/kktour. By either route, Knox and his men struggled across the Berkshires in the midst of a brutal winter. The road from East Otis to the summit at Blandford and down toward Westfield, now Mass. State Highway 23, a distance of approximately 17 miles, is a hellish series of steep inclines and descents, without any switchbacks. Callahan claims the artillery train climbed toward the Blandford Summit passing between the two Spectacle Ponds and a mountain pass. There is no road there today. Callahan’s version rules out Knox’s route as the present Highway 23. (Callahan, p. 51). The Knox Trail markers follow Highway 23 to the Blandford summit and down to the valley and river leading to Westfield.

  On January 13, 1776, before the ascent to the Blandford summit, some of the teamsters refused to proceed any further. Again, according to Callahan, it took “about ‘three hours of persuasion’ by Knox to get them to go on.” (Callahan, p. 52). What Knox said to convince them to continue is unknown. I have used actual incidents of the Battles of Lexington and Concord as part of Knox’s fictitious speech to the Massachusetts teamsters to inspire them to continue on the trek and deliver the cannons to General Washington. These stories about the battles were well publicized by the Whigs, through sermons, gazettes and news sheets.

  For example, as the British retreated from Lexington, they passed through the town of Menotomy, now Arlington, a part of greater Boston. David Hackett-Fischer describes the stand there by an old patriot. Samuel Whittemore, who was 78 years old and badly crippled, “an old soldier and a strong Whig,. . . armed himself with a musket, two pistols and his old cavalry saber and took a strong position behind a stone wall. . . . [When the retreating British came within range] Whittemore got off five shots with such speed and accuracy that a large British detachment was sent to root him out. As the Regulars assaulted his position, Whittemore killed one soldier with his musket, and shot two more with his pistols. He was reaching for his saber when a British infantryman came up to him and shot away part of his face. Others thrust their bayonets into his body. After the battle he was found barely alive, bleeding from at least fourteen wounds. Friends carried him to Dr. Cotton Tufts of Medford, who shook his head sadly. But Samuel Whittemore confounded his physician. He lived another eighteen years to the ripe age of ninety-six, and populated a large part of Middlesex County with a progeny of Whittemores. . . (HackettFischer, Paul Revere’s Ride, p. 257.) The description of the bashing out of the brains of two Colonialists at Cooper’s Tavern by British Regulars appears on the same page.

  Chapter 5 - The Muddy Slog to Cambridge 1) Surprisingly, despite Knox’s own accounting, historians differ on how many cannons were part of his “noble train.” Knox’s specific inventory “of Cannon &c., brought from Ticonderoga, December 10, 1775, and instructions for their transportation,” lists 43 cannon and 16 mortars for a total of 59 guns with a total weight of 119,900 tons. (Drake, pp. 129-130.) Knox originally estimated it would take him sixteen days to get to Cambridge. Instead, it took more than forty days to cover approximately three hundred miles. The entire train arrived after fifty-six days. He paid for the costs from his own funds, although General Washington had given him a warrant to the Paymaster General of the Continental Army for a thousand dollars, “to defray the expense attending your journey and procuring these articles, an account of which you are to keep and render upon your return.” (Washington’s Instructions for Henry Knox, Esq., dated December 16, 1775 at Cambridge).

  Knox indeed did keep an exact accounting that came to 520 pounds, 15 shillings and 8 and ¾ pence, including expenses for himself, his brother and a servant. (Drake, p. 23.) In today’s money the cost of bringing 59 cannons, mortars and howitzers, one barrel of flint and twenty- three boxes of lead was roughly $50,735 (converting the 1780 value of 520 pounds, 15 shillings to the 2005 value of more than 32,731 pounds, converted at $1.55 to one British pound as of January 2012).

  Chapter 6 - In the Employ of Colonel Knox 1) Immigrant gunsmiths, primarily Germans who settled in the area around Lancaster, Pennsylvania, originally made what became known as the long rifle. Daniel Boone carried such a rifle with him when he explored the area west of the Cumberland Mountains. At the time that area was generally referred to as Kentucky, and the name Kentucky rifle stuck. By the 1750s, long rifles were commonly used in the frontier areas, including the western parts of Maryland and Virginia. (For more on the origin of the Kentucky long rifle, see Alexander Rose, American Rifle: A Biography).

  2) On June 14, 1775, Congress v
oted for “six companies of expert riflemen [from] Pennsylvania, two in Maryland and two in Virginia” to join General Washington’s Army in Cambridge. These rifle companies were composed of frontiersmen. They generally wore hunting shirts and moccasins, and otherwise, dressed and acted like Indians. Many carried sinister-looking hunting knives or tomahawks. They put on shooting exhibitions for the other troops and notables from Boston. One Dr. Thacher stated “their shot have frequently proved fatal to British officers and soldiers, who expose themselves to view, even at more than double the distance of common musket shot.” (Rose, American Rifle, p. 45-46).

