The bottom-line is this: when one sees more consciousness consistently accompanied by less brain activity, one is forced to contemplate the possibility that brain function is associated with a localization of consciousness, as opposed to its production.
4. On skepticism and science
As a culture, we’ve come to believe that skeptical science now understands most of the mysteries of our ordinary world. There may be unanswered questions regarding abstract parallel universes and alternate realities, but we assume that most of the facets of concrete life have been explained by rational scientific theories, from the weather to health, to psychology, to social dynamics. We believe unquestioningly that the Faustian power of rationality, skepticism and the application of the scientific method have answered – or are on the cusp of answering – all questions of any practical relevance to our daily lives. But is that really so? What reasons do we actually have to believe it? Could it be that the apparent runaway success of science – and, more generally, of our rational faculties – is as much illusory as it is factual? Could it be that we live in a world of illusions enabled precisely by a spectacular failure of skepticism?
Essay 4.1 explores – in a metaphorical manner – the insanity of our deification of rational faculties. Essay 4.2 illustrates how the belief that science has explanations for most of the events of our daily lives is nothing more than an illusion. Essay 4.3 discusses the unexamined and tendentious philosophical beliefs adopted by many scientists when it comes to extracting conclusions from the available data. Essay 4.4 goes deeper into this subject by exploring how most scientists have come to conflate scientific observations with philosophical interpretations of these observations. Essay 4.5 discusses the one and true taboo that pervades science as practiced today, and which so often corrupts proper scientific assessment of the empirical facts of reality. Essay 4.6 confronts the question that underlies the culture wars: does the scientific evidence in favor of evolution by natural selection imply that life is purposeless? Finally, essay 4.7 argues that the solution to the prejudices of scientific thinking today is not a departure from skepticism but, surprisingly, its revitalization.
4.1. Intellectual fundamentalism
Important disclaimer: this essay adopts the format of a fictional medical description of a fictional psychiatric condition – called ‘intellectual fundamentalism’ – for the purposes of social and cultural criticism. This essay should not be interpreted literally. The signs, symptoms, causes, risk factors, treatments and preventive steps described below are not – insofar as I am aware – medically recognized.
Intellectual fundamentalism is a dangerous condition that affects increasing and alarming numbers of people worldwide. Though its origins can be traced to the West – some think René Descartes was the index case – modern means of communication and easy travel have allowed it to spread far and wide into the East as well. This essay is an attempt to raise awareness of this dangerous epidemic, so people can identify the early signs of the condition and take appropriate steps.
Definition
Intellectual fundamentalism is characterized by a severe psychological imbalance: exaggerated focus on one specific psychic function – namely, the rational intellect – to the detriment of all others, including intuition, poetic imagination, emotional intelligence, artistic sensitivity, empathy, perceptual awareness, etc. Curiously, the intellect isn’t always the patient’s dominant psychic function: often, those whose intellect is relatively limited also fall victim.
Signs and symptoms
Patients tend to implicitly or explicitly deny the efficaciousness and reliability of all psychic functions except the intellect. They insist that the intellect is the only valid avenue for approaching reality, even though they are unable to coherently justify why. The condition blinds them to this obvious cognitive dissonance and causes them to arbitrarily consider their position selfevident. If, while in therapy, the patient is confronted with the fact that the human psyche is equipped with many other forms of cognition beyond the intellect, he will typically point to historical events in which these other faculties have been unreliable, while ignoring all other historical events in which they have been vital. Such tendency to selectively consider evidence is a hallmark of intellectual fundamentalism.
In social interactions, the condition manifests itself clearly in the patient’s approach to communication. A psychologically healthy individual, when conversing, tries to look beyond the particular logical and grammatical constructs used by his interlocutor, so to understand what the interlocutor is actually trying to say. In other words, a healthy individual is interested in what his interlocutor means, as opposed to what his interlocutor says. A sufferer of intellectual fundamentalism, on the other hand, loses interest in intended meaning and focuses, instead, on the form of the logical and grammatical constructs used by his interlocutor. The patient will fixate obsessively on what is said, losing sight of what is meant. When a logical flaw is found in what is said, the patient will construe it as sure evidence that his interlocutor is unworthy and completely close himself up to the intended message. This fixation on form above intended meaning is not only detrimental to the patient – who misses out on much of the subtlety and nuance of what others try to convey to him, particularly those who have most to contribute for seeing the world in a different way – but also to his interlocutors: it is frustrating for family, friends and acquaintances to interact with someone who insists in finding flaws in the finger pointing at the moon, instead of looking at the moon.
Indeed, sufferers of intellectual fundamentalism derive great satisfaction from finding logical flaws, ambiguities and inaccuracies in the way others communicate. Since they see the intellect as the only valid psychic function, differentiating themselves from others on an intellectual basis provides them with powerful feelings of self-worth and adequacy, hiding whatever other unpleasant psychic issues might be present. This narrow field of awareness may seem counterproductive and silly to an external observer, but it is sincerely embraced by patients and ranks very high in their value system.
