The first day of the Somme should nonetheless be seen as a strategic positive for the Allied coalition, although definitely not a victory. German efforts at Verdun were crimped: some pressure was taken off French forces there and essential German resources were diverted northwest to the Somme. But Falkenhayn’s response to ward off an Anglo-French breakthrough was always more of a knee-jerk reaction to the unexpectedly strong and successful French element than to the British performance. Falkenhayn was more troubled by Haig’s accumulation of men and materiel as part of a larger coalition enterprise than his achievements in isolation, and the danger this posed in the future. If the British army had attacked alone its results would have been unlikely to have jolted Falkenhayn into diverting resources from the Meuse; he believed Below had men and materiel to shut down the Fricourt–Mametz–Montauban incursions. He would probably have been proved correct had there been no French operation. But there was; 1 July was always a coalition affair and its results must be measured in that broader context. Haig and Joffre had together achieved some of their intended strategic objectives, but the French army had very obviously outpaced the British army in terms of hoped-for tactical outcomes. If this pyrrhic sum-of-Somme-parts outcome mildly favoured the Anglo-French offensive going forward, it also, by dint of coalition necessity and direct German rejoinder, spawned one of the most notorious offensives of attrition the world has ever seen.
By the time that offensive ended in mid-November 1916 it had comprised no fewer than three distinct phases that took the British and French armies over the Thiepval–Morval ridge. The breakthrough battle that Haig so hoped to produce had devolved into a slog forward, foot by bloody foot, studded with roughly a dozen component battles of varying magnitude, against a determined and well-armed enemy that clung stubbornly to its defensive positions. Bapaume, that lofty aim for the cavalry on 1 July, remained firmly in German hands. After four-and-ahalf months, Haig’s best gains were about seven miles from the jumpingoff lines of 1 July — these skewed south of the Albert–Bapaume road — but were mostly more limited than this. The French army had continued to press forward, too, astride the Somme, managing a total advance of up to six miles. With the exceptions of Gommecourt and Serre, all of the villages built into the German front-line defences and earmarked for capture by Fourth and Third Armies on the opening day of the offensive had fallen, along with a string of others that broadly marked the hightide line for Haig’s offensive: Beaumont Hamel, Beaucourt, Courcelette, Le Sars, Pozières, Gueudecourt, Lesboeufs and Morval. There were plenty of other brickheap villages in between, too. Casualties (killed, wounded, missing and prisoners) totalled about 1.28 million officers and men of all armies involved in the fighting, this number including 419,654 British, 204,253 French and an estimated 660,000 German.99
The German army withdrew from the Somme to a new defensive line in late-February 1917, this amounting to a tacit admission of defeat.100 Its then commander, Generalfeldmarschall Paul von Hindenburg, who took up the job after Falkenhayn’s removal in August 1916, sanctioned the ‘forced’ withdrawal eastwards to the formidable position known as the Hindenburg Line (Siegfriedstellung), which ran between Arras, St Quentin and Soissons.101 This move, which was conducted behind a brutal scorched-earth policy, clearly flagged that neither Hindenburg nor his deputy, General-der-Infanterie Erich von Ludendorff, wanted to undergo another attritional struggle on the Somme.102 It further revealed that these generals realised the German army had suffered severely in quantitative and qualitative terms in 1916, on both the Western and Eastern Fronts. Hindenburg explained his outlook for 1917:
We had not the slightest doubt about what out enemies would do in the coming year. We had to anticipate a general hostile offensive, as soon as their preparations and the weather permitted it. It was to be assumed that, warned by the experiences of the past year, our enemies would endeavour to co-ordinate their attacks on all fronts, if we left them time and opportunity to do so. . . . There was no doubt that, at the end of 1916, the position as regards relative numbers between us and our enemies had developed even more to our disadvantage than had been the case at the beginning of the year.103
It was obvious to Hindenburg and Ludendorff that their talentthinned army would again be on the defensive in 1917 and that Germany would definitely not win the war on the Western Front that year.104