  The musket was neither suited nor designed for accuracy. The standard army practice was to mass enough men with muskets so the volume of their fire would strike the opposing force. It was calculated that “a skilled musketman, who fired five shots a minute, and who often had just five minutes of firing time before a charge, could participate in up to nineteen battles before he actually killed a man using his [musket].” (Rose, American Rifle, p. 25).

  The frontiersmen and their accurate long rifles were certainly a novelty among the other soldiers. They were also a source of envy and resentment. The riflemen were excused from normal camp tasks, such as guard duty and working parties, and they lacked discipline. General Thomas, headquartered in Roxbury, complaining about the southern riflemen wrote they “deserted to the enemy, were mutinous, repugnant to all kinds of duty and exceedingly vicious.”

  3) Rumors about an attack across the ice were not idle camp gossip. Washington contemplated such a move in January 1776, even before the ice had frozen. By early February it was solid enough to walk on. On February 16, 1776, Washington convened a council of war and proposed that the American troops cross the frozen Roxbury Bay or attack across the ice from Lechmere’s Point. Washington was anxious to take action. The Continentals outnumbered the British and Washington wanted to strike before reinforcements arrived by sea. His Generals, by unanimous vote, opposed Washington’s plan. They objected on several grounds: there were not enough soldiers, guns or gunpowder for the assault, and the British had strong fortifications and more artillery on land as well as a strong supporting navy. What did evolve from the council’s discussion was a plan to seize Dorchester Heights, thereby threatening the British troops and fleet. The objective was to draw the British Army out of Boston to attack the Continentals on the Heights. (See David McCullough, 1776, pp. 86-87; and “Washington’s Attack That Never Was,” posted on the fascinating, detailed and lively history blog “Boston 1775” on February 18, 2008. (Boston1775.blogspot.com.)

  Chapter 7 - With the Mariners 1) A Google search for Emmanuel Leutze, Washington Crossing the Delaware yields many images of the familiar painting of the Commander-in-Chief on his way to surprise the Hessians at Trenton. The painting is wildly inaccurate: the crossing occurred at night, not at sunrise, the American Flag being resolutely held by two men was not designed and approved until later in 1777, the boat is not a high-sided Durham boat, and the entire party seems to be going in the wrong direction. Nevertheless, it is accurate in that at Washington’s right knee is an African American wearing the short blue jacket of the Marblehead Mariners.

  The Marblehead Mariners were organized as a militia in April 1775. On January 1, 1776, they were reorganized as the 14th Continental Regiment. They were sailors and fishermen from Marblehead, other Massachusetts North Shore fishing towns and Salem, where their Colonel, John Glover, was born. And they were the first integrated militia or regiment in the Continental Army. Freed Negroes worked on board Marblehead fishing vessels, lived in the same towns, attended the same churches and enlisted in the same militia as did their white counterparts. The Mariners were Washington’s amphibious troops, “sailors who could handle oars as well as muskets.” (See George Billias, General John Glover and His Marblehead Mariners ). They carried General Putnam’s men in bateaus from Cambridge into Boston in March 1776, when the British abandoned the city. Throughout 1776, the fatal first harrowing year of the War, the Mariners were the men who saved the Army. They ferried the trapped Continental Army across the East River to Manhattan. They carried the Army in retreat across the Delaware and back again on the offensive to attack Trenton. In 1776, they were the most essential troops for the very survival of the Continental Army.

  2) For the names of the fictitious African Americans in the Marblehead Mariners, I have drawn upon the Massachusetts portion of Forgotten Patriots-African American and American Indian Patriots in the American Revolutionary War published by the National Society, Daughters of the American Revolution. Many of the soldiers and sailors designated as African American, and listed as having served during the Revolution from 1775 to 1783, have first names such as Plato, Julius, Titus, Nero, Pompey, Scipio, Primus, Prince, and Fortunatus, coupled with well-established and familiar New England last names such as Abbot, Adams, Everett, Fairweather, Fuller, Gage, Glover, Mason, Mead and Miller. Presumably, their former masters, with their knowledge of Greek and Roman history, saddled their slaves with these pompous-sounding first names. Others have Portuguese or Spanishsounding names and are designated in the pension rolls as having been of Iberian, Azorean or mixed African descent.

