1812: The Navy's War

by George Daughan

  The world did not have to wait long for an answer. Ignoring Kutuzov’s doubts, Alexander drove his army into East Prussia in late December 1812 and early January 1813, proclaiming that he had come as a liberator. Immediately, the Prussian king, Frederick William, moved to ally Prussia with Russia, and after some negotiation he signed an alliance on February 28. It was a major step forward. Already, part of Frederick William’s army under General Yorck had deserted Napoleon and changed sides.

  The key to defeating Bonaparte was now Austria. If she joined Russia, Prussia, and Great Britain, Napoleon might be destroyed. But it was unlikely that Austria would join the alliance, and even if she did, it was by no means certain that the allies could achieved the degree of cooperation necessary to defeat the new army Napoleon was raising.

  By the beginning of March the armies of Alexander and Frederick William had liberated all of Prussia. A lull followed, as the allies rested their soldiers and prepared for the inevitable showdown with Napoleon. Meanwhile, Bonaparte’s new army had swollen to 120,000, and he marched east beyond the Rhine into Saxony, intending to destroy the allies before they got stronger. It looked as if Napoleon would repeat the brilliant victories of the past. He met the allied armies at Lutzen, southwest of Leipzig, on May 2. The Russians and Prussians combined had around 85,000 men. Not only did they have fewer troops than the French, but they did not have a battlefield commander who could compare with Bonaparte.

  Demonstrating his tactical genius once more, Napoleon defeated the allies decisively. They suffered 20,000 casualties and were barely able to escape total ruin. The French had an equal number of killed and wounded, however, and unlike previous victories, Napoleon failed to pursue and deliver a final blow. Even though his raw recruits had fought well, he did not have the cavalry he once had. If he had, the defeat might have been fatal to the allies.

  The allied armies were able to retreat east and cross the Elbe to Bautzen, where Napoleon attacked them again on May 20–21. Once again, he had an advantage in numbers. The allies had around 100,000 troops, and Napoleon, having received reinforcements from France after Lutzen, now had nearly 200,000. Bautzen was almost another Austerlitz. The allies were nearly annihilated, but thanks to Marshall Ney’s blunders, they were able to escape final destruction. As they retreated east, Bonaparte’s star appeared on the rise again. When word of Lutzen and Bautzen reached Washington during the summer, Madison was relieved and encouraged. His gamble on Bonaparte was still viable.

  Instead of pressing his advantage at this point, Napoleon sent Caulaincourt to seek an armistice with Alexander, which the czar eagerly accepted. It lasted from June 4 to August 10. Napoleon’s casualties in the two great battles had been exceedingly high, and he needed to rejuvenate his army, particularly the cavalry. He later admitted that agreeing to the armistice was a major blunder. Alexander and the Prussians needed a respite more than the French did. They had been bloodied and were on the brink of disaster. They desperately needed to reconstitute their armies.

  The armistice was supposedly for the purpose of arranging a peace settlement, but both sides used it to prepare for a fight to the death. Austria had still not committed to the allies. Napoleon’s fate would hang on what she chose to do. Bonaparte saw with great clarity that he needed to placate Austria and to divide Prussia from Russia. Whether he could do so was another matter.

  Shortly after the armistice began, news came of Wellington’s stunning victory at Vittoria on June 21. The great British general had finally defeated Joseph Bonaparte and sent the French army reeling back to the Pyrenees. The victory influenced Austria’s decision to enter the war on the side of the allies, something Prince Metternich, the powerful Austrian foreign minister, had been considering for some time. Convinced that Austria could only achieve her goals if Napoleon were defeated, Metternich joined the allies on August 12. He did so only after trying to convince Napoleon to accept a modest diminution of his power. Bonaparte refused. He deluded himself into thinking he was as potent as ever and would overcome his adversaries, as he had before. Metternich concluded that Napoleon would never accept a balance of power in Europe compatible with Austria’s interests. Helping Metternich decide was Britain formally joining the alliance on July 9 and committing large subsidies to her allies. Napoleon’s intransigence created the grand coalition that alone could defeat him.

