by Peter Brune
However, matters were brought to a head when Monash learnt that he was to lose some 6000 of his most experienced soldiers who had enlisted in 1914 on ‘Anzac Leave’. That leave was to involve furlough back in Australia for a period of six months. Lieutenant Syd Traill, serving in the 1st Division’s 1st Battalion, was one of those eligible for ‘Anzac Leave’. His diary, 2 September 1918: ‘They again took a list of 1914 officers and men for 6 months transport duty to Australia—its [sic] going to be a weekly return I believe, just enough to tantalise, but not materialise.’2
This measure had first been suggested as far back as 29 May 1917 by Senator Pearce, the Minister for Defence—who proposed an additional recruitment of around 5000 soldiers on top of the needed 7000—‘to be granted to survivors of General Bridge’s original [Anzac] force’.3 The proposal was rejected by the Army Council in London on the grounds that if adopted, it might necessitate similar leave for British and Dominion troops stationed in all ‘distant theatres of war, with accompanying difficulties of finding transport . . .’4
Prime Minister Hughes had been in London since June 1918 and by September he had made four decisions. These were ‘Anzac Leave’ for the AIF’s Gallipoli veterans; the withdrawal of the AIF from the front by 15 October; that it should winter in the south of France or Italy; and that he be informed of all subsequent AIF deployment(s). There were two basic reasons for these initiatives. With an eye to the future, and therefore his role in the representation of Australia at a potential peace conference, the first was his desire to preserve the strength of the AIF, and thus his influence. The second was his political standing in Australia: those measures would strengthen his leadership in the face of numerous enemies from within his own party, from the opposition and, indeed, from a significant portion of the electorate.
On 12 September 1918, Hughes informed Birdwood that limited shipping had been found, and the first 800 original Anzacs were to sail immediately for two months’ leave in Australia. Further, he told Monash that the Australian Corps was to be withdrawn from the front no later than 15 October and that, as Peter Pedersen has recorded, ‘his position as corps commander depended on it’.5 Given that General Monash had had to endure the attempt to remove him from his command of the Corps only a few months before, this threat from Hughes must surely have been galling, especially when the recent and present pressures of his command are considered.
As a response to the ‘Anzac Leave’ order and the increased British War Council pressure for disbandments, Monash was now forced to act. Birdwood and Monash agreed that this reduction should not immediately apply to the original four brigades of the AIF, as they were to be initially deployed in the coming offensive. Thus the 1st Division’s 1st, 2nd and 3rd Brigades and the 4th Division’s 4th Brigade were exempt for the time being. And as General Hobbs was currently on leave in England, his 5th Division’s 8th Brigade was also initially exempted.
The selection of battalions for disbandment was rightly conducted by each divisional commander in consultation with their brigadiers. General Rosenthal identified the 19th Battalion (5th Brigade), the 21st Battalion (6th Brigade) and the 25th Battalion (7th Brigade) from his 2nd Division. General Gellibrand’s 3rd Division selected the 37th Battalion (10th Brigade) and the 42nd Battalion (11th Brigade), while the 5th Division selected the 54th Battalion (14th Brigade) and the 15th Brigade’s 60th Battalion. It will be remembered that the 3rd Division had already lost its 36th Battalion and the 4th Division its 52nd and 47th Battalions during the period April–May 1918.
Although there can be little doubt that Monash and his division and brigade commanders were aware of the angst that those September 1918 disbandments would cause, they could not have contemplated the intensity and breadth of their soldiers’ response. This work began with Lieutenant (later Captain) George Mitchell’s description of going into battle at the beginning of Operation Michael. He has left us with a pithy definition of the esprit de corps of a battalion. It was, said Mitchell, ‘our father and our mother of unforgettable years’ and that it was one of the critical ‘links that connected us with the unforgotten dead . . .’6
The first reaction came from the 10th Brigade’s 37th Battalion. Its CO, Lieutenant-Colonel Story, whom Bean referred to as ‘a fine leader’,7 circumvented the chain of command in an extraordinary manner. It would prove his immediate undoing. The 10th Brigade Unit Diary entry for 13 September:
Dull day: 37th Bn officially notified of their disbanding and are naturally very much upset . . . (Lt Col Story) wrote a strong letter of protest to the Corps Hqrs [Monash], G.O.C. AIF [Birdwood] & Prime Minister with copies to Bde & Div Hqrs., and was suspended from duty by Div. Commdr for his action.8
This ‘dull day’ was followed by a number of others. The next day the Brigade Commander visited the 37th and found ‘a good deal of unrest’. On 15 September the 10th Brigade’s Unit Diary reported that ‘representatives of other units AIF have visited 37th Bn & promised support to resist amalgamation’.9 When the 37th Battalion soldiers decided that they would obey every order except the final one directing them to march to their new battalions, matters came to a head. On the morning of 21 September, when the paraded Battalion was ordered to pass to the 38th and 39th Battalions’ lines, only 40 men did so, including the ‘officers, sergeants and a few corporals & other ranks’.10 On 22 September the 10th Brigade’s Unit Diary provided an excellent insight into the 37th Battalion’s attitude, and that of other units destined for disbandment:
GOC Division called re 37th then went to the Bn and saw each Coy without any result. The attitude of the men is one of opposition to the disbanding of any Australian Bn . . . there has certainly been a good deal of excellent organising which has been carried out quite unobtrusively and of which the leaders are not apparent. Delegates have both been sent to & been received from other units whose disbanding is threatened and promises of mutual support have been made. One outstanding feature of the whole thing has been the excellent discipline in 37th Bn on all points but that of obedience to . . . amalgamation. Turnout, saluting, cleanliness & tidiness of billets have never been better . . . and . . . never at any time the slightest signs of disorderly conduct or AWL . . . The whole attitude of the Bn was a good example of their views on discipline . . . The men themselves insisted on more than ordinary care being paid to their general behaviour.11
The remaining six battalions all followed the 37th Battalion’s decision: to obey every order but the one to move to their new battalion lines. Further evidence of the sincerity of the stand taken by those battalions was provided by the 2nd Division’s 25th Battalion, whose soldiers requested that their unit be allotted the toughest task in their next operation, which would either cause the Battalion’s extinction or add such prestige to its record that disbandment could not be contemplated. But one of them, after an initial refusal, did comply.
