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Appendix I
Classification of BEF Field Artillery
Mention has been made of both field and heavy artillery in this book. What do these terms mean? Unfortunately there is no simple, clear-cut answer. Generally, field and heavy artillery can be distinguished by projectile weight, or by the calibre of the bore, or by their barrel weight, or on the basis of whether they are either quick firing (QF) or breech loading (BL). Some examples are the QF 18-pounder gun, the QF 4.5-inch Howitzer and any of above combined with barrel weight and breech system such as the BL 6-inch 26-cwt Howitzer.
In the Great War field artillery, which included horse artillery, was designed to provide close, intimate support to the infantry and cavalry. As the war progressed, it supported the tanks as well. Field artillery was primarily armed with a gun of about 3 inches (75 mm) calibre or a howitzer of up to 4.5 inches (114 mm) calibre. And the combined weight of the gun and limber behind a team of six horses under normal, favourable conditions was about 3300 pounds.
Heavy artillery, sometimes called ‘siege artillery’, on the other hand, was often too heavy to be brought into action as a single piece of equipment and therefore it was dismantled into manageable components. Until mechanical transport was available, these components were hauled into position by many teams of horses or other draught animals. On arrival at the gun position, the dismantled gun or howitzer was reassembled with the aid of fairly primitive mechanical handling aids. All this took a considerable amount of time.
However, the system of classification became complicated when guns and howitzers of the same calibre or projectile weight were introduced. In some circumstances, one was classified as belonging to field and the other to heavy artillery. As far as the BEF artillery was concerned, the following table attempts to separate the guns or howitzers into the appropriate categories of ‘field’ and ‘heavy’. Antiaircraft, railway and obsolete/obsolescent artillery are not included. Imperial units from the weapon user handbooks are used. It has been noted that the BL 6-inch Howitzer of 26 hundredweight has sometimes been classed as belonging to ‘field’ artillery. From the table, it could be assumed that any gun or howitzer with a calibre greater than 5 inches could be classed as ‘heavy’ artillery.
CLASSIFICATION TABLE FIELD ARTILLERY
Nomenclature Calibre (inches) Projectile Weight (lb) Range (yards)
QF 13 pr gun 3 12.5 5 900
QF 18 pr gun Mk 1 3.3 18 6 525
Mk 4
9 300
QF 4.5 inch how 4.5 35 7 300
QF 4.7 inch gun 4.7 46.5 10 000
HEAVY ARTILLERY
Nomenclature Calibre (inches) Projectile Weight (lb) Range (yards)
BL 60 pr gun Mk 1 5 60 12 300
BL 6 inch 26 cwt how 6 100 9 500
BL 6 inch gun Mk 7 6 100 13 700
BL 6 inch gun Mk 19 6 100 18 750
BL 8 inch how Mk 1 8 200 10 500
Mk 4
13 000
BL 9.2 inch how Mk 1 9.2 290 10 050
Mk 2
14 000
BL 12 inch how Mk 2 12 750 11 340
BL 15 inch how 15 1400 10 795
Appendix II
General Monash’s notes for his conference with his divisional commanders, 31 July 19181
CONFERENCE OF 31st JULY, 1918
INTRODUCTION. Take full notes because only then bare minimum of orders will be issued.
SECRECY. An essential condition for success.
Secrecy as to facts; as to dates and times.
MEASURES. (a) Normality of our procedures.
(b) Movement by night.
(c) Concealment by day.
(d) Don’t tell anyone until the action is essential.
(i) Prisoners;
(ii) Talk by prisoners;
(iii) Spies.
(e) Camouflage stories.
GENERAL SITUATION.
German failure has seriously affected his strategy.
Maintenance of our initiative.
Moral effect of another defeat on a large scale.
Therefore, FOCH decides on a large offensive by Fourth Army within 8 or 9 days.
Reasons: for our front.—Minor offensives and their effect.
Enemy holds weakly.
Junction with French least suspected.
Absence of organised enemy defences.
Disengagement of AMIENS and ABBEVILLE.
ARMY PLAN OF BATTLE. (Tell so far as essential for Divisions to know).
Action by four Corps: III, Australian, Canadian, French.
