At our fireside,
Sad and lonely,
The children I do tell,
How their noble father fell.
FOURTH DIVISION’S INITIAL attack was eastbound on a 1500-yard front between Redan Ridge and Heidenkopf. Here, immediately north of 29th Division, there was plenty of failure, but also some initial gains. ‘We sprang like cats on the [trench parapet] top, and then we had to walk,’ said Private Thomas Kirby, 1st East Lancashires.85 The assault was led by three battalions — south to north, 1st East Lancashires, 1st Rifle Brigade (both of 11th Brigade) and the 1/8th Royal Warwicks, this last attached from 48th (South Midland) Division’s 143rd Brigade — going over abreast and moving forward in linear successive waves.86 Three more — 1st Hampshires, 1st Somerset Light Infantry and 1/6th Royal Warwicks, also of the 143rd — followed in section columns to mitigate the effect of an expected defensive barrage.87
Sections from 7th, 1/1st Durham and 1/1st Renfrew Field Companies, RE, were to help with consolidation.88 Four Russian Saps in 4th Division’s patch had Lewis-gun teams at their respective heads in no-man’s-land. The men at the heads of these saps — north to south, Delaunay and Bess Street in 1/8th Royal Warwicks’ sector, and Cat Street and Beet Street in 1st Rifle Brigade’s zone — quickly fell prey to so-called ‘friendly’ shellfire or enemy infantry.
German machine guns in the front and support trenches spat lead directly at the attackers. ‘When the Germans saw us coming they did not half open out with [artillery] heavies and machine guns,’ said Kirby.89 Machine guns to the north around the ruins of Serre, where 31st Division’s attack was a failure in progress, and south at Ridge Redoubt, caught 4th Division in brutal enfilade.90
As it turned out, 4th Division’s two northern-most lead battalions made limited gains around Heidenkopf, whereas the third met with outright failure on the camber of the east–west running Redan Ridge. Eleventh Brigade’s 1st East Lancashires* moved into no-man’s-land on the ridge shortly before Zero and met with heavy machine-gun fire.91 About 40 men fought their way into the hostile line and were killed or captured.92 Following behind, 1st Hampshires† was confronted by a storm of metal and said it was ‘impossible even to reach the German front line.’93 The division’s two other lead battalions did better. Adjoining companies of 1st Rifle Brigade‡ and 1/8th Royal Warwicks,§ of 11th and 143rd Brigades respectively, found the enemy wire cut and separately fought their way into the enemy front line and the scarcely defended Heidenkopf. This group of trenches was a jot north of today’s Serre Road Cemetery No. 2 and projecting from the main German line. These battalions’ outermost companies — 1st Rifle Brigade’s right company on the ridge and the 1/8th’s left company nearer to Serre — were mostly stopped either by frontal and enfilade machine-gun fire, or both.94 Survivors from the following 1st Somerset Light Infantry¶ and 1/6th Royal Warwicks,** of 11th and 143rd Brigades respectively, pressed forward. They suffered from machine guns around Serre and in Ridge Redoubt, the 1/6th losing 80 men before reaching its own parapet.95 Some reached the German lines, but in insufficient numbers to do anything other than help consolidation.96 By 9 a.m., 11th Brigade had penetrated the German front line behind Heidenkopf on a frontage of about 600 yards and to a depth of 250–500 yards, but their early gains were already taking on the characteristics of a siege rather than an advance.97
Captain Douglas Adams, 1/8th Royal Warwicks, said the enemy enfilade was initially too high as his battalion crossed over. The triggermen soon shortened their range.98 ‘Casualties became so heavy that by the time that isolated parties had reached the German support trench (about 200 yards behind the front line) further advance was impossible.’99 It was a question of numbers. Even if 11th Brigade had forced a limited entry into the German line it was still a long way short of Hunter-Weston’s objectives and never of sufficient scale or momentum to be expanded upon.