  During the armistice, the Russian army was rejuvenated. By August the combined allied armies, including Austria, were now over 500,000. Napoleon had roughly 400,000. But the allies did not have a general who could match Bonaparte; he was still master of the battlefield. Numbers alone would not determine who won. When the armies took the field again, they met at Dresden on August 26–27, and once again Napoleon was the victor, sending the Austrian-Russian army retreating back to Bohemia.

  Napoleon sent General Vandamme in pursuit. He caught up with the enemy just across the Austrian border at the Bohemian town of Kulm, where on August 29–30, he unexpectedly suffered a stunning defeat. The victory restored allied morale. Napoleon’s generals suffered other losses in separate battles as well. On August 23, Marshall Oudinot was beaten at Grossbeeren by Bernadotte (Sweden’s ruler, who was part of the alliance against Napoleon). Oudinot had been trying to attack Berlin. On August 26, Prussian General Blucher defeated Marshall Macdonald at Katzback; on August 27, General Major von Hirschfeld defeated General Girard at Hagelberg; and on September 6, General von Bulow defeated Marshall Ney at Dennewitz. Together these defeats administered a crushing blow to Napoleon. He had now lost over 100,000 men in the various battles, and he could not easily replace them. The allies, on the other hand, were having no trouble replenishing their ranks.

  The armies rested during September and met again at Leipzig, where Napoleon had taken part of his army for tactical reasons but became trapped with an army half the size of the allies who closed in on him from the north and the south. The Battle of Leipzig took place October 16–18. The fighting was intense, and in the end Napoleon, with only 160,000 men, could not prevail against the allies, who had 320,000. During the night of October 18, his dispirited troops retreated out of Leipzig toward Mainz on the Rhine River, heading home to France. On the morning of October 19, when the bloodied allies discovered that the French had left the city, there was wild rejoicing, despite both sides having lost an astounding 120,000 men killed or wounded. The French may have sustained as many as 60,000 casualties.

  Leipzig sounded the death knell for Napoleon, but he could not hear the sound. Unable to admit defeat, he intended to fight on, imagining he could still overcome his opponents. The allies were not able to cut him off before he reached the French border, condemning Europe to more weeks of suffering. On November 2 he crossed the Rhine at Mainz and rode into France. Europe east of the Rhine was now liberated, but no one doubted that when Bonaparte reached Paris, he would raise another army of conscripts and attempt another comeback.

  ON DECEMBER 30, 1813, His Majesty’s packet Bramble, under Lieutenant Pogson, arrived at Annapolis, Maryland, from Plymouth, England, with the momentous news: Napoleon had suffered a near fatal blow at Leipzig and had barely made it back to France. The Bramble also carried a letter from Castlereagh proposing direct negotiations between Britain and America without Russian mediation. The note was addressed to Secretary of State Monroe and dated November 4—after Castlereagh knew the outcome of Leipzig. Monroe immediately wrote back on January 5, 1814, accepting the offer.

  Madison’s swift approval of Castlereagh’s proposal spoke loudly of how well the British were doing in America, and how desperate the president was to end the war. Liverpool and Castlereagh were confident that in any negotiation with Madison, they would dictate the terms. And although they had proposed talks, they were in no hurry to begin them until victories on the battlefield gave them the upper hand. The Bramble departed Annapolis on January 12 with Monroe’s reply, arriving in London three weeks later. Liverpool and Castlereagh were pleased with Madison’s acceptance and his unseemly ha
ste.

  The president moved quickly to augment his negotiating team. He added Jonathan Russell and Henry Clay to work with Bayard and Adams. Clay was particularly important as a symbol to the West and the South that their interests would be protected in the peace treaty. The president also reappointed Gallatin when he found out he intended to remain in Europe and not return to the Treasury. Admiral Cockburn issued a passport for Clay and Russell to travel to Europe, and on February 26, 1814, they sailed from New York on the John Adams.

