Earlier that morning, from his position on the Mametz–Montauban road, Unteroffizier Paul Scheytt, RIR109, had watched the British advance.183 At midday, word was passed along the German ranks that Montauban had fallen. By early evening casualty numbers were rising and ammunition dwindling. Resistance was fragmenting in the face of advancing British infantry, which outnumbered the defenders:
Although we took all the ammunition from wounded & dead we realised that if the British had made a fresh attack we could not hold our position. The day closed with another heavy attack by the British, partly standing up in an open field we fought the attack. When our last cartridge had been fired we retreated through Artillerieschlucht [Caterpillar Valley Wood] to Bazentin-le-Petit.184
Once there, Scheytt and other parched survivors guzzled mineral water and nodded off as battle fatigue overtook them. On the other side of Caterpillar Valley the men of the 18th were similarly downing bottles of liberated soda water, puffing on captured cigars, ratting dugouts for souvenirs and shaking hands with one another, after what most saw as a fine day’s work.185
‘Our boys were amongst the first to meet and get to our objective,’ wrote Private Barden, 7th Royal West Kents,* of the advance to Montauban Alley.186 ‘God only knows how any of us got there, but we did, and held it, too. It was a terrible night of suspense, and we waited for the demoralised Fritz to get together again and come at us in a counterattack.’187 A few hundred yards away, Private Norton’s platoon of 8th Norfolks was digging a strongpoint overlooking Caterpillar Valley and out towards Longueval.188 In the early evening, Norton saw the enemy ‘dragging out his guns & transport as if moving back, it was then very quiet with only an occasional long range shell from Jerry coming over.’189 Sections of the 79th, 80th and 92nd Field Companies, RE, were also helping dig strongpoints and wire defences around Montauban Alley.190 All along the new line exhausted soldiers toiled to make their positions defensible: ‘If a man ceased digging for a moment he dropped off to sleep where he stood or fell.’191 Major Lanoe Hawker, VC, 24th Squadron, RFC, was overhead at about 8 p.m. and said the attack had gone well: ‘Very heavy shelling along ravine from Caterpillar [Valley] Wood to North of Bois de Bernafay [Bernafay Wood] followed by white and red [flare] lights along the same ravine.’192 Lieutenant Heath, who was now at Montauban Alley, spied a German field-gun emplacement about 300 yards away in Caterpillar Valley. He fired a single trench mortar round to encourage any crew nearby to surrender:
In a few seconds, a white handkerchief was hoisted, tied to the end of a rifle. I ceased fire. A Pickelhaube (German spiked helmet), then made its appearance, but, to our astonishment, its wearer who climbed out of the trench was seen to be wearing khaki [i.e. a British uniform]. He then cheered at the top of his voice, and after executing an extempore war dance, ran briskly over to us amid roars of laughter from the men.193
From Maxse’s viewpoint the debut attack of his 18th (Eastern) Division had been one of frustratingly slow progress capped off with eventual success. At first all appeared to go rather well.194 But by 11 a.m. if not earlier, Maxse was well aware that his infantry were not consolidating Montauban Alley at the scheduled time of 10 a.m. Progress reports revealed that the centre and right of the 18th’s sector were held up; there can have been no doubt in Maxse’s mind that his attack was stalling. He was well aware that his brigadier-generals — Harold Higginson of the 53rd, Thomas Shoubridge of the 54th and Jackson of the 55th — were committing their attack and support battalions to break the impasse. He also knew the 18th’s objectives needed to be achieved alongside those of 30th Division. Maxse had spent ample time training his men to overcome unplanned tactical setbacks and unexpectedly strong resistance. More reinforcements were sent in, but come 1.30 p.m. the central portion of the 18th’s sector still held out, even if the German grip was weakening. At 3.15 p.m. Maxse intervened, ordering the re-bombardment of a 300-yard stretch of Montauban Alley. At 4.30 p.m. another bombardment was ordered for 30 minutes from 5.15 p.m., but this was postponed to 6.15 p.m. and then cancelled at 5.50 p.m., as progress was finally being made against now-collapsing German resistance. Maxse said in-touch-with-events Higginson did ‘not now consider it [the bombardment] necessary.’195 Finally, at 7.40 p.m., a relieved Maxse got word that all of Montauban Alley had been taken and that consolidation was afoot; his well-trained men on the battlefield and brigade staffs had proved themselves equal to the job set them. ‘Well done. It’s what I expected,’ wrote Maxse in a message to his men that night. ‘Now hold on to what you have gained so splendidly.’196
Captain Maurice Grove-White, an RE staff officer with XIII Corps, described the 18th’s achievement as ‘no mean feat in any battle, and certainly an extraordinary performance in their first battle.’197 He explained that Maxse’s mopping-up parties had been a key element of the victory, as had the pre-battle training in open-warfare methods, with infantry ‘working forward by fire and manoeuvre without artillery support.’198 It was a point echoed repeatedly in the post-war divisional history, which attributed rather less import to the flank gains of 55th Brigade and 30th Division in eventually forcing a German collapse within the wedge.199
Casualties in the 18th totalled 3115, among them 912 dead, 2157 wounded and 46 missing.200 German units opposite suffered about 1060 casualties. Among these were about 1044 casualties in RIR109, with a little less than a third of these dead.201 The company of IR23 involved lost 16 killed and missing and an unknown number of wounded.202 That is, for every one German casualty there were 2.9 British.
