1812: The Navy's War

by George Daughan

  Perry did not want to spend the war stuck in Newport leading a few inactive gunboats. He had promised Chauncey he would bring a hundred scarce seamen to Lake Erie, and that was a powerful incentive for the commodore to request his appointment. The selection did not sit well with Lieutenant Jesse Elliott, who coveted the assignment for himself. Although junior in rank to Perry, Elliott was four years older, and after capturing the Caledonia and the Detroit off Fort Erie in 1812, he considered himself a hero, as did the country. Congress had presented him with a sword.

  Perry arrived at Presque Isle with his Rhode Island seamen on March 27, 1813. Noah Brown, the master shipbuilder from New York, and his brother Adam were already there, along with their remarkable foreman, Sidney Wright, and a contingent of shipwrights. The Browns and their men had arrived on March 2 and immediately went to work building two identical 20-gun brigs, the Lawrence (named after the late Captain James Lawrence) and the Niagara. Both would displace four hundred eighty tons and mount two long twelve-pounders and eighteen thirty-two-pound carronades. The Browns were building four gunboats as well. Daniel Dobbins was also at Presque Isle. He had been in charge there during the winter and was staying on to help Perry.

  Exquisite timber for the new ships abounded in the region—oak, poplar, ash, cedar, walnut, and pine. But nearly everything else—anchors, carronades, long guns, shot, powder, iron for making chain plates, and other items, such as canvas, rigging, fittings, tools, oakum, and cordage—had to be brought from Pittsburgh, which by then was the industrial center of the west. These supplies were conveyed up the Allegheny River and its tributary French Creek to Meadville, Pennsylvania, and then hauled north for forty-one miles over a primitive road to Presque Isle. If an item could not be procured in Pittsburgh, it had to come from Philadelphia or New York. Most of the carpenters, blacksmiths, and other skilled workmen came from eastern cities as well. In February Oliver Ormsby, a Pittsburgh merchant, became the naval agent in Pittsburgh. He facilitated the movement of supplies and workmen to Presque Isle. “Many are the difficulties we have to encounter,” Perry wrote to Chauncey, “but we will surmount them all.”

  Perry was a natural leader: frank, friendly, courteous in his manners, and modest but at the same time strict and demanding. He never spared himself, working every day at an exhausting pace. He expected everyone else to do the same. From the start, he worried about being attacked before the brigs were finished. He had his men clear the hill in back of the ships and build a blockhouse. He then went to Pittsburgh and acquired four cannon. The governor of Pennsylvania helped by sending five hundred militiamen under Major General David Mead to defend Presque Isle.

  As difficult as it was for Perry to accomplish his assignment, his British counterpart, twenty-eight-year-old Lieutenant Robert Heriot Barclay, had it much harder at Amherstburg. Barclay, although young like Perry, was also a seasoned, fifteen-year veteran, having fought at Trafalgar in 1805, when he lost an arm. He did not reach Amherstburg until June 5, two and a half months after Perry took charge at Presque Isle. Barclay’s supply chain was infinitely more complicated than Perry’s, running from England through Kingston, where his superior, Admiral Yeo, was engaged in his own arms race and was reluctant to part with the men and supplies Barclay needed. “There is a general want of stores of every description at this post,” Barclay complained to Governor-General Proctor on June 29. Barclay desperately needed the naval stores and armament that Chauncey and Dearborn had destroyed when they attacked York back in April. Making matters worse for Barclay, London’s first priority was defending Lower Canada. If absolutely necessary, Liverpool and his colleagues were prepared to let sparsely populated Upper Canada go.

  Despite Barclay’s supply and manpower problems, while Perry’s 20-gun brigs were still on the stocks, the British had a significant advantage on Lake Erie. Barclay had the 18-gun Queen Charlotte, the 12-gun Lady Prevost, the 6-gun Hunter, the 2-gun Erie, the 2-gun Little Belt, and the 2-gun Chippewa, and he was constructing a 20-gun sloop of war, the Detroit. He also had Major General Henry Proctor’s army at Fort Malden. With these forces and a bit of luck, he could squash Perry before he got started.

  The first thing Barclay did when he arrived at Amherstburg was take his fleet up to Presque Isle and have a look. He then went back and planned an immediate land and sea attack. He would need help from Brigadier General Francis de Rottenburg, the new leader in Upper Canada, who had replaced General Roger Hale Sheaffe. De Rottenburg quickly informed Proctor, however, that he would not supply the troops and provisions they needed, and Barclay abandoned his plan.