  At the beginning of 1814, things looked bleaker than ever for Madison. Repeated defeats along the Canadian border, except for Lake Erie, had undermined his hopes for a satisfactory peace. In addition, recruiting was going poorly. He had no hope of instituting conscription. Congress would never approve it. Militias from the New England states refused to march across the border into Canada, and money was hard to come by. Congress would not support a national bank or raise taxes enough to fund the war, and Federalist moneymen would not lend the president the money he needed to fight.

  The British, on the other hand, were enormously gratified by their successes in Canada. They considered the defeat on Lake Erie an anomaly that would quickly be reversed. The future for Britain on the North American continent looked exceedingly bright.

  Napoleon remained to be dealt with, of course, but optimism in London about finally destroying him was growing. He had returned to Paris in November 1813 and, as expected, immediately set about trying to raise another army of 300,000. At the same time, he held out to the allies the possibility of negotiations, and they responded on November 9 with a generous peace plan known as the Frankfurt Proposals. If accepted, they would allow Bonaparte to keep his throne, provided he evacuated the areas of Europe he still held, like Hamburg, and agreed to accept the “natural frontiers” of France, which meant withdrawing behind the Rhine, the Alps, and the Pyrenees. He would retain Belgium, the left bank of the Rhine, Savoy, and Nice. Napoleon rejected the offer out of hand.

  Liverpool and Castlereagh were relieved. Their ambassador to Austria, the young Earl of Aberdeen, had approved the proposals, but the ministry was horrified by them. Liverpool and his colleagues wanted to get rid of Napoleon completely, and they wanted France’s frontiers pushed back to what they were prior to 1792. In their view, Europe would never have peace as long as Napoleon was on the French throne. Aberdeen’s misstep moved Castlereagh to take over British leadership on the continent personally, with important consequences not only for Britain but for Napoleon, the allies, the Bourbons, and America.

  Before driving onto Paris and delivering the final blow to Bonaparte, the allies issued a declaration that the boundaries of France would be returned to those existing in 1792. It was not meant as an offer to Napoleon, but even if it had been, he would have scorned it. Returning to those boundaries would have meant that the size of France had been reduced while he was in power, a prospect that was anathema to him. Losing more contact with reality by the day, he fought on, believing he could still win. He was able to raise less than 100,000 men, however, while the allied armies gathering along the French border totaled over 400,000. The czar, who had never liked the Frankfurt Proposals either, wanted to get on with the march to Paris and dictate terms, as did some of the Prussians like General Blucher. By this time, Wellington was established in the south of France with an army of 80,000. He had consistently pursued a generous policy toward the French people and was warmly received in most places.

  Napoleon tried to summon the patriotic spirit of the nation, hoping he could convince the French to fight a partisan war, as the Spanish had against him. “The whole nation will be under arms,” he promised Caulaincourt. “We shall have to come to the enemy’s rescue to stop the violence; they will slaughter everything that has a foreign look to it.” But he was dreaming. The French people no longer supported him. They had had enough of heavy-handed government, excessive taxation, being deprived of free speech and political rights, and most of all, having their youths harvested three times a year to be consumed in endless war. Instead of support, Bonaparte found widespread hatred of him and his regime. Thousands of young men fled the country to avoid conscription.

  It took some time for the allies to mount a successful drive on Paris, however. They had great difficulty working in harness. Their squabbling added considerably to Napoleon’s chances for survival. Even with his small army of 70,000, he went on the attack and won a series of battles in February 1814 against the Prussians and the Austrians fighting separately. He did so well that Austria was on the verge of pulling her army back beyond the French border. Castlereagh’s timely intervention kept them in the fight and prevented the alliance from splitting apart. In the end, Bonaparte’s obstinate resistance forced the allies to bury their differences and continue working together. On March 9 they signed the Treaty of Chaumont, pledging to fight until France was reduced to her prerevolutionary boundaries.

  As the allied armies closed in on Paris during the last two weeks of March, the French vigorously defended their capital, but they were overwhelmed and forced to surrender on March 30. Napoleon wasn’t there; he had already left Paris to continue the fight.