Haig firmly believed he had achieved a victory on the Somme. At year’s end, in a dispatch summarising the fighting, he described the offensive as the opening of a wearing-out battle, which revealed at that time he saw plenty more campaigning before the British army and its Allies could deliver a decisive blow on the Western Front and so end the war. To this end, British command emerged from the Somme more skilled and experienced when it came to conducting operational-level set-piece engagements, and officers and soldiers on the ground were considerably more tactically adept. There was a closer alignment between and greater sophistication in the application of infantry, artillery, engineering and the air force. There were also technological advances, such as the introduction of tanks to the order of battle, and better-quality and more numerous munitions for the artillery, plus an overhaul of the governing infantry doctrine. These were the hard-won lessons of the Somme, but the grim process of converting Haig’s untrained collection of divisions, as he assessed them in March 1916, into a war-winning legion of experienced and skilled battle technicians against a world-class opponent was by no means finished.105 As Haig put it on the cusp of 1917:
The enemy’s power has not yet been broken, nor is it yet possible to form an estimate of the time the war may last before the objects for which the Allies are fighting have been attained. But the Somme battle has placed beyond doubt the ability of the Allies to gain those objects. . . . Our new Armies entered the battle with the determination to win and with confidence in their power to do so. They have proved to themselves, to the enemy, and to the world that this confidence was justified, and in the fierce struggle they have been through they have learned many valuable lessons which will help them in the future.106
WITH ITS BROAD sweeps of shingle and grass, the Thiepval Memorial to the missing looms over the former battlefields. There are few places on the Somme from which this stone giant cannot be seen, its adjacent car park being one. In the fields you can still find lumps of red brick from houses long gone. After the plough, spent bullets and rusted steel fragments occasionally stud the furrow lines. Neatly chiselled into the memorial’s stone panels are the names of 72,255 British and South African soldiers who have no known graves.107 The dog-eared memorial registers begin with 23-year-old James Aaron of Hull, killed on 1 July 1916. Tens of thousands of names later they end with 20-year-old Charles Zwisele of Clapton, London, who fell in August the same year. Between them is a legion of men who served in the British and South African forces who hailed from a multitude of places between Stornoway, Scotland, and Dunedin, New Zealand. Before the war they were labourers and linesmen and lawyers, married or single men. They were and are, in every sense of the phrase, a lost generation.
It is winter 2015, and a group of UK teenagers have been bussed to the memorial for a school trip. They are wearing ski gloves, which makes it difficult for them to snap photos with their mobile phones. Most give up. It is bitterly cold; everyone wants to get back into the warm bus. There will only be one group photo. ‘What happened here, sir?’ asks one of the teenagers. ‘Well . . .’ begins the teacher, and his answer is swept away in an icy blast of Somme wind.
One generation passeth away, and another generation cometh: but that rich Somme earth abideth forever.
Endnotes
Abbreviations
BL British Library
NAUK UK National Archives
ULLC University of Leeds, Liddle Collection
Chapter 1: A Mother Named ‘Attrition’
1. Rawlinson, Henry, diary, 21 June 1916, Rawlinson Papers, Churchill Archive.
2. Charteris, Brigadier-General John, At G.H.Q. (London: Cassel
l, 1931), p. 142.
3. Harris, J.P., Douglas Haig and the First World War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), p. 19.
4. Gibbs, Philip, Now it Can be Told, (London: Harper & Brothers, 1920), pp. 42–3.
5. ibid.
6. Dixon, Norman, On the Psychology of Military Incompetence (London: Pimlico, 1994), p. 380.
7. ibid.
8. ibid., p. 375.
9. ibid.
10. ibid., p. 254.
11. Sheffield, Gary, The Chief: Douglas Haig and the British Army (London: Aurum Press, 2011), p. 13.
12. Dunlop, John, The Development of the British Army 1899–1914 (London: Methuen, 1938), p. 226.
13. Farrar-Hockley, A.H., The Somme (London: Pan Books, 1983), p. 32.
14. Sheffield, Gary, The Somme (London: Cassell, 2003), p. 1.
15. ibid.
16. Wilmott, H.P., The First World War (London: Dorling Kindersley, 2003), p. 11.
17. Balfour, Michael, The Kaiser and his Times (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1964), p. 355.
18. ibid., pp. 350–1.
19. Sheffield, The Somme, p. 4.
20. Terraine, John, Douglas Haig: The Educated Soldier (London: Hutchinson, 1963), p. 149.
21. Haig, Douglas, diary, 14 December 1915, NAUK, WO/256/6.
22. Edmonds, Brigadier General Sir James E., Military Operations, France and Belgium 1916: Sir Douglas Haig’s Command to the 1st July: Battle of the Somme (London: Macmillan, 1932), p. 7.
23. ibid., pp. 7–8.
24. ibid., p. 8.
25. War Committee, minutes, 28 December 1915, NAUK, CAB/42/6/14.
26. ‘An Examination by the General Staff into the Factors Affecting the Choice of a Plan,’ 16 December 1916, War Committee, appendices, 28 December 1915, op. cit.
27. Kitchener, Horatio, to Haig, Douglas, 28 December 1915, Appendix 5, Military Operations France & Belgium 1916: Vol. 1, Appendices, pp. 40–1.