Because patients are severely dissociated from most other aspects of their own psyches, they become delusional in believing that all reality is amenable to intellectual modeling and apprehension, despite the complete lack of any rational reason for such belief. In other words, patients believe arbitrarily that all reality fits into the only psychic function they acknowledge as valid: the intellect. This delusion is a natural self-defense mechanism attendant upon the condition: were the patient to acknowledge otherwise, he would have to face the anxiety of great uncertainty. Moreover, he would also have to acknowledge the severe limitations of his own psychic state, with associated feelings of inferiority and shame. The delusion is, thus, the patient’s effective way to avoid distress by losing contact with reality. For this reason, intellectual fundamentalism is considered a psychosis, as opposed to a neurosis.
Associated with this, sufferers of intellectual fundamentalism display a tendency to interpret everything literally. Since they are alienated from the cognitive faculties necessary to capture the deeper meaning of symbols, allegories, metaphors and other indirect ways of conveying ineffable meaning, they have no alternative but to try to make sense of reality on a purely literal basis. Indeed, many patients deny even that anything at all exists that can’t be described or conveyed in literal form. They then project their inability to see beyond the literal onto all other human beings, deeming others’ attempts to communicate ineffable meaning to be drivel.
Depending on the severity of the condition, the denial of all forms of cognition other than the intellect usually grows to become a fixation. At this point, if still left untreated, the condition has the potential to further evolve into a hero syndrome, which drives the patient to try to ‘save the world’ by attempting to eradicate all human activities, views and general outlooks that do not conform to intellectual value systems. If and when this happens, the patient may become a threat to the com
munity. The condition is also particularly contagious at this advanced stage.
Causes
The causes are not yet fully understood, but well-substantiated hypotheses have been put forward. Some speculate that attempts at self-affirmation during adolescence can evolve into intellectual fundamentalism in later years. A hypothesis is that children who are socially impaired and have difficulties commanding the respect of their peers find self-worth, instead, in lonely intellectual pursuits. Other times, an individual might even be reasonably well integrated into his peer group, but eventually discovers that he has an intellectual edge over others, which he then attempts to profit from. The self-worth found in both cases is, naturally, directly proportional to the individual’s belief that the intellect is superior to all other cognitive faculties: one needs to narrow the playing field to the particular segment where one has a perceived advantage. This way, there is significant psychological incentive for the individual to dissociate from the rest of his cognitive faculties, eventually leading to full-blown intellectual fundamentalism.
The tendency displayed by sufferers to try to humiliate others during intellectual exchanges arises from the need to increase this engineered perception of self-worth. Compensation for bullying suffered in early years is strongly believed to be a factor in this process, as well as the general psychological predisposition colloquially referred to as ‘nerdish.’
Risk factors
• Receiving high academic education in science or engineering;
• Working in academic, scientific or engineering environments;
• Being publicly recognized as an expert in a scientific or engineering discipline;
• Episodes of bullying in childhood or adolescence;
• Having a ‘nerdish’ predisposition in childhood or adolescence;
• Lack of appreciation or patience for art, poetry, psychology, mythology or religion;
• Lack of empathy and sensitivity.
Prevention and treatment
The cultivation of a rich variety of outlooks is essential for preventing intellectual fundamentalism. For instance, if one’s professional life is highly specialized and focused on science or engineering, one can reduce one’s risk by cultivating hobbies such as play-acting, reading poetry and the classics, volunteering for social work (particularly with senior citizens), cultivating a vegetable garden and other forms of interacting directly with nature, attending exotic religious rituals about which one hasn’t developed early prejudices, cooking, painting, attending art exhibitions, meditating, going to silent retreats, etc. It is important that one insists in pursuits that one’s first instinct is precisely to avoid.
If intellectual fundamentalism has already taken hold, talk therapy with a qualified depth-psychologist is recommended in addition to the steps above. With the guidance of the therapist, one can slowly bring up to awareness one’s repressed psychic functions and cognitive faculties. In severe cases, confrontational therapy or medically supervised journeys with legal and safe psychedelics can be last resorts, though neither is guaranteed to be effective.
This essay has been written by a recovering intellectual fundamentalist who still experiences frequent relapses of the condition.
4.2. Living in a cocoon of mere hypotheses
In logic, there is a strong distinction between so-called deductive and inductive inferences. Here is an example of a deductive inference:
Amsterdam is the capital of the Netherlands. Therefore, to go to Amsterdam I must go to the Netherlands.