  Instead of attacking Presque Isle, he imposed a blockade on the port. Barclay thought that at some point Perry would have to float his two brigs over a formidable bar, and he did not think the Americans could manage it. Even if Perry did the impossible and got the brigs over the bar, he would have to remove their guns to do it, which would make them easy targets for Barclay’s fleet. Whatever the difficulties, Barclay was certain that the Americans would try to move the brigs on to the lake. He hoped to have the Detroit finished in time to destroy them when Perry made his attempt.

  Barclay was having problems completing the Detroit, however. He was also having difficulty obtaining enough men and supplies to keep the rest of his fleet going. He wrote to Prevost on July 16, pleading for more men, ammunition, guns, and stores. Prevost pressured Yeo to send what he could, but he also warned Barclay that the supplies would probably have to come from the enemy.

  Perry was also woefully short of seamen. He sent urgent requests to Chauncey and to Jones for more. The secretary was now corresponding directly with Perry rather than going through Chauncey, thus setting up a separate command, which Chauncey objected to. Jones made the arrangement in order to hurry along the work at Presque Isle.

  Perry became convinced that Chauncey was keeping the best seamen for his own fleet. Matters came to a head when Chauncey sent Perry sixty men from Sackets Harbor on July 16. Sailing Master Steven Champlain, Perry’s nephew, who had served under him in the gunboat flotilla at Newport, led them. Perry was desperate for men, but when he saw what Champlain brought, he did not like their quality and sent a blistering letter to Chauncey, calling them “a motley set, blacks, soldiers, and boys.” Chauncey shot back, “I have yet to learn that the color of the skin, or cut and trimmings of the coat, can effect a man’s qualifications or usefulness. I have nearly 50 blacks on board of this ship [the General Pike] and many of them are amongst my best men.” Chauncey insisted that the quality of the crews on both fleets was the same. Perry was unconvinced and annoyed. He got so angry he wrote to Secretary Jones requesting to be “removed from this station.” But Jones refused, counseling Perry to carry on in his own interests and those of the country. After that, Perry calmed down and shouldered on, but his resentment continued to smolder.

  DURING THE GREATER part of July, Barclay remained off Presque Isle blockading it with his squadron. He was unaware that the new brigs he was so concerned about were lightly guarded at night. General Meade’s Pennsylvania militiamen refused to spend nights aboard the ships. Barclay could have sent in boats during the hours of darkness and destroyed both the Lawrence and the Niagara. He remained offshore, however, watching. Then suddenly, on July 31, he vanished. He was running low on supplies and had to travel to Port Dover in Upper Canada to replenish them. He thought if Perry tried to float the brigs over the bar in his absence, at least one of them—but more likely both—would get stuck fast aground.

  Barclay’s sudden departure was just what Perry had been hoping for. His two brigs had been completed by the fourth of July, and he was waiting for an opportunity to move them onto the lake. Barclay’s blockade had stymied him until now. When Barclay’s squadron suddenly disappeared, Perry made his move, even though Barclay’s departure might have been a ruse and he could reappear at any moment.

  The depth of water at the big sandbar blocking the entrance to the harbor was only four feet, but the 20-gun Lawrence and her twin, the
Niagara, drew nine. Unknown to Barclay, Sidney Wright had solved the problem by devising giant “camels”—large, watertight containers attached to the ships’ sides below the water. The camels were designed to be filled with water, which would be pumped out at the critical moment, raising the ships enough to slide them over the bar. On August 4 Perry was ready. He removed the armaments and ballast from the Lawrence, unmoored her at high tide, lifted her by means of the camels, and floated her over the bar with surprising ease. Barclay’s squadron was nowhere in sight.

  Perry was preparing the Niagara to be floated when Barclay suddenly reappeared.

  A providential haze obscured his view, however, and Perry was able to glide the Niagara and his other vessels onto the lake without Barclay seeing them. When the haze cleared and Barclay saw the American fleet, he thought they were about to attack him. Believing he now had the weaker squadron, he exchanged a few shots and retreated. Perry then moved all his ships to the protection of the battery at the blockhouse, while Barclay sailed back to Amherstburg to work on getting the Detroit manned and equipped. Until he could, Perry would command the lake, and Barclay could no longer receive men and supplies by water. They would have to make the long trek overland through the wilderness—that is, if any were coming.