Brigadier-General Elliott received orders for the disbandment of one of his 15th Brigade Battalions at 3.00 pm on 24 September. He decided that ‘the whole of the 60th Battalion would transfer to 59th Battalion as two complete companies’,12 while the 59th would also reorganise its soldiers into the two remaining companies. The parade for the handover of the 60th Battalion personnel to the 59th was timed for 9.00 am on 26 September, and Elliott promised to attend that parade and speak to the 60th Battalion at 10.00 am. The acting CO of the 60th informed Elliott that although the men were ‘sore at being broken up’ he anticipated that there would be no trouble when the time came to cross over to the 59th Battalion.13
When Elliott rode onto the parade ground the men were called to attention and ordered to slope arms, whereupon that order was obeyed ‘by about half a dozen men. The order was repeated with a similar result’.14 The 15th Brigade Unit Diary:
Addressing the assembled parade the Brigadier informed them that this nonsense must cease at once. He certainly was surprised and pained to know that such action had been taken by the 60th Battalion, and, if they had reached such a state that the
y would not obey lawful orders given them, then he would cease to command them, for he would not command a mob. There were two things for which a wise Australian Defence Act, the most human Army Act in the World, had provided that the death penalty be awarded: these were—desertion to the enemy and the concerted refusal to obey an order, which was mutiny. Open mutiny on the part of the Battalion would result in the ringleaders being shot; if they could not be found then one man in every ten would be shot.15
According to Elliott’s biographer this brazen threat met with an equally unequivocal response from an anonymous source within the ranks: ‘We’ve got bullets too.’16 This comment elicited a more conciliatory attitude from the Brigadier. He now attempted to explain the reasons for the disbandment. Elliott pointed out, with dubious substance, that it was not the fault of the ‘AIF authorities’ for this action, but the politicians who had failed to provide the necessary reinforcements. But what then followed must have made sound sense to the 60th. He spoke of the good name of the Battalion, which would be forfeited by such an action, and ‘what was the use of keeping a full Battalion Staff with Transport organised to administer 1,000 men to follow 200 men about the country?’17 Further, to alleviate the idea that battalions had been ‘ranked’ in order to select those for disbandment, he informed the parade that there was no best or worst battalion in his Brigade, and in selecting the 60th Battalion he had simply followed the Corps order, ‘which stipulated that the last Battalion in each Brigade was to go unless there was a special reason . . .’18 It is of interest to note that of the three battalions disbanded in April–May 1918 and the seven chosen at this time, only two were the last battalion in their brigades.
Elliott gave the men half an hour to contemplate their stance, and when he returned he met with a delegation who put forward their views. One of their six grievances was widespread among the five divisions: a ‘general feeling of dissatisfaction at not receiving the long promised rest’.19 In the end the crisis passed. Elliott handed the 60th Battalion over to the 59th Battalion’s Lieutenant-Colonel Scanlan ‘and the new Battalion marched past being played past by the old 60th Battalion band’.20 In the meantime Monash, in the midst of planning the final assault upon the Hindenburg Line, and acutely aware of the intense feelings of his Corps towards the disbandments, managed to convince General Rawlinson to ask Field Marshal Haig for a fortnight’s delay. This was granted. The reader can imagine the torment and frustration felt by both the soldiers of the 60th Battalion and Brigadier-General Elliott when this decision became known. When Elliott was again confronted by delegates from the 60th, he managed to convince them to accept the situation.
Charles Bean referred to the whole episode as ‘the mutinies over disbandment’, but also rightly observed that while in the strict sense they were mutinies, the AIF soldiers’ non-compliance was not treated as such by either the British or Australian authorities.21 Indeed, no soldier—other than the 37th Battalion CO, Lieutenant-Colonel Story—was in any way punished for his role in the incident. The fact that Monash and his division and brigade commanders made every effort to explain the situation to the men, and also willingly received delegations and written protests from them, reflects both the widespread nature of the protest and their understanding of the esprit de corps of the AIF as a whole. In the end, the request to delay the disbandments was an astute command decision that eased the tension until such time as the AIF could be relieved from the front and the matter could be addressed.
