by Peter Brune
Corporal Cliff Geddes was most impressed with his 13th Battalion, 4th Brigade visit to Vaux. His diary, 30 June 1918:
Breakfast 7.30, and then parties from each company of each of the 4 battalions in our brigade sent off, we marched to the other side of Daours where motor lorries took us on, through the city of Amiens, to the place where we had a practice attack with tanks . . . an English Brigadier-General explained the scheme of attack & the objective. I was delighted when he said we could have a ride on them afterwards. I sat on the back of one . . . it started off with a jerk, came to a shell hole, quietly went into it, & up again the other side, then crossed a trench, & came to a steep bank & stopped. It then simply raised its nose, climbed the bank went on, travelled right along a trench, & could have poured fire into any Huns there . . . It came to some small trees & just knocked them down & went on, & knocked out an imaginary enemy strong post with its 6 pounder guns. On the level ground they can go pretty fast, look just like caterpillars plodding along. Provided they get across to the enemy lines alright, they’d be grand things in an attack & would put the wind up the enemy infantry . . . When we got back to our spot, there were a lot of Yanks there, they will be mixed up with us, good style of chaps they look too, as they ought to, as America hasn’t lost her best men yet like the other Allies.21
The infantry–tank training at Vaux produced two distinct outcomes. The first was tactical. Such training gave both parties an appreciation of the other’s capabilities (particularly those of the new Mark V Tank), in which each began to appreciate the potential for mutual support in terms of movement, firepower and minor infantry–tank tactics with regard to enemy strong posts. The second was the onset of a lasting esprit de corps between the Australian Corps and the 5th Tank Brigade. After the war, Fuller noted that at Hamel:
. . . co-operation between the infantry and tanks was as near perfect as it could be; all ranks of the tank crews operating were impressed by the superb moral [sic] of the Australian troops, who never considered that the presence of tanks exonerated them from fighting, and who took instant advantage of any opportunity created by the tanks.22
A further point regarding this esprit de corps should be made. Rather than train with a random selection of tanks, where possible, each tank, and most importantly its crew, trained with the very infantry that they were to go into action with. Tanks were marked by an informal chalk drawing of the colour patch of the battalion they were to support (it was suggested that chalk be replaced by paint later); and the tanks were given a name by the infantry. In battle, therefore, the Australians were not in action with an anonymous steel monster and an equally anonymous crew, but with comrades they had trained with and developed confidence in. ‘The friendly relations thus established were to be of the utmost value in action at a later date.’ As time passed, the ‘friendly relations’ grew to the point where ‘the drivers were forced to maintain a constant vigilance against curio [trinket] hunters from the Antipodes’.23
***
In his initial proposal to Rawlinson on 21 June 1918, Monash stated that, ‘In view of the unsatisfactory position of Australian reinforcements, any substantial losses would precipitate the time when the question of the reduction in the number of Australian Divisions would have to be seriously considered.’24
It is at this period in time that we note a fundamental change in the BEF’s tactical thinking, which was exemplified by Monash and the Australian Corps. And the issue was quite simply the vital preservation of its dwindling infantry manpower by the employment of concentrated, accurate and coordinated firepower across all cooperating arms, and that those resources must initially be deployed by a rigorous application of the key Principle of War: ‘surprise’.
In short, the new dictum had become firepower not manpower. If the BEF’s ‘tools had been sharpened’ over the previous two years, it is here, in the second half of 1918, that its past trials and errors, its gradual technological, industrial and tactical development would result in a doctrine that had begun to rigidly conform to another long-lost Principle of War: ‘economy of force’.
General Monash’s vehicle for the planning and implementation of this developing doctrine was by the use of conferences, which began at the corps level, but very soon occurred at division, brigade and battalion levels. Peter Pedersen has raised an interesting point:
Although Monash was its most renowned practitioner, the conference method was a prominent weapon in the command armoury of the best British generals, a fact which tends to be overlooked. Currie attributed the Vimy success ‘largely . . . to the way in which everything had been carefully explained to those concerned.’ Plumer’s army was famous for its careful briefings, as were Maxse, Cavan and Jacob at corps level and Fielding and Babington at divisional. It is prudent to assume that they extracted as much from their conferences as Monash did from his.25
The point is valid. What does stand out when an examination is made of Monash’s conference agendas is their minute detail; the painstaking coordination of the various arms; the encouragement of questioning and constructive input at all levels of command in the Corps; and, most importantly, that once that conference process had been completed, there were to be absolutely no alterations to the plan. Nor should it be forgotten that the conference of mid-1918 was drawing upon a much greater degree of specific expertise than had been the case earlier in the war.
