When Sinclair departed, he sailed to the Nottawasaga River and destroyed the schooner Nancy. Her skipper, Lieutenant Miller Worsley, and his sparse crew escaped, however, and made their way to Michilimackinac in canoes. While they did, Captain Sinclair sailed for Detroit, leaving the small schooners Tigress (one gun, Sailing Master Stephen Champlin) and Scorpion (two guns, Lieutenant Daniel Turner) to maintain American naval supremacy on Lake Huron and make life difficult, if not impossible, for McDouall.
Lieutenant Worsley decided to turn the tables on the Americans, however, and McDouall supported him. On September 3, Worsley led a surprise night attack on the Tigress, using four small boats filled with armed men, including some Indians. They had rowed silently for six miles from a hiding place to within one hundred yards of the Tigress when her night watch spotted them and opened fire with muskets and a single twenty-four-pounder. Worsley was not deterred; he soon pulled up to the schooner’s side and boarded. After a fierce hand-to-hand fight, his superior numbers told, and Sailing Master Champlin surrendered with thirty sailors.
The Scorpion had been fifteen miles away when the Tigress was captured, and Lieutenant Turner had no idea what had happened. Two days later, the Scorpion returned and anchored for the night two miles from the Tigress, where Worsley and his men were hiding. Worsley had the American flag flying conspicuously on the Tigress. Turner did not suspect a thing. At dawn, the Tigress crept toward the Scorpion. Worsley got to within ten yards before being discovered. As the Scorpion’s night watch fired at him, he ran up alongside, jumped aboard with his crew, and overpowered Turner and his thirty-two men.
Not long afterward, McDouall went on the offensive, sending a substantial force of over six hundred men to seize Prairie du Chien on the Upper Mississippi, in what is today southwestern Wisconsin but was then Illinois Territory. An American force of two hundred men had captured the area in May 1814 and built a fort. Prairie du Chien was strategically located at the terminus of the Fox-Wisconsin waterway that connected the Great Lakes with the Mississippi. It was an important fur trading center, where Jacob Astor had a large warehouse. McDouall’s men easily captured the American fort, which surrendered on July 19. Major Zachary Taylor tried to regain control of the area later, marching three hundred thirty men in August to the mouth of the Rock River in Illinois, but he was checked on September 5 by Indians, supported by British regulars from Prairie du Chien, and he retreated to St. Louis. The British and their Indian allies held the area until the war was over.
The administration, meanwhile, went ahead with General Brown’s invasion of Canada in the Niagara region, despite the threat to the eastern states from British forces gathering at Montreal, in Bermuda, and in Chesapeake Bay. It was decided that Brown would cross the Niagara and take Fort Erie, then proceed north and attack Fort George. After that, he would move on to Burlington. If all went well, he would combine with Chauncey and occupy York again and then Kingston. If that were accomplished, he was to push into the St. Lawrence with the armed galleys being made at Sackets Harbor and move on Montreal. It was a strategic vision divorced from reality, particularly with the thousands of reinforcements Prevost was receiving at the port of Quebec from Wellington.
Brown’s offensive depended on Chauncey regaining control of Lake Ontario. Without Chauncey’s big guns, Brown could not hope to take even Fort George. He could subdue lightly defended Fort Erie, but that was about all. Since Chauncey would not be ready until mid-July at the earliest, Armstrong advised Brown: “To give . . . immediate occupation to your troops and to prevent their blood from stagnating—why not take Fort Erie and its garrison, stated at three or four hundred men. Land between point Albino and Erie in the night—assail the fort by land and water—push forward a corps to seize the bridge of Chippawa, and be governed by circumstances in either stopping there, or going further.” Armstrong sent the necessary orders to Brown on June 10.
Brown decided to follow Armstrong’s suggestion. He wrote to Chauncey asking when he’d be ready to stand out into Lake Ontario. Chauncey replied on June 25 that his movements would depend on Yeo. He would not move up the lake to Niagara unless Yeo led him. This amounted to no commitment at all. Brown conferred with his commanders, Generals Eleazer Ripley and Winfield Scott, who gave him conflicting advice. Ripley advised waiting for Chauncey, but Scott wanted to act now. He had been training his men for months, and he was anxious to lead them into battle. Brown decided that the United States needed a victory at this depressing time and planned to attack Fort Erie.
