German commanders refined their views on the extent and focus of the Allied offensive throughout June.26 Falkenhayn initially expected Alsace-Lorraine would be the focal point and then, when the Picardy–Artois area appeared more likely, that Kronprinz (Prince) Rupprecht of Bavaria’s Sixth Army at Arras would be targeted.27 He considered a preemptive attack there, but Sixth Army did not have the men or guns.28 Prince Rupprecht had noted the shift of British and French divisions south and, along with prisoner interrogations and artillery activity on Second Army’s front, concluded that an offensive in that area was ‘imminent.’29 Stein agreed, and by 23 June was telling Supreme Army Command that ‘I expect the enemy will attack the whole [XIV Reserve Corps] front. He possesses the forces to do so.’30 In early June, Below forecast British attacks on the Gommecourt and Fricourt salients, accompanied by an attempt to hold the intervening ground with shellfire or a minor attack.31 His opinion evolved with Prince Rupprecht’s and Stein’s. ‘The supposed frontage of the enemy’s offensive was fairly clearly established [by late June] as extending from the neighbourhood of Gommecourt, on the north, to the neighbourhood of the Roman road about 8 kilometres [5 miles] south of the Somme [River].’32
Uncompromising Falkenhayn had already prescribed how such a defensive battle should be waged. Not an inch of territory should be ceded, he said, even if it would result in better-placed defensive positions.33 In 1915 he had issued guidance on constructing defensive positions,34 which was mostly confined to the roles of infantry and machine guns.35 The content had been derived from battlefield experience; it recognised that enemy artillery firepower was critical, and also that the infantry had an increasing arsenal of defensive mechanisms, such as machine guns, available. Falkenhayn — who was said to be a man of ‘excellent disposition’ — insisted that the ‘thin’ defensive systems of 1914–15 should be expanded, with second- and possibly third-trench systems constructed behind the first.36 Each position would be independently defensible and consist of two trenches. The first position would be the main defensive line, while the second needed to be sufficiently far back that it could not be hit by concentrated hostile shellfire and required a fresh deployment of enemy artillery and infantry to be attacked.37 This front-loaded defensive scheme was implemented through XIV Reserve Corps and Second Army in 1915, and with time evolved into the formidable defence-in-depth schemes in place throughout late 1916 and into 1917.
Stein’s XIV Reserve Corps numbered about 95,000 men, most serving in the regiments of its regionally recruited infantry divisions. North to south,38 2nd Guards Reserve Division (Generalleutnant Richard Freiherr von Süsskind-Schwendi) and 52nd Infantry Division (Generalleutnant Karl von Borries) held the ground around Gommecourt and Serre, while 26th Reserve Division (Generalleutnant Franz Freiherr von Soden) was in the line from just south of Serre, via Beaumont Hamel and Thiepval, to Ovillers. Twenty-eighth Reserve Division (Generalleutnant Ferdinand von Hahn) was ensconced around La Boisselle, Fricourt and Mametz, while 12th Infantry Division (Generalleutnant Martin Châles de Beaulieu) was around Montauban and south to the River Somme. Tenth Bavarian Infantry Division (Generalmajor Hermann Ritter von Burkhardt) was in corps reserve. These divisions were drawn mostly from Württemberg and Baden. Other units present had been recruited from the Hanseatic towns or were populated by Mecklenburgers, Westphalians, Thuringians, Saxons, Bavarians and Rhinelanders.39 It was these men who, in the 18 months to 1 July, turned XIV Reserve Corps’ positions into formidable defensive strongholds.
Stein’s corps held 28 miles of dog-legged trenches and rolling downs astride the River Ancre. A pilot flying high enough might have likened the front line here to a wonky human head in profile. Gommecourt salient took the appearance of a bushy eyebrow, while the terrain around Beaumont Hamel more or less marked the tip of the nose, with the Ancre crossing the trench line at roughly the location of the nostrils. Thiepval was the philtrum, Leipzig Redoubt and La Boisselle marked the upper and lower lips, while the marked curve of the line around the Fricourt–Mametz salient was the chin. Stein’s corps had held this land since 1914, first against the French, and from August 1915 opposite the British.