At a conference held on 28 June, Monash placed 118 items on the agenda, while on 30 June at Corps HQ 133 items for discussion were held before a gathering of infantry divisional, brigade, tank battalion commanders, air squadrons and other cooperating units. Monash’s handwritten notes for the 30 June conference are illuminating:
Conference 30/6/18
Copy of agenda sheet
Add my notes to do [sheet]
Relief model & map to Conference
Object 1. Go over all—settled
—still to be settled
2. Each to know what others going to do
∴ Each Commander states his plans
3. Try settle each point finally now
4. No alterations—only confusion
5. Secrecy—prime necessity
(a) losing men who will talk
(b) Clumsiness in our preparations.26
Some idea of the sheer detail in planning and the crucial dissemination of that Australian Corps work down through the chain of command is provided by Corporal Geddes’s 13th Battalion Unit Diary. Its CO, Lieutenant-Colonel Marks:
On 22nd June a conference was held at Brigade Headquarters, at which the impending operation was outlined. Great importance was placed on the necessity for secrecy . . . By a judicious arrangement of the nightly patrol programme, practically every Officer was enabled to familiarize himself with ‘No-man’s land’ without having any knowledge of the proposed operation . . . Message maps were supplied in sufficient numbers to give every man one copy, and every Officer and N.C.O. was in possession of an aeroplane photo. Material for the operation was available in such quantities as we have never known before. [author’s italics]
. . .
Company Commanders were assembled on the 1st July and full details of the operation were communicated to them.
Close liaison was established with the C.O. 21st Bn., and O.C. Right Coy. 13th Bn. got in touch with the O.C. of the left Coy. 21st Bn. Similar liaison was maintained with the 16th Battalion on left, Engineers, M.G. Coy, Fighting Tanks and Supply Tanks.
At 4 p.m. on the 2nd July a conference was held of all Officers of 13th Bn., of ‘A’ Coy. 132nd Regiment American Army, of No. 8 Section 8th Tank Bn., of the G.C. Tank Officers, two Officers of the 4th M.G. Coy., C.O. 4th Field Coy. Aust. Engineers, officer of T.M. [Trench Mortar] battery. At this conference, all details as to formation for attack, allotment of frontages, assembly positions, approach march, special tasks, material to be carried, medical arrangements, supply arrangements, etc., were discussed and finally settled . . . The Battalion was assembled and every detail of the
scheme fully explained by me. In addition, Coy. Commanders were able on the afternoon of the 2nd and morning of the 3rd July to practise their formation and certain details of their attack.
Tanks were allotted minor tasks in concert with Coy. Commanders but their disposition to be as shown graphically on attached map ‘D’. One Bn. Scout to ride in each of the three fighting Tanks and two others to ride on supply Tank as unloading party.
. . .
Supplies and ammunition to be carried forward as follows:-By Supply Tank: 134 coils Barbed Wire, 180 Long Screw Pickets [used for barbed wire], 270 Short Screw Pickets, 45 Sheets of Corrugated Iron, 50 Petrol tins water, 10,000 Rounds S.A.A, 4 Boxes No. 36 Grenades, 16 Boxes No. 23 Grenades.
Each fighting tank, 2000 rounds S.A.A. and a few tins of water.