Clearly, a deductive inference is necessarily implied by its premises. As long as the premises are correct, a proper deduction is a certainty, not a guess or a hypothesis. Now consider the following inductive inference:
My house has been broken into and there are unidentified footprints in the backyard. Therefore, the footprints were left by the burglar.
Here the inference cannot be derived with certainty from the premises. There is only a reasonable probability that the footprints were made by the burglar. Indeed, they could have been made, for instance, by the gardener who came by to collect some tools. A deductive inference isn’t a certainty, but a mere hypothesis.
Inductive inferences are entirely dependent on our ability to correctly evaluate probabilities. Only because we know that all other possibilities – including the gardener coming by – are comparatively unlikely in view of the data, can we infer that the footprints were made by the burglar. However, probabilities are notoriously tricky to evaluate without the benefit of past observations of equivalent situations. Consider this hypothetical case:
For the past 10 years, 90% of the times the postman came by my house I had already woken up. Therefore, I infer that tomorrow I’ll be awake when the postman arrives.
Here the probabilities are easy to estimate based on past observations; 10 years of it, to be precise. These previous observations constitute a so-called ‘reference class.’ The probability of the inductive inference can then be calculated based on the reference class: in this case, there is a 90% chance that the inference is correct. But what about cases where no proper reference class is available? For instance:
George saw a luminous object in the sky performing maneuvers impossible for any known aircraft. Therefore, George saw an alien spaceship.
How many times have similar observations been known to be caused by spaceships from another planet? Here is another example:
Vicky returned from verified clinical death claiming to have seen the doctors working on her body as if she stood outside it. Therefore, Vicky’s story is a post-event confabulation based on earlier memories.
How many times have similar stories, told in equivalent situations, been known to be confabulations? A final example:
The fundamental laws of nature have been the same across space since the birth of the universe.
Where are the reference classes in all these three cases? Our estimates of probabilities here aren’t based on past statistics. Instead, they are based solely on subjective values, assumptions and beliefs, which suggest to us what should be possible and impossible. In other words, they are based on a subjective paradigm. According to this paradigm, we’ve already catalogued every observation that could conceivably be produced by the dynamics of our earthly reality, so George could only have seen a spaceship from another planet. Still according to this paradigm, consciousness is a product of brain activity, so Vicky could only have confabulated her story. And finally, if the laws of nature could change over time our celebrated cosmological theories would be baseless, so the laws could only have stayed the same.
In all these cases, the form of the thought is this: since all other alternatives allowed by the paradigm can be discarded, then the only alternative left must be true. In other words, we extract conclusions by elimination of alternatives. The problem is that, in order to correctly make inductive inferences by elimination, we must know all the alternatives. In other words, we must assume that there is no yet-unknown aspect of reality lying outside the paradigm. This is a supremely conceited assumption; one that history has shown again and again to be untenable.
We don’t know all the parameters and dynamics of our earthly reality, so postulating a non-earthly agency to explain certain bizarre observations is hastened. Nobody has a clue how the material activity of the brain can possibly generate consciousness, so discarding the possibility that consciousness can exist independent of brain activity is unjustified. Finally, we just cannot know whether the laws of physics have been the same since the Big Bang. Yes, we have models based on this assumption that seem to explain reality, but that’s inverting the argument: these models were built in order to make the assumption work.
These apparently inconsequential examples betray a very serious problem in science and in our culture: the mainstream worldview is based on just this kind of inductive inferences unsupported by empirically derived reference classes. Inductive inferences motivated only by subjective paradigms lead to worldviews that a
re at least as much a reflection of our own biases and limitations as of nature at large. Our experience of the world is thus largely shaped by subjective values, beliefs and expectations, as opposed to empirical facts. Indeed, we tend to hold many more ideas about what reality is – and is not – than the empirical facts warrant. In science, this is reflected in the way the validity of models is routinely extrapolated way beyond what observations actually corroborate. Let’s unpack this claim slowly.
Models are mathematical mock-ups that are to reality like a map is to the streets of a city. In the case of science, however, only very few positions in the map are empirically tested against the actual configuration of the myriad streets it’s meant to represent. But since the map is generated by a coherent mental procedure – that is, an internally-consistent set of axioms, rules and derivations – by confirming only a few of its predictions we gain confidence of the validity of the procedure and, therefore, of the entire map.
For instance, the Standard Model of particle physics is a map of matter at the subatomic level. It correctly predicts laboratory observations of relatively simple systems of particles. In other words, when we test the map against a few, small, isolated alleys of the city, we find an excellent match. And since the map wasn’t put together arbitrarily, but derived from a coherent mental procedure, we extrapolate these simple matches and inductively infer that the map accurately represents all the streets, highways, junctions, tunnels and overpasses of the entire city. However, as any inductive inference, this is a mere hypothesis motivated by a subjective, paradigmatic assessment of probabilities. We don’t know that it’s true.
Brief Peeks Beyond Page 11
