Joffre thought the key to exploiting the first assault was getting French troops beyond the Somme south of Péronne, where it ran behind and broadly parallel to the German front line. He believed this would be more easily achieved if the natural barrier imposed by the slow-moving waterway was outflanked north of its acute southward bend at Péronne.93 As Joffre saw it, the ultimate goal of the Anglo-French joint venture was to establish Rawlinson’s and Fayolle’s armies in open country on the arc of Bapaume–Rancourt–Péronne–Ham. In Joffre’s eyes the weak point in the scheme lay north of the river, and that had a lot to do with lingering suspicions over whether the British would pull their weight given Haig’s ongoing interest in a Flanders attack.94 It was for this reason that Joffre cancelled any preliminary operations, hoping to focus Haig’s mind on the Somme, and began espousing a concentrated offensive progressing in successive stages determined by artillery coverage.95
Haig now spelled out the operation he wanted Rawlinson to put on paper. It would be part of a wider Anglo-French attack, with operations also to be undertaken by the Russians and Italians elsewhere. In the first phase, Fourth Army would establish a defensive flank on the Serre–Grandcourt Spur at the northern end of its sector and also capture the high ground about Pozières in the centre, along with the spurs tapering off towards Beaucourt, Grandcourt and Fricourt. A simultaneous attack between Fricourt and Maricourt would quickly seize the Mametz–Montauban–La Briqueterie ridgeline — broadly, the southern lip of Caterpillar Valley. Thereafter, in the second phase, the Ginchy–Bazentinle-Grand Ridge — effectively the German second defensive line in this part of the battlefield and part of Caterpillar Valley’s northern lip — was to be captured, with assistance to be given to the French around Combles. ‘Operations subsequent to those [phases] . . . must depend on the degree of success gained and on developments which cannot be foreseen.’96 Haig continued: ‘The object will continue to be to prevent the enemy from reestablishing his line of defence and to exploit to the full all opportunities opened up for defeating his forces within reach, always, however, with due regard to the need to assist the French Army to effect passage of the River Somme.’97
Haig further expected the attack to be pushed forward as rapidly as possible, and stressed that opportunities to use cavalry supported by artillery, machine guns and infantry should be actively sought.98 He warned that it was inadvisable to push isolated and disorganised troops beyond the reach of possible support if the enemy was still capable of launching successful counterattacks. He was more sanguine when it came to having strong, organised groups press forward. The risks to infantry if it advanced beyond the effective artillery support could be foreseen, and ‘to a great extent guarded against by careful previous arrangement for providing artillery support, for throwing in reinforcements as required to fill gaps in the line and to cover flanks that may become exposed . . . and generally, for providing the means of holding what may be gained.’99 Haig was already considering mobile warfare after breaking into and then through the German second defensive position.
Rawlinson said he would defer to Haig’s specifications, then chewed through several pages justifying his now redundant proposal.100 ‘On it may possibly depend the tactics of one of the greatest battles the British Army have ever fought and I fully recognise the responsibility.’101 He agreed to factor the neighbouring French attack into his plans, and said that while the prospect of capturing the high ground north of Pozières was alluring, he was concerned about cutting the more distant enemy barbed wire, the potential for disorganisation of his own forces and the possible inability of artillery to support his most advanced infantry from existing battery positions.102 He was further annoyed by the extension of his southern flank around Montauban, which required an additional division but no extra artillery,103 and said his army had insufficient resources to include the Gommecourt salient in its operation.104 He still believed a 50–60-hour bombardment was needed to cut the German wire, and, misinterpreting Haig’s instruction, planned to use massed cavalry south of Grandcourt to help protect the attack’s north flank if enemy forces were reduced to a serious state of demoralisation.105 Rawlinson disagreed with much of Haig’s rationale, and specifically with the length of the bombardment and vulnerability of any troops attacking more distant German positions.