Back in the British assembly trenches, soldiers of reserve battalions spent the day amid a grisly scene. Here, sporadic German shellfire collapsed trench walls, wounded soldiers struggling in from no-man’s-land and eviscerated others. Private Sydney Fuller, 8th Suffolks,* was in the ditches vacated by 55th Brigade. It was about 11 a.m. ‘I stepped on something, and looking down I saw a piece of a man’s backbone, and pieces of flesh strewn about the trench. Hanging down from the parapet, in the corner of the traverse, was a mass of entrails, already swarming with flies.’203
NEWS OF THE attack reached the headquarters of Generalleutnant Ferdinand von Hahn, commander of 28th Reserve Division, and 12th Infantry Division’s Châles de Beaulieu at about 8 a.m. Confusion in the battle zone and broken telephone links meant it was another twoand-a-half hours before they had a clearer picture of events.204 The two officers, in telephone contact with one another, were aware of British gains around Montauban and had received vague reports that the village was lost.205 They still did not know that their units to the south and west of Montauban were disintegrating under XIII Corps’ attack.206 Both realised the ‘uncertain situation around Montauban meant that the second position north of the village [between Bazentin-le-Petit and Longueval] needed to be strengthened,’ with more troops held ready to garrison Mametz Wood.207 By noon Châles de Beaulieu and Hahn were certain Montauban was lost and knew British infantry was overlooking Caterpillar Valley and not far from the German second defensive position on its opposite side. Châles de Beaulieu must have now realised his error in moving the Bavarians into the line just before battle. With no local reserves to speak of, and confronted by British gains around Fricourt and Mametz and French progress closer to the River Somme, he and Hahn were forced to abandon any idea of an immediate counterattack to reclaim lost ground and set to shoring up what little their men still retained.208
Hahn and Châles de Beaulieu’s tactical defeat between Mametz and Montauban resulted from a lack of defensive artillery firepower. They each had fewer guns than 26th Reserve Division to begin with, and many of those they had were destroyed during 24–30 June. Come 1 July, artillery–infantry communication links had failed, numerous observation officers had beome casualties, and the fluid battle meant surviving artillerymen either lacked reliable target co-ordinates or were firing blind in the mist and smoke of battle.209 By mid-afternoon on 1 July, even more guns had been destroyed, neutralised or were out of ammunition.210 Dust- and smoke-shr
ouded gun pits were peppered with shrapnel and explosives.211 Casualties were heavy.212 RFC observers raked German batteries with machine-gun fire and pinpointed them for British counter-battery gunners.213 As one German historian wrote, ‘An English flyer circling low over the [Bernafay] wood quickly discovered the batteries and soon 28-cm shells began landing.’214 As XIII Corps sent patrols forward from Montauban Alley during the afternoon and evening, several more guns were lost — either abandoned or disabled.215 In this part of the battlefield Hahn and Châles de Beaulieu had lost the artillery duel both prior to and on battle day, and with it the ability to lay down any kind of meaningful defensive shellfire that might have slowed or broken Congreve’s attack.
