1812: The Navy's War

by George Daughan

  Jackson was later able to reconstitute and expand his army. By the end of February, with help from his friend Willie Blount, the governor of Tennessee, Jackson built an army of 4,000 men, and he marched 3,000 of them back to Horseshoe Bend. At the time, Red Eagle was away, and only 1,200 Red Sticks were present. Jackson attacked on March 27, provoking a savage battle. The Red Sticks had a few rifles and muskets, but mostly they used more primitive weapons. They did not have a chance. Jackson overwhelmed them with numbers and superior weapons.

  Jackson did not have the satisfaction of capturing Red Eagle, but Creek power was broken. Jackson moved on to the Creek camp at the junction of the Tallapoosa and Coosa rivers, known as the Holy Ground. Chiefs came and submitted to him, including Red Eagle. The great chief asked sustenance for his women and children, and Jackson, admiring the chief’s courage, extended help. Red Eagle recognized sadly that his people were defeated and had to come to terms with the Americans. Jackson gained immense respect for the chief, who later became useful in subduing other Creeks. Red Eagle eventually became a farmer with a large plantation and a friend of Jackson’s, even visiting him at the Hermitage from time to time.

  Jackson still had unfinished business with the Creeks, however. He wanted to destroy their power forever. He was determined to prevent the British and Spanish from using them anymore, and on August 9, 1814, he forced the chiefs, even those who were friendly, to sign the suicidal Treaty of Fort Jackson, in which the Creeks ceded twenty-two million acres—half their territory—to the United States, destroying their nation forever. Many Red Sticks wanted to continue the fight, and they had already fled to Florida. They were the Creeks who met Captain Pigot in the spring of 1814, but by then they were too few in number to be of real help to Cochrane against Jackson.

  ON JULY 23, 1814, Cochrane dispatched Major Edward Nicholls to Pensacola (in Spanish territory) with one hundred men to negotiate an understanding with the Red Stick Creeks and to facilitate slaves leaving their masters. Nicholls had arms for the Indians, but what Indians wanted most was evidence of British strength. Captain William Percy in the Hermes and the sloop Carron transported Nicholls and his munitions. Percy was directed to remain in the Gulf of Mexico and take command of the small squadron there. When Nicholls arrived on August 14, he established himself at Pensacola. The Spanish governor, fearing an attack from Jackson, had invited him.

  Jackson was paying close attention to what the British and Spanish were doing. Expecting a British attack in the Gulf, he left Fort Jackson with his army and traveled four hundred miles south, down the Coosa and Alabama rivers to Mobile, arriving on August 22. He went immediately to work reconstituting Fort Bowyer, which sat on a spit of beach commanding the entrance to Mobile Bay. Jackson put Major William Lawrence of the Second Infantry in command at the fort with a hundred sixty regulars. In two weeks Lawrence had twenty guns mounted, mostly twelve- and nine-pounders, and two larger guns.

  From his base in Pensacola, Major Nicholls planned an attack on Fort Bowyer with Captain Percy. On September 12 Percy approached Mobile Bay with four warships—the 20-gun sloop of war Hermes, his flagship; the 20-gun Carron, under Captain Robert Churchill Spencer; the 18-gun Sophie, under Captain Nicholas Lockyer; and the 18-gun brig-sloop Childets, under Captain John Umfreville. Major Nicholls was aboard the ships with sixty marines, twelve marine artillery pieces, and one hundred and thirty Indians.

  Percy landed his troops nine miles from Fort Bowyer, but he could not get his ships over the bar at the entrance to Mobile Bay until September 15. When he did, he immediately brought the Hermes and Sophie in close to the fort and began bombarding it at four o’clock in the afternoon. Adverse winds made it impossible for the Carron and Childets to get into position.

  Major Lawrence’s guns fired back, and the battle raged for the next three hours, until the Hermes, badly shot up, went aground. Major Nicholls, who was ill, stayed aboard rather than accompany his men ashore. He was wounded in the leg and lost an eye when a splinter pierced it. Percy managed to refloat the Hermes, but when she grounded a second time, he order the crew to evacuate and set fire to her. In minutes, she blew up with an earsplitting roar. That ended the attack. Percy’s squadron had thirty-two killed and thirty-seven wounded. Lawrence had four killed and five wounded. The defeat was a severe blow to Cochrane’s plan to attack New Orleans by way of Mobile and Baton Rouge. And seeing the British so easily defeated undermined the confidence the Red Sticks had in them.