  At nine o’clock that night, an exhausted but elated Perry wrote to Secretary Jones from the Lawrence at anchor outside the Erie bar: “I have great pleasure in informing you that I have succeeded after almost incredible labor and fatigue to the men, in getting all the vessels I have been able to man, over the bar, viz. Lawrence, Niagara, Caledonia, Ariel, Scorpion, Somers, Tigress, and Porcupine.”

  Perry was still in dire need of men. On August 10 Commander Jesse D. Elliott arrived at Presque Isle with 102 sailors. Chauncey had sent them even though he badly needed them himself. Perry was happy to have the additional seamen, but he was annoyed that Chauncey had not sent more. Elliott became skipper of the Niagara and second in command of the Lake Erie squadron. Unfortunately, that was not good enough for him; he found it galling not to be the senior officer.

  Perry lost no time putting his fleet to work. On August 12 he sailed to the western end of the lake and established a base at Put-in-Bay in the Bass Islands, thirty miles east of Fort Malden, where he could keep an eye on the British fleet while training his men. General William Henry Harrison was close by in Sandusky, Ohio, and Perry established a close working relationship with him. On September 2 he sailed the squadron to Sandusky Bay to confer with Harrison, who had a high appreciation of the importance of Perry’s mission. Harrison was happy to give him a hundred thirty Kentucky riflemen for the fleet.

  With Perry in control of the lake, the British supply problem at Amherstburg became acute. General Proctor had hundreds of Tecumseh’s warriors and their families to feed, and with food running out, Proctor feared the Indians would turn on the British and massacre them all. “I do not hesitate to say,” he wrote, “that if we do not receive a timely and adequate supply of Indian goods and ammunition we shall inevitably be subjected to ills of the greatest magnitude.”

  To regain control of the lake and acquire the desperately needed supplies, Barclay was compelled to engage Perry at least a month before he was ready. “So perfectly destitute of provisions was the post that there was not a day’s flour in store,” he wrote, “and the crews of the squadron . . . were on half allowance of many things, and when that was done there was no more.”

  Barclay continued to be woefully short of seamen. He was forced to rely on the army to man his vessels. Of the 364 crewmen in his fleet, not more than 50 were British sailors; the rest were either soldiers or Canadians, “totally unacquainted with such service,” he wrote to Yeo. Many were French-speaking and could not understand English. Barclay also lacked naval guns; he was forced to use some of Proctor’s artillery for the Detroit. Barclay blamed Yeo for not providing him the seamen and ordinance he needed.

  At sunrise on September 9, Barclay stood out from his anchorage with the ships Detroit and Queen Charlotte; the brig General Hunter; two schooners, Lady Prevost and Chippewa; one small sloop, Little Belt; and two other light vessels. The following day, at seven o’clock in the morning, lookouts in Put-in-Bay spotted Barclay’s fleet. In short order, Perry had his squadron under way and standing for the enemy. His flagship Lawrence was flying a banner emblazoned with the words, “Don’t Give Up the Ship.” Fully one-quarter of Perry’s men were blacks, who were determined to give a good account of themselves.

  Presently, Barclay’s lookouts spotted Perry’s fleet. The wind was from the southwest and light, giving Barclay the weather gauge and an edge. Perry was forced to beat to windward. Around ten o’clock, however, the breeze hauled around to the southeast, giving Perry the weather gauge and the advantage. Miraculously, the wind remained light and steady for most of the next four hours. Because his crews were inexperienced, Barclay had planned to close quickly with Perry and board, but now, with the wind against him, he could not. Perry bore up for Barclay under easy sail in line abreast. Barclay formed a line of battle as well, so that each of his large ships, the Detroit and the Queen Charlotte, which would be in the center, could be supported by the smaller vessels, “against the superior force of the two brigs [Lawrence and Niagara] opposed to them.”

  The American fleet in general was stronger. Barclay’s most powerful weapon, his flagship Detroit, had seventeen long guns (one eighteen; two twenty-fours; six twelves; eight nines) and two short guns, while Perry’s lead ship, Lawrence, had eighteen thirty-two-pound carronades and two long twelve-pounders. Barclay’s long guns were effective at a mile or less, while Perry’s carronades were not effective beyond five hundred yards. The Queen Charlotte mounted sixteen twenty-four-pound carronades, but the Niagara had eighteen thirty-two-pound carronades and two long twelve-pounders. Perry expected to take a beating from the Detroit’s long guns before he could bring his carronades into play, but now that he had the weather gauge, he could close with Barclay much faster and negate to some extent his advantage in long guns. Furthermore, Barclay’s long guns were not regular naval cannon but artillery from Fort Malden, whose effectiveness on the water at any range was uncertain.