But September 1918 also brought Monash and his Australian Corps another far more serious issue with which to contend.
***
We have noted in Chapter 9 the intense strain that had beset the Australian Corps by the time Mont St Quentin and Péronne had fallen. It has been further recorded that General Hobbs had warned Monash on 31 August that his 5th Division was approaching the very limits of its endurance. Bean stated that by the time those two objectives had been taken ‘the strain on the 2nd and 3rd Divisions was even greater’.22 In his Official History Bean recorded two incidents of mutiny in the AIF during September 1918. These will be examined shortly. But in an intriguing rider to his examination of those incidents—mentioned in a footnote—he stated that: ‘There had during this period been slighter incidents, of which only hints are given in the records.’23 While this is conjecture, perhaps one such incident was recorded on 29 August by Private William McLennan, 2nd Machine Gun Battalion: ‘Heard that 18th Btn refused to go across river & attack. Position said to be too strong as left flank is not up far enough. Btn likely to be cut off. 20th Btn are coming to do the job, so we are now to attach ourselves to them.’24 The 18th Battalion Unit Diary for this period is unclear concerning McLennan’s comment.
At 3.00 am on 5 September a mutiny occurred when the 15th Brigade’s 59th Battalion was ordered to move through Péronne and deploy to the rear of a 57th Battalion outpost.25 At 7.15 am that Battalion’s CO, Lieutenant-Colonel Scanlan, went to Brigade HQ and told Elliott that about 60 men from B Company’s 5, 6 and 7 Platoons and their Headquarters had refused to comply with the movement order.26 Scanlan informed Elliott that the men were ‘in an exhausted condition after the fighting of the last few days’27 [at and around Péronne] but that there was no excuse for their action. He then handed Elliott his resignation, which was not accepted. Elliott then ordered Scanlan to proceed with his remaining three companies to his Battalion’s new location, while the Brigade Major was ordered to go and talk to the 60 men and obtain a list of their grievances in writing.
After reading the grievances, Elliott visited the men and pointed out that their ‘refusal to obey an order was one of the most serious crimes of which a soldier could be guilty and was punishable by death’.28 He then proceeded to appeal—in much the same manner as he would later do with the 60th Battalion’s soldiers during their disbandment—to the men’s pride in their battalion, the loss of trust the men had displayed to both Lieutenant-Colonel Scanlan and himself, and the Brigade’s good name. The 15th Brigade Unit Diary, 5 September:
He [Elliott] said that he would go away for half an hour and receive their decision on his return. If they still decided to remain as they were he would immediately direct them to pile their arms and march them to a compound in rear; if they wished to return to their Battalion they could do so and while the official notice of their action would have to proceed he would speak strongly in their favor [sic] as he was fully persuaded they did not fully understand the nature of their offence.29
The men returned to their Battalion.
The 60 soldiers’ eight grievances are recorded in an appendix to the 15th Brigade Unit Diary for September 1918. They are worth noting:
1.Absolutely unfit to carry on.
2.Consider not getting a fair deal from Medical Officer.
3.Shortage of food in forward area.
4.Continuously in forward area since 1st February 1918 and have had an extremely strenuous time since April and it is now September.
5.Companies too weak we are overburdened when going in and out of line.
6.When out of line not knowing whether out for five minutes or a day and, promises of relief made from time to time never fulfilled.
7.We were relieved from line at 11 p.m. after 8 days fully expecting a Corps relief but, was awakened at 3.30 a.m. to move forward again. We are in a filthy state and have had no opportunity given us to rectify same.
8.We are of opinion that the Australian higher Command have failed to inform General Headquarters of the condition of the men and the difficulties they have been working under, and, that the necessary relief might have been forthcoming.30
The one aspect of this episode that cannot be ignored is that 60 soldiers of mixed ranks of the 59th Battalion refused to obey a legal order. As there were more than two members involved, a mutiny had taken place as laid down in the Army Act which members of the AIF were subject to, provided it was not inconsistent with the Australian Defence Act. This was not the case, and if the alleged mutineers ha
d been prosecuted before a Court Martial and found guilty, the penalties could have been quite severe, as they were on War Service as defined in the legislation.
A Court of Enquiry was assembled to consider the Terms of Reference pertaining to the case. Appropriately the Court was composed of members selected from a different battalion in the 5th Division. However, the matter to be enquired into was not related to an alleged mutiny but to the more minor grievance concerning the shortage and unsatisfactory quality of recent rations (point 3 above). No formal charges of mutiny were laid against the soldiers involved.
We have recorded that the 5th Division’s Commander, Major-General Hobbs, and his brigade commanders were well aware of the debilitating state of health of the troops, as the matter had been raised formally. It may be that for this reason it was decided to ignore the alleged mutiny and overlook the possible serious consequences. Such an important decision could only have come from General Monash himself. Publicity surrounding the case could not have been avoided, and other cases in the 5th Division might have followed, particularly as most of the Division were in the same state.