III Corps—one Division (18th) perhaps two (58th).
Australian—five Divisions.
Canadian—four Divisions.
French—1 Division (Foch insists).
11 Divisions—and 1 cavalry Division.
General objective—Map—blue line.
Describe boundaries on general map.
. . .
CORPS RESOURCES.
4 Battle Divisions.
1 Relieving Division.
18 Brigades Field Artillery.
9 Brigades Heavy Artillery.
TANKS. 108 Mark V; 36 Mark V (Star); 18 Whippets; 16 Store Tanks; 24 Carrying Tanks.
1 Regiment Light Horse; 1 Battalion Cyclists.
Corps Squadron, A.F.C.
CORPS PLAN OF BATTLE.
1.Green Line—includes ACCROCHE WOOD, WARFUSSE [sic] and enemy guns
2.Red line—describe.
3.Blue line—old Reserve System of 1916.
4.Corps Boundaries.—SOMME inclusive and Railway exclusive
4a.Inter-Divisional Boundaries.
5.Two Divisions to capture Green line—in a set piece attack under barrage, with Tanks, g.v. HAMEL.
II Div on right; III Division on left—each on a two Brigade front—each 12 Tanks.
6.Two Divisions to leap-frog—and fight on principles of open warfare—to red line.
V Division on right; IV Div. on left—each on a two Brigade front, with one Brigade in Reserve.
Each Infantry Brigade to have 1 Brigade of Artillery, and each first line Brigade to have 12 Tanks.
7.EXPLOITATION—By IV and V Divisions.
using—
(a)Reserves brigades—if necessary.
(b)Each Mark V (Star) Tanks x 20 men = 64 M.G’s and Lewis Gun
(c)M.G. Battalion—(and Lewis Guns) = average 70 to 80 yards per gun.
CORPS MOVES IN PREPARATION.—Provisional only.
1.5th Division comes into Corps Reserve complete by 1st Aug.
2.4th Division takes over French front, complete by 2nd Aug.
3.4th Division takes over 2nd Division, front as far north as Railway (inclusive)—complete by night 2/3rd Aug.
4.2nd and 3rd Divs, rearrange frontages to junction at p. 21.b. central—complete by night 2nd/3rd August.
5.All three Divisions get on to a single Brigade front (disposing these troops as a passive outpost line) by night 4/5th August. The other two Brigades of each Divn. are withdrawn to positions of readiness for commencement of approach march as follows (to be done on nights 3rd/4th and 4/5th August):-
IV Division—2 Brigades—(replaced by 2 Canadian Bdes.)
Division—2 Brigades—replaced by 2 Brigades of 5th Division) go W. of VILLERS-BRETONNEUX.
Division—2 Brigades—(replaced by 2 Brigades of 4th Division) go to region of CORBIE.
V Division—2 Brigades—go into support of 2nd Division.
G.O’s.C. II and III Divisions remain in control of Battle fronts till green line passed.
Canadian Division takes over command of their line on 5th Aug.
All above must be complete by dawn on 5th August.
OBJECT—To save 4th and 5th Divs. a long march on Z day.
6.Last Brigade of 4th Division is relieved by Canadians on 5/6th August and moves to position of readiness.
Last Brigade of 5th Division moves up to position of readiness.
POSITIONS OF READINESS.
(a)Where troops can be instructed and equipped.
(b)Whence they can get to their approach routes having regard to their tasks.
(c)Where they will be clear of routes of other troops
(d)In case of 4th and 5th Divisions—Where they can act in support of Outpost Brigades.
Necessity for careful inter-divisional co-ordination and mutual conciliation.
Divisions to work in pairs—II and V; III and IV.
Commanders and Staffs to confer—Corps can give little help.
Inter-divisional line not to be encroached upon except by approval of Corps.
7.Actual battle programme—(order of events).
(a)Assault Brigades of II and III move through IV and V and get to tapes.
(b)Time Table Barrage in time for Zero—to capture of green line.
(c)IV and V Divs. prepare to move at Zero.
(d)Assault Brigades of IV and V, with their Tanks and Artillery to have moved up to green line ready to start, by Zero plus 4 hours, followed by reserve Brigades with their Arty.