On the man:-200 Rounds S.A.A., 1 No. 23 or No. 5 Grenade. 1 No. 34 Grenade. 1 Pick or Shovel (except Lewis Gun No. 1.) Ground Flares, (18 per Company) Message Rockets (2 per Company) Wire cutters: 10%. Sandbags, 3 per man. Extra water bottles: one per man.27
‘The man’ often has a different perspective to those who plan the battle. Corporal Geddes’s diary, 2 July 1918: ‘After tea we all drew extra arms, bombs & grenades, pick & shovel. Lor’ knows how we’ll go over the top with all this load, a chap won’t have the strength to bayonet a plum pudding, let alone a Fritz.’28 While Geddes might have thought his pack heavy, the day before he was thoroughly briefed as to his role:
Well, we are in for a hop over alright. Lt. Col. Marks addressed the battalion under the trees this evening, & explained the part the battalion is to play in the attack. My company D is to go over first, take the first two trenches & stay there, & A, B, & C companies will go on past us, our battalion will have 3 tanks, & aeroplanes will take part too . . . Our platoon officer, Mr. Smith, explained our position on the map, & how to read a map by the numbers & letters, to the N.C.O’s of his platoon.29
Geddes’s D Company was ordered to wear a red streak on their tin hats to indicate that they were being leapfrogged by the remaining companies, and the attached Americans were to have a blue patch on their hats to distinguish them from the company attached to the 15th Battalion.30 While Monash, his Australian Corps staff and their supporting arms had left little to chance, it is also obvious from the above brigade and battalion planning that the experience, expertise and meticulous planning were not peculiar to Corps HQ.
The only hindrance to these plans came on 2 July, when after having finally found out that a small contingent of his troops was being committed to Hamel, the American C-in-C, General Pershing, informed Haig that he did not want his still-raw troops to participate. Monash would have none of it—he informed Rawlinson that if the Americans were withdrawn, he would cancel the operation. His strong stance was rewarded. The Americans’ participation would go ahead.
***
At the Australian Corps HQ at Bertangles Chateau on 4 July 1918, Brigadier-General Walter Coxen rose well before zero hour. Looking out of his window, he noticed a solitary figure slowly pacing back and forth along the gravel drive. There were frequent pauses while this figure consulted his watch. That lonely figure was Lieutenant-General John Monash. As the artillery unleashed its fury upon the unsuspecting German lines, Monash went inside. His thoughts can be well imagined. Given the efforts of others to unseat him in his command of the Corps and his obligations to his visiting prime minister, everything now hinged on Hamel.
***
Gunner James Armitage was a nineteen-year-old student from Double Bay, Sydney. A reinforcement, he had arrived in France on 4 May 1918. He was posted to the 30th Battery, 8th Field Brigade AFA, 3rd Division. His diary, 4 July 1918:
Got to our new positions and started setting progressive fuses at about 2 a.m. and on the tick of 4 a.m. [it was actually 3.10 am] every gun on this mile long, and God knows what depth of wheel to wheel guns, fired simultaneously. The earth shook and the mind boggled at the concussion . . . The assault was on Hamel and we were drawn up between Villers Bretonneux and Sailly-le-Sec . . . Those Germans who came back past us seemed rather weedy and very young and utterly shattered by the savagery of the barrage.31
The first barrage on 4 July was sited 200 yards ahead of the infantry start line and consisted of 60 per cent 18-pounder shrapnel, 30 per cent HE with delayed action fuses and 10 per cent smoke shell. The position of each gun was fixed, carefully camouflaged, bearings were given and artillery boards provided by the Army and Corps Topographical Sections.32 Here, building on the success of the initial barrage at Cambrai—with no prior registration or preliminary barrages—we see the concentrated and accurate predicted fire of the Fourth Army coming into play. Between 4 July and the next few days, over 200 000 rounds were expended by the artillery.33 The ploy to induce the enemy to wear gas masks by firing smoke and gas shells in the days leading up to the battle and then induce him to still wear them on the day when only smoke and not gas was employed, was ‘to a certain extent successful’.34 It was also noted that smoke shells did deceive the Germans as to the frontage of the attack and also screened their observation of the approaching tanks and infantry.
From the time that static trench warfare had descended upon the Western Front, one of the biggest impediments to an infantry crossing of no-man’s-land had been machine gun posts. In the case of German posts, these were well sited and camouflaged, mutually supporting, and usually manned by well-trained, disciplined and brave troops. But by the onset of the Battle of Hamel they faced daunting odds. If they survived the artillery’s accurate predicted fire and creeping barrages, then a further terrifying ordeal awaited them: tanks and infantry in mutual cooperation. Whereas low-flying bombers had, for two days, drowned out the noise of the tanks’ arrival at their lying-up points prior to the Battle of Cambrai, and then during their movement to the front line at the start of that battle, that same tactic had been employed for eight days prior to Hamel.