Leutnant-der-Reserve Friedrich Stutz, RIR121, was in the Redan Ridge front line as the 1st Rifle Brigade attempted to advance:
‘The English had pushed underground tunnels [Russian Saps] forward, close to our front line. They broke the surface just before the attack and positioned Lewis guns at these. The name of the tunnel in front of us was “The Cat.” They tried to force us to keep our heads down [while the infantry crossed no-man’s-land]. A hand grenade salvo silenced the Lewis gun and we rushed forward. Reservist Fischer did great work with the bayonet. The Lewis gun is ours. Now our machine guns prove devastating to the enemy’s [infantry] columns and an artillery battery behind sends shells into them.’100
Private Ralph Miller, 1/8th Royal Warwicks, remembered ‘hundreds of fellows, shouting and swearing, going over with fixed bayonets.’101 Second-Lieutenant George Glover, 1st Rifle Brigade, said his battalion’s first wave bunched at the German wire and a ‘most fearsome hail of rifle and machine gun fire with continuous shelling opened on us. Most of us seemed to be knocked out.’102 Private Fred Lewis, 1/8th Royal Warwicks, prayed ‘to Almighty God that if I got wounded that it would be light.’103 He got his wish: a bullet pierced his left foot. His battalion commander was nearby: ‘We’d only gone over the top a few yards and he [the commander] was killed instantly — right at my side — a bullet through his head. Colonel [Edgar] Innes his name was.’ Others, wrote Lewis, were less fortunate and died slowly and in pain. ‘You’d look at them lying there all gashed, legs off, arms off, and stomach all ripped open. You’d think “Poor bugger!” and that was it. It was a matter of being used to it.’104 Second-Lieutenant William Page, 1st East Lancashires, saw some German soldiers atop their parapet waving their caps. ‘Come on English,’ they taunted, before being killed by a shell burst.105 Private John Kerr, 1st Somerset Light Infantry, reached the German trenches. A bullet grazed his head and he was taken prisoner. Among all of the carnage and death it bothered him more that his captors ‘stole our money and valuables.’106
Fourth Division, including the two Royal Warwicks battalions attached, would run up a total of 5752 casualties for 1 July, among them 1883 dead, 3563 wounded, 218 missing and 88 prisoners. Meanwhile, RIR121 recorded 179 dead, 291 wounded and 70 missing for the period 1–10 July, although mostly on the first day of that period.107 In short, for every one German casualty opposite the 4th, there were 10.7 British.
Nobody knows exactly what happened to Private Harry Woodward, 1/6th Royal Warwicks, except that he was probably killed by machinegun fire. The Birmingham teenager, whose 15th birthday was just a few weeks before he hopped the sandbags and went forward into battle, is named on the Thiepval Memorial. At the time of his death Woodward had been in France for more than a year, which meant he had been in the trenches since the age of 13. Another among 1/6th Royal Warwicks’ dead was 21-year-old Private Fred Andrews. He penned a letter to his mother in late June: ‘Do not worry I hope the war will soon be over now. Things are looking up here.’108 A few weeks later his mother wrote back: ‘Oh son I do hope you are all right. I have not had a line for nearly three weeks. . . . My own dear boy I am quite sure it is not your fault I do not know what is preventing you from writing if I could only get a line in your hand writing I should feel better.’109 Andrews is buried at Serre Road Cemetery No. 2.
Such was the noise and confusion of battle that nobody really noticed four underground German mines detonating at the head of Heidenkopf. The idea was to blow up British infantry as they entered the trenches. The mines were fired at about 7.45 a.m., some probably later in the morning. British and German sources are equally vague. One detonated as 1/8th Royal Warwicks entered the German line, two smaller mines were apparently fired as 1st King’s Own* crossed at about 9.30 a.m., while around the same time 2nd Lancashire Fusiliers had a couple of mines blown ‘under our first wave.’110 Four craters were seen after battle, but German observers shied from saying they had seen the blasts.111 Apparently the British attack ‘suddenly faltered’ near the mines, and many corpses were later found nearby.112 Quite how quadruple explosions — each with a charge of 1250–1600 kilograms
(2750–3500 pounds), according to German records, and leaving a crater about 10 metres (11 yards) deep and roughly 25 metres (27 yards) across — could go unmentioned in the memoirs of so many men in the area remains unknown. The only certainty is that these four mine blasts were nowhere near as effective as had been expected.113
AT THE EXTREME north of VIII Corps, 31st Division’s attack eastwards up the exposed grassy incline leading towards Serre village and positions held by IR169 was a disaster from the outset. Thirty-first Division’s leading waves moved through their wire and into no-man’s-land at about 7.20 a.m. and lay down waiting for Zero.114 The first two waves were to advance in extended order, with subsequent ones in columns of sections.115 German shells were already bursting, soon joined by grazing machine-gun fire.116 A company of the 12th King’s Own Yorkshire Light Infantry (KOYLI)† was attached to each of the 31st’s 93rd and 94th Brigades. Three sections of 210th Field Company, RE, were attached to 94th Brigade, which hoped to consolidate its gains by day, while the 93rd planned to deploy sections from 211th and 223rd Field Companies later that night.117 Five Russian Saps on the 31st’s front — north to south, John, Mark, Excema, Gray and Bleneau, the latter containing a Stokes mortar that quickly spent its ammunition when it began firing at 7.28 a.m. — were opened at 6.30 a.m. Once the attack began, the remaining two companies of 12th KOYLI were to dig these saps across to the German lines. All of the opened Russian Saps in the 31st’s sector would to some extent become havens for wounded men throughout the day.
