by Peter Brune
On 11 September 1918, in preparation for the forthcoming attacks upon the Hindenburg Line, Lieutenant-General Sir Walter Braithwaite and his newly created British IX Corps joined the Fourth Army and took over General Monash’s right or southern flank, which had been held by the British 32nd Division. During the previous two days, General Monash had relieved his 3rd and 5th AIF Divisions with the 1st and 4th AIF Divisions.
In the offensive by the Fourth Army on 18 September, the British III Corps (General Butler) was to attack on the left or northern flank, Monash’s Australian Corps was in the centre and the British IX Corps was to attack on the right or southern flank. The attack was to be supported by elements of the British Third Army to the north and the French First Army farther south. Three objectives were identified: the first was the old British Main Line (Green Line); the second was the old British Outpost Line (Red Line); and, if possible, the exploitation phase of the battle envisaged the occupation of the Hindenburg Outpost Line (Blue Line). Peter Pedersen has recorded that ‘Monash was confident about the set-piece phases of the battle, but unsure of the exploitation to the Blue Line, which entailed the crossing of an open valley 1 mile wide and seamed with uncut wire. The attack was not to be pressed if strong resistance was met there.’13
Monash had every reason to feel confident about the two set-piece phases of the battle. By this time the Australian Corps doctrine for a set-piece battle was so sophisticated, and its personnel so well versed in their procedures, that success could be confidently predicted.
The artillery plans for this 18 September offensive incorporated all of the painstaking lessons learnt over considerable time, and further refined and practised since Hamel. This operation would see a devastating use of artillery fire support, the resultant employment of surprise, the highly successful use of creeping barrages, and a speedy movement forward of both the field and heavy artillery. In all this, the 5th Field Survey Battalion and the Australian Flying Corps No. 3 Squadron played a key role. During September 1918 that squadron alone had taken a staggering 686 aerial photos and had issued 14 048 prints—and all this despite some eight days of poor weather that inhibited the squadron’s flying time.14 In unison with its techniques of flash spotting and sound ranging, the 5th Field Survey Battalion was able to provide these photos to a depth of 4000 yards across a thirteen mile-front, which were subsequently issued to officers and NCOs of the eight divisions taking part in the operation.15 Accurate maps showing such features as the location of German gun batteries, machine gun posts, supply dumps, communications and transport hubs were provided across the Fourth Army. Using this accurate and plentiful supply of maps and photos, Monash employed the same tactic first used by him at Amiens in August: for both accuracy and simplicity, a perfectly straight artillery start line, which enabled his gunners to site their guns with great precision. When they needed to move they could be relocated with pinpoint accuracy. Peter Chasseaud, in Artillery’s Astrologers: ‘Once in position, they could lay out their line by compass, or more accurately by resecting their position from any map detail or trig points in sight, and measuring the angle on the fighting map or artillery board.’16
In an endeavour to bring the Hindenburg Main Line under artillery range, and therefore inhibit the German potential for counter-attack from that feature—and also to reduce the infantry ground to be covered to 5000 yards—Monash fixed his artillery start line on ground not yet taken. That is, on ground he expected his Corps to acquire by ‘Peaceful Penetration’ before 18 September. The infantry start line at the commencement of the attack was to be fixed 200 yards behind that artillery line. Creeping barrages were to be staged in lifts of 100 yards ‘measured along the Inter-Corps boundaries’, the first being at zero plus three minutes, the second at zero plus five minutes, succeeding lifts up to and including the eleventh lift at three minutes, and the twelfth and succeeding lifts at every four minutes.17 Further, a prolonged protective barrage was to be laid in front of the first two objectives before the attempt to advance to the exploitation Blue Line (Hindenburg Outpost Line).