Rawlinson also knew he did not have to agree with orders to follow them, as he explained in a carefully worded missive to GHQ: ‘I, however, fully realise that it may be necessary to incur these risks in view of the importance of the object to be attained. This will, no doubt, be decided by the commander-in-chief, and definite instructions sent to me in due course.’106 Rawlinson was very obviously providing a paper-trail defence that transferred blame to Haig if the more ambitious attack went wrong.
Haig saw this guileless turn for what it was and his 16 May response provided the basis for what was to become Britain’s first day of the Somme. The Serre–Grandcourt Spur, Pozières, Contalmaison and Montauban were the objectives to be attained on the first day of fighting. The capture of Montauban was subject to co-operation with the French army and assistance from their artillery. ‘It is understood,’ wrote Haig, deftly paring Rawlinson’s paper-trail defence away, ‘that you concur in this view and that your plan of attack will be designed accordingly.’107 This was a wily move: Haig was challenging Rawlinson either to directly oppose his scheme, or to give it his tacit approval. Haig had, however, conceded a number of points, which implied he was listening to his subordinate. The Gommecourt diversion was now Third Army’s job and the bombardment would be a methodical one, ‘until the officers commanding the attacking units are satisfied that the obstacles to their advance have been adequately destroyed.’108 One all-arms cavalry division would be at Rawlinson’s disposal during the operations. Haig had insisted his broader scope of operations for the first day of the Somme be retained, and placed the burden of tactical responsibility squarely back on Rawlinson’s shoulders.
Lieutenant-General Sir Launcelot Kiggell, Haig’s chief of staff, explained after the war, in a letter to the British official historian, the difference in Haig’s and Rawlinson’s thinking at this juncture:
Sir D.H.’s original plan was to aim at pushing the attack originally right through to the German guns. He found such decided unwillingness to attempt too much, supported by Rawlinson too, that he decided it would be unwise to demand more than those responsible for execution [of the operation] felt within their power. Their view was that each day’s advance should be limited to a line which could be effectively covered by our artillery without its having to move forward. This, I gathered, was due to previous experience of counter-attacks against [infantry] advances pushed beyond effective artillery support and to the heavy losses of bodies [of infantry] dashing forward without adequate support or flank protection.109
It appeared the bones of Fourth Army’s first day of the Somme were almost decided. Eleven divisions would attack on a frontage of about 25,000 yards (14.2 miles), to a depth of 3000–4000 yards in the north and 2000–3000 yards in the south. Defensive flanks would be formed around Serre in the north and around Montauban in the south, the latter adjacent to the French Sixth Army. The German second defensive line between Serre and Pozières on the Albert–Bapaume road would be captured, including the village of Ovillers. Thereafter south — and all shy of the enemy’s second positions — the villages of La Boisselle, Contalmaison, Fricourt, Mametz and Montauban would be seized, too.
Artillery support was increased to 220 heavy howitzers, which would provide a five-day bombardment before the infantry went in. Villages not assailed directly would be doused with gas shells, and infantry advancing nearby screened by smoke. All-arms cavalry formations would be used to protect the flanks and, in the case of soldiers on horseback, help the infantry capture its objectives. Further progress depended on how the battle unfolded. Additionally, Third Army’s diversion at Gommecourt would stop enemy reserves from being moved south, this area having been selected
over alternative options at Vimy Ridge and Monchy-au-Bois, southwest of Arras, for its potential value in assisting the hoped-for drive towards Bapaume. This was almost entirely Haig’s plan, with several key concessions that showed some flexibility on his part and quietened Rawlinson.
Firm as this plan looked, it was about to undergo more change as Verdun chewed through French lives. In mid-April, 39 French divisions were supposed to attack alongside Fourth Army on the Somme, but, by early June, Joffre was no longer talking in specific numbers and was anticipating a prolonged operation.110 The initial objective, Joffre said, should be the German first defensive position, and he now thought it premature to fix any objective beyond the enemy’s third defensive position, which was under construction.111 He had scaled back excitable Foch’s plans to an extent that just 12 infantry divisions of Sixth Army were left to complement Rawlinson’s attack.112 What had begun as a French-led joint offensive had been watered down by Joffre to one in which the French army played a minor role,113 which was just as Kitchener had predicted in his conversations with Rawlinson.
