Dispatches from the religious left

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Dispatches from the religious left Page 14

by Frederick Clarkson


  CONCLUSION

  Although identifying, recruiting and developing leaders is critical to the capacity-or power-of most organizations, it is the particular focus of organizers whose work is to be leaders of leaders. The primary responsibility of an organizer is to develop the leadership capacities of others and, in this way, of the organizations through which their constituents act on their common interests.

  MARRIAGE EQUALITY IN

  MASSACHUSETTS:

  A PROGRESSIVE VICTORY

  LEO MALEY

  On November 18, 2003, by a vote of 4 to 3, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court ruled in Goodridge v. Department of Public Health that the state constitution did not permit "the creation of second-class citizens," and that therefore, Massachusetts could no longer ban same-sex civil marriages. The first same-sex marriage licenses were issued 180 days after the ruling, on the fiftieth anniversary of the Brown v. Board of Education decision ending legal segregation of the public schools. Celebratory crowds gathered at city and town halls across the state as over 1,000 same-sex couples wed for the occasion. Over 10,000 gay and lesbian couples have been married to date-and marriage equality is now an established fact of life in Massachusetts.

  The back-story of this historic civil and human rights victory is the role of over 1,000 clergy-and numerous laypersons-who, in publicly supporting marriage equality, powerfully reframed the same-sex marriage debate in a way that helped lead to this major progressive achievement. However, the historic Goodridge decision is not the achievement I am talking about. Instead, the victory to which religious progressives contributed so significantly was the dramatic showdown vote in the state legislature in 2006 that head ed off a state-wide ballot question designed to undo Goodridge and thus write discrimination into the Massachusetts constitution. This success story should embolden and inspire progressive religious activists as a model for organizing on this issue over the long haul, as well as informing our thinking about a broader and more politically dynamic Religious Left.

  CHANGING THE CONSTITUTION

  Even as progressives celebrated the first same-sex marriages in 2004, the opposition was already mobilizing to amend the state constitution to forbid future marriages. Fortunately, it is not easy to change the Massachusetts constitution. There are two ways to do it. One, a majority of legislators can vote (during two successive two-year legislative sessions) to put an amendment question on the ballot, whereupon it must be approved by the voters. Two, an amendment can be initiated by petition of the voters. If an amendment originates by petition, a mere one-forth of the state legislature must vote in favor of the amendment (also during two legislative sessions) for the question to move to the ballot.

  In the spring of 2004, some legislators proposed a constitutional amendment that would have outlawed same-sex marriages, but sanctioned civil unions. This would have been a major step backward for the marriage equality movement. The proposal passed the first of its two required constitutional conventions by a vote of 105 to 92, but lost by a vote of 157 to 39 when it came up a second time in the fall of 2005. However, the real test for proponents of marriage equality was yet to come.

  That fall, a coalition supported by the Catholic Church, Focus on the Family, and its state political affiliate the Massachusetts Family Institute gathered 170,000 signatures (almost three times the number needed) to restrict marriage to opposite-sex couples. On January 2, 2007, days before the 2005-06 legislative was to end, 62 out of 200 legislators-twelve more than the 25 percent need ed-voted in favor of the amendment. But, just five months later, on June 14, 2007, by a vote of 151 to 45, legislators voted against sending the question to the ballot in 2008. The ballot initiative was dead, and marriage equality in Massachusetts was assured for the foreseeable future. Needless to say, this win did not come easily.

  MassEquality, a coalition of state and national organizations that formed in the late 1990s to oppose conservative efforts to pass discriminatory "defense of marriage" legislation, took the lead in the wake of the opposition to Goodridge. The group developed an impressive statehouse lobbying effort, as well as a first-rate field organization. This dual approach was important, because the antimarriage-equality forces mounted vigorous efforts to increase their numbers in the legislature (the votes of only one-quarter of the legislature was needed to go the ballot initiative route).

  In addition, the Republican Party actively recruited conservative candidates to run against pro-equality legislators. However, in the legislative elections of 2004 and 2006, something remarkable happened: Every pro-equality legislator was reelected, several antiequality incumbents were defeated, and a number of pro-equality candidates were elected for the first time. All this was thanks in large part to MassEquality and the Mass Alliance (a broad-based multi-issue progressive electoral coalition). To top it all off, Deval Patrick, an articulate pro-equality candidate was elected governor in 2006 in place of the retiring Mitt Romney, a vocal opponent of marriage equality. In just two years, marriage equality had gone from a potential liability to being a clear political plus for anyone running for a legislative seat or for state-wide office.

  Progressives-both inside and outside of Massachusetts-have yet to come to terms with the enormity of this political shift, the possibility that it might be replicated in other states, and particularly, the critical role progressive clergy and laity played in this landmark civil rights victory, which has served as a catalyst for wider progressive electoral victories.

  ENTER THE RCFM

  Not to be overlooked in this story was the role of the Religious Coalition for the Freedom to Marry (RCFM), which began in 1998 as an annual interfaith gathering of clergy committed to the idea that gay and lesbian couples should have the same right to marry as heterosexual couples. RCFM considered marriage equality to be "one of the most pressing civil rights issues in America today" as well as a matter of religious liberty.