Below and Stein had long regarded the ridge between Pozières on the Albert–Bapaume highway and St Pierre Divion in the River Ancre valley as the cornerstone of their defences north of the River Somme.40 The importance of this ground was first recognised as early as 1914, and Soden’s 26th Reserve Division had spent months installing successive parallelograms of trenches supported by powerful redoubts studded with fortified villages and brimming with carefully sited machine guns. If the British were to hold this high ground they could observe large portions of the German defensive network crisscrossing its eastern slopes as they tapered off towards Bapaume, and could therefore tellingly direct artillery fire. It was this ridgeline — around the notorious Schwaben Redoubt, on the lofty heights above Thiepval, then across gentle slopes leading up from Ovillers and La Boisselle to Pozières at its highest point — that Below and Stein identified as a lynchpin of their positions. Leutnant-der-Reserve Matthaus Gerster, Reserve Infantry Regiment 119 (RIR119), explained the danger posed by the loss of Schwaben Redoubt:
They [the British] would be sitting on the highest part of the Thiepval Plateau [on the Pozières Ridge], able to observe far into the rear areas and to overlook all the approach routes and battery positions, especially those north of the Ancre. Thiepval itself would have been threatened from the rear, [and to the north] St Pierre Divion would have fallen and Beaumont Hamel would have become untenable, because it would have been overlooked from three sides.41
So, too, Pozières, Ovillers and La Boisselle would undoubtedly have been lost. German commanders were blunt about the importance of the ridge and Schwaben Redoubt: ‘If the enemy gets established there, he is to be ejected at once.’42 It was for this reason that Below and Stein spared no effort in turning the approaches to Pozières Ridge into a defensive fortress.
This thinking was underpinned by concerns about what might happen if the expected Allied offensive punched through the German lines south of the River Ancre, more so if these gains were exploited in a northeasterly direction and driven forcefully towards the Arras area.43 In effect this would unravel Second Army’s northern battle sector, catch Prince Rupprecht’s Sixth Army on its exposed southern flank and potentially complement any eastwards drive by French forces in that vicinity. If this happened, German commanders recognised that, at least hypothetically, there would be far-reaching strategic consequences for Second Army’s tenure on the Somme.
Further north, XIV Reserve Corps’ sector was equally sensitive to a British advance. Here the Redan Ridge–Beaucourt and Serre–Grandcourt Spurs, both terminating in the Ancre valley, would potentially see Stein’s, Soden’s and Borries’ positions north of that waterway unravelled,44 followed by those immediately to the south. These spurs, wrote Stabsarzt Dr Richard Schwartz, Reserve Infantry Regiment 121 (RIR121), yielded extensive views ‘of the Ancre valley and beyond to the heights of Thiepval and Pozières.’45 If the Serre–Grandcourt Spur, also known as Serre Heights, fell, ‘Beaumont [Hamel] and Thiepval would have automatically fallen,’ added Hauptmann Georg Freiherr von Holtz, RIR121.46 Soden’s gun lines north of the Ancre would become untenable, denuding Thiepval and Pozières of northern flank support. If this happened, the 26th’s positions south of the river would be jeopardised. ‘Had Serre heights fallen into the possession of the enemy the whole [divisional] front could have been shaken. The danger was therefore enormous,’ wrote Soden in his post-war memoir.47 It was with good reason that Stein’s estate north of the Ancre was also said to be ‘impregnable’ to enemy attack.48
Not so XIV Reserve Corps’ defences south of Fricourt, namely at Mametz and Montauban. Here the trench systems held by 28th Reserve and 12th Infantry Divisions zigzagged over a tangle of shallow valleys and waterways 2.5–4 miles in advance of the main ridgeline, which continued between Pozières and Longueval. Most of these positions were op
en to at least some observation from the British or French lines. Both divisions regarded Hill 110 as must-hold ground because it overlooked their defences immediately around Fricourt and Mametz.49 However, German records are silent on the tactical and strategic value of the gentle Mametz–Montauban inclines, which tapered from the Pozières–Longueval ridge. This was mostly because Below and Stein expected the main British attack further north, and the absence of major actions in this area since 1914 implied that the Allies attributed little importance to it. Probably all of these factors contributed to XIV Reserve Corps attaching less tactical and strategic importance to the Mametz–Montauban area than others further north, and as a result it was comparatively under-developed as a defensive stronghold.
