1812: The Navy's War

by George Daughan

  On the other hand, Cochrane yearned to hurl Mr. Madison “from his throne.” He was also impressed with the psychological importance of taking the capital and of how easy it would be right then. Rear Admiral Cockburn had been urging Cochrane to attack right away. “It is quite impossible for any country to be in a more unfit state for war than this now is,” he wrote to his chief, “and I much doubt if the American Government knew . . . every particular of the intended attack on them, whether it would be possible for them to . . . avert the blow.” In another letter, written the same day, Cockburn boasted, “within forty-eight hours after the arrival in the Patuxent of such a force as you expect, the city of Washington might be possessed without difficulty or opposition of any kind.”

  In spite of Cockburn’s assurances, Cochrane and Ross remained uncomfortable with the timing of an attack on Washington. They left Bermuda on August 1 in Cochrane’s flagship, the 80-gun Tonnant, and sailed for Chesapeake Bay to confer with Cockburn. A flotilla of troop transports and warships, under Rear Admiral Pulteney Malcolm, left Bermuda two days later, arriving at the Virginia Capes on the fourteenth, after six hundred often difficult miles, discomforting the long-suffering soldiers even more.

  President Madison was convinced that Washington would be Admiral Cochrane’s primary target. Secretary of State Monroe agreed with him. At one time Monroe entertained the idea that the British would be so tied down in Europe dealing with the aftermath of the war that they would not invade the United States at all, but when he saw them building up their forces in North America, he became convinced that Washington was in mortal danger. Secretary Jones thought that the British might attack Washington but that Baltimore or even Annapolis was a more likely target. Secretary Armstrong was fanatical in his belief that only Baltimore would be attacked.

  Madison, however, was certain the British would aim at the seat of government. Attorney General Rush reported that the president thought Washington would be an inviting target because of “the éclat that would attend a successful inroad upon the capital.” As apprehensive as the president undoubtedly was, it is difficult to explain why he hadn’t strengthened the capital’s defenses much earlier in the war. Madison thought a force of around 13,000, including 500 of Barney’s sailors, would be sufficient to defend the capital, and he believed they could be obtained from the militias of the District of Columbia and the surrounding states of Virginia, Maryland, and Pennsylvania. Secretary Armstrong was in charge of the capital’s defense, but he remained unshakable in his conviction that the British would not attack there, and he did nothing to prepare. Madison was well acquainted with the secretary’s views and actions, but still he did not replace him.

  To strengthen Washington’s defense, Madison on July 1 created the tenth military district, which included the capital, Maryland, and parts of Virginia. And he put thirty-nine-year-old Brigadier General William Winder in command. It is difficult to explain why Winder was appointed. He had been one of the key figures responsible for the defeat at the important Battle of Stoney Creek on the Niagara Peninsula the previous year. That action stopped the progress Dearborn and Chauncey were making against Upper Canada.

  Winder had been captured and removed to Quebec with the rest of the prisoners. He was then released to go to Washington and arrange a prisoner exchange, which he did, concluding a convention on April 16, 1814. He was the nephew of the antiwar Federalist governor of Maryland, Levin Winder, and that may be why the president appointed him.

  Madison may have thought that having the governor’s nephew in command would make calling out the Maryland militia easier. Whatever the president’s reasoning, it was a baffling appointment. To make matters worse, the inscrutable Armstrong opposed Winder’s selection and refused to work with him.

  Winder’s recruitment problems were daunting. Only 500 regulars were in the Tenth District. Primary reliance had to be on militiamen. Although 93,500 had been placed on alert, Winder had no authority to call them out until there was imminent danger. On July 12, he received permission to call up 6,000 from Maryland, but in the next six weeks his uncle managed to produce only 250. Even when called up, the militiamen were not under Winder’s command until the War Department organized and equipped them and turned them over to him. On July 17 Winder was allowed to call up 7,000 more from Pennsylvania, 2,000 from Virginia, and 2,000 from the District of Columbia, but fewer than 1,000 appeared. It turned out that because of changes in state law, Pennsylvania could not send any.