  With the decision in the landmark Goodridge case looming, in 2003 activists involved in the litigation asked if RCFM could increase its organizing efforts and play a more public role once the legal decision had been rendered. After the court decision, RCFM held a public worship service and, most importantly, intensified efforts to increase the number of clergy who signed the group's "Declaration of Religious Support for the Freedom of Same-Gendered Couples to Marry." The Declaration stated that "a denial of civil recognition dishonors the religious convictions of those communities and clergy who do officiate at, and bless, same-gender marriages," and that "the state may not favor the convictions of one religious group over another to deny individuals their fundamental right to marry and have those marriages recognized by civil law." Signers of the Declaration committed "to public action, visibility, education, and mutual support in the service of the right and freedom to marry." Newspaper advertisements containing the names of clergy signers of the Declaration ran in several Massachusetts newspapers.

  RCFM also encouraged clergy and laity to tell personal stories that emphasized the themes of civil rights (equality before the law) and religious freedom (the state not establishing one religious perspective over another). Many of these stories-several quite moving-were collected in People of Faith Testimony: Rejoicing in Marriage Equality, a book that was delivered to all 200 state legislators in 2006. In addition, a pamphlet titled, "Neither Fair Nor Just: Why We Dont Vote on Civil Rights," was distributed in synagogues and churches.

  In June 2006, RCFM publicly confronted what it called the "bigotry espoused in the name of faith," by releasing an open letter that charged the Catholic Church with "religious discrimination" for trying to deny legal recognition to marriages conducted by clergy of other faiths. (Keep in mind that Catholics comprise fully half of the population in Massachusetts, and over two-thirds of state legislature.) The letter declared that "By proclaiming homosexuality and same-sex unions to be universally immoral and worthy of second-class status under state law, you are sending a message that our faith communities are immoral. You are harming us an
d our families and your own faithful as well."

  RCFM also gathered thousands of signatures from pro-equality Catholics on a "Roman Catholic Statement Supporting Marriage Equality for Same-Sex Couples in Massachusetts" which emphasized the "danger of one religious tradition or doctrine dominating another," and affirmed the constitutional principle of the separation of church and state. The Statement recalled that Roman Catholics were once denied civil rights, argued that Catholic social justice teachings called for respect, "not merely tolerance," and reminded the public that "same-sex civil marriage does not in any way coerce any religious faith or tradition to change its beliefs or doctrine."

  RCFM's challenge to the Catholic Church's anti-equality stance was critical. And the courage and integrity of the religious leaders who stood up for what they believed, and effectively organized on behalf of their convictions, made a crucial difference in preserving marriage equality in Massachusetts.

  In 2006, Arline Isaacson, lobbyist for the Massachusetts Gay and Lesbian Political Caucus and one of the state's key strategists for the marriage equality struggle, summarized the important role RCFM had played, telling a newspaper that the organization "pro duced critically important support to legislators struggling with theological and cultural questions about marriage by providing two things for lawmakers-a comfort zone based on traditional theology and a political cultural framework to consider the issue that never existed before." Isaacson continued by saying that RCFM had "changed the nature of the debate from religion versus gays to religion versus religion. So we can now forcefully assert that denying us marriage rights is the equivalent of choosing one set of religious views over another. And no legislator ever wants to be caught favoring one religious tradition over another, debating over whose interpretation of God is the right one."

  LESSONS

  The main lesson that can be ascertained from the marriage equality fight in Massachusetts is that if progressives leave the playing field to the Religious Right and its allies, they are in essence forfeiting the game. However, when progressives play-and play to win-they can accomplish much.

  A winning strategy for the Religious Left on the issue of marriage equality-which can be extended to other progressive issues as well-can be distilled into three main points:

  1. Clergy and laity should not avoid taking a public stand in favor of marriage equality because it is "controversial" or because it might upset a few members of one's congregation. It is not only the right thing to do and politically important, but interviews with proequality clergy suggest that personal-and congregational-affirmations of marriage equality contribute to a deeper personal religious understanding, and also to congregational growth and renewal.

  2. Winning requires hard work. In the case of marriage equality, public opinion had to be changed, and legislators had to be persuaded or replaced. In addition, there were the usual ideological, tactical, and personality issues with which to contend. But, in the end, people worked hard, played smart, and kept the faith.

  3. Start small; start now. The handful of Jewish, Protestant, and Unitarian Universalist clergy who started RCFM in the 1990s had no idea that marriage equality would so quickly become a defining issue in state politics. However, when the Goodridge decision came, they were ready to play a critical role. Religious progressives should take heart from their victory, and learn from their example.