On July 2, in the dead of night, concealed by a heavy fog, Scott and Ripley led 3,500 men—Brown’s entire army—across the Niagara River. Scott commanded the left division and Ripley the right. Scott was in the lead boat and nearly drowned when he stepped out too soon into deep water. Only 137 men were defending the fort, and their commander, Thomas Buck, immediately sent word of the invasion to the British commander at Chippawa. At eight o’clock Buck fired three small cannon, and four hours later he sent out a flag of truce and surrendered. When the residents of Chippawa heard what had happened, they evacuated the town.
The following day, July 4, Brown sent Scott and his brigade north to Chippawa on what amounted to a recognizance in force. British lieutenant colonel Thomas Pearson, one of Wellington’s veterans experienced in rearguard actions, harassed Scott the entire sixteen miles with a small detachment of light infantry and dragoons, making Scott’s march to Chippawa far more difficult than he had anticipated. Scott had to cross five creeks, and Pearson annoyed him at each one of them.
Major General Phineas Riall was in command on the Niagara peninsula, and he was at Fort George when he learned of the invasion. He immediately sent to General Drummond at York for reinforcements and then marched what troops he had to reinforce Chippawa. When Scott reached the south side of the Chippawa River, he found that Riall had taken up a strong defensive position on the north side. Deciding to wait for reinforcements, Scott withdrew south a short distance to Street’s Creek, which he crossed, and settled down for the night. Brown and Ripley joined him later with additional troops. The former congressman, now militia general, Peter B. Porter arrived with New York volunteers and Indians early the next morning.
By July 5, Riall had 1,350 regulars, 200 militia, and 350 Indians led by John Norton. In spite of knowing he was greatly outnumbered, he crossed the Chippawa with 1,200 regulars and attacked, thinking the American militiamen would run. Scott reacted quickly, marching his brigade, 1,300 strong, over the single bridge at Street’s Creek under heavy fire and deployed on the plain between the creek and the Chippawa River. Scott’s soldiers were attired in grey uniforms, which Riall thought marked them as militiamen. He soon realized, however, that he was facing regular troops—militiamen would have run long before now. A vicious fight ensued for an hour, when Riall, much to his surprise, was forced to withdraw. He successfully retreated across the Chippawa, destroying the bridge as he went. Scott and Porter were close behind, but with little daylight left, Brown ordered them back to camp. Casualties on both sides were severe—485 British and 319 Americans.
“For completeness, Scott’s victory at Chippawa could be compared with that of Isaac Hull over the Guerriere,” Henry Adams wrote, “but in one respect Scott surpassed Hull. The Constitution was a much heavier ship than its enemy; but Scott’s brigade was weaker, both in men and guns than Riall’s force.” Actually, Scott’s force slightly outnumbered Riall’s. Nonetheless, Chippawa was a source of immense pride to the fledgling U. S. Army. For the first time, American regulars defeated British regulars of nearly equal force in an engagement on an open plain. Instilling self-respect in the beleaguered American army was no mean achievement, but Scott paid a high price in lives for a victory that had only symbolic value.
Two days later, Brown crossed the Chippawa in force, and Riall retreated, falling back toward Burlington Bay to await reinforcements, leaving detachments at Fort George and Fort Niagara. Brown then moved his army up to Queenston, five miles from Fort
George. He needed siege guns to attack the fort, however, and he did not have any. He also needed reinforcements and provisions, all of which he expected Chauncey to supply. But Chauncey, who was seriously ill at the time, still did not have command of the lake, despite his earlier promises. He could neither stop Drummond from moving troops and provisions across the lake to Riall nor help Brown. And even if he could, he had made it clear in his June 25 letter that his movements would be dictated by Yeo, not by Brown. In other words, Brown was not to count on him for either bombarding Fort George or for transporting men and supplies.
Anxious to counter Brown’s movements, General Drummond took advantage of Yeo’s dominance on the lake to ferry reinforcements from Kingston and York to the Niagara area. At the same time, sickness and desertion had reduced General Brown’s army to 2,500 effectives. Chauncey’s weakness put Brown in danger of being stranded on the west side of the Niagara, cut off from his bases at Buffalo, Black Rock, and Fort Schlosser on the east side of the river. All three places were weakly defended. If Drummond and Riall pushed down on both sides of the river, Brown would be trapped on the Canadian side.