At midday, the German second position between Bazentin-le-Grand and Longueval was held by a battalion of IR23 and a hotchpotch of noncombatant troops totalling about 1000 men, plus a handful of machine guns.216 IR23’s most advanced position was a quarry in Caterpillar Valley, about 800 yards due north of Montauban, garrisoned by a jumble of its soldiers, some from IR62 and some Bavarian battle stragglers. In total they numbered about 150, of whom many were wounded. In theory this position would block any British advance down into the valley, and the approaches from Caterpillar Valley Wood to the west; in reality the quarry’s few defenders did not have the means to resist a concerted attack. Between the quarry and Bernafay Wood was a single platoon of IR23. From mid- to late-afternoon, four companies of IR62, a company of pioneers and four infantry companies from the divisional training depot — all together probably numbering fewer than 2000 — arrived forward at Bernafay and Trônes Woods, and Bois Favière.217 The western and southern fringes of Bernafay Wood were held by about half these men. There were, in brief, insufficient troops to launch a counterattack, and in any case battle reports were sketchy on where exactly the forward-most British infantry was. As one German historian wrote: ‘A daylight attack on Montauban from the north [Bazentin-le-Grand–Longueval area] was hopeless. The village could only be attacked with any chance of success from the east. But the enemy had probably also reached Bernafay and Trônes Woods. That was not the case, as it was later revealed. . . . Nightfall had to be awaited.’218 Oberleutnant Reymann later put an overtly positive slant on events, alleging that the ‘front was held and a big breakthrough prevented.’219 Others such as Grenadier Goebelbecker, who was closer to Mametz, were surprised: ‘What puzzled me most all day was the lack of further forward movement by the British troops after the initial attack. The whole German line had collapsed & it would have been a simple matter for them to make a much larger advance than they did.’220
Seven miles away at Bapaume, an increasingly alarmed Stein realised the danger on his corps’ left flank. An Anglo-French breakthrough between Montauban and the River Somme had the potential for catastrophe if extended northwest towards Thiepval and 36th (Ulster) Division’s break-in, roughly north in the direction of Bapaume, or northeast in conjunction with the French break-in immediately to the east. He had already sent a regiment to close down the Thiepval incursion, and at 1.30 p.m. committed Bavarian Infantry Regiment 16 (BIR16), the last of his on-the-spot reserves, to Hahn as a precautionary measure to bolster the Bazentin-le-Grand–Longueval line.221 Stein also expected Bernafay and Trônes Woods to have fallen, which was incorrect, and he began moving 12th Reserve Division forward from Rancourt to slot into the line between Longueval and Hardecourt in Châles de Beaulieu’s divisional area, the latter village being among the objectives of the French XX Corps.222 It would be hours before these units arrived forward and — despite best attempts and numerous orders — early on 2 July before any meaningful and then unsuccessful counterattack began.223 Stein realised the implications of Congreve’s break-in, especially in combination with events elsewhere, and moved to comply with Supreme Army Command orders that no ground be yielded. But, as we shall see, Stein, whose second defensive line was threadbare but still intact, need not have worried about the British and French attempting a Montauban–Hardecourt breakthrough at all.
One story has it that Congreve went up to the Mametz–Montauban ridge early in the evening and saw an opportunity to extend his corps’ advance.224 He allegedly dashed back to his headquarters some miles away, telephoned Rawlinson and sought consent.225 While Congreve did go forward the next day, his diary makes no reference to his leaving his headquarters at any time before 10 p.m on 1 July.226 Corps and divisional war diaries and reports make no mention of Congreve’s alleged going forward on 1 July.227 The official history is no different, and no known officers on the battlefield witnessed Congreve anywhere near Montauban that day.228 None of these sources logged Congreve’s alleged telephone call, and neither did Haig’s, Rawlinson’s nor Gough’s accounts.229 There is nothing in the Fourth Army headquarters telephone log remotely akin to a request from either Congreve or his headquarters to exploit its gains.230 In fact, Fourth Army had ‘nil’ telephone contact with XIII Corps between 4 and 8 p.m.231 It is incredibly difficult to believe that Congreve either went forward or put in his urgent call seeking to extend XIII Corps’ attack after the fall of Montauban.