As at Hamel and Amiens, measures to maintain secrecy were also instituted: in the case of the artillery, no movement was permitted by day; guns and ammunition stocks were camouflaged; and no firing of those guns in the forward position was permitted prior to zero day. It is little wonder that Monash’s conference (and subsequent divisional and brigade conferences) were of a relatively short duration, for as Monash observed:
The methods of the Corps were becoming stereotyped, and by this time we all began to understand each other so well that most of what I had to say could almost be taken for granted. Each commander was ready to anticipate the action that would be required of him, almost as soon as I had unfolded the general plan.18
While the return of tanks to operations by the Australian Corps was welcomed, their paucity in number was a concern. A paltry twenty tanks were available across the whole Fourth Army front, eight being allotted to III Corps, four to IX Corps and eight to the Australian Corps—four each to the 1st and 4th AIF Divisions.19 Given their past impressive performances, Monash sought to counter this scarcity of tanks, and maximise their impact upon the offensive by three initiatives. The first was psychological. He ordered that dummy tanks be constructed by the engineers and placed in positions where the Germans would see them. To what extent this ruse worked is debatable, since the 4th Division Report on Operations would later note that:
Dummy tanks were not an entire success due to the rain over night making the ground sodden and heavy going. Such conditions would have to be provided for and the design of wheels and propelling gear altered accordingly. The scheme is capable of producing considerable moral effect on German troops.20
Monash’s second problem regarding his shortage of tanks was the consequent loss of concentrated firepower upon hostile machine gun nests. This had the potential for high infantry casualties, which he could ill afford. His solution was adept. While he could look to his accurate and concentrated creeping barrages to provide their usual support, Monash sought to replace his lack of tank fire with extra machine gun fire. For the attack on 18 September, the machine guns of the recently relieved 3rd and 5th Divisions were added to those of the 1st and 4th Divisions, which saw some 250 machine guns available to lay down a barrage that was to advance 300 yards ahead of the infantry. Thus, the now standard 1918 principle of ‘firepower not manpower’ was adhered to. The third initiative was a more studied use of that limited tank resource. Those few tanks were to confront only specific targets, and significantly they were to follow behind the infantry and were not, with the exception of those four supporting the 1st AIF Division, which had the furthest to travel, to go beyond the first Green Line objective. Clearly, Monash was attempting to preserve a limited resource.
In support of the offensive, it was arranged that No. 3 Squadron was to play three main roles. The first was for its contact planes to fly over each of the three line objectives at prearranged times to confirm infantry occupation of those lines. This was to be done by the planes calling for flares by ‘the aeroplane sounding a succession of “A’s” on the Klaxon horn and by firing a White Very light’. The foremost advanced infantry were to respond to this procedure by red ground flares, bright metal discs, and rifles laid across the trench in batches of three or four. The second task was to fly counter-attack planes to identify hostile concentrations and/or abnormal movement. Once identified, those planes were to signal this intelligence to the artillery by wireless and signal the infantry by dropping white parachute flares. No. 3 Squadron’s third task was to support the tanks by reporting on their progress and to bomb and strafe hostile anti-tank guns. And as at Hamel and Amiens, aircraft were designated to fly over the assembly approaches to drown out their noise.21
The strength of the 4th Division’s battalions now averaged nineteen officers and 405 other ranks in the field (including HQ), and the 1st Division eighteen and 339. This gave the Australian Corps strength a total of 277 officer
s and 5545 other ranks.22 Monash and his Corps staff had certainly adhered to the Principle of War ‘economy of force’ and had left little to chance.
***
With each division attacking on a 3500-yard front, the 1st AIF Division on the left flank had Hargicourt as its first objective, while the 4th Division on the right had the task of moving on Le Verguier. The number of battalions initially deployed on each brigade front depended upon the ground to be crossed, the distances to their objectives, and the perceived degree of difficulty of the defences to be overcome.
The 1st Division, with the furthest to advance to its key objective of Hargicourt, was to attack on a two-brigade front with two battalions in the van and two in support, the task of the latter battalions being a movement through the front two upon reaching the Green Line and then moving on the Red Line and, if possible, undertaking the exploitation phase to the Blue Line (Hindenburg Outpost Line).