  Barclay arranged his ships from van to rear as follows: the Chippewa, Detroit, Hunter, Queen Charlotte, Lady Prevost, and Little Belt. On seeing this arrangement, Perry placed two schooners, the Scorpion (one long thirty-two and one short thirty-two) and the Ariel (four long twelves) in the lead, followed closely by the Lawrence to fight the Detroit. The Caledonia (two long twenty-fours and one short thirty-two) was behind Lawrence, followed by the Niagara, which was expected to engage the Queen Charlotte. The other schooners followed behind to support the Niagara.

  Barclay opened fire at 11:45, directing his long guns at the Lawrence, hitting her hard and badly cutting her rigging, making her difficult to manage. Conscious of the limited range of his carronades, Perry continued straining to get within effective range, suffering for ten punishing minutes before he could bring his guns into play. Finally, at five minutes before noon, Perry, supported by the two schooners, unloaded on the Detroit at about two hundred and fifty yards—“canister range,” Perry called it.

  The Niagara and Jesse Elliott, for some unknown reason, remained far to windward and far from the action. Elliott’s specific assignment was to take on the Queen Charlotte, and given the prevailing conditions, nothing prevented him from engaging her. Elliott’s reluctance to get into the fray made it appear that Perry did not have command of his squadron. Before the action, Perry reminded his commanders of Nelson’s famous admonition that “no captain could go far wrong who placed his vessel close alongside those of the enemy.” Elliott was ignoring Perry’s express order and endangering the fleet.

  Seeing the Niagara hesitating, the Queen Charlotte moved up to support the Detroit in clobbering the Lawrence. Early in the action, the Queen Charlotte’s captain, Lieutenant Robert A. Finnis, was killed, and his second, Acting Lieutenant Thomas Stokoe, was struck sense
less by a splinter. Provincial Lieutenant Robert Irvine, an enthusiastic but inexperienced fighter, took command. Losing Finnis was a severe blow to Barclay, but Irvine continued to pummel the Lawrence. Perry was receiving fire from both of Barclay’s large ships and the Hunter as well.

  Whatever Elliott’s motives in remaining apart from the fighting, the men aboard Perry’s flagship were furious with him. The Lawrence, the Caledonia, and the two schooners ahead had to withstand the full fury of Barclay’s heavy ships. For an excruciating two hours, Perry kept struggling against great odds, his ship being torn to pieces and his men being killed and wounded wholesale. Within two hours twenty-two men and officers lay dead on the Lawrence’s decks, along with sixty-six wounded. Every gun was dismounted and their carriages knocked to pieces, every strand of rigging was cut off, and mast and spars were shot and tottering; the entire ship was a wreck. “Every brace and bowline being soon shot away, she became unmanageable, not withstanding the great exertions of the sailing master,” Perry wrote. “In this situation, [we] sustained the action upwards of two hours, within canister distance, until every gun was rendered useless, and the greater part of Lawrence’s crew either killed or wounded.”

  Miraculously, Perry himself was unscathed, and he refused to surrender. But he had nothing more to fight with; not another gun could be worked or manned. Instead of hauling down his colors, however, he had a brilliant inspiration—remove his flag to the untouched Niagara. He placed the crippled Lawrence in the capable hands of First Lieutenant John Yarnall and took his private flag displaying Captain Lawrence’s inspirational words into the only small boat left on the Lawrence. With his younger brother, twelve-year-old Midshipman James Alexander Perry—also unscathed—Perry rowed toward the Niagara.

  In a few minutes, Yarnall, in order to save what was left of the crew, struck his colors, while Perry rowed furiously to reach the Niagara, determined to fight on. When he arrived, Elliott—no doubt anxious to get away—volunteered to leave the ship and bring the schooners, which had been kept astern by the lightness of the wind, into closer action. Perry agreed. In the next instant he looked back and saw that Yarnall had lowered the Lawrence’s flag. But Barclay, whose ship had also suffered grievously, could not take possession of her, and circumstances soon permitted the Lawrence’s flag to again be hoisted. Barclay later described the Detroit as a “perfect wreck.” His first lieutenant, Garland, was mortally wounded, and Barclay himself had been so severely injured just before Yarnall surrendered that he had to be carried below, leaving the Detroit in the hands of Provincial Lieutenant Francis Purvis.