  Armstrong was indifferent to Winder’s problems. The secretary was constantly complaining about the lack of money, absolving himself of any shortcomings, and placing the blame for whatever happened on the president and Congress. Avoiding responsibility was an old habit of Armstrong’s.

  The secretary’s gross insubordination continued unabated throughout the crisis. He gave no direction to Winder, who had no idea how to proceed. The hapless general spent an inordinate amount of time simply reconnoitering the area under his supervision without doing anything to erect defenses along the major invasion routes to the capital. The first and most likely was through Bladensburg; another was through Old Fields to the Eastern Branch bridge, a mile from the Washington Navy Yard. Yet another was by way of the Potomac. That was the least likely: the river itself presented too many obstacles to navigation. And it was defended at a strategic point by Fort Washington on the Maryland side of the river, opposite Mount Vernon. Winder made no attempt to fortify Bladensburg or to strengthen Fort Washington.

  ON AUGUST 14 General Ross and Admiral Cochrane arrived at the mouth of the Potomac in the Tonnant for talks with Rear Admiral Cockburn. They still entertained doubts about the wisdom of attacking Washington right then. The weather was a problem, as was the condition of the troops after their long voyages. Also, using 4,500 tired regulars to attack the capital of a nation of nearly 8 million would seem at first glance a harebrained scheme. Cockburn, however, was absolutely confident, as he always was, and he removed their doubts. They agreed to land the troops at Benedict, Maryland, on the Patuxent, and march them along the west bank to Lower Marlboro and then Nottingham. At the same time, Cockburn would ascend the river with his squadron on Ross’s flank, carrying supplies. Their immediate objective was the destruction of Barney’s flotilla. Once that was accomplished, a final decision could be made about Washington.

  Figure 24.1: Irwin Bevan, Attack on Fort Washington on Potomac, 17 August 1814 (courtesy of Mariner’s Museum, Newport News, Virginia).

  On August 17, Cochrane ordered Captain James A. Gordon to sail up the Potomac with a powerful squadron, draw attention away from Ross’s landing, and assist him as a rear guard. Beside his own 38-gun frigate Seahorse, Gordon had the 36-gun Euryalus, under Captain Charles Napier; the bomb vessels Devastation (Captain Alexander), Aetna (Captain Kenah), and Meteor (Captain Roberts); the rocket ship Erebus (Captain Bartholomew); the schooner Anna Maria (a tender); and a dispatch boat. The Potomac was extremely difficult for larger ships to ascend, which is one of the reasons Secretary Jones thought it unlikely the British would attempt it. Gordon, who had the temporary rank of commodore and was one of the senior—and most accomplished—captains in the Royal Navy, expected the river and Fort Washington to give him plenty of trouble.

  As a further distraction in favor of Ross, Cochrane sent Captain Sir Peter Parker to create havoc farther up the Chesapeake above Baltimore with a squadron that included the 36-gun Menelaus and some smaller vessels. Cochrane then proceeded with the remainder of his naval force to the mouth of the Patuxent and landed Ross and his army on August 19 and 20 at Benedict, forty-five miles from Washington. The town was practically empty; the townspeople had fled. Ross had one six-pounder and two three-pounders. Attacking the American capital with only 4,500 troops might have seemed imprudent to Ross earlier, but now the utter lack of opposition impelled him forward.

  WHEN GENERAL WINDER and President Madison heard about the landing at Benedict, they ordered obstructions put in the way of the invaders, but no
thing happened. Winder also called out the militia. Armstrong had refused to let him call them out ahead of time, but now a crisis demanded it. The militiamen began gathering, and Winder soon had 2,000 camped ten miles southeast of the capital.

  Unaware that Ross had actually landed, Secretary Jones wrote to Commodore Rodgers in Philadelphia on August 19: “The enemy has entered the Patuxent with a very large force, indicating a design upon this place, which may be real or it may serve to mask his design upon Baltimore.” Since Jones thought Baltimore the more likely target, he ordered Rodgers to march there with three hundred men and combine them with the detachment of marines at nearby Cecil Furnace. Jones sent similar instructions to Commodore Porter in New York. Commodore Oliver Hazard Perry was already at Baltimore supervising construction of the new frigate Java.