The 4th Division’s left flank, with the key objective being the village of Le Verguier, which lay on a spur only about half a mile from the start line, presented a different challenge. Here it was decided to attack on a three-battalion front. The 4th Brigade’s 15th Battalion was to outflank the village from the north; the 13th Battalion was to outflank it from the south; and, while those two battalions then moved on the Green Line, the Brigade’s 16th Battalion was tasked with the capture of Le Verguier followed by the mopping up of that village. Once those tasks were completed, the 16th Battalion was to move to the Green Line to become the brigade reserve, the 15th and 13th were to capture the Red Line, and the hitherto ‘unused’ 14th Battalion was then to move through them and attempt the seizure of the final Blue Line. On the 4th Division’s right or southern flank, its 12th Brigade was to attack on a one-battalion front with a ‘leapfrogging’ of battalions on each of the Green and Red Lines. The 4th Brigade was allotted three tanks and the 12th, one.
***
At about 3.00 am on 18 September, the rain came and persisted until just after sunrise. The infantry were wet through from their approach march and time spent on the start line. When the barrage opened promptly at 5.20 am, they were confronted by gradually fading rain, slippery sodden ground and dense mist. Moreover, they were met by a thunderous roar the intensity of which they had not previously experienced. The usual din of the artillery was heightened by 250 machine guns firing a barrage across the Australian Corps front.
It was inevitable that navigation in these conditions would be challenging. But the very conditions that made that navigation difficult also undoubtedly screened the advancing troops from German field guns and, particularly, their machine gun fire. In what had now become standard drill, ‘specially selected Officers and N.C.O’s using compass bearings’ were mostly able to guide their platoons and companies successfully towards their objectives.23
On the left-flank or northern Australian Corps front, the 1st Division’s 1st Brigade crossed its start line with the 2nd Battalion on the left and the 4th on the right. Its 3rd Brigade was tasked with the right-flank advance, with its 11th Battalion on the left and its 12th on the right. On the right or southern 4th Division front its 4th Brigade (the 15th Battalion left and the 13th right) was flanked to its south by the 12th Brigade.
Although the 1st Division had by far the greatest distance to traverse to reach its first Green Line objective, it encountered little resistance for the first 800 yards. The two Battalions of the 1st Brigade on the left advanced on a front of 500 yards for each company and managed to keep within 100 yards of the barrage, which caused the 4th Battalion to record that ‘only in a few instances was the enemy able to get into action before our troops were upon them’.24 Where resistance from German machine gun posts were encountered, those rapid assaults, or an outflanking movement allowing the support line to mop up those positions, produced a brief fight, a withdrawal or a surrender. On the 1st Division’s right or southern flank, the 3rd Brigade’s 11th Battalion (on the left) employed two tactics in its advance:
The two line companies adhered throughout with marked success to the principle of advancing along the high ground avoiding the valley, which ran through the centre of the sector. In addition gaps were left in the line of advance, thrusts being made into the enemy’s positions, the gaps thus becoming outflanked were mopped up.25
Despite the Germans making a ‘resolute stand’ at Fervaque Farm and its adjoining trench system, the abovementioned tactics allowed the advance to continue unabated.
The 3rd Brigade’s 12th Battalion (on the right) encountered tougher resistance. Its first obstacle was the small Brosse Wood, where it met intense machine gun and rifle fire. This caused its support platoon to drive the enemy out of that feature into the open, where they were either killed or surrendered. However, when the Battalion reached the trench line beyond Brosse Wood, stubborn German resistance—numerous machine guns and two 77-mm guns—caused it to fall behind the barrage. Thus, when its soldiers entered the much more extensive Grand Priel Wood, they sustained significant casualties. In the ensuing stiff fight at a chateau, the Germans ‘were badly mauled and, a large number of prisoners . . . [were] captured amongst whom was the machine gun Commander, Capt. von Streseman’.26 By around 7.30 am the 1st Division was on its first Green Line objective. Of the two tanks deployed to assist the 1st Brigade, one performed admirably in support of the 4th Battalion, while the second, in support of the 2nd Battalion, hit a mine and was put out of action. But in what was now standard tank drill, the carrying tank in support of the Brigade managed to bring forward two loads of ammunition and entrenching tools for consolidation of that Green Line.