[(e) was omitted.]
(f)Advance to red line.
(g)After green line is passed line Brigades of II and III concentrate.
(h)After red line is reached, Assault Brigades of II and III concentrate, reorganize and move up to suitable support positions—predetermined.
(i)Exploitation to blue line by IV and V.
(j)Garrisoning of blue line by IV and V—two Brigades in line and one in reserve—disposed in depth.
(Army police re defences to be got later).
TIME TABLE. (Provisional).
Zero hour to be settled by Army—Assume 3.30 a.m.
100 yards lifts, Advance 3,500 yards; = 2 lifts of 100 yards in 2 minutes then 100 yards in 3 minutes for 1,000 yards.
Balance = 100 yards in 4 minutes.
This will take about 2 hours.
Reach Green Line Z plus 2 hours—say 5.30 a.m.
Leave Green Line Z plus 4 hours—7.30 a.m. halt.
Reach Red Line Z plus 7 hours—10.30 a.m.
Exploitation starts Z plus 8 hours—11.30 a.m.
Exploitation complete Z plus 9 hours—12.30 a.m.
G.O.C., R.A., commands all Artillery till green line is reached.
ARTILLERY. FIELD ARTILLERY. 18 Brigades—in time table Barrage. Protective Barrages—½ guns stand ½ hour; rest sweep and search to extreme range.
6 Brigades—mobile—1 to each Infantry Brigade of IV and V.
7 Brigades to Divisions i.e. 3 each to IV and V for Defensive.
6 Brigades as Corps Reserve, under G.O.C. R.A.
HEAVY ARTILLERY.
In time table—counter battery.
Back barrage.
After Green Line—1 mobile Brigade to each Division, IV and V.
Remainder under G.O.C., R.A.
Counter-battery map.
Action in case of gas bombardment.
N.B.
Infantry Start Line—must have it by 10 a.m. 2nd August.
[Underneath this in pencil he has II + III]
MACHINE GUNS.
All left to Divisions—Green line—Barrages and consolidation.
Red line—For exploitation.
For consolidation.
Suggestion only.—Each Div. (IV and V)—32 guns for consolidation
= 16 per Assault Bde.
---
32 guns for Mark V (Star) Tanks.
16 Mark V (Star) Tanks to carry 2 Vickers and 2 Lewis Guns each and Crews.
18 Mark V (Star) Tanks to carry Infantry and Officers.
TANKS—Allocation.
II Division, Mark V—27. ie 12 per Brigade and 3 in Reserve.
2 Tanks in 1750 x = 1 tank per 150 x
Store Tanks—1 per Brigade = 2
Carrying Tanks = 3
III Division [as above]
IV Division, Mark V—27, i.e. 12 per Bde. and 3 in Reserve
Mark V (Star)—18, 8 to each Bde., 2 in support.
Whippets—9—4 per Brigade and 1 in Reserve.
Store Tanks 6—2 per Brigade.
Carrying Tanks 9—3 per Brigade.
V Division. [as above]
TOTALS: Mark V 108
Mark V (Star) 36
Whippets. 18
Store Tanks 16
Carrying Tanks. 24
Loading of store Tanks—each carries 6 tons.
Time for their movements.
(Courage) Green Line Tanks—Some to join in advance to Red line if available—in own Brigade Zones.
Balance to rally and act under orders of Divisions.
Divisional Commanders to decide
Distribution of Tanks to their Infantry.
Times of movements of Whippets and Store Tanks
Withdrawal of Tanks.
Tank Commanders to be detailed forthwith and to Liaise.
ENGINEERS AND PIONEERS.
Need for pooling.
Corps Pool 1 Field Coy. from IV Division.
1 Field Coy. from V Division.
2 Field Coys. From II Division.
2 Field Coys. From III Division.
6 Field Companies.
5th Pioneer Battalion.
3rd Pioneer Battalion.
2 Pioneer Battalions.
2nd Pioneer Battalion will serve II and III Divs. 2 cos. [Coys] to each.
4th Pioneer Battn. will serve IV and V Divs. 2 Coys. to each.