By day’s end, the 31st had accrued about 3600 casualties, including 1349 dead, 2169 wounded, 74 missing and 8 prisoners. Opposite, IR169 sustained 141 dead, 219 wounded and 2 missing.118 That worked out at a rate of one German casualty for every 9.9 British.
In 93rd Brigade’s patch, just north of 4th Division, 15th West Yorkshires* was almost annihilated by ‘severe’ frontal and flanking machine-gun and rifle fire.119 Following, 16th West Yorkshires,† along with one company of 18th Durham Light Infantry,‡ suffered appalling casualties even before reaching their own front line. Numerous men were killed and wounded as they clambered from their assembly trenches, and still more fell as they pressed towards the British wire to begin their attack. Against the odds a small number, incredibly, made it across no-man’sland and into enemy lines, fewer still to Munich Trench immediately south of Serre and some of these, allegedly, to Pendant Copse, about a mile behind the German front line.120 Eighteenth West Yorkshires,§ coming on behind, made no headway, and incurred most of its casualties before even reaching its own wire.121 The remaining three companies of 18th Durham Light Infantry were held in reserve.
Ninety-fourth Brigade, to the north, advanced on a two-battalion frontage from trenches lacing Mark, Luke and John Copses just west of Serre. The attack of 11th East Lancashires¶ and 12th York & Lancasters** also faltered in withering machine-gun crossfire,122 as well as a heavy curtain of shellfire. That shellfire, the blasts of which Brigadier-General Rees earlier likened to poplar trees, began on the brigade’s rear-most assembly trenches and worked its way forward to the British front line.123 Twelfth York & Lancasters later reported: ‘As soon as our [preparatory] barrage lifted from their front line, the Germans, who had been sheltering in Dug-outs immediately came out and opened rapid fire with their machine guns.’124 Most of these two battalions were stopped in no-man’sland. However, up to 100 men of 11th East Lancashires surprisingly reached the ruins of Serre, only to be killed or captured there, with very few of the 12th York & Lancasters making it that far, too.125 In the wake of these battalions, the leading companies of 13th* and 14th York & Lancasters† were also fired on before reaching no-man’s-land, and were then mauled by a ‘perfect tornado’ of shell- and machine-gun fire when attempting the cross.126 Again, a very small number of men of the 14th reached the enemy line.127 It was with bloody and good reason that the 94th’s attacks were immediately suspended.128 On 94th Brigade’s extreme northern flank, the Russian Sap known as John jutted into no-man’s-land to provide northern flank protection. It was soon clogged with bloody, broken men and others sheltering from German defensive fire.
If a few isolated parties of the 31st had breached the German trenches, the overall theme was of multiple battalions effectively destroyed as effective fighting units around and behind their own front line, or as they attempted to cross the barren no-man’s-land. Supporting battalions of the 93rd and 94th all ‘suffered heavily from the German artillery barrage, which was at once put down when they made any movement and was obviously directed by observation.’129 Those small groups of survivors who miraculously made it further were all too often confronted by intact coils of German wire, sections of patchy entanglements that were essentially impassable, and gaps defended by German infantry. As 12th York & Lancasters’ war diarist bleakly noted:
In view of the fact that the enemy artillery became active as soon as it was daylight, it would appear likely that the enemy was warned of the attack by observing gaps cut in our own wire [for infantry to pass through] and tapes laid out in No Man’s Land [to aid deployment], thus obtaining at least three and a half hours warning of the attack. . . . Our intention to attack must have been quite obvious.130
He might have been writing for the whole of 31st Division, with 29th Division further south having failed for strikingly similar reasons.