  HAVING DEBARKED HIS troops, Ross now marched—again unopposed—to Lower Marlboro and then to Nottingham on August 21, while the British squadron under Rear Admiral Cockburn made its way up the Patuxent on Ross’s right flank toward Barney’s flotilla. Barney knew they were coming. He had already put five heavy cannon (two eighteen-pounders and three twelve-pounders) on carriages and marched with them and four hundred men to Upper Marlboro and from there on the twenty-first to the Washington Navy Yard. A few of Barney’s men remained with the flotilla, ready to set it on fire when Cockburn approached. The night of the twenty-second, when Cockburn’s boats and marines appeared, Barney’s men burned the flotilla and fled.

  On the same day, August 22, Ross resumed his march and easily reached Upper Marlboro. No obstacles were in his path nor any resistance. He was now only fifteen miles from Washington, and being that close and having encountered no opposition, he decided—with Cockburn urging him on—to push on toward the capital.

  Cockburn received a note from Cochrane congratulating him on the destruction of Barney’s flotilla. Cochrane added, however, that “the sooner the army gets back the better.” This was not an explicit order to return immediately, but it might have been read that way. The aggressive Cockburn chose to ignore its implications, however, and proceeded with the attack on Washington.

  General Winder, in the meantime, had succeeded in gathering 2,000 militiamen at Battalion Old Fields, not far from Upper Marlboro and Ross’s army. Barney and his men were with him. The president and his cabinet visited there on the twenty-second and conferred with Winder, stayed overnight, and returned to Washington the next day.

  Ross put his troops back in motion the evening of the twenty-third. The heat and humidity, combined with the weak condition of the men, caused many to fall by the wayside from exhaustion and disease, forcing him to stop for the night after advancing only five miles.

  For some unexplained reason, that same day, Winder, not knowing Ross’s ultimate destination, marched his troops back to Washington, crossing the lower, or Eastern Branch bridge, into the city a mile from the navy yard. People were terrified. They thought the British had pushed Winder back. Barney and his men were still with him, and they remained through the night.

  That same day, August 23, Baltimore militiamen, under Brigadier General Tobias Stansbury and Colonel Joseph Sterrett, numbering approximately 2,000, arrived at Bladensburg. The small town was at a crossing point on the Eastern Branch of the Potomac seven miles from Washington. Winder had ordered Stansbury to position his troops between Ross’s army and the town. Stansbury wisely ignored the order, and on the morning of August 24 he marched his men through the town, crossed the wooden bridge (Stoddert’s bridge) to the west side of the Eastern Branch, and took up a defensive position on the high ground overlooking the bridge and the shallow ford nearby. Stansbury ordered the bridge destroyed, but for some unknown reason it remained standing.

  That same morning, Ross marched his army to Bladensburg, arriving at noon. Winder, meanwhile, having guessed wrong about what road Ross was taking to Washington, had his men guarding the Eastern Branch bridge six miles away. Incredibly, Winder at no time had intelligence of Ross’s movements.

  While Ross was marching to Bladensburg, the president and his advisors were conferring with Winder at the Washington Navy Yard. It was ten o’clock. Suddenly, word came that the British were on the road to Bladensburg. Monroe raced to the town, while Winder set his troops in motion and galloped off to Bladensburg himself, leaving Barney to defend the Eastern Branch bridge and to blow it up if necessary. The president followed Winder, but before he left, Barney asked him if he could march his flotilla men to the battlefield as well. Only a few were needed to blow up the Eastern Branch bridge, Barney argued. He was needed far more at Bladensburg. Madison agreed, and Barney set out for the battlefield, arriving with five heavy cannon and five hundred men. He was forced to set up a half mile from the bridge, well back of Stansbury’s men. Barney arranged his big naval guns to cover the road to Washington.

  WHEN ROSS REACHED Bladensburg, Winder’s militiamen were well positioned on commanding heights on the other side of the river. Ross estimated there were between 8,000 and 9,000. Actually, there were fewer than 6,000. In spite of the enemy’s numbers and the fatigue of his men, Ross attacked immediately. He began by firing Congreve rockets, and as they screamed overhead, the first of the British light infantry, led by Colonel William Thornton, rushed across the bridge under heavy fire. They were stymied by the heavy outpouring coming from cannon and muskets, however, and had to withdraw back across the bridge. But they attacked again, and the second wave, with Ross in their midst urging them on, managed to cross; more followed, and then even more.