By mid-May 1916, Stein’s headquarters was circulating doctrine that expanded on Falkenhayn’s original guidance.50 Emphasis remained on using the front line to blunt an enemy attack. Stein’s guidelines laid down the best defensive practices for infantry, artillery, machine-gunners, signallers, engineers and so forth. They also detailed the construction of trenches, strongpoints, dugouts and communication lines, the use of barbed wire and the conversion of villages into defensive obstacles, among myriad other subjects. This was a common-sense guide based on experience.51 Soden, for instance, later noted that the Battle of Serre against the French in June 1915 had been ‘extremely instructive preparation for the Battle of the Somme,’52 and also that his defences reflected the lessons of fighting at Arras, Champagne and Verdun,53 namely in their ability to withstand heavy artillery fire. Châles de Beaulieu — who had a talent for talking up his own game ahead of practising it — said the Arras battles of 1915 showed that well-constructed positions could, even if heavily shelled, ‘be held against repeated assaults.’54 Stein’s directives became the benchmark for the construction of defensive positions throughout most of his corps, and broadly encapsulated practices already well established in many of his divisions.
The eight-day Battle of Serre against the French in June 1915 offered particularly valuable insights for Below, Stein, Soden, Borries and Hahn in preparing their defences. The 6–13 June attack by the French was presaged by a massive bombardment west of Serre, followed by infantry breaking into 52nd’s and 26th’s lines. Fighting devolved into costly thrust and counterthrust. It ended with XIV Reserve Corps retaining the high ground around Serre and on Redan Ridge, and the French clinging to lower ground to the west. From this battle, Below, Stein and several of their divisional commanders learned how to prepare their positions to withstand attack and bombardment, use defensive artillery, locate and apply reinforcements to battle, seal off enemy break-ins, and maintain lines of communication and command. Soden said these lessons were of the greatest value:55 ‘At the time nobody fully appreciated the devastating effect of concentrated artillery fire against the forward trenches.’56 Below further noted the importance of spotting attacks early, and giving defenders enough warning to exit their dugouts and man the parapet quickly.57 These lessons were emphasised in Stein’s directive and formed the basis of Soden’s, Borries’, Hahn’s and, later on, Süsskind-Schwendi’s defensive schemes.
In his document, Stein said all trenches were to be suitable for firing from, and that the first defensive line must not yield in the event of an enemy attack. He insisted that the front-line position comprise three separate trenches, rather than two, and that each should have two rows of barbed wire in front as an impediment to enemy infantry. Each infantry company sector should have communication trenches linking these three first-position trenches, and each battalion sector should have separate communication trenches for troops coming into and leaving the line. The intermediate and second-line trench systems should consist of two trenches, each with two rows of wire and the same number of communication trenches as in the first line, while the third line should be dug to the depth of a spade head, and several strongpoints housing machine guns established. The ‘thin’ defensive lines of 1914 and early 1915 were soon replaced by increasingly deep, sophisticated networks of trenches, strongpoints, fortified villages and obstacles.
Carefully deployed machine guns were integral to XIV Reserve Corps’ defences. By 30 June each of Stein’s regiments had at least 12 guns operated by specialist companies, often supplemented by independent machine-gun units, captured weapons and at least 30 Musketen (light machine guns) per division. The 26th, for instance, had at least 90 heavy machine guns and 30 Musketen distributed throughout its sector.58 These were to be employed at commanding points in the second and third trenches of the front-line system, and fired over the front-line trench into no-man’s-land.59 ‘The possibility of delivering both frontal and flanking fire must not be forgotten,’ wrote Stein of deploying watercooled MG08 machine guns that fired 500–600 rounds a minute to an observable range of about 1900 yards.60 ‘The better the first trench is defended by flanking fire, especially that of machine guns, the more can the infantry garrison be reduced.’61 Machine-gun posts were camouflaged and dummy positions created to conceal the exact location of weapons, which were to be kept in dugouts during bombardments and only deployed when an enemy attack began. ‘It is taken for granted that the crews are trained in firing without the sledge [base for the gun], on a pedestal built up of sand bags.’62 Stein wanted his positions protected by multiple killing zones, or areas of no-man’s-land where multiple machine guns co-ordinated their fire to devastate any enemy infantry attack.
