by Scott McEwen
Following the White House meeting, Secretary Panetta returned to the Pentagon and convened a series of meetings from 12:00 AM to 2:00 AM with senior officials, including General Dempsey and General Carter F. Ham, the Commander of U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM), which is the Geographic Combatant Command responsible for U.S. military activities in Libya. They discussed additional response options for Benghazi and the potential outbreak of further violence throughout the region, particularly in Tunis, Tunisia; Cairo, Egypt; and Sana’a, Yemen.
To help expedite the movement of forces after the receipt of formal authorization, Pentagon officials verbally conveyed orders to other Combatant Commands.
Specifically, Secretary Panetta verbally directed the deployment of:
1. two Marine Fleet Antiterrorism Security Team (FAST) platoons from Rota, Spain to the Benghazi Mission and Embassy Tripoli;
2. a U.S. European Command (EUCOM) Commander’s in-Extremis Force (CIF) to an intermediate staging base in southern Europe; and
3. a special operations force based in the United States to an intermediate staging base in southern Europe.
Concurrently, at 12:30 AM, a six-man security team and one linguist stationed at Embassy Tripoli departed for Benghazi; the team landed in Benghazi at 1:30 AM. At 2:39 AM, officers in the National Military Command Center transmitted the formal authorizations for the deployments of the two Marine FAST platoons and the EUCOM special operations force. At 2:53 AM, the U.S-based special operations force received formal authorization to deploy.
Analysis of the Defense Department’s Response
Despite the brave and honorable efforts of the individuals on the ground in Benghazi–reinforced by the team from Tripoli–serious concerns regarding the Defense Department’s systemic response required extensive review. Combined with the failure of the President to anticipate the significance of the day and to proactively authorize the Defense Department with an alert posture to launch offensive operations beyond self-defense, forces were provided no notice to defend diplomatic facilities. Fundamentally, the progress report finds that the Benghazi Mission did not have a sufficient, layered defense designed to fend off an attack until a military response could be deployed to provide a decisive conclusion to an assault. The oversight review of the Defense Department’s response, however, has highlighted serious deficiencies in the military’s strategic posture in Africa–and the region–which require corrective action and necessitate further examination by congressional committees of jurisdiction.
The military command responsible for this region is U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM), which officially became one of the Defense Department’s six geographic commands in 2008. The Command is responsible for all Department of Defense operations, exercises, and security cooperation efforts on the Continent of Africa, its island nations, and surrounding waters. AFRICOM faces serious resource deficiencies: it does not have any Army or Marine Corps units formally assigned to the command; it shares Air Force and Navy components with U.S. European Command (EUCOM); and it did not have a Commander’s in-Extremis Force (CIF) assigned to the command at the time of the attack on September 11, 2012. Moreover, AFRICOM still lacks a fully constituted CIF with vital and unique enabling capabilities.35 As a result, when the U.S. needed to respond swiftly to the attacks in Benghazi, the Defense Department did not task AFRICOM. Instead, it was forced to task EUCOM’s CIF to respond, which was engaged in a training mission in Croatia.
In addition, because AFRICOM does not have assigned Marine FAST platoons–which are limited-duration, expeditionary security forces capable of responding to emergencies–it had to rely on elements of a FAST unit assigned to EUCOM for response in Benghazi. The Marine FAST platoon in Rota, Spain was hindered in its response because it lacked dedicated airlift at its location; the airlift was in Germany. Even if the airlift had been co-located with the platoon, the platoon would not have been able to arrive in time to save the lives of the four Americans killed in the attack.
The House Armed Services Committee also examined the deployment of stateside-based response forces. The special operations force deployed from the continental United States (CONUS) reached the staging based in southern Europe approximately 24 hours after the initial attack, even though the force was forward-leaning in its preparations as it awaited formal authorization to deploy. The Benghazi attack highlights significant drawbacks of policy options that solely rely on a CONUS-based response force, and the Committee will continue its vigorous oversight of the global disposition of military forces to determine whether the Department of Defense is appropriately postured to more rapidly respond to similar incidents in the future.
In addition, the House Armed Services Committee conducted a review of air assets available to respond to Benghazi. No U.S. government element refused or denied requests for emergency assistance during the crisis. The evidence also does not show there were armed air assets above Benghazi at any time or that any such assets were called off from assisting U.S. personnel on the ground. According to witness testimony, the security officials on the ground did use laser sights, but they did so as an escalatory demonstration of force in an effort to deter some attackers. They were not lasing targets for air assets.36
The House Armed Services Committee also examined the question of whether the Defense Department failed to deploy assets to Benghazi because it believed the attack was over after the first phase. The progress report finds that officials at the Defense Department were monitoring the situation throughout and kept the forces that were initially deployed flowing into the region. No evidence has been provided to suggest these officials refused to deploy resources because they thought the situation had been sufficiently resolved.
Similarly, the evidence does not show that military commanders involved in the U.S. military’s response to the terrorist attacks in Benghazi were relieved of command, transferred, or encouraged to seek early retirement as a result of their actions in response to the attacks. In the case of General Carter Ham, Commander of U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM), House Armed Services Committee staff were aware of General Ham’s plans to retire well in advance of September 11, 2012.