  The following day Alexander and Frederick William rode into the city in triumph. As they did, demonstrations in favor of Louis XVIII broke out. Talleyrand had organized them to show Alexander, who detested the Bourbons, that the people wanted the monarchy restored. Behind the scenes, Castlereagh gave tacit support to Talleyrand’s efforts. The Times reported approvingly that “the cry of Vive Louis XVIII is heard everywhere.” Meanwhile, Napoleon continued to believe that all was not lost. He tried to resume the struggle from Fontainebleau, but his marshals would have no more, and on April 11 he finally abdicated unconditionally.

  In a few days, he began his journey from Fontainebleau to St. Raphael on the Mediterranean, where the British frigate Undaunted waited to take him to Elba. The trip was one of the most dangerous of his life. Only the skill and bravery of his guards saved him from being torn to pieces by his own people. He managed to reach his destination, however, and Europeans, including the French, celebrated his departure. In London, the Times reported “heartfelt and universal joy.” In America, however, the mood was more mixed. Thomas Jefferson wrote to John Adams, “I own that, while I rejoice, for the good of mankind, to the deliverance of Europe from the havoc which would have never ceased while Bonaparte should have lived in power, I see with anxiety the tyrant of the ocean remaining in vigor, and even participating in the merit of crushing his brother tyrant.”

  Britain’s celebratory mood did not lessen her commitment to throttle the United States. “The reinforcements for North America all sailed last week,” the Times noted with approval on April 11. The troops were expected to rendezvous at Bermuda and then sail to the St. Lawrence and Quebec. Four days later the Times wrote, “There is no public feeling in this country stronger than indignation against the Americans.” It accused Madison of attempting “to consummate the ruin of Britain.” “The American government,” it cried, “is in point of fact as much of a tyranny . . . as that of Bonaparte. . . . It has already indulged in something more than dreams of the most unmeasured ambition.... [It seeks to] sap the foundations of our maritime greatness . . . seize our possessions on mainland America and later in the West Indies.”

  The Morning Post had been using even more extravagant language for months, calling the American government “unprincipled” and “contemptible.” The Courier was equally vicious.

  One would have thought that after more than twenty-two years of war, the British people, and especially their army and navy, were entitled to some relief. Instead, the Liverpool government intended to turn their war machine against the United States and cut her down to size. The Times wrote that substantial numbers of troops in France would be “immediately transferred to America.”

  In all the excitement over Napoleon’s downfall, the Liverpool ministry—and indeed the country—were overly sanguine about how easily Euro
pe’s boundaries could be redrawn. Fundamental differences existed among the greater and lesser powers about what the new Europe should look like. Allied unity had been possible only because of a common enemy, and even then, getting the great powers to work together had been exceptionally difficult. Once Bonaparte was removed, ancient rivalries were bound to surface. Rearranging the European map might absorb as much of Britain’s energy as Napoleon had. For the moment, however, intoxicated with success, the British minimized Europe’s problems and fixated on curbing America’s power.

  MADISON RECEIVED WORD of Napoleon’s demise in the middle of May and with it news that he had long feared—a huge British army was on the way to North America via Bermuda. The war that he had undertaken to insure free trade and sailors’ rights was about to become one to save the United States, and in that sense it would be a second war of independence.

  CHAPTER TWENTY-ONE

  British and American War Plans

  THE LIVERPOOL MINISTRY’S plan of attack against the United States had been developing for weeks before Napoleon’s abdication, but it could not be implemented until Bonaparte was packed off to Elba in April 1814. Once that event actually occurred, the prime minister and his colleagues intended to divert forces from Europe to smash the incipient power of the United States. They wanted to regain Britain’s position as the dominant power on the North American continent and crush a bothersome maritime rival.

  Their grandiose strategy included two major invasions of the United States—one from Canada and the other from New Orleans. Simultaneously, large-scale raids would be conducted along the Atlantic seaboard to act as diversions, and the blockade would be tightened from the Canadian border to Louisiana. The goal was to wrest the Louisiana Territory, including West Florida, from the United States and unite it with both Canada and the newly acquired base at Astoria on the Pacific coast. At the same time, Liverpool intended to further dismember the United States by encouraging New England to break away from the Union and either join Canada or become independent and by creating a huge Indian buffer state north and west of the Ohio River.