At La Boisselle, for instance, Hauptmann Otto Wagener, a specialist machine-gun officer in Reserve Infantry Regiment 110 (RIR110), set up the notorious killing zones of Mash and Sausage Valleys. Wagener, who in the 1930s became a confidant to Adolf Hitler, possessed a keen eye, understood how to adapt defences to the land, and searched out the best machine-gun sites for achieving interlocking and flanking fields of fire.63 It was this architect of death’s crossfire killing traps that caused thousands of British casualties in 8th and 34th Divisions in an unwavering fusillade of bullets on the first day of the Somme.
Stein set XIV Reserve Corps to implementing his defensive doctrine, the hefty workload falling squarely on the rank and file, as well as men such as Wagener. ‘Men are not eager to take part in this kind of work; they must be kept to it with a firm hand,’ wrote Stein.64 ‘This task becomes less difficult when the men have once realised from experience how important the work is to their own personal safety.’ Stein insisted that no effort was to be spared in ensuring his corps could fend off a major attack and believed the results would be realised when the Allied offensive arrived.65
WORK BEGAN WITH revitalising the existing positions as winter faded into spring in 1916. Dugouts, headquarters and observation posts were mined into the ground and camouflaged, as were machine-gun posts. Trench walls were lined with chicken mesh, woven brushwood and planks of timber to reduce the likelihood of their collapsing under shellfire or rain. Duckboards were laid, more trenches were dug with steel loopholes for sentries built into their parapets. Barbed-wire entanglements were thickened, and further back more artillery gun pits were dug. Soden said there was a ‘feverish development of the positions, including the Intermediate Position and the Second and Third Positions.’66 The number of microphone-equipped ‘Moritz’ underground telephone interception stations was increased. ‘Church bells, sirens and gongs were installed to warn of gas attacks.’67 Large stores of ammunition, including hand grenades, were placed in shell-proof shelters, as far forward as the front line itself.68 This labour-intensive, spring–summer programme consumed large volumes of materiel, time and labour.
Leutnant-der-Reserve Paul Heizmann, RIR109, recalled the toil at La Boisselle. He wrote of lugging timber, knife rests, trench mortars and ammunition, sandbags, coils of wire and pickets into the trenches:
Over time, at the cost of strenuous labour, which robbed us of our nights, we produced a first-class trench system . . . which in our sector, not including the long communication trench to Contalmaison, eventually reached twenty-seven kilometres [16.8 miles]. .
. . How we sweated, what labour it cost, to link up the saps in the left-hand sector! What care we took over dugouts for the regiment, battalion, kitchens, aid post and the mortar pits! We made every piece of ground into a fortress.69
Unteroffizier Otto Lais, a machine-gunner in Infantry Regiment 169, laboured through the spring of 1916 on the gentle slopes before Serre, which he later said became an ‘ingeniously organised infantry fortress’ that would be deadly to the attacker:70
‘Curse and work’ was our trench-motto in the positions in front of Bapaume in the Artois! This motto was a reference to the ‘endless’ digging, to the drawing of wire entanglements, and to the never-ending construction of dugouts. One swore, one grumbled, one groaned at the nightly hauling of the rolls of barbed wire, the barricades, the wooden frames and all the other ‘treasured’ things in the life of an infantryman. Particularly ‘popular’ was the enjoyment we infantrymen had hauling the hundredweight mines [for mortars]. We have the feeling that nowhere on the whole Western Front is there as much graft, digging and tunnelling as here.71
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