  3) During much of the siege of Boston, the Marblehead Mariners served as General Washington’s Headquarters troops at Vassall House and were housed on the grounds. There was an actual race riot between a regiment of Virginia riflemen and the Mariners. I have placed it on the grounds of Vassall House, where the Mariners were stationed. I have also assumed it was between them and Morgan’s Rifles. Although it could have been provoked by each group making fun of the other’s uniforms or frontier dress, it was more likely caused by the presence of freed African Americans among the Mariners, which aroused the racist emotions of the riflemen.

  Here is how David Hackett-Fischer describes the event: “Many of the Virginians were slaveholders and some of the Marblehead men were former African slaves. Insults gave way to blows, and blows to a ‘fierce struggle’ with biting and gouging.’ One spectator wrote that ‘in less than five minutes more than a thousand combatants were on the field.’ [This is probably an exaggeration because the Marblehead Mariners Regiment at full strength were only 405 men].

  Washington acted quickly. A soldier from Massachusetts named Israel Trask watched him go about it. As the fighting spread through the camp, Washington appeared with his ‘colored servant, both on horseback.’ Together the General and William Lee rode straight into the middle of the riot. Trask watched Washington with awe as ‘with the spring of a deer he leaped from his saddle, threw the reins of his bridle into the hands of his servant, and rushed into the thickest of the melees, with an iron grip seized two tall, brawny, athletic, savagelooking riflemen by the throat, keeping them at arm’s length, alternately shaking and talking to them.’” (Hackett-Fischer, Washington’s Crossing, p. 25).

  4) At the end of the War, the Continental Army was the first integrated institution of the new United States of America. Again, according to Hackett-Fischer, Washington’s views on African Americans serving in the Continental Army evolved. At first, free Negroes were allowed to continue in service but no new recruits were permitted. Then, new enlistments were tolerated but not approved. By the end of the War, the Americans were actively recruiting African Americans, including slaves and promising them freedom in return for their service. (Hackett-Fischer, Washington’s Crossing, p. 22). An estimated 6,611 African Americans and other minorities, (of which roughly 1,000 were Native Americans) served in the Continental Army or Navy. See, Forgotten Patriots, Appendix D, p. 706.)

  The British, on the other hand, from the beginning of the war, openly recruited slaves and enticed them with the promise of their freedom if they fought for the Crown. Virginia Governor Lord Dunmore (who had fled from Williamsburg after a skirmish with the local militia prompted by an effort to impound their gunpowder) issued a proclamation offering slaves their freedom if they fought for the British. An initial 500 slaves were recruited into the British
Army and misnamed the Ethiopian Regiment. Lord Dunmore’s proclamation had the unwanted effect of making revolutionary supporters out of the landed gentry in Virginia and in the other slaveholding colonies. The Virginians saw the prospect of armed African Americans as a serious threat to the slave holding plantation owners, as well as the loss of valuable property. Thomas B. Allen, Tories: Fighting for the King in America’s First Civil War, pp. 154-155).

  Chapter 8 - The Bombardment from Lechmere Point 1) Henry Knox and Lucy Flucker were married on June 16, 1774. She was the second daughter of Thomas Flucker, Royal Secretary of the Province of Massachusetts. Knox was a simple bookseller. After the battles of Lexington and Concord on April 19, 1775, Knox, an avid patriot, fled Boston in disguise, accompanied by Lucy. She never saw her family again. When the British evacuated Boston on March 17, 1776, Lucy’s mother, Hannah Waldo Flucker, and Lucy’s brothers and sisters left with them. According to David McCullough, her father, Thomas Flucker, appears to have departed earlier. (McCullough, 1776, p. 103.) Ultimately, the entire family returned to London where Thomas Flucker continued to be paid as Royal Secretary to the Province. In a letter written in July 1777, Lucy informed her husband, “By a letter from Mrs. Tyng to Aunt Waldo (Lucy’s aunt on her mother’s side) we learn that papa enjoys his 300 pounds a year as Secretary of the Province. Droll, is it not?” (Noah Brooks, Henry Knox, A Soldier of the Revolution, p. 46.)

  2) According to Dr. David Robarge, Chief Historian at the Central Intelligence Agency, Washington employed subterfuge throughout the War to confuse the British and mislead them as to his intentions. One such ploy was turning barracks into hospitals and bringing wheelbarrows to the front lines in Cambridge, moves designed to deceive the British into thinking he was preparing to attack their fixed positions in Boston. In reality, he was planning a stealth operation to occupy Dorchester Heights overlooking the city and harbor. (Dr. David Robarge, “Secret Revolution: How the Patriots Used Intelligence to Help Win American Independence,” Lecture to The Society of the Cincinnati, July 26, 2011.)

 

‹ Prev