Survivors of the 31st’s leading waves told of an operation that was shot into submission from the outset.131 Lance-Corporal James Glenn, 12th York & Lancasters, remembered the attackers ‘hadn’t gone but a few steps when they went down again.’132 He said the ‘funny thing about being in a barrage was being frightened and trying not to show it to your mates.’133 Corporal Douglas Cattell, 12th York & Lancasters, said he ‘never saw a German and I never fired at one. Yet all this firing was coming at us.’134 Private Alfred Howard, 15th West Yorkshires, had brazened his way to the intact German wire when a bullet smashed his rifle and he went to ground. ‘Away on the left a party of Germans climbed out of the trench, they kicked one or two bodies, any showing signs of life were shot or bayonetted.’135 After a few hours under the blazing sun surrounded by corpses, Howard bolted back whence he came. A bullet clipped his leg and he collapsed into a shell hole. ‘I got out of the hole and crawled to our line, all was quiet, except for the groans of dead and dying. You could not tell what had been trenches from shell holes, but all were full, bodies one on top of the other.’136 Most did not get close enough to the hostile parapet even to see a German soldier, let alone squeeze off a pot shot.
Those in follow-up battalions saw the grisly fate of those before them. It was with good reason that Private Tommy Oughton, 13th York & Lancasters, said he felt ‘very mixed as we waited to go over.’137 Then his battalion moved towards the British front line. ‘You could see bodies dropping here, there and wondering, is it you next?’ Nearby, Lance-Corporal Charles Moss, 18th Durham Light Infantry, saw a soldier resting a piece of raw meat on his left forearm: ‘It was the remains of his right forearm.’138 Private Frank Raine, 18th Durham Light Infantry, reached a ‘stage where you get beyond being frightened, but I felt guilty at dropping into a shell hole.’139 Lieutenant Robert Heptonstall, 13th York & Lancasters, made good distance before being wounded and going to ground. He saw a ‘dead man propped up against the German wire in a sitting position. He was sniped at during the day until his head was completely shot away.’140 Corporal Arthur Durrant, 18th Durham Light Infantry, was wounded a few paces into no-man’s-land. ‘I started dragging myself along again over bodies. Dead bodies and bits of bodies and I came to a shallow trench and I was on my back and I thought well if this is the end it is the end and that is that and I lay there looking at the sky.’141
ALL ALONG VIII Corps’ line German machine-gunners were deciding the outcome of the battle. Few British soldiers saw the muzzle flashes of those machine guns firing from the intermediate position, about 1500 yards away. But they could definitely see and hear the damage they were doing, and take an educated gues
s at where the welter of bullets was coming from. One soldier, at least a mile behind the front line, described the sound as a ‘tearing rattle’ within the battle symphony.142 Raine was in no-man’s-land: ‘Oh my God, the ground in front of me was just like heavy rain, that was the machine-gun bullets.’143 Private Wilfred Crook, 1st Somerset Light Infantry, was met with a ‘murderous burst’ just south of Heidenkopf: ‘I knew we were doomed. Bullets flew everywhere and dust spurted near our feet and all around as they hit the ground. Near misses in passing whispered of death, while others plucked at our sleeves or hissed and spat viciously to ricochet. The noise was deafening.’144 Private Bert Ellis, in the yet-to-attack Newfoundland Regiment, later described the fusillade tearing across the open sweeps of what is now Newfoundland Memorial Park:
No doubt you know what a noise the ‘air hammer’ makes at the dock when they are working; well, that’s something like a machine gun sounds when in action. They played havoc with our men and to make matters worse they had, practically on both sides, what is called enfilading fire, which is the worst kind of fire to be under. You could almost see the bullets coming, they came so thick and fast.145
All of these machine guns between Serre and the River Ancre had pre-registered and interlocking arcs of fire that covered no-man’s-land, as well as the British front line and the latticework of ditches behind.
‘We just had to load and reload. They went down in their hundreds,’ wrote Musketier Karl Blenk, IR169, who was among those pelting 31st Division’s infantry with bullets before Serre.146 ‘We just fired into them.’ He later surveyed the carnage: ‘There was a wailing and lamentation in No Man’s Land and much shouting for stretcher-bearers. . . . When the English tried again, they weren’t walking this time, they were running as fast as they could but when they reached the piles of bodies they got no farther.’147 Blenk was describing the killing zone, the area of no-man’sland in which the cones of fire from multiple machine guns overlapped and created a concentration of bullets essentially impassable for infantry, no matter what small-unit tactics they were using.
First day of the Somme Page 20