28. Terraine, p. 182.
29. War Committee, subjects of discussion and conclusions, 13 January–8 March 1916, NAUK, CAB/42/7/6.
30. War Committee, minutes, 13 January 1916, NAUK, CAB/42/7/5.
31. Note by Secretary of State for War, NAUK, CAB/42/7/5.
32. War Committee, minutes, 7 April 1916, NAUK, CAB/42/12/15.
33. War Committee, extract from proceedings, 7 April 1916, op. cit.
34. Edmonds, p. 26.
35. ibid., pp. 26–7.
36. Douglas Haig: War Diaries and Letters 1914–1918, ed. Gary Sheffield and John Bourne (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2005), p. 180.
37. Philpott, William, Bloody Victory: The sacrifice on the Somme (London: Abacus, 2011), p. 130.
38. Sheffield, The Somme, p. 14.
39. Passingham, Ian, All the Kaiser’s Men: The Life and Death of the German Soldier on the Western Front (Stroud: The History Press, 2011), p. 93.
40. Edmonds, p. 31.
41. ibid.
42. ibid., p. 32.
43. ibid., p. 33.
44. Prior, Robin, and Wilson, Trevor, Command on the Western Front: The Military Career of Sir Henry Rawlinson 1914–1918 (Barnsley: Pen & Sword, 2004), p. 7; Godley, Alexander, Life of an Irish Soldier (New York: EP Dutton, 1939), p. 33; de Lisle, Beauvoir, Reminiscences of Sport & War (London: Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1939), p. 131.
45. Malins, Geoffrey, How I Filmed the War (London: Imperial War Museum, 1993), p. 208.
46. Godley, p. 33.
47. Gibbs, Now it Can be Told, pp. 50–1.
48. ibid., p. 51.
49. Charteris, G.H.Q., p. 125.
50. Haig, diary, 12 December 1915, NAUK, op. cit.
51. Haig, diary, 18 April 1915, NAUK, WO/256/4.
52. Sheffield, The Chief, p. 168; Sheffield referred only to Rawlinson being ruthless and devious, the other assertions belonging to the author of this book.
53. ibid.
54. Prior and Wilson, Command, p. 25.
55. ibid., pp. 72–9.
56. ibid., pp. 72–9.
57. ibid., p. 72.
58. Philpott, p. 130.
59. Prior and Wilson, Command, p. 31.
60. Griffith, Paddy, Battle Tactics of the Western Front: The British Army’s Art of Attack 1916–18 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994), p. 31.
61. Haig: War Diaries and Letters, ed. Sheffield and Bourne, p. 160.
62. Philpott, p. 107.
63. Haig, diary, 18 January 1916, NAUK, WO/256/7.
64. Maurice, Major-General Sir Frederick, The Life of General Lord Rawlinson of Trent (London: Cassell, 1928), p. 152.
65. Prior, Robin, and Wilson, Trevor, The Somme (Sydney: University of New South Wales Press, 2005), p. 39.
66. Rawlinson, diary, 2 March 1916, Rawlinson Papers, Churchill Archive.
67. ibid.
68. GHQ, ‘The Opening of the Wearing-out Battle’, 23 December 1916, in Sir Douglas Haig’s Despatches, ed. Lt.-Col John H. Boraston (London: JM Dent & Sons, 1919), pp. 22–3.
69. ibid.
70. Rawlinson, Henry, diary, 30 March 1916, Rawlinson Papers, Churchill Archive.
71. ibid.
72. ibid., 31 March 1916.
73. Plan for Offensive by the Fourth Army, G.X.3/1, 3 April 1916, Fourth Army Operations Papers, NAUK, WO/158/233.
74. ibid.
75. ibid.
76. ibid.
77. ibid.
78. ibid.
79. ibid.
80. ibid.
81. ibid.
82. ibid.
83. ibid.
84. Philpott, p. 98.
85. MacDonald, Alan, Z Day: VIII Corps at Beaumont Hamel and Serre (London: Iona Books, 2014), pp. 2–3.
86. ibid.
87. ibid., p. 4.
88. Philpott, p. 99.
89. Haig, diary, 5 April 1916, NAUK, WO/256/9; Plan for Offensive by Fourth Army, 3 April 1916, Fourth Army Operations Papers, NAUK, WO/158/233; OAD 710, op. cit.; OAD 710/1, op. cit.
90. Plan for Offensive by Fourth Army, 3 April 1916, Fourth Army Operations Papers, NAUK, WO/158/233; Haig, diary 5 and 8 April 1916, op. cit.
91. Edmonds, p. 254.
92. ibid., p. 255.