While the 1st Division was thus engaged, the 4th Division 4th Brigade’s advance had also began promptly at 5.20 am. The 15th and 13th Battalions achieved their outflanking of Le Verguier and the subsequent penetration of the German trench line to reach their Green Line objective with little difficulty. The 4th Brigade’s Report on Operations:
So effective was the artillery and Machine Gun fire, and so complete the surprise, that generally little determined opposition was met with, most of the enemy ‘going to earth’ until the barrage had passed when they readily surrendered to our troops. A few machine gun nests attempted to put up a stand, but these were quickly out-manoeuvred and effectively dealt with.27
The 16th Battalion’s task of attacking and mopping up Le Verguier presented a potentially tougher challenge. It assaulted the village from north to south using its D, C, and B Companies with A Company in reserve. In essential terms, the German village defence was dominated by numerous machine gun posts, a number of 77-mm guns for anti-tank defence and abundant dugouts. Unlike the approach over the more open ground across the front, the 16th Battalion’s C Company Report on Operations stated that: ‘The village was more or less non-existent, consisting of a mass of debris and shell holes, with wire stretching in every direction. These obstacles had a tendency to divert the men to the roads which running at all angles as they were, tended to throw the men off the right direction.’28
The 16th Battalion’s D Company was confronted with two posts: Fort Bell and Orchard’s Post, which both put up a spirited if brief fight with bombs and machine guns before being outflanked and overrun. To that Company’s south the Battalion’s C and B Companies were confronted with Fort Bull, which ‘was really the key of the whole defences of the village’. The fact that its numerous defenders were either defeated in short, sharp outflanking encounters or caught in dugouts simply reflects the savagery and accuracy of the creeping barrage, the machine gun barrage, and the declining morale of its German occupants.29 On the southernmost flank, the 12th Brigade’s 48th Battalion encountered only slight resistance before gaining its Green Line objective at around 7.30 am.
Following the occupation of the Green Line across the Australian Corps front by around 10.00 am, the 1st and 4th AIF Divisions now prepared for a resumption of the offensive towards the second Red Line objective.
If the 1st Division had had a greater distance t
o its first objective than the 4th Division, then it was to now enjoy a much shorter approach to its Red and Blue Lines. On that Division’s front, the barrage now continued in front of the Green Line for some 70–90 minutes, thus allowing its 2nd and 4th Battalions to dig in and consolidate that line, while its 1st and 3rd Battalions prepared to move through them to assault the second Red Line objective. While the intensity of the barrage waned temporarily as elements of the artillery also moved forward, its resumption once again provided critical support to the 1st and 3rd Battalions’ advance. Lieutenant Syd Traill, 1st Battalion, had moved in rear of the 4th Battalion from the start line early that morning. His diary, 18 September 1918:
We got up to Hargicourt and reformed behind a bank. All my platoon was there. Here the Bn. passed through the 2nd Bn. and our advance started.
The Hun is a wily bird and as we advanced he shortened his artillery range—damnably clever work and shews [sic] great system of communication. It was annoying to us though. Bull was killed instantaneously, had his head split in two. Tanks were doing pretty good work and we had two in front of us. It was rough going and machine-gunners caused us trouble. The tanks dealt with most of these—damn fine things for us—but they are reckless with their 6 pdrs—firing with an abandon that put the wind well up on us more than one occassion [sic]. We got a few guns, beaucoup m.g.s and our objective.30
Lieutenant Syd Traill’s 1st Battalion was able to gain the Red Line with few casualties. Upon reaching that objective, the Battalion was able to establish contact with its 3rd Brigade’s 9th Battalion on its right. After gaining the Red Line the 1st Battalion, faced with an exploitation advance of 1200 yards, was able to secure positions on the Hindenburg Outpost Line (Blue Line). But the 1st Brigade’s 3rd Battalion on the left flank had a tougher fight. Moving over more challenging terrain and held up for a time by German artillery and machine gun fire, their barrage got away from them, and consequently, although the Battalion gained its Red Line objective, it sustained ‘greater losses than any other unit at the time’.31 In its subsequent advance from the Red Line after 10.00 am, the 3rd Battalion encountered extremely heavy machine gun fire from the direction of Quennemont Farm, which stalled its advance. It was later able to link up with its left-flank 74th British Division, which had also failed to reach the Blue Line objective.