If Congreve ever flirted with ideas of additional operations around Montauban, he definitely quit them quickly. Shea was ordered to delay the conditional phases of the 30th’s operation due to failures elsewhere along the British battle line, and instead help the lagging 18th.232 Congreve was also well aware that the neighbouring XV Corps was still fighting hard around Hill 110, Fricourt and Mametz, while to his right the French 39th Division had some interest around midday in pressing its gains towards Hardecourt. These operations were apparently abandoned by the 39th’s commander, General Antoine Nourrisson, on the grounds that Hardecourt was not guaranteed to be empty of enemy infantry, and also because Congreve’s corps was not proceeding to its second-phase operations.233 It was a combination of all these factors, along with fears of a German counterattack, that prompted Captain Ernest Sotham, 16th Manchesters, to note that the defence of Montauban was the ‘main & only thought’ that afternoon.234 This was emphasised to subalterns on the battlefield.235 However, at least one officer noted that the 9th (Scottish) Division was in corps reserve, and pondered ‘could not they have used them?’236 Congreve did have the 9th to deploy, but his afternoon focus was on completing all of his corps’ primary objectives and consolidating them rather than launching an ad-hoc exploitative operation.
Even if Rawlinson and Congreve had opted to take extra ground at Montauban, potentially in combination with Nourrisson’s division at Hardecourt, it would have been considerably more difficult than is often stated. Stein’s defences between Bazentin-le-Grand, Longueval and Bernafay Wood were definitely thin but they were certainly not toothless. As we have seen, there were about 1000 men, plus a handful of machine guns, holding the under-developed Bazentin-le-Grand–Longueval line from midday.237 Within 12 hours it would be heavily reinforced by BIR16. From mid- to late-afternoon, Bernafay Wood was held by another 1000 men with an unknown number of machine guns. After dusk, the troops in this wood would be supported by Reserve Infantry Regiment 51 (RIR51).238 There were also several German artillery guns firing on Montauban during the afternoon that could be re-aimed to help break up any renewed British attack. The obvious point is that any exploitation of gains by XIII Corps during the afternoon would have had to have been co-ordinated and organised, comprise fresh troops of the still-hours-away 9th and be properly supported by artillery. It was never just a matter of Congreve sending a few battalions sauntering across Caterpillar Valley towards Bazentin-le-Grand and Longueval, or east in the direction of Bernafay Wood, to take up occupancy.
Taking all of this into account, the sentiments of some British soldiers in response to the lack of further forward movement can be seen as those of men flushed with the thrill of victory. Private Norton said a cavalry force could have ‘inflicted enormous damage to the Germans’ lines of communications.’239 Lieutenant Heath recalled that the decision for consolidation over exploitation was met with ‘unutter
able disappointment’ and anger.240 A somewhat optimistic Heath continued, outlining his plan for a push beyond Caterpillar Valley: ‘Even a comparatively small, determined, fast moving force pushed through the fifteen-kilometre-wide [9.3-mile-wide] gap and advancing north east towards the Ancre, while the Germans were off their balance, could capture their artillery in the Ancre Valley and attacking from their rear, might well surround them and destroy them.’241 Captain Edward Spears, a liaison officer attached to the French Sixth Army, was ‘almost biting my nails down to the palms with frustration.’242 Sergeant Thomas Bennett, 2nd Bedfords,* commented that ‘if only we had attacked at dawn instead of 7.30 a.m. we could have done much better.’243 If only, indeed. Tempting as many of these propositions may be to believe, they remain straw-man arguments founded on XIII Corps’ gains rather than an appreciation of Fourth Army’s overall attack framework and performance, its decision-making to that time and a marked under-estimation of the German forces still holding XIV Reserve Corps’ line in the Bazentin-le-Grand–Longueval–Bernafay Wood area.
None of this was lost on Captain Hugh Cornes, Royal Field Artillery, who years later noted a perennial problem associated with grassroots battlefield tacticians’ casting judgement on what might have been: ‘My outlook at the time was frightfully local.’244
IT IS SUMMER and fields either side of the road from Montauban down into Caterpillar Valley are alive with wheat swishing in the breeze. In the heart of the valley, adjacent to an abrupt cutting, is Quarry Cemetery. It was here that the 150-strong band of Prussian and Bavarian battle stragglers was holed up throughout the afternoon of 1 July in what was then no-man’s-land. The cemetery holds 583 graves, five dating from the Somme’s first day. It is one of the lesser-visited cemeteries in the area, perhaps because it is hidden by the fold of the ground and all but invisible from the outskirts of Montauban. Twenty-three-year-old former shop assistant Lance-Corporal Horace Brown, 16th Manchesters, who died on 1 July, rests here. His epitaph: ‘Far Away Yet Ever Near.’
First day of the Somme Page 38