Corporal Cliff Geddes and his 13th Battalion moved off from their taped start line and headed for their Vaire and Hamel Wood objective:
. . . one would think this awful crash of artillery & bursting shells would deafen or drive you crazy, but your blood is warm, & really, I felt as cool as could be, just slightly ‘keen’ I’ll admit . . . there is a temptation to go too fast, & one of our shells burst fair among our company, & played havoc. I was pleased to see the tanks moving forward, they had arrived to time without mishap . . . Came to a trench, & saw a Fritz with his hands up surrendering to some of our boys, they fired into other dugouts, in case there were some hiding in there before we moved on. I was amongst some Yanks & A Coy now, the tanks still trudged along; & day was breaking. I then saw the tank in front of me hit with a shell. After going about 800 yards, D Company’s objective was reached & we immediately began to dig in while A, B & C Coys pushed on past us, & went ahead. The shells still screamed & our aeroplanes flew low overhead. Fritz prisoners in twos & threes were being brought back . . . We dug in unmolested while our other lads pushed ahead . . .35
The tank in front of Geddes that had been hit by a shell was Tank 9044 commanded by Lieutenant G H Etherton, B Coy, 8th Tank Battalion:
Started from Infantry tape line Z-8, arriving as Infantry jumped off in Coy with other Two Sec tanks. Overtook infantry behind barrage about 150 yds ahead and worked in conjunction with same, crushing enemy trench system . . . the tank . . . received direct hit from enemy artillery through starboard observation turret, killing Pte Parrish, No 3770, 13 Bn AIF, who was acting as a liaison scout between tank and coy infantry, and wounding L.Cpl Bond, Grs Adler, Birkett and Williams.36
But not far away, also in support of the attack on Vaire and Hamel Woods, Tank 9403, commanded by Lieutenant W A Vickers, 8th Tank Battalion, fared far better:
I encountered a strong post, held by a party of German bombers . . . where the Australian infantry were held up. I gave my driver orders to drive over it, and kept up rapid fire. They succeeded in throwing 4 bombs on the roof of my tank before I was able to dem
olish it. I suspected that some were getting at the rear of my tank with the intention of bombing my petrol tank, so told my driver to reverse, thus going over some of the enemy. The Australian infantry then occupied this position and I proceeded to get well ahead of the first wave again. I was then informed by an infantryman that they were held up by heavy machine gun fire to which I proceeded and found a strong point consisting of 2 machine guns manned by 8 gunners. I drove straight up to their position firing at them. They refused to surrender so I drove over them . . . I then proceeded and found myself in front of the infantry, until I reached a small trench containing a few of the enemy. These immediately surrendered. Our barrage was then concentrating a heavy fire in front of me so had to stop for about 6 minutes. On the barrage lifting I proceeded and encountered numerous German infantry who freely surrendered. By this time I found myself on the plateau, behind and on the right of Hamel mopping up small trenches. I then found that the Aust Infantry had started to consolidate the objective behind me. I then turned round and proceeded to the rallying point.37
After this action Vickers reported that his crew’s condition was ‘good, only suffering a little shock’; that he had expended some 962 rounds of ammunition; that his tank had a ‘right track broken’; and that his exhaust pipe on the top of his tank was ‘partly blown away’.38 Tank 9292, commanded by Lieutenant C T Draper, was also attached to Geddes’s 13th Battalion:
I took part with my female tank in the attack on Vaire Wood and Hamel, operating on the southern fringe of Vaire Wood in co-operation with 13 Bn AIF . . . As I passed the southern edge of Vaire Wood, I raked it with m/g fire from left sponson . . . I saw male tank . . . receive a direct hit, so changed my direction further to the south to include this tank’s section, and so maintain co-operation with 13th Tank Bn on my right flank. Throughout the action . . . my chief function . . . [was] searching possible strong points and m/g emplacements, four of which I crushed . . . After being released by the infantry, I withdrew to the rallying point . . . Valuable assistance was rendered by the Australian Scout attached to the tank for liaison purposes.39