The disposition of military forces is a reflection of policy, strategy, and resources. Because of a number of factors–including the lack of a coherent Administration policy toward North Africa; an ad hoc and reactive Administration strategy for addressing threats to U.S. interests in the region; a lack of resources for AFRICOM; and the short duration of the attack–the Department of Defense was unable to provide an effective military response to the Benghazi attacks. Although responsible military officers and civilian officials within the Department of Defense reacted quickly to the attacks in Benghazi, the effectiveness of their response was hindered because U.S. military forces were not properly postured to address the growing threats in northern Africa or to respond to a brief, high-intensity attack on U.S. personnel or interests across much of Africa.
Analysis of the Intelligence Community’s Role
The Benghazi terrorist attacks did not constitute an intelligence failure. The Intelligence Community collected considerable information about the threat and disseminated regular assessments warning of the deteriorating security environment in Benghazi and risks to American interests, facilities, and personnel.
The House Intelligence Committee examined the question of why the U.S. Intelligence Community (IC) did not provide an immediate and specific tactical warning of the attack in Benghazi. A review of relevant documents confirmed that the intelligence community did not possess intelligence indicating planning or intentions for an attack on the Benghazi facility on or about September 11, 2012. The review, however, also demonstrated that any official responsible for security at a U.S. facility or for personnel in Benghazi or the region would have had sufficient warning of the deteriorating security situation, the corresponding increasing threat, and the expressed intent of anti-U.S. extremists in the region to attack Western and specifically U.S. targets.
Throug
hout 2012, there were more than 20 attacks against Western and international interests in Benghazi. The IC monitored these and other extremist activities in North Africa and published hundreds of reports and assessments related to threats to these interests in the region before the September 11 attacks.37 These reports and assessments, which were available to senior policymakers in the government, including those at the State Department and the White House, made clear that there were serious and credible threats to American interests and facilities in the region and in Benghazi specifically.38 In addition, these reports and assessments made clear that the Benghazi Mission was the subject of credible threats, although no reporting warned of the attack on September 11, 2012.39
Other U.S. facilities were raided in September 2012, and known al-Qa’ida-affiliated terrorists were involved in each of the incidents. Also on September 11, Egyptian protesters scaled the walls of the U.S. Embassy in Cairo, Egypt, which at least four senior jihadists with well-documented ties to al-Qa’ida helped instigate.40 On September 13th, hundreds of Yemenis–including some al-Qa’ida-linked individuals–stormed the U.S. Embassy in Sana’a, Yemen, but were repelled by local security forces. On September 14th, Ansar-al-Sharia-Tunisia (an al-Qa’ida-affiliated group) participated in an attack on the U.S. Embassy in Tunis, Tunisia, and set fire to the nearby American school.
III. After the attacks, the Administration perpetuated a deliberately misleading and incomplete narrative that the violence grew out of a demonstration caused by a YouTube video. The Administration consciously decided not to discuss extremist involvement or previous attacks against Western interests in Benghazi.
The U.S. government immediately had information that the attacks were conducted by al-Qa’ida-affiliated terrorists, yet Administration officials downplayed those connections, and focused on the idea that provocation for violence resulted from a YouTube video.
Analysis At the Time of the Attack
The U.S. government knew immediately that the attacks constituted an act of terror. In an “Ops Alert” issued shortly after the attack began, the State Department Operations Center notified senior Department officials, the White House Situation Room, and others, that the Benghazi compound was under attack and that “approximately 20 armed people fired shots; explosions have been heard as well.”41 Two hours later, the Operations Center issued an alert that al-Qa’ida linked Ansar al-Sharia (AAS) claimed responsibility for the attack and had called for an attack on Embassy Tripoli.42 Neither alert mentioned that there had been a protest at the location of the attacks.43 Further, Administration documents provided to the Committees show that there was ample evidence that the attack was planned and intentional. The coordinated, complex, and deadly attack on the Annex–that included sophisticated weapons–is perhaps the strongest evidence that the attacks were not spontaneous. The question of why a deliberately misleading and incomplete narrative to the contrary was initially perpetuated by the Administration despite the existence of this information has not yet been fully answered and must be addressed as oversight efforts continue.