Haig expanded Fourth Army’s operational scope to compensate for the fast-eroding French element. The strategic goals were to kill Germans and relieve the pressure on Verdun.114 The first objective, the so-called Green Line, remained the German second defensive position, Serre–Pozières–Contalmaison, with a strong defensive flank formed on the Serre–Grandcourt Spur.115 The second phase, or Brown Line, would see the defensive flank extended to Martinpuich, allowing Fourth Army simultaneously to ‘advance our line eastward to the line Montauban–Martinpuich.’116 A third objective, the ridge running from Martinpuich via High Wood to Ginchy,117 was also added. All of this meant that Fourth Army’s operation was now focused east, rather than southeast towards the French, and its objectives from a single day’s fighting were effectively doubled. It did not stop there. Three all-arms cavalry divisions would be amassed to strike out towards Bapaume, about nine miles behind the German front line. Fourth Army’s rejigged operation order stated that the attack’s aim was to break the enemy’s defensive system and fully exploit ‘all opportunities opened up for defeating his forces within reach.’118
Rawlinson formed an opinion on precisely when the cavalry would be committed to battle as part of General Sir Hubert Gough’s yet-to-beformed Reserve Army, but only after lengthy talks with Haig, Kiggell and Major-General Sir Noel ‘Curly’ Birch, Artillery Advisor at GHQ. Rawlinson wrote after their meeting on 18 June:
Goughy [sic] is to be under me and I am to decide when he is to go forward with the Cavry [sic]. If he does I shall reinforce him with the nearest fresh Divisions that are available. . . . If we are not successful in gaining the Green Line with comparative ease the Cavry [sic] will not be pushed through and it is doubtful even if we shall attack the Brown Line for it may be advisable to send the GHQ reserve up north as soon as we have drawn all the German reserves down here. However, this will be decided as soon as we know what happens in the first day of the operations.119
Next day, Rawlinson worked through the detail with Montgomery.
He [Montgomery] thinks we shall not be able to get the Cavry [sic] through until we are in possession of the Brown Line which are the objectives for the second phase of the operations. I shall have to go into this matter in further detail when Goughy [sic] has worked out his lines of getting them [the Cavalry] through and I am not prepared yet to say which the moment will be. It is highly important and is just one of those chances which if it did come off might result in our smashing up the hostile lines of defence on a really wide front.120
Rawlinson obviously saw potential if cavalry was committed at just the right moment, but, equally, he was already tending towards a very conservative set of conditions for committing those all-arms units to battle.
While Fourth Army’s orders were increasing in scope, those of the French army were, as mentioned, being pared back. Foch’s short-lived initial plans were devised around the German defences and the course of the River Somme. South of its bend at Péronne, the river and the numerous fortified villages and woods posed tactical headaches for the infantry to overcome. Foch’s plan issued on 14 April had envisaged a three-army attack: in the south Tenth Army was to establish a defensive flank; in the centre another yet-to-be-designated army was to push up to and across the river; and to the north Sixth Army, whose jumping-off line crossed the waterway at Curlu, was to support this breakthrough, cooperate with the British and press towards the Bapaume–Péronne road. But Verdun had intervened, and within six weeks the proposed threearmy strike was cut to the three corps of Fayolle’s Sixth Army. By the end of May, Fayolle’s brief was little more than to support Rawlinson.121 The proposed breakout south of Péronne and beyond the river was dumped, and the attack to the north of the river became the main axis of French advance.122 One army corps would attack north of the river, supporting the British flank in addition to taking its own objectives, and two south of it. Quick-minded Foch and Fayolle envisaged a brisk conquest of the German first position followed by an immediate advance on the second, with the infantry supported from start to finish by artillery.