  THE ORGANIZING MODEL OF

  WE BELIEVE OHIO

  ANASTASIA PANTSIOS

  The Reverend Rod Parsley, pastor of the World Harvest megachurch in suburban Columbus, Ohio, was feeling his oats after the 2004 election. He had stumped the state with Ohio Secretary of State Ken Blackwell on behalf of an amendment to the state's constitution banning gay marriage, and the issue had carried with more than 60 percent of the vote. The latest item on Parsley's agenda was getting Blackwell elected as Ohio's governor in 2006. Parsley and fellow suburban Columbus megachurch pastor Russell Johnson of Fairfield Christian Church, geared up, with Johnson spearheaded the Ohio Restoration Project, a group that aimed to enlist thousands of "Patriot Pastors" to register half a million new conservative Christian voters. Parsley's Reformation Ohio was doing similar work through its Center for Moral Clarity.

  However, Parsley's bluster and overt partisanship had an unintended effect: it aroused people in Ohio who did not share his view of what it meant to be a person of faith. This led to the formation of We Believe Ohio, a loose network of pastors, rabbis, imams and other religious and lay leaders of various faiths which was founded to provide a counterbalance to the very vocal pastors on the religious right.

  Tim Ahrens of Columbus's First Congregational Church, who was the driving force behind the formation of We Believe Ohio, recalled a pivotal moment that took place in mid-October, 2005:

  "I sat down over a nice cup of coffee on a Saturday morning and opened the paper and read that Rod Parsley and his group were on the Statehouse steps saying, and I quote, `We are locked, loaded and firing on Ohio.' My next question was `What does that have to do with Jesus?' [Parsley's] on our Statehouse steps and a lot of us took the ostrich approach: `If we keep doing our good works and organizing for justice in Columbus, this guy will just go away.' But it dawned on me that we needed a different response. We wanted to have another voice in the public square, and to end the monologue and have a dialogue."

  Ahrens called up all the Christian pastors he knew, rounding up about fifty for a mid-November meeting. At that gathering, the group decided it needed to reach outside the Christian community and bring other religious leaders into the discussion.

  An article written about the meeting by First Congregational Church's Denny Mahoney appeared in the Columbus Dispatch on November 18, 2005 and attracted the attention of the Washington, DC-based 501(c)(3) group Faith in Public Life, which was forming at the same time with the intention of being a communications and networking resource for faith groups that "share a call to pursue justice and the common good." Reverend Jennifer Butler, the executive director of Faith in Public Life, and director of communications strategy Katie Barge made contact with the fledgling Ohio group in order to figure out how the two organizations could work together.

  "We were founded to be a resource center for faith groups working for compassion, justice and the common good," said Barge. "We were looking to get involved in Ohio even before Faith in Public Life actually launched, before We Believe Ohio launched, when we were a nascent organization. [Butler] was interviewing people to get a sense of the religious landscape. She heard about the Rev. Tim Ahrens in Columbus and ended up speaking with him. It seemed like something good was happening there so she ended up sending me down to Ohio, to meet with the folks there. And we ended up working together because there was so much energy around what was going to be an official media launch."

  With Faith in Public Life offering input on honing its message and organizing its debut, We Believe Columbus launched in March, 2006 with more than 100 people in attendance at the launch event.

  We Believe Ohio is designed as a peer-to-peer (mainly) clergy network to bring leaders of various faiths together to work on peace and social justice initiatives and to provide a media voice to counterbalance that of the religious right. In 2007, the group publicly called for civility in the budget-making process between the new Democratic governor and the Republican-majority legislature. In May 2007, it sponsored a lobby day in Columbus on issues related to housing, education and health care. In the fall of 2007, with a vitriolic Republican primary in Ohio's 5th district to replace Congressman Paul Gillmor, who had died suddenly, We Believe Ohio announced a "Sleazefree Ohio" campaign, which urged candidates of all parties to sign a pledge promising to stick to issues and eschew name-calling.

  The group's next priority was working on a response to initiatives for equal opportunity for all people, acknowledging that, although group members have different beliefs on homosexuality, all agree that equal treatment under the law is a civil rights and justice issue. (In fact, individua
l members of We Believe Ohio may be politically or theologically conservative; their agreement stems from their belief that issues like gay marriage and abortion have crowded out important faith-based discussions of issues like poverty and social and economic justice.)

  We Believe Ohio's greatest success to date has been to start conversations among in-state progressive faith groups about building coalitions behind social-justice legislation. In Columbus, it has worked with the voter-mobilization group Faith Vote Columbus, an affiliate of the Industrial Areas Foundation, and B.R.E.A.D., an association of congregations which describes itself as "a vehicle for congregations to practice justice by joining together large numbers of people that can hold public officials accountable."

  To date, We Believe's greatest liability is its limited funding, which is far overshadowed by the congregations and organizations on the right. Faith in Public Life has provided some resources in the areas of communications and web-site building, and Reverend Butler facilitated a September, 2006 retreat for forty of We Believe's clergy and lay leaders. But since the group doesn't accept money from corporate sponsors, can't raise the millions of dollars that megachurch collection plates generate, hasn't hired professional fundraisers to solicit donations or go after grants, and doesn't have staff or field organizers, its ability to do community organizing or to mobilize the numbers that someone like Parsley can bring to the Statehouse steps is still lacking.

 

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