Recognizing his exposed position, Brown withdrew south of Chippawa on July 24. Riall followed with 1,000 men, marching at night, stopping at Lundy’s Lane, just north of town. On July 25 Brown dispatched Scott’s brigade north toward Riall in the hope that Drummond, who was now at Fort Niagara, would notice and concentrate on coming to Riall’s rescue, rather than marching down the east side of the river, taking the forts, and trapping the American army.
Drummond did exactly what Brown wanted. By late afternoon on the twenty-fifth, Drummond had crossed the river and was approaching Riall with a 2,000-man reinforcement. Before he arrived, Winfield Scott’s brigade appeared and began attacking Riall, who ordered a retreat. But when Drummond arrived suddenly, Riall countermanded his order and turned on Scott. Riall’s force was now three times larger than Scott’s. It was 6 P.M.
Scott soon discovered he was badly outnumbered and sent for reinforcements while continuing to skirmish so fiercely that Drummond thought he was facing a much larger army than he was. In the initial fighting, Riall himself was captured. In the next couple of hours, Brown, Porter, and Ripley arrived with reinforcements and artillery. The American force now totaled 2,800 men.
A general battle developed that lasted from around 8:45 until midnight and was as fiercely fought as any in the war. The key was Drummond’s artillery, which was posted on a small hill north of Lundy’s Lane. Brown and his generals recognized that they had to seize the seven heavy guns there or lose the battle, and after heroic efforts they succeeded. They then beat off three of Drummond’s counterattacks. The fighting went on hour after bloody hour, the armies often within half pistol shot of each other. “The slaughter had been prodigious,” Brown reported, and as midnight approached, he decided to withdraw to Chippawa to regroup before returning to the fight. By that time, the battle had lasted for six ugly hours. It had been a ghastly bloodletting. Brown had 171 killed, 572 wounded, and 110 missing. Drummond had 84 killed, 559 wounded, 193 missing, and 42 prisoners. Brown was badly hurt, and so was General Scott. His wound was so severe he could no longer participate in the war.
Both sides claimed victory. Since the British remained on the battlefield, they maintained they had won. But Militia General Peter Porter wrote in his report to Governor Tompkins that “victory was complete, ... but converted into a defeat by a precipitate retreat.” In fact, Lundy’s Lane was a bloody draw. If anything, it was an American victory. Brown held Drummond off with a decidedly weaker army. When Brown withdrew from the battlefield, Drummond, who had been shot in the neck himself, could not follow; his army was as totally exhausted as Brown’s was.
The following morning, Ripley, under Brown’s order, reluctantly led 1,200 exhausted men back to the battlefield. He soon found Drummond, who obviously had a larger force. Ripley did not attack as Brown had directed. Neither did Drummond. They simply watched each other warily from a distance. Believing the Americans outnumbered him, and knowing that the previous day’s fighting had worn out his troops, Drummond let Ripley retire unmolested, which the American general chose to do.
Ripley’s return to camp angered Brown, who was convinced that Ripley was robbing him of a chance for a clear-cut victory. Nonetheless, given the condition of his army, there was nothing Brown could do for the moment. He ordered Ripley to move the men sixteen miles back to Fort Erie; Ripley proceeded to do so that same day. Brown was taken to Buffalo to recuperate, and from there he sent to Sackets Harbor for General Gaines to assume command at Fort Erie. Brown did not trust Ripley to do the job.
COMMODORE CHAUNCEY, WHO had just regained command of Lake Ontario, finally appeared off Fort George on August 5 with a squadron, but it was much too late to coordinate an attack with Brown. Chauncey then returned to blockading Kingston, which prevented General Drummond from receiving supplies by water. Men marching overland reinforced Drummond, however, increasing his army to over 3,000.
With his new troops in camp, Drummond carefully planned an assault on Fort Erie. While waiting, he sent a detachment of six hundred exhausted regulars across the Niagara to attack Black Rock, but two hundred forty American riflemen beat them off, and the British returned to camp.