  After the victory, Jackson strengthened the fort and the town, and then concentrated on the British base at Pensacola. While he did, he ignored the desperate need for building up the defenses of New Orleans. The city was so politically and ethnically divided it could not organize its own defense, and neither the state government nor the federal government was of any help. Jackson had to provide the leadership; he was the indispensable man.

  But Jackson was not going to move until he dealt with the British at Pensacola. He was still convinced that their invasion of New Orleans would come through Pensacola or through Mobile. On the evening of November 6 he arrived before Pensacola with 3,000 troops, including Choctaw warriors. Jackson sent Major Pierre with a flag of truce to communicate with the Spanish governor at Fort St. George, but before Pierre could reach the fort, he was fired on and had to return. Jackson then went himself to reconnoiter and decided to storm Pensacola the following morning.

  The British were in no position to help the Spanish governor; they were simply too far removed from the town. Seven men-of-war were anchored six miles distant in Pensacola Bay, and Major Nicholls had some regulars and Indians in Fort Barrancas, overlooking the entrance to the bay. He also had a contingent in the small fort at the tip of Santa Rosa Island, directly across the narrow entrance to the bay from Fort Barrancas.

  Jackson attacked Pensacola on the seventh and won a quick victory, the governor surrendering the town and tiny Fort St. George without at fight. On the morning of the eighth Jackson prepared to storm Fort Barrancas, but before he could, Major Nicholls blew it up, along with the small fort on Santa Rosa Island. Nicholls then retreated to the men-of-war with Captain Woodbine and a few remaining Red Sticks. After Jackson’s victory even more Indians deserted the British.

  AS EARLY AS September 5, 1814, Secretary of War Monroe had warned Jackson that New Orleans was the probable British target, not Mobile or Pensacola. On October 10 Monroe sent another warning, telling Jackson that intelligence from the American ministers at Ghent indicated Cochrane would attack New Orleans directly. But other than warnings of an impending direct attack—which Jackson already knew was a good possibility, since he had strengthened Mobile and Pensacola—no help was forthcoming from Washington.

  Jackson now returned to Mobile. He continued to worry that the British would strike there first, so he kept bolstering its defenses. He gave command to his old friend Brigadier General James Winchester, who had been taken prisoner by Proctor’s troops at Frenchtown on the River Raison in January 1813 and then exchanged. Winchester was also in charge of making spoiling operations against both the Indians and the British, particularly Major Nicholls’s new operation on the Apalachicola River.

  On November 22, Jackson finally left for New Orleans. He stationed his old Tennessee comrade-in-arms General Coffee at Baton Rouge with 1,300 men. From there, Coffee could travel quickly to either Mobile or New Orleans. It was late in the day for Jackson to be turning his attention to New Orleans. The city desperately needed a strong hand to organize it. Without Jackson, the British could have walked in unopposed. He rode in on December 1, and the city’s notables, led by Governor William Claiborne, greeted him enthusiastically. Jackson looked haggard from his journey and the dysentery that was plaguing him, but his hawk-like eyes showed the fire within. He vowed to defend New Orleans or die in the attempt. Jackson’s biographer Robert Remini writes, “Andrew absorbed a near-permanent hatred for the British not only because of his mother’s instruction but as a result of his own revolutionary war experien
ces.” Admiral Cochrane never had a more determined, resourceful enemy.

  Jackson had already issued emergency calls for troops from Tennessee, Kentucky, and anywhere else he could get them, and he posted men at the probable invasion routes into the city to give him as much warning as possible of the British approach. He also needed supplies in great quantities, especially muskets, gunpowder, and ball. On December 11, to his amazement, the steamboat Enterprize , commanded by Henry Miller Shreve (Shreveport is named after him), arrived towing ammunition barges. Captain Shreve brought his precious cargo all the way from Pittsburgh. His munitions would be of critical importance.