93. Philpott, p. 111.
94. ibid., p. 110.
95. ibid., pp. 110–11.
96. OAD 710 Plans & Preparations for an Offensive, 12 April 1916, Fourth Army Operations Papers, NAUK, WO/158/233.
97. ibid.
98. OAD 710/1 Plan for Offensive Operations, 13 April 1916, Fourth Army Operations Papers, op. cit.
99. ibid.
100. Amended Plan Submitted by the Fourth Army to GHQ, 19 April 1916, Fourth Army Operations Papers, op. cit.
101. Rawlinson, diary, 19 April 1916, op. cit.
102. Amended Plan, 19 April 1916, op. cit.
103. ibid.
104. ibid.
105. ibid.
106. ibid.
107. OAD 876 to Sir H. Rawlinson, 16 May 1916, Fourth Army Operations Papers, NAUK, WO 158/233.
108. ibid.
109. Kiggell, Launcelot, to Edmonds, James, letter, 2 December 1937, NAUK, CAB/45/135.
110. Edmonds, p. 46.
111. ibid.
112. Philpott, p. 104.
113. Edmonds, p. 47.
114. OAD 12 to General Sir H. Rawlinson, 16 June 1916, Fourth Army Operations Papers, op. cit.
115. Fourth Army Operation Order No. 2, 14 June 1916, Fourth Army Operations Papers, NAUK, WO/158/234.
116. ibid.
117. ibid.
118. ibid.
119. Rawlinson, diary, 18 June 1916, op. cit.
120. ibid., 19 June 1916.
121. Philpott, pp. 116–17.
122. ibid., p. 117.
123. OAD 17 Commander-in-Chief’s Instructions in Amplification of OAD 12, 16 June 1916, Fourth Army Operations Papers, NAUK, WO/95/158/234.
124. ibid.
125. Prior and Wilson, Somme, p. 51.
126. ibid.
127. Philpott, p. 127.
>
128. OAD 12, op. cit.
129. ibid.
130. OAD 17, op. cit.
131. Philpott, p. 122.
132. ibid., p. 123.
133. ibid.
134. Kiggell to Edmonds, 25 January 1938, NAUK, CAB/45/135.
135. ibid.
136. Charteris, GHQ, p. 137.
137. ibid.
138. Army Commander’s Conference Remarks, 22 June 1916, Fourth Army Operations Papers, NAUK, WO/158/234.
139. ibid.
140. ibid.
141. Haig, diary, 27 June 1916, op. cit.
142. ibid.
143. ibid.
144. Haig, diary, 27 June 1916, NAUK, WO/256/10.
145. Fourth Army Memorandum, 28 June 1916, NAUK, WO/95/158/234.
146. ibid.
147. ibid.
148. Haig, diary, 27 June 1916, op. cit.
149. Fourth Army Memorandum, 28 June 1916, op. cit.
150. Rawlinson, diary, 28 June 1916, op. cit.
151. ibid., 30 June 1916.
152. Edmonds, p. 44.
153. ibid.
154. ibid., p. 45.
155. War Committee, minutes, 17 May 1916, NAUK, CAB/42/14/1.
156. Prior and Wilson, Somme, p. 30.
157. War Committee, minutes, 7 June 1916, NAUK, CAB/42/15/6.
158. War Committee, minutes, 30 June 1916, NAUK, CAB/42/15/15.
159. Prior and Wilson, Somme, p. 34.
160. War Committee, minutes, 21 June 1916, NAUK, CAB/42/15/10.
Chapter 2: ‘I Learned to Hate the Place’
1. To Fight Alongside Friends: The First World War Diaries of Charlie May (London: William Collins, 2014), ed. Gerry Harrison, p. 126.
2. Capper, Derick, ULLC/WW1/GS/0267.
3. Pollard, George, ULLC/WW1/WF01/P/9.
4. Polack, Ernest, letter, 30 June 1916, ULLC/WW1/GS/1283.
5. Upcott, John, diary, 1 May 1916, ULLC/WW1/GS/1644.
6. Moakler, Frank, ULLC/WW1/WF01/M/21.
7. Fisher, Alex, ULLC/WW1/TR/02.
8. ibid.
9. Grindley, Ernest, ULLC/WW1/WF01/G/14.
10. ibid.
11. Capper, op. cit.
12. Pollard, op. cit.
13. Haig, Douglas, diary, 29 March 1916, NAUK, WO/256/9.
14. XIII c.3500 yards; XV c.4500; III c.3500; X c.5000; VIII c.4500; and VII c.4000. Tenth Corps’ longer linear frontage included the River Ancre.
First day of the Somme Page 47