Timeline of the Administration’s Narrative
In the days after the events, the White House and senior Administration officials sought to portray the attacks as provoked by a YouTube video.44 The President, Secretary Clinton, White House Press Secretary Jay Carney, and United States Ambassador to the United Nations Susan Rice each made statements denouncing the video and condemning those who purportedly used it to justify their behavior.45 The President and Secretary Clinton also appeared in a $70,000 advertisement campaign in Pakistan to disavow the video.46
On Sunday, September 16, 2012, Ambassador Rice appeared on five morning television programs to discuss the Administration’s account of the attack. In nearly identical statements, she stated that the attack was a spontaneous protest in response to a “hateful video,” similar to what transpired in Cairo, Egypt, earlier that day.47 Rice asserted that “we do not have information at present that leads us to conclude that this was premeditated or preplanned.”48 Her interviews stand in sharp contrast to interviews given on the same morning talk shows by the President of the Libyan National Congress, Mohamad Magarif, who characterized the attack as criminal and preplanned.49 Further, on that same day and prior to Ambassador Rice’s scheduled appearances on the Sunday morning programs, a senior official on the ground in Libya informed senior leaders at the State Department that there was no demonstration prior to the attack.50
The Administration echoed Ambassador Rice’s statements until September 19 when National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) Director Matt Olsen testified before the Senate Homeland Security and Government Affairs Committee that our diplomats died “in the course of a terrorist attack on our embassy.”51
Director Olsen’s testimony marked a significant shift in the Administration’s rhetoric. Immediately afterward, Administration officials began referring to the event as a terrorist attack. On September 20, 2012, Mr. Carney stated that, “it is, I think, self-evident that what happened in Benghazi was a terrorist attack.”52 Similarly, on September 21, Secretary Clinton stated, “What happened in Benghazi was a terrorist attack, and we will not rest until we have tracked down and brought to justice the terrorists who murdered four Americans.”53 On October 9, the State Department held a conference call briefing for reporters in which Department officials publicly acknowledged that there had been no protest outside the Benghazi diplomatic facility prior to the assault. Members should note that the following day, senior State Department officials were scheduled to appear before the House Oversight and Government Reform Committee.
Analysis of the Evolving Drafts of the Talking Points
To protect the State Department, the Administration deliberately removed references to al-Qa’ida-linked groups and previous attacks in Benghazi in the talking points used by Ambassador Rice, thereby perpetuating the deliberately misleading and incomplete narrative that the attacks evolved from a demonstration caused by a YouTube video.
The Administration’s talking points were developed in an interagency process that focused more on protecting the reputation and credibility of the State Department than on explaining to the American people the facts surrounding the fatal attacks on U.S. diplomatic facilities and personnel in Libya. Congressional investigators were given access to email exchanges, in which White House and senior Department officials discussed and edited the talking points. Those emails clearly reveal that Administration officials intentionally removed references in the talking points to the likely participation by Islamic extremists, to the known threat of extremists linked to al-Qa’ida in Benghazi and eastern Libya, and to other recent attacks against foreign interests in Benghazi.
The talking points in question were initially created for the House Intelligence Committee, after a briefing by then-Director of the CIA, David Petraeus.54 Members of the Committee sought guidance on how to discuss the attacks publicly and in an unclassified manner. The CIA generated the initial drafts of the unclassified talking points and provided them to other officials within the Executive Branch for clearance. The initial CIA draft circulated to the interagency group included references to:
1. previous notifications provided to Embassy Cairo of social media reporting encouraging jihadists to break into the Embassy;
2. indications that Islamic extremists participated in the events in Benghazi;
3. potential links to Ansar al-Sharia;
4. information about CIA-produced assessments of the threat from extremists linked to al-Qa’ida in Benghazi and eastern Libya; and
5. information about five previous attacks against foreign interests in Benghazi since April 2012.55
When draft talking points were sent to officials throughout the Executive Branch, senior State Department officials requested the talking points be changed to avoid criticism for ignoring the threat environment in Benghazi. Specifically, State Department emails reveal senior officials had “serious concerns” about the talking points, because Members of
Congress might attack the State Department for “not paying attention to Agency warnings” about the growing threat in Benghazi.56 This process to alter the talking points can only be construed as a deliberate effort to mislead Congress and the American people.
After slight modifications were made on Friday, September 14, a senior State Department official again responded that the edits did not “resolve all my issues or those of my building leadership,” and that the Department’s leadership was “consulting with [National Security Staff ].”57 Several minutes later, White House officials responded by stating that the State Department’s concerns would have to be taken into account and asserted further discussion would occur the following morning at a Deputies Committee Meeting.58
After the Deputies Committee Meeting on Saturday, September 15, 2012, at which any interagency disagreement would be resolved by the White House,59 a small group of officials from both the State Department and the CIA worked to modify the talking points to their final form to reflect the decision reached in the Deputies meeting.60 The actual edits were made by a current high-ranking CIA official.61 Those edits struck any and all suggestions that the State Department had been previously warned of threats in the region, that there had been previous attacks in Benghazi by al-Qa’ida-linked groups in Benghazi and eastern Libya, and that extremists linked to al-Qa’ida may have participated in the attack on the Benghazi Mission.62 The talking points also excluded details about the wide availability of weapons and experienced fighters in Libya, an exacerbating factor that contributed to the lethality of the attacks.63
Administration officials have said that modification of the talking points was an attempt to protect classified information and an investigation by the FBI,64 but the evidence refutes these assertions. Administration officials transmitted and reviewed different drafts of the talking points—many of which included reference to al-Qa’ida-associated groups, including Ansar al-Sharia—over unsecure email systems. Also, there were no concerns about protecting classified information in the email traffic. Finally, the FBI approved a version of the talking points with significantly more information about the attacks and previous threats than the version requested by the State Department. Claims that the edits were made to protect the FBI investigation are not credible.65