  Twenty-nine-year-old Commodore Daniel T. Patterson commanded the navy in New Orleans, having replaced Captain John Shaw on December 10, 1813. Since the navy viewed New Orleans as a secondary theater, Patterson had precious little to work with—six old gunboats; two small warships, the Carolina and the Louisiana; a tiny schooner; and an even smaller tender. With this pathetic squadron he was expected to defend a city of over 25,000, the second largest port in the United States. He was determined to make the most of what he had, however. He ordered twenty-four-year-old Lieutenant Thomas ap Catesby Jones to Lake Borgne—a likely invasion route—to watch for the enemy. Jones had the schooner Seahorse, the tender Alligator, and five gunboats, carrying twenty-three guns and manned by 182 officers and men.

  The five gunboats had numbers but no names. Gunboat Number 5, under Sailing Master John D. Ferris, had one long twenty-four-pounder, four twelve-pound carronades, and a crew of thirty-six. Number 23, under Sailing Master Isaac McKeever, had one long thirty-two-pounder, four six-pounders, and a crew of thirty-nine. Number 156, Jones’s flagship, had one long twenty-four-pounder, four twelve-pound carronades, and forty-one men. Number 162, under Sailing Master Pollock, had one long twenty-four-pounder, four six-pounders, and a crew of thirty-two. Number 163, under Sailing Master George Ulrick, had one long twenty-four-pounder, two twelve-pound carronades, and a crew of thirty-five. The Alligator, under Sailing Master Richard S. Sheppard, carried one four-pounder, and the Seahorse, under Sailing Master William Johnson, carried one six-pounder and a crew of fourteen.

  Jones stationed his mosquito fleet at Pass Christiana, blocking the entrance to Lake Borgne. On December 8, lookouts saw Admiral Cochrane hove into view aboard his flagship, the 80-gun Tonnant, accompanied by four other ships, and anchor between Cat Island and a thin sliver of land called Ship Island, ninety miles east of New Orleans. Shallow waters and hidden shoals in Lake Borgne prevented Cochrane from getting any closer to the city. General Keane, temporarily in command of the army until General Pakenham arrived, was on the Tonnant. On December 11 and 12 the rest of Cochrane’s huge armada of fifty ships arrived, carrying 7,800 soldiers. There were 2,200 more on the way from England, under Major General John Lambert. When Jones saw the Tonnant, he immediately sent the tender Alligator to warn Patterson of Cochrane’s arrival. Patterson quickly passed the information on to Jackson.

  Jones’s initial orders were to position his boats across Pass Christiana at the mouth of Lake Borgne and then fall back west, across the lake to the Rigolets, the small passageway connecting Lake Borgne with Lake Pontchartrain. Patterson ordered Jones to make his stand at the Rigolets with help from the guns at Fort Petites Coquilles. Wind and tide could intervene, however, and make it impossible for Jones to get back to the Rigolets.

  Since the bar at the entrance to Lake Borgne blocked access to all the British ships, once Cochrane and Keane chose a landing place from which they could march on the city, the troops would have to be ferried to it in small craft. Cochrane had requested large numbers of shallow draft boats for just this situation, but the Admiralty refused to send them, telling Cochrane he would have to make them in Jamaica. He needed too many for that to be practical, however.

  The troops could not be debarked until Cochrane got rid of Lieutenant Jones and his gunboats. On December 12 he dispatched 1,200 men in forty-five open boats with carronades in many of their prows, under veteran Captain Nicholas Lockyer, to attack Jones. It was late in the afternoon, about 3:30, when Lockyer’s odd squadron began rowing toward the American boats. Lockyer’s rowers had to labor for many miles before they got near the enemy. They rowed all through a cold, damp night, and it was not until late in morning on the thirteenth that Lockyer got almost in range of his target. He then stopped to have breakfast and to rest.

  At ten o’clock Jones spotted the enemy flotilla advancing toward Pass Christian and then stopping. He had already pulled his squadron back from the pass. At first he thought the British were going to land troops. At two o’clock, however, when the barges rowed beyond Pass Christian without stopping, it was clear they were after him. The wind was strong from the west, and the water in Lake Borgne was unusually low. Gunboat numbers 156, 162, and 163 got stuck in mud. At 3:30 the flood tide allowed them to break free, and Jones beat back west toward the Rigolets.