TWO DAYS AFTER Fourth Army’s operational orders were inked on 14 June, Haig received an intelligence report outlining the enemy’s Somme strength and reserves. The report’s content only served to entrench his belief that great things were achievable by his Fourth and Reserve Armies. It revealed there were ‘only’ 32 German battalions facing the main British attack, and ‘only’ 65 more to be rushed forward as reinforcements within the first week of battle.123 ‘We shall therefore have considerable numerical superiority,’ wrote Haig, ‘and prompt action taken to develop a success gained in the assault on the first objective may give great results.’124 Haig clearly interpreted this intelligence report in the most charitable possible light; once the breakthrough was effected, he believed there was at least a five-day window for his cavalry to roam over enemy territory beyond Pozières Ridge towards Bapaume, Arras and Monchy-le-Preux, a village just east of Arras, and potentially further afield. Nowhere did he mention that his most ambitious plans required nothing less than a collapse of the German army opposite Rawlinson’s Fourth Army.
This intelligence report only consolidated Haig’s intention, stated in early June, of using his cavalry along ‘the lines of 1806,’ a direct reference to Napoleon’s victory at Jena–Auerstedt.125 ‘Thus,’ wrote two historians of the Somme, ‘machine-guns, quick-firing artillery, barbed wire, and trenches, none of which had been present at Jena, were wished away by the commander-in-chief as he sought to return to simpler times and decisive victories.’126 As potential epics went, this one could not have been scripted better: cavalryman Haig was planning a 40-mile advance and in the process figuratively riding to rescue the French at Verdun.
It was never quite that simple. Haig’s looking to Napoleon for inspiration was no bad thing, so long as he realised the Corsican’s victories belonged to a different era, had taken place on different ground, had faced different defences and had been defined by altogether different technology. Neuve Chapelle and Loos had shown Haig that breaking into thin-line German positions was possible, and therefore — so the theory ran in his mind — punching into the open ground beyond was not merely wishful thinking. Equally, however, he did not want to see a repeat of those battles’ second-day failures.127 Moreover, he recognised that applying all of this to the vastly more sophisticated German positions on the Somme was a materially different proposition. On 16 June, he said the push towards Bapaume and then Monchy-le-Preux was conditional on achieving a break-in, namely the fall of Pozières Ridge.128 If a further advance eastwards turned out not to be advisable, the ‘most profitable course’ would probably be to transfer ‘our main efforts’ quickly to another portion of the British front, namely that held by Second Army in Belgium.129 Haig reinforced this five days later: ‘If the first attack goes well every effort must be made to develop the success to the utmost by firstly opening a way for our cavalry a
nd then as quickly as possible pushing the cavalry through to seize Bapaume.’130 In brief, Haig was advocating a breakthrough battle as his preferred outcome and saw the break-in as a prerequisite of achieving that, rather than necessarily being an immediate end in itself.
Haig’s conclusion was founded on a misinterpretation of Joffre’s correspondence, along with Joffre’s perceptions of Verdun, of Russia’s just-launched Brusilov Offensive and of the wider war on the Western and Eastern Fronts. He had interpreted Joffre’s early June reference to ‘knocking out the German army on the Western Front, or at least an important part of their forces’ too favourably. He believed Joffre was suggesting that decisive results were possible — whereas the Frenchman’s clumsily communicated intent was nothing more than to secure a strong British commitment to a sustained offensive.131 Moreover, Joffre had hinted that the Verdun fighting had ground down the German army and soaked up its reserves, which was a conclusion Haig’s own intelligence officials had reached independently. Haig — his four-stage-battle thinking coming to the fore — saw the 1914 battles as the manoeuvre element, and the subsequent fighting in 1915 and early 1916, including that at Verdun, as the wearing-out phase.132 Haig met with Prime Minister Herbert Henry Asquith in the second week of June in London, and told him the 1916 offensive would be sustained and attritional. But — as we have seen — his thoughts were very definitely tending elsewhere.133 Haig actually saw the Somme as a logical extension of 1914–15 fighting and a potentially decisive blow to break enemy resistance, followed by exploitation, but in his mind it was always better to promise too little and then deliver much.
First day of the Somme Page 5