  President Madison was on the battlefield and withdrew with his party when the first rockets screeched overhead. There was a report that he was nearly captured, but this was not the case. As the president was leaving, disorder had already begun spreading among the inexperienced militiamen. A short while later, they began retreating in earnest, fleeing in all directions. But Barney and his five hundred sailors and marines with their heavy guns held firm, and militiamen from Maryland and Washington to Barney’s left and right stood with them, halting the British advance.

  Barney’s guns and the militiamen beside him were the last line of defense—all that stood between Ross and Washington. The British continued their attack, with Barney’s crew and the nearby militiamen desperately holding them off. The militiamen near Barney were under heavy fire when Winder rode up and inexplicably ordered them to fall back, which they did, and then fled like the others, leaving Barney and his seamen alone. They continued firing at the enemy. Barney’s horse was shot out from under him, but he got up and continued to fight. A musket ball then struck him in the thigh, and he lay on the ground bleeding. With the British closing in, he ordered a retreat, which his men reluctantly carried out.

  Barney could not go with them. He had collapsed in a pool of blood and was soon captured, as the British swarmed around. Admiral Cockburn and General Ross were directed to his side. When Barney saw them, he looked up with a grin, “Well admiral, you have got hold of me at last.” Cockburn and Ross had an English surgeon tend to him right away and may have saved his life. They could not have been more solicitous. Ross promptly freed Barney and his officers on parole. He had Barney taken to Ross’s Tavern in Bladensburg, where he’d be comfortable. Barney later said he was treated “as if I was a brother.”

  The one-sided battle was over by four o’clock. Of Ross’s men, 64 were dead and 185 wounded. There were 71 American casualties, most of them Barney’s flotilla men. During the entire crisis the enigmatic Armstrong had acted as if he were a spectator, offering no direction to Winder or advice to the president. He performed as he had the previous year during the abortive attack on Montreal, when, sensing disaster, he sought to place all the blame for it on Wilkinson and Hampton. Now he kept his head down, seeking to put all the onus for the debacle on Winder and Madison.

  An hour earlier, just after three o’clock, Dolley Madison left the presidential mansion in a wagon with plates and portable articles, including George Washington’s portrait. She cross
ed the Potomac on the Little Falls Bridge and made her way to Rokeby plantation in Loudoun County, Virginia, the home of Richard Love, where she would spend the night with her close friend Mrs. Love.

  The day before, the president had warned her to be prepare to leave Washington at a moment’s notice. He had told her to take care of herself and the papers, public and private, in the president’s house. At the same time, he had ordered important papers from all government offices removed. Many of the documents dated back to the Revolution, including the Declaration of Independence and the papers and correspondence of George Washington.

  Shortly after Dolley’s departure, Madison himself reached the Potomac and crossed over to Virginia at Mason’s Ferry. He would spend the night at Salona, the home of Reverend John Maffitt. The following day he and Dolley were reunited at Willey’s Tavern, where she remained until the British left Washington.

  AFTER THE BATTLE, Ross rested his men only two hours before marching them seven miles unopposed to the capital. Cockburn, who, as might be imagined, was exhilarated, went with them. He and Ross rode white horses, and even though it was eight o’clock and Washington was dark, they were conspicuous. As they entered the city, three hundred men from behind buildings next to Albert Gallatin’s house opened fire, killing Ross’s horse. The militiamen were quickly dispersed, however, and the British proceeded to burn the capital’s public buildings and a few private ones.

  Ross and Cockburn entered the White House, or President’s House as it was then called, and found plenty of good wine to toast the Prince Regent before setting the place on fire. The Capitol and the Library of Congress were also burned, as was the building housing the National Intelligencer, which Cockburn personally attended to, since its editor, Joseph Gales Jr., was a persistent critic of his. Gales was surprised to learn that Cockburn was reading his newspaper. The August 24 edition had expressed complete confidence that Washington was safe.