  Fifteen minutes later, Lockyer sent three barges after the Seahorse in the Bay of St. Louis, where Jones had sent her that morning to help remove public stores to keep them out of British hands. As the barges approached, Sailing Master Johnson fired on them and checked their advance, but they were soon joined by four more. Johnson used two six-pounders on the bank and his own six-pounder to mount a sharp action on all seven for thirty minutes before the British retreated. At 7:30 Johnson, fearing more barges were coming, blew up the Seahorse and the stores.

  Lockyer’s rowers, in the meantime, continued straining to get within range of Jones, but the tide had turned, and they made little progress against it. At eight o’clock Lockyer rested them again.

  At 1 A.M. on the fourteenth, the wind died away, forcing Jones to anchor in the west end of Malhereux Island’s passage, long before he reached the Rigolets. No breeze came up during the night. At daylight, the water was flat. Lockyer’s barges now pulled to within nine miles of Jones. At 9:30 the Alligator, which had been caught to the eastward of Jones, was captured trying to rejoin the squadron. A strong ebb tide was running, and with no wind, Jones still could not sail west to the Rigolets. Unable to withdraw, Jones prepared to fight, forming the five gunboats in a tight line abreast between Malhereux Island and the mainland. At 10 Lockyer’s entire force was under way, forming a line abreast and rowing directly at Jones. The rowers were battling the strong current the entire way. As the enemy rowed toward him, Jones counted forty-two boats—heavy launches, gun barges, and light gigs.

  The current pushed Jones’s gunboat (number 156) and gunboat number 163 one hundred yards in front of the others. When Lockyer’s barges were in range, Jones and gunboat number 163 fired on them as fast as they could. But the barges were small and hard to hit. At 10:50 Lockyer opened fire with all his guns, and the battle raged. At 11:50, three advanced barges reached Jones’s boat and attempted to board, but he beat them off, killing or wounding every officer and sinking two of the barges. Four more barges made a second attempt, and Jones beat them off as well with a similar number of casualties. During the fracas, a musket ball hit Jones in the left shoulder, forcing him to quit the main deck and go below. Master’s Mate George Parker took command and fought on. But he was soon severely wounded himself. By 12:10, Lockyer had enough men on Jones’s boat to overwhelm the crew and take her. He then turned her guns on the other American boats, while the gunboat’s American colors were still flying, taking the Americans by surprise. They thought Jones was firing on them.

  Figure 31.1: T. L. Hornbrook, The Gallant Attack and Capture of the American Flotilla near New Orleans, December 1814 (courtesy of U.S. Naval Academy Museum).

  By 12:40 it was all over. Gunboat number 23 was the last to surrender. The British had seventeen killed and seventy-seven wounded. Jones had ten killed and thirty-five wounded. Lockyer allowed his men to plunder Jones’s boats and steal the personal belongings of his men, an indication of what was in store for New Orleans if the British were victorious. Jones survived, but it took a long time for him to heal. The muske
t ball remained in his shoulder for the rest of his life. Jones and his crews were eventually taken as prisoners to Bermuda, where they were released when the war ended.

  Commodore Patterson could ill afford to lose Jones and his men. Nor could he afford to lose five of his six gunboats. Jones did not fight in vain, however; he gave Jackson precious time to prepare. Inexplicably, when Jones and his flotilla were crushed and removed, Jackson did not replace them with scouts. He was without effective intelligence on Lake Borgne for ten days, an egregious oversight that might have been fatal.

  When the British questioned Jones and the other prisoners, they gave estimates of Jackson’s strength at 20,000. Some American deserters made the numbers much smaller, however—as few as 5,000. Cochrane had estimates from a number of sources, and in the end he overestimated Jackson’s strength, although not to the degree that Jones hoped. Regardless of what the British thought they were up against, they had scant regard for American militiamen, and this attitude would work decidedly in Jackson’s favor.

  With Lieutenant Jones and his boats out of the way, Cochrane moved his army thirty miles west to Pea Island at the mouth of the Pearl River, where he set up an advance base. With almost no trees, but a surfeit of alligators and snakes, Pea Island was a barren, wet, godforsaken place halfway across Lake Borgne. Getting men from the fleet to the island was itself a monumental, backbreaking chore. Cochrane did not have enough boats to take his men across all at once. Several round trips of sixty miles had to be made. Not until December 19 was General Keane’s army finally on the island. With no tents or huts, the troops suffered in the cold rain that poured down on them nearly every afternoon.