Before Drummond attacked Fort Erie, the Royal Navy pulled off a smart action on the Niagara River just outside the fort. On August 12 British commander Alexander Dobbs and seventy-five men surprised and captured the 3-gun schooner Ohio, under Lieutenant Augustus H. M. Conckling, and the 3-gun schooner Somers, under Sailing Master Gamliel Darling. The schooners were part of the American fleet on Lake Erie and had thirty-five men each. They had been anchored close to Fort Erie to assist the army. Dobbs narrowly missed capturing a third schooner, the Porcupine, under Acting Sailing Master Thomas Brownell, who heard the commotion, cut his cable, and, using the current in the Niagara, slipped away into the night.
The next day, August 13, Drummond began bombarding Fort Erie. His long delay had given generals Gaines and Ripley critical time to strengthen the dilapidated fort. On August 15, Drummond attacked in earnest, with 2,100 men in three columns rushing the fort. But they were beaten back with huge losses—57 killed, 309 wounded, and 539 missing. The Americans had 84 casualties. Drummond’s repulse underscored the bloody stalemate that had developed on the Niagara frontier.
Despite Drummond’s defeat, he remained outside the fort, rebuilding his force and planning another attack. Inside the fort, General Brown, although still recovering from the wounds he received at Lundy’s Lane, had assumed command again. General Gaines had been wounded in the fighting. Brown was not content to remain on the defensive. On September 17 he launched a surprise attack on the enemy’s three main batteries. The fighting was ferocious, and Drummond eventually drove Brown’s men back with heavy losses on both sides. The Americans suffered 79 killed and 432 wounded, while Drummond had 115 killed, 176 wounded, and 315 missing. The butcher’s bill was so excruciating it influenced Drummond to finally call off the siege on September 21 and retreat back to Chippawa. Brown could not follow; the casualties he had sustained made it impossible.
The standoff in the Niagara region continued. It demonstrated that Madison’s dream of conquering Canada was dead, but also that the U. S. Army, with its new leadership, could stand up to British regulars, making the Liverpool ministry’s plans for invading America look ill-advised. The strength shown by both sides in these bloody battles would have important consequences when the peace treaty was negotiated later in the year.
CHAPTER TWENTY-TWO
The British Blockade
WHILE A STALEMATE had developed on Lake Ontario and along the Niagara River, Vice Admiral Cochrane was tightening his blockade along the American coast and conducting large scale raids to divert attention away from General Prevost’s invasion of the Champlain Valley. As early as March 11, 1814, Cochrane wrote to Prevost, “I hope to be able to make a very considerable diversion in the Chesa
peake Bay, to draw off in part the enemy’s efforts against Canada.” The decision about where to attack along the American seaboard was left to Cochrane, but clearly Washington and Baltimore were prime targets.
As Cochrane thought about the tasks assigned to him, he estimated that ninety-eight warships would be required—seven ships of the line, five razees, twenty-eight frigates, thirty-eight sloops, and twenty smaller vessels. When he arrived in Bermuda, Cochrane had a total of fifty-six warships under his command. By any measure, it was a large fleet, but not enough to tighten the blockade and conduct raids at the same time.
As one of his first acts, Cochrane extended the commercial blockade to include New England. The British blockade now ran from the Canadian border to Louisiana. Since General Ross and the additional troops needed to conduct substantial raids would not arrive until summer, Cochrane concentrated on the blockade. At the same time, he ordered his subordinates to carry out what raids they could. He wrote to Admiral Cockburn on April 24 that Americans in the seaports towns need to “be taught to know that they are now at the mercy of an invading foe.”
Cochrane also planned to encourage slaves to leave their masters and join the British army. Luring slaves away from their masters was part of his attack on the American economy, just as the blockade was. He hoped to augment his strike force with ex-slaves and at the same time deprive the local economy of essential manpower. On April 2 Cochrane issued a proclamation urging slaves to join the British army or become “free settlers into some of His Majesty’s colonies.” He promised to receive them aboard the king’s ships “or at the military posts that may be established upon or near the coast of the United States.” He ordered Rear Admiral Cockburn to establish posts in Chesapeake Bay to receive the refugees. Bathurst prohibited Cochrane from encouraging slaves “to rise upon their masters.” The admiral was expected to entice them into leaving peacefully, which in most